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FOREWORD 
Four years ago, the secretariat submitted 
to the States members of ECLAC the 
document entitled Changing Production 
Patterns with Social Equity. It offered 
general guidelines for the development of 
the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, including, in particular, the 
proposal that production should become 
more internationally competitive, not only 
in order to increase exports but also to 
achieve efficient import substitution. At 
the same time, the document offered a 
framework for subsequent activities of the 
Commission revolving around the study 
of a number of related topics.* 
The economic panorama of the region 
has indeed changed considerably in these 
four years. Although with certain 
differences among countries, the 
macroeconomic disequilibria of the past 
decade have begun to be corrected; the 
transfer of resources out of the region has 
turned around to become a huge net 
inflow of foreign capital; the export sector 
has grown and diversified; and economic 
activity as a whole has shown a modest 
recovery. The Latin American and 
Caribbean countries are now feeling the 
need to build on these advances, some of 
which are still rudimentary and partial, 
surmount the difficulty of making 
headway in highly competitive 
international markets and overcome the 
considerable social lags that have 
accumulated. Their chance of carrying out 
all these tasks will ultimately depend on 
establishing better linkages with the global 
economy. 
One of the many conclusions reached 
in this document is that, notwithstanding 
the multiple obstacles that impede 
development in the region, a constellation 
of potentially favourable factors is also 
present today which could give this 
development a strong boost. These 
include the gradual assimilation of the 
lessons learned in the process of increasing 
and diversifying exports; improvement of 
the quality of macroeconomic 
management; the chance to fill a gap in 
public policy instruments in the region 
-i.e., the implementation of micro- and 
meso-economic policies- in order to 
increase productivity in accordance with 
the best international practices; renewed 
access to external financing; and a boom in 
intraregional economic cooperation. 
Another factor has been the recent 
adoption of new international trade rules 
under the Uruguay Round. These rules, 
* Thus, for example, the link between changing production patterns, social equity and the environment 
was addressed in 1991; in 1992, the existing reciprocal ties between changing production patterns 
and social equity were examined in further depth; and in 1993, the topic of population was 
incorporated into this framework. The references for these documents are contained in the 
bibliography. 
12 LATIN  AMERICA AND THE  CARIBBEAN: POLICIES TO., 
although far from meeting all the region's 
demands, at least represent a step forward 
in support of multilateralism. 
Whether improvements can be made 
in the participation of Latin America and 
the Caribbean in dynamic trade flows and 
in the region's access to technology, 
foreign direct investment and financing 
depends in part on exogenous factors 
which are beyond the control of the 
countries of the region. However, much 
remains to be done in terms of both 
national policies and intraregional 
cooperation to enhance linkages with the 
global economy. 
The main purpose of this document is 
to explore the scope of efforts being made 
to achieve these objectives. It discusses 
three interrelated types of policies, 
namely, trade policy, micro- and 
meso-economic policy in support of 
production systems, and macroeconomic 
policy, with specific emphasis on financial 
flows. The last one is especially relevant in 
the current economic environment, in 
which capital inflows are having a crucial 
effect on two key variables in the 
behaviour of exports -interest rates and, in 
particular, exchange rates. 
The document is divided into three 
parts, one for each type of policy. The first 
chapter of the summary section not only 
provides an overview of the contents of 
these three parts, but also combines their 
various components into an integrated, 
coherent presentation in the framework of 
the systemic proposal that has been put 
forward by the secretariat. 
It should be noted that this document, 
like those preceding it, does not claim to 
offer universal recipes, in view of the 
enormous diversity of situations in the 
region. Rather, it seeks to promote a debate 
on areas of key interest to the various 
countries in their efforts to improve their 
linkages with the global economy, as part 
of the agenda of changing production 
patterns with social equity. 
The potential for economic integration is the subject of a separate but complementary document. See 
ECLAC, Open regionalism  in Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic integration  as a contribution  to 
changing  production  patterns  with social equity (LC/G.1801/Rev.l-P), Santiago, Chile, 1994. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.II.G.3. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES AND DEVELOPMENT 
1. Main features of Latin American and 
Caribbean linkages with the global 
economy in the 1990s 
1. The linkages between a number of 
Latin American and Caribbean countries 
and the international economy have 
undergone very significant changes in 
recent years. These include, in particular, 
the intensification of efforts to export and 
to liberalize imports, a process that began 
during the 1980s in several countries and 
that is becoming more pronounced in the 
1990s. For the region as a whole, the 
volume of merchandise exports increased 
by an annual average of 5.4% during the 
1980s, and by 7% from 1990 to 1994; these 
figures compare favourably with the 4.7% 
growth rate recorded for the volume of 
world trade during that same 14-year period. 
2. None the less, the relative buoyancy 
of the export sector has not always been 
reflected in the behaviour of the 
economies as a whole. In the 1980s, gross 
domestic product increased by only 1.2% 
a year; from 1990 to 1994, it registered an 
average annual growth rate of 3.4%. As a 
result, the export coefficient rose from 14% 
in 1980 to 21% in 1990 and to 23% in 1994. 
In other words, the growing importance of 
the export sector in the region's economies 
can be attributed in part to the expansion 
of this sector, and in part to the poor 
performance of the regional economy as a 
whole. 
3. The reason for this phenomenon is 
that during the 1980s, in a context of 
burdensome external debt service and a 
collapse of the flow of fresh funds to make 
the necessary economic changes, the 
countries of the region had to make a 
recessive adjustment. A good part of this 
adjustment was based on sharp reductions 
in the money supply and fiscal expenditure, 
and on devaluations in the exchange rate 
for the dual purpose of slowing down 
imports and promoting the production of 
exportables. In the first stages -marked by 
high costs of domestic finance and scant 
improvement in productivity- real wage 
levels, employment and production 
activity bore the brunt of the adjustment, 
and this in turn depressed domestic demand. 
4. Thus, although export volumes were 
frequently dynamic, the opposite was true 
of production and investment for the 
domestic market, especially in non-tradables 
at the international level. Consequently, 
the performance of the economy as a 
whole, as well as of investment and total 
output, tended to be rather lackluster 
despite the growth of exports. 
5. A small portion of this growth was the 
outcome of a still incipient change in 
production patterns, based on an 
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endogenous process of increases in 
productivity and encouraged, inter alia, by 
the gradual elimination of anti-export 
biases in economic policy. The restructuring 
process also enhanced the competitiveness of 
a growing number of firms and increased 
their capacity to explore and penetrate 
external markets, with considerable 
variation among the countries of the 
region. This change in production patterns 
gained momentum in the 1990s. 
6. Part of the impact of the push for 
exports was also neutralized by the 
deterioration of the terms of trade that was 
caused not only by negative trends in the 
international markets for the region's 
exportable supply, but also by insufficient 
diversification of Latin America and the 
Caribbean's trade structures in favour of 
product lines having a more stable, 
dynamic external demand. 
7. Since the beginning of the present 
decade, and owing to a combination of 
factors, the outward transfer of financial 
resources that characterized the 1980s has 
reversed itself, and private external finance is 
once again in abundant supply, with 
annual inflows averaging US$ 61 billion for 
the period 1992-1994. Net inflows, which 
mirror the universal changes taking place in 
international capital markets, have been 
based on more diversified sources of finance 
than before. In particular, foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment have 
increased in the form of bonds and equities 
-either directly or as ADRS/GDRS-, and foreign 
investors are increasingly participating in 
emerging markets. These phenomena 
indicate that the region is developing new 
mechanisms to attract external resources, 
and that the growing importance of 
foreign direct investment means not only 
more funds but also technology transfers in 
support of the processes involved in 
changing production patterns. 
8. In a situation of increased capital 
inflows, most of the economies have 
begun to recover in a context of greater 
price stability. However, their growth 
tends to be much slower than the trend in 
export volumes would suggest. One 
reason for this is the deterioration of prices 
-which fell by an average of 11% just 
between 1990 and 1994- and the weakness 
of production linkages between the export 
sector and the rest of the economy. 
9. The reversal of the trend in net external 
finance from a situation of marked 
constraint to one of considerable abundance 
has not been reflected, in general, in 
investment levels. Available data up to 1993 
indicate that gross fixed capital formation 
stood at over 18% of regional gross 
domestic product, somewhat higher than 
the average of 17% in 1983-1990 but much 
lower than the 24% registered in the 
five-year period 1976-1980. The growth of 
the investment coefficient has been 
significantly slower than the increase in 
resources from abroad, because part of 
these resources had to be spent to offset the 
deterioration of the terms of trade, while 
another part was used to finance more 
consumption, especially of imported 
goods. 
10. Because of their high volume, these 
flows have also had some undesired 
effects in a number of countries, especially 
on the exchange rate and money supply, 
and have increased the countries' 
vulnerability to external shocks. In some 
cases, these effects have undermined the 
objective of promoting the tradables sector 
of these economies and, as mentioned 
above, have diverted national saving to 
the consumption of imported goods. 
11. In general, the economic policy 
adopted by the countries of the region has 
underlined the need to export more goods 
and services and to do it better. In a 
situation where imports are expanding 
faster than exports, and where there is a 
growing deficit on current account, the 
increase in export volume increasingly 
appears to be a macroeconomic requirement 
for sustaining the recovery of growth. It 
would also be useful to strengthen the ties 
between export sectors and other production 
sectors, because such linkages lead to 
intermediate demands for goods, services 
and labour, quality improvements and 
absorption of technological progress. 
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2. The international scenario 
12. The international scenario will 
present new challenges and opportunities 
for Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
foreseeable future. Four features of world 
economic trends in the 1990s stand out: 
i) slower growth in the industrialized 
economies in comparison with previous 
decades, and recession in the transitional 
economies; ii) stronger trends towards 
globalization and technological change; 
iii) realignment of the major markets, 
with Asia becoming more important in 
global economic dynamics, and with 
many developing countries seeking to 
improve their linkages with international 
markets; and iv) an impressive 
expansion of international capital 
mobility and the creation of mechanisms 
to facilitate this expansion. 
13. One of today's leading trends is 
globalization, as can be seen from the 
increase in trade volume compared to global 
output, the boom in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the enhanced importance of 
transnational corporations, the much 
more flexible, dynamic financial system 
and the new international organization of 
production and trade characterized by the 
importance of subcontracting and intra-
industry (and intra-firm) trade. This 
globalizing trend is not immune to the 
tensions produced by trade imbalances in 
the countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), especially the high surpluses in 
Japan and the deficit in the United States, 
the persistence of protectionist attitudes 
and the latent risk that agreements among 
groups of countries will lead to more 
closed economic blocs. 
14. Technological change, for its part, 
offers many opportunities and also some 
risks. In growing economies, it favours the 
net creation of jobs in the medium term, 
but may act in the opposite direction in the 
short term. This risk is higher if global 
investment is relatively low. It is worth 
noting that the most important impact of the 
current technological cycle on employment is 
the obsolescence of certain skills and 
know-how. Consequently, some jobs are 
eliminated and others are created which 
require new skills that workers who are 
currently unemployed or those who have 
been displaced by technical or organizational 
change do not necessarily have. 
15. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 
recent signing of the Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round of GATT, together with the 
ratification of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement by Canada, the United 
States of America and Mexico, constitute 
(for different reasons) a reaffirmation of 
multilateralism which is consistent with 
the globalization process. The adoption of 
new rules, procedures and institutions to 
govern contemporary international trade 
is a promising -although still imperfect-
point of departure for the efforts being 
made throughout Latin America and the 
Caribbean to improve the region's 
linkages with the global economy. 
B. POLICY GUIDELINES 
1. Introduction 
16. To make sustainable changes in 
production patterns with social equity, the 
economies of the region must improve 
their linkages with the international 
economy, i.e., their participationnin 
dynamic flows of trade, foreign direct 
investment, technology and finance. These 
linkages should enhance the countries' 
capacity to take advantage of expansive 
cycles in international and regional trade 
and to cope with adverse cycles and 
financial instability by diversifying 
products and markets, seeking investment 
and alliances abroad, applying domestic 
stabilization mechanisms and improving 
the coordination of exports with other 
productive activities. 
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17. What is required in order to make a 
quantitative and qualitative improvement 
in the linkages of the Latin American and 
Caribbean economies with economic 
globalization is a simultaneous, coherent 
effort in a number of policy areas, within 
the framework of the systemic approach 
proposed by the ECLAC secretariat. These 
areas include policies on trade, exchange 
rates, productive development and 
finance and, in particular, the interaction 
among the policies themselves. In other 
words, for these policies to be effective 
and efficient, none of the areas can be 
addressed in isolation from the rest. 
18. Indeed, in the absence of a suitable 
macroeconomic environment, the effects 
of micro- and meso-economic policies 
designed to promote the development of 
the production sector will be weakened. 
To base such efforts exclusively on trade 
policies, disregarding the expansion of 
production and the macroeconomic 
environment, may, at best, promote export 
growth, but this may not necessarily 
invigorate the rest of the economy. On the 
other hand, limiting export promotion to 
trade reforms and the preservation of 
macroeconomic equilibrium may lead to 
stability but not growth, and still less to the 
stimulation of endogenous processes of 
improved productivity and competitiveness. 
19. There are, of course, no universally 
valid paradigms for improving international 
competitiveness; the experiences of East Asia 
show that, although there may be a common 
denominator in the general approach, 
different paths have been taken in terms of 
the details of policy implementation, 
instruments and institutions. With this 
caveat, the subject areas and proposed 
policy guidelines contained in this 
document are presented below. 
2. Integrated trade reforms 
a) A strategy for  enhancing the region's 
integration with the global economy 
20. The modernization of trade policies 
requires more, of course, than just 
reducing import restrictions: this is, at 
best, only a starting point. In addition, a 
strategy must be developed for improving 
the region's linkages with international 
markets, which would then be 
implemented on the basis of a series of 
coherent guidelines and measures that 
would persistently and energetically help 
promote the production of goods and 
services with export potential. 
21. Tariffs, non-tariff measures and 
incentives to produce non-traditional 
exports are core components of any trade 
policy. Together with the exchange rate, 
they influence the net incentive to export 
or to substitute imports. The anti-export 
biases of this combination of incentives 
must be eliminated. It would even be 
advisable to introduce temporary 
biases in favour of non-traditional 
exports, which would be consistent with 
a reasonable degree of transitory 
protection for other activities; this would 
create a mix of selective policies geared 
towards overcoming market 
shortcomings and taking advantage of 
clear externalities. 
22. One expression of the selectivity 
referred to above is found in the reformed 
tariff structures in the region in recent 
years. Many Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have drastically 
reduced their high tariffs and have 
considerably narrowed the distance 
between minimum and maximum levels. 
However, the great majority of them have 
retained a certain moderate differentiation, 
with only a few brackets, which is justified 
on the basis of externalities and 
deficiencies in factor markets (technology, 
finance and training) and product markets 
(economies of scale and dynamic 
externalities). 
23. With regard to the production and 
sale of exportable goods and services, a 
bias persists in many cases against the 
value added in their production, although 
it is clear that this bias has been 
significantly reduced. The new tariffs, 
although they tend to be moderate, are 
usually above zero, and do not always 
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have an equivalent counterpart in 
incentives to compensate exporters. In 
such cases it thus becomes necessary to 
offset the specific anti-export biases 
generated by protection. Added to this, in 
general, is the failure to provide 
compensation to pioneer exporters for the 
externalities they generate, even though 
their activity has all the earmarks of an 
"infant industry". 
24. The first firms to identify a new 
product which the country can produce 
efficiently and sell on international 
markets at competitive prices are real 
innovators. They become liable to the costs 
and risks of penetrating a new market; 
once they have done so, other firms benefit 
from the innovator's efforts. Pioneer 
exporters therefore deserve to receive 
incentives so as to be able to meet the high 
initial costs of penetrating markets, and 
should be compensated for the positive 
externalities they generate for the other 
firms that imitate them. 
25. Promoting the international 
competitiveness of a country's products 
and of its non-traditional exports 
necessarily forms a part of the policy mix 
aimed at implementing a strategy to 
change production patterns. Experience 
shows, however, that incentives -both to 
enhance international competitiveness in 
domestic activities and to promote 
non-traditional exports- should be 
circumscribed, should be limited in 
duration, should depart no more than 
moderately from a point of neutrality and 
should do so selectively. 
26. The outcome of trade liberalization 
and its evolution are influenced by each 
country's structural features, its economic 
situation and the mix and sequencing of 
policies. However, opening up an 
economy to imports does not, per se, 
guarantee high export and GDP growth 
rates. There is a clear need for 
complementary measures which are 
directly aimed at promoting exports, 
easing the restructuring of import 
substitutes and improving systemic 
competitiveness. 
27. It is important to send out clear 
signals on the significance of investment 
and innovation in expanding and 
improving export capacity, and of 
restructuring and rationalizing the sectors 
that produce importables. A well-
balanced management of the exchange 
rate, a gradual overall reduction of 
protection levels, effective export 
promotion mechanisms and a productive 
development policy will be crucial 
elements in achieving this objective. 
28. Exchange rate or investment 
policies should not respond passively to 
misleading short-term signals, such as a 
temporary increase in exports resulting 
from an initial recession or from the 
elimination of artificial obstacles, or the 
failure of imports to react immediately to 
liberalization, also because of a recession 
or lack of marketing channels. 
29. Reform processes in which 
decisions are shared with private agents 
are less traumatic, since they make it 
possible to adjust to the new conditions at 
the micro-economic and sectoral levels. If 
trade liberalization is accompanied by 
consistent macroeconomic policy and 
credibility in government action, there are 
better chances of working together to 
reduce the costs of adjustment. 
b) Exchange rate policy and trade 
reforms 
30. Tariff reductions should be 
accompanied (if not preceded) by a 
compensatory variation in the real 
exchange rate. Easing access to imports, 
associated with an appreciation of the 
currency (and the use of this policy to 
stabilize prices), is usually a dangerous 
combination for the equilibrium of the 
balance of payments and for productive 
development. 
31. A sine qua non for the success of 
trade reforms, whether these involve a 
drastic liberalization or a gradual opening 
and whether they are integrated or only 
partial, is to avoid exchange rate 
appreciation. The experience of a number 
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of Southern Cone countries in the period 
1976-1981 illustrates how harmful the dual 
impact of real exchange rate appreciation 
and drastic liberalization of imports can 
be. To enable the Latin American 
economies to produce tradables, a 
favourable, stable effective exchange rate 
must be maintained, i.e., a real exchange 
rate which, as a reflection of the basket of 
currencies used in the country's foreign 
trade, fluctuates on the basis of long-term 
factors, is relatively independent of 
temporary economic conditions and is not 
overly correlated with short-term capital 
movements. 
32. The impact of exchange rate policy 
on the various sectors is heterogeneous. 
The greater the diversification and 
installed capacity of the industry, the more 
sensitive it will be to exchange rate policy. 
It has been shown that the elasticity of the 
manufacturing sector in relation to the 
level of the exchange rate and equivalent 
incentives is systematically higher than 
the elasticity of total exports, in both the 
long and short terms, and that this sector's 
velocity of response is also higher, 
especially in countries where industrial 
diversification and expansion of 
production capacity have historically been 
greater. 
33. A number of empirical studies also 
show that a stable real exchange rate, at a 
remunerative level for producers of 
tradable goods and services, is essential to 
the success of a trade policy geared 
towards changing production patterns. 
Exchange rate instability tends to hurt 
investment, especially in non-traditional 
exports, since the process of launching 
products in international markets is 
usually costly, and investors will not take 
the risk without being fairly certain that 
the venture will be profitable. 
34. One of the key economic policy 
challenges in the region, which arose in the 
early 1990s, is to find a way to maintain 
trade liberalization together with either 
the depreciation or stability of the 
exchange rate in a situation of huge net 
capital inflows. To do so, countries must 
not only encourage domestic saving but 
must also regulate these inflows in order 
to maintain the real exchange rate at a 
competitive level in line with the relevant 
medium-term factors. 
35. Most of the recent liberalization 
experiences in Latin America have taken 
place in economies whose exchange rates 
had previously depreciated sharply as a 
result of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the 
shortage of external finance. Under 
current reforms, however, the effects are 
being produced in a context of a strong 
real exchange rate appreciation in the 
1990s, associated with voluminous flows 
of external capital, much of which is 
short-term. Systematic data for 17 Latin 
American countries indicate that 12 of 
them have experienced significant 
revaluations of their real exchange rates 
during this decade. It is worth repeating, 
however, that these revaluations occurred 
following considerable depreciation. With 
regard to capital movements, it is 
noteworthy that net inflows in 1992 and 
1993 represented a similar proportion of 
GDP as in the period 1977-1981, and 
quadrupled the low average of 1983-1989. 
36. To sum up, there are no good 
substitutes for exchange rate stability, 
especially in economies such as those of 
Latin America, for which a qualitative 
improvement in international linkages is a 
decisive factor in their development 
strategy. Hence the importance of linking 
trade policies with those designed to 
expand production and gain a better 
international financial position by 
stimulating domestic saving, fostering a 
comprehensive development of the 
country's capital market, reducing its 
segmentation, and adapting the level and 
composition of external capital inflows to 
the domestic capacity to absorb them. 
c) Anti-dumping regulations, 
countervailing measures and 
safeguard  clauses 
37. Liberalizing their trade policies and 
import regimes has made Latin American 
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economies more vulnerable to unfair trade 
practices and the instability of their 
trading partners. It is therefore essential 
that the countries of the region adopt or 
improve anti-dumping regulations, 
countervailing measures and safeguard 
clauses, without, however, allowing 
private interests to use the new provisions 
in these areas to introduce undue regional 
protectionism. 
38. Under the Uruguay Round, new 
international regimes have been adopted 
in each of these fields. Accordingly, the 
regulations which countries adopt in this 
area will have to be compatible with the 
commitments made. While it is true that 
the new regimes will determine the kind 
of mechanisms that the countries of the 
region can establish, they will also limit the 
arbitrary treatment sometimes faced by 
Latin American and Caribbean exports in 
extraregional markets. 
39. The issue of fair competition is 
becoming increasingly relevant in the 
context of current regional integration 
agreements leading to total liberalization 
of the corresponding markets. It is 
particularly important that the safeguard 
mechanisms adopted in Latin America 
and the Caribbean to avoid exceptional 
short-term problems should not interfere 
with the long-term benefits that can be 
expected from intraregional integration 
programmes (see ECLAC, 1994a). 
40. The adoption of the new regulations 
emanating from the Uruguay Round 
could limit the possibilities of 
implementing an active trade policy in the 
region, particularly for the promotion of 
non-traditional exports. However, those 
regulations do make certain exceptions for 
the developing countries, and the 
countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean should take advantage of them 
to promote their exports, while taking care 
to avoid infringing upon multilaterally-
established rules. 
41. In this connection, the countries of 
the region should evaluate carefully the 
new opportunities for market access 
afforded by the results of the Uruguay 
Round, examine the possibilities and 
restrictions created by the new 
multilateral regime and rethink many of 
the issues related to the latitude they enjoy 
for formulating policies on trade and 
productive development. For example, 
such policies must consider their new 
linkages with the environment and social 
rights. 
42. These observations hold true not 
only for the action to be taken immediately 
following the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, but also for future international 
negotiations, particularly those on free 
trade agreements with developed nations. 
They also hold true for making better use 
of generalized systems of trade 
preferences, especially in cases such as 
that of the European Union, which in 1994 
will define its new system of preferences 
for the developing countries. 
d) Export-promotion policies 
43. The countries of the region should 
have active export-promotion policies. As 
mentioned above, the main reasons for 
implementing such measures are the need 
to offset the anti-export bias inherent in 
tariffs, alluded to in earlier paragraphs; the 
positive externalities generated by export 
activity; the shortcomings in capital 
markets for financing exports; and the 
economies of scale and learning 
opportunities that exporting provides. 
Without an active export-promotion 
policy, exports will tend to be 
concentrated in products for which 
demand is less dynamic and more 
vulnerable in global markets. 
44. One basic prerequisite for 
promoting the competitiveness of export 
firms is to guarantee them access to inputs 
on competitive terms. These firms should 
have access to flexible mechanisms for 
importing inputs on a temporary basis to 
produce exportables, once certain basic 
requirements have been met. Other 
alternatives are tariff exemptions or 
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drawbacks, with a minimum of red tape. 
Such mechanisms could also be applied to 
indirect exporters (domestic producers of 
inputs for exporters). 
45. The governments of the region 
could support pioneer export firms by 
providing incentives for exports of new 
products or for penetrating new markets. 
One mechanism is a "simplified 
drawback" for products whose export 
level is below a given amount for a specific 
period. These incentives should be 
moderate (helping to place competitive or 
near-competitive products in foreign 
markets), limited in time, and subject to 
precise results in terms of new products, 
amounts or markets. 
46. The public sector can help improve 
performance in foreign markets by 
providing institutional support for export 
activity, especially in the areas of 
information, financing and export 
insurance; management training to 
encourage businesses to focus on 
exporting; and promotion of the 
exportable supply abroad. Pioneering 
efforts are also being made in such areas 
as investing abroad to support export 
activities, marketing chains, joint ventures 
with firms in target markets and other 
mechanisms that export-promotion 
policies are beginning to consider. 
47. The development of the exportable 
supply within the country should also be 
actively supported, in order to adapt it to 
the demands of foreign markets. Timely, 
up-to-date information on the 
requirements of export markets in terms of 
quality, environmental regulations, 
standardization, deadlines and volumes 
would facilitate this task. It would also be 
useful to promote ties between domestic 
firms and international trading 
companies, particularly in sectors in 
which the country has export potential. 
Besides laying the bases for strategic 
export alliances between domestic and 
foreign firms, these ties also stimulate 
steady quality improvement and the 
development of new products, making 
domestic firms more flexible in 
responding to new commercial 
opportunities. 
48. Past export-promotion policies 
often neglected sectors based on natural 
resources. Recent technological advances 
in microelectronics, data processing, 
telecommunications and satellite 
technologies considerably augment the 
supply of information on the quality and 
volume of economically available natural 
resources. This is one more reason for 
acquiring and strengthening comparative 
advantages in non-traditional natural 
resources with significant economic rents. 
49. To be effective, an export-
promotion system must be somewhat 
selective. It is impossible to promote 
everything indiscriminately. The selection 
of sectors, and export-promotion 
decisions in general, should be made in 
close, systematic cooperation between the 
public and private sectors. To this end, 
exporters' and producers' trade 
associations should also be strengthened. 
50. Many countries have recognized the 
advantages of consolidating into one 
institution the various agencies that 
support non-traditional exports. These 
agencies should be financially stable and 
have qualified professional staff, so that 
they can have more influence on policy 
decisions affecting exports. 
3. Meso- and micro-economic policies 
for expanding production 
51. One of the main concerns of the 
ECLAC secretariat throughout the past 
decade has been to enhance international 
competitiveness by applying technical 
progress to the production process. The 
secretariat has emphasized repeatedly the 
systemic nature of the effort required to 
close the present gap between the "best 
international practices" and the average 
total productivity of factors in the 
countries of the region. 
52. It has also insisted that becoming 
internationally competitive, either in 
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exports or in efficient import substitution, 
requires not only suitable macroeconomic 
and trade policies, but also micro- and 
meso-economic policies; in other 
words, the enterprise itself must be 
modernized (technology, equipment, 
organization, labour relations), as must its 
environment (factor markets and 
infrastructure). The pace of restructuring, 
and in some cases the very survival of the 
firm, will depend essentially on the 
information and human and financial 
resources at its disposal. 
53. The more distorted the factor 
markets and the greater the uncertainty 
about the seriousness of the adjustment 
and liberalization process and the stability 
of the prevailing key prices, the greater the 
likelihood that potentially competitive 
firms will fail, for lack of time and 
resources, to undertake the restructuring 
needed to acquire a comparative 
advantage in the domestic or foreign 
market. 
54. This is why it is important that key 
markets -those for technology, physical 
capital, human capital and foreign 
exchange- should function at 
near-optimum levels. Horizontal policies 
are needed to achieve this, namely policies 
designed to fill in the main gaps and 
resolve the main bottlenecks in those 
markets. The difference between today's 
policies for expanding production and the 
"industrial" policies of the past is, 
precisely, the importance they attach to 
improving factor markets, with a view to 
narrowing or eliminating the gap between 
the average productivity of the region and 
that obtained using the best international 
practices. 
55. Latecomers to development like the 
countries of the region have tremendous 
latent potential for increasing their 
productivity. Narrowing the gaps 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph -in 
other words, modernizing- demands an 
active learning and restructuring process 
in the areas of technology and 
organization, as well as in quality-control 
systems and selling on new markets. All of 
this entails a major investment in time and 
capital, both physical and human, 
especially by firms that are lagging 
technologically. The essence of a modern 
policy for expanding production is that it 
facilitates this learning process, as 
experiences in other parts of t he world and 
even some in the region show (motor 
vehicles and parts, wood, paper and pulp, 
for example). 
56. Policies for expanding production 
are designed to reinforce, rather than 
replace, market forces. Any incentives 
should also be temporary. An orientation 
towards international competition 
promotes a business attitude centred more 
on productivity than on short-term 
profitability, seeks levels of output that 
result in economies of scale (either because 
there is a large domestic market, because 
the original orientation was towards 
exports or because the activity involves the 
continuous processing of a natural 
resource that can easily be exported if 
domestic demand is insufficient) and 
tends to adopt relatively advanced but 
tried and tested technologies (technology 
is mastered, updated and even adapted, as 
necessary). 
57. Building on the ideas put forward in 
Social Equity and Changing Production 
Patterns: An Integrated Approach (ECLAC, 
1992a), three sets of measures can be 
proposed, given their special relevance to 
policies for expanding production in 
support of international competitiveness. 
The first set of measures covers 
technological development policies; the 
second, manpower training; the third, 
improvements in long-term capital 
markets. A practical programme is also 
suggested for putting the region's 
entrepreneurs in touch with the best 
international production practices. 
58. The following policy options are 
proposed for technological innovation and 
dissemination: 
i) Implement domestic competition 
policies that go beyond mere trade 
liberalization. 
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ii) Partially subsidize firms' technological 
innovation and development 
activities, whether these are carried 
out by them directly or in conjunction 
with research centres, taking into 
account the positive externalities 
generated by these activities. 
iii) Develop and strengthen systematic 
monitoring of the technologies and 
management methods available 
internationally, and integrate firms 
into the relevant information 
networks, bearing in mind that each 
firm should be able to make the most 
informed choice possible as to the 
technology it decides to apply. 
iv) Ensure better financing for 
technological development efforts, 
paying particular attention to the 
needs of small and medium-sized 
firms. Such efforts include the 
development of prototypes and pilot 
plants to facilitate the transition from 
research to application. The sums 
needed may be relatively small, the 
main idea being to demonstrate to 
private banks that this kind of 
investment can be profitable and to 
serve as a tool for learning how to 
evaluate technological risk. 
v) Acquaint businessmen and economic 
agents in general with the most 
promising experiences in developing 
and disseminating technology 
-technology centres for each branch of 
industry, think-tanks, industrial 
parks, links between universities and 
business and alternative financing 
mechanisms- in order to increase the 
impact of these experiences. 
vi) Promote strategic alliances between 
domestic and international firms that 
are leaders in technology, management, 
quality and access to the most 
important markets, by simplifying 
administrative procedures, improving 
information and providing tax 
incentives. 
59. With respect to training, which is 
sorely lacking in the region despite the 
demonstrably high returns on investment 
in human capital, and also despite the fact 
that manpower capacity is a key to 
productivity, the following measures are 
proposed: 
i) Provide tax and monetary incentives 
to firms that train their staff, to offset 
the negative externality that such 
training creates (training tends to 
benefit the worker far more than the 
firm that trains him). 
ii) Undertake promotional and publicity 
measures to accelerate the use of 
training incentives and to introduce 
more efficient human resources 
management practices and more 
cooperative industrial relations. 
iii) Reorganize the supply of training, 
promoting private sources and 
concentrating public efforts on 
bringing instruction, and instructors, 
closer into line with the production 
system and its future needs; ensure the 
quality and relevance of the courses 
offered, establishing mechanisms for 
certifying the training given; and 
promote and finance training 
opportunities for marginal or 
unemployed workers or those 
employed by small firms, who are not 
usually reached by such programmes. 
iv) Promote special basic training 
programmes for the large segment of 
the labour force (40%) that have not 
completed their primary education, 
and subsidize regular training 
programmes to help raise the 
productive potential of this huge 
group of workers who will be unable 
to benefit from any educational 
reforms that are implemented. 
60. The lack of a long-term capital market 
means that the extent to which most firms 
in the region are equipped, modernized 
and expanded, depends on their ability to 
finance themselves, not on their future 
prospects, and this leads to inefficient 
allocation of capital. This problem is 
aggravated during periods of 
restructuring: the fact that a firm has 
abundant capital (which may be a 
reflection of its past success) does not 
always mean that it has a potential for 
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success in the future, yet firms that have 
such capital tend to invest it in their own 
activity. They may even overinvest in 
obsolete activities, to the detriment of 
other activities with better chances of 
being modernized and restructured. 
61. Lastly, one specific proposal for 
narrowing the gap between the 
productivity of many of the region's firms 
-except for those on the leading edge of 
their respective branches- and that of the 
developed countries is to implement 
massive extension programmes, which 
would co-finance visits to foreign factories 
where the "best international practices" 
are to be found. 
62. The proposal involves organizing 
and helping finance visits by managers, 
engineers, technicians, supervisors, 
workers and trade unionists, from various 
production subsectors, to foreign plants 
where the best practices prevail. These 
visits would last for a specific period of 
time, for instance, six weeks. On their 
return, participants would write a report 
on the best practices with respect to 
equipment and technologies, production 
methods, organization of work, industrial 
relations, quality control, marketing and 
other aspects. Each of them would 
disseminate the results of their visits 
among other firms and the respective 
business associations and trade unions. 
The programme would be open to any 
sector willing to pay its share, whether it 
was involved in exporting or in import 
substitution. 
4. Capital movements and 
macroeconomic policy 
a) Economic policy and access to 
international financial  markets 
63. In the context of the policies under 
which trade liberalization was 
implemented, most governments also 
applied policies to reduce or eliminate 
restrictions on international capital 
movements. This initiative, combined 
with greater macroeconomic stability, 
investment opportunities and, 
particularly, the differential between 
interest rates in the countries of the region 
and those in international financial 
markets, helped to strengthen the trend 
in these markets towards the resurgence 
of a significant flow of private external 
funds. The combined effect of these 
changes in the international arena and in 
the region's economies has led to the 
re-emergence of net capital inflows in the 
past three years. 
64. International capital mobility plays 
a number of highly significant roles in 
development. Two of these are notable for 
their macroeconomic effects: i) the 
channelling of external savings towards 
countries with insufficient capital; and 
ii) the compensatory financing of external 
shocks, which helps to stabilize domestic 
spending. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, external capital has played a 
positive role in both of these areas in the 
1990s, even though only a small fraction of 
net inflows have translated into an 
increase in productive investment. 
65. It is clear, then, that the capacity to 
attract external financial flows does not, in 
itself, ensure that savings and investment 
processes will automatically be 
strengthened. This is because domestic 
and external financial markets have 
serious imperfections, which limit their 
ability to allocate resources efficiently, 
especially to investment in tradable 
sectors. In this context, a coherent, 
sustained economic policy can play a vital 
role in achieving more dynamic and stable 
development. 
66. Moreover, the soundness of 
economic policy cannot be evaluated 
solely on the basis of access to external 
flows, especially during cycles when 
international funds are in abundant 
supply. Above all, it is important to 
consider the capacity of national 
authorities to maintain macroeconomic 
stability and the incentives for economic 
agents to take decisions based on 
sustainable medium- and long-term goals. 
Intervention* to manage the effects of 
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capital flows is justified in so far as the 
latter simultaneously affect two key 
variables for efficient resource allocation: 
the real exchange rate in the foreign 
exchange market, and the real interest rate 
in the money market. 
67. In this regard, it should be recalled 
that Latin American history has been 
marked by periods of large-scale capital 
inflows, followed on a number of 
occasions by periods of debt crisis. This 
has sparked a wide-ranging debate on the 
dynamics of the process of opening up the 
capital account. Today, it is generally 
agreed that this process should be 
implemented sequentially, and that it 
should occur after other liberalization 
processes, particularly those affecting 
trade and the domestic financial market, 
have been consolidated. 
68. With respect to the speed at which 
the capital account should be liberalized, 
in order to maintain macroeconomic balances 
and a stable real exchange rate, the process 
must be tailored to the economy's capacity 
to absorb and efficiently allocate external 
resources. It may be desirable to liberalize 
the entry of long-term capital first, before 
facilitating transactions involving 
short-term financial capital. With respect 
to capital outflows, priority should be 
given to trade credits for export 
promotion, and to direct investment 
abroad by national firms, which is another 
way of improving their export platform. 
69. Capital-account liberalization in the 
industrialized countries has been fairly 
slow and gradual, accelerating only in the 
past 10 years as capital markets have 
become globalized. However, it is 
interesting to note that Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland introduced certain restrictions 
on capital movements in 1992 to deter 
exchange rate instability. Once the 
objectives of stability were achieved, the 
restrictions were lifted. This highlights the 
importance of flexible instruments that, 
according to circumstances, allow some 
temporary restrictions to be imposed on 
capital movements to support efforts 
towards macroeconomic stability. 
70. The economic recovery taking place 
in a number of countries in the region, 
based on the removal of external 
restrictions, is obviously limited by 
available productive capacity. Some 
countries have been gradually approaching 
their production frontier. On the one hand, 
this creates a need to regulate patterns of 
aggregate demand so as to avoid renewed 
bouts of inflation or excessive deficits in 
the external sector. On the other, it 
heightens the urgency of boosting 
investment to sustain GDP growth with 
increases in productive capacity and in the 
production of tradables. As the debt crisis 
is resolved, this is the area on which the 
macroeconomic policies of the countries of 
the region will have to focus. 
71. Promoting a strategy of changing 
production patterns with social equity 
also requires, at the strictly 
macroeconomic level, efforts to manage 
aggregate demand and its composition. 
The instruments available for this purpose 
are fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies. In the absence of an active fiscal 
policy, these instruments are reduced to 
simultaneously controlling the real 
interest rate (as a monetary policy 
instrument to stabilize and control 
aggregate domestic expenditure) and the 
real exchange rate (as a trade policy 
instrument to promote the growth of 
tradables production and influence the 
composition of aggregate expenditure). 
72. A conflict arises when an interest 
rate consistent with the objective of 
curbing inflation and stabilizing economic 
activity (by sterilizing the monetary effects 
of accumulating reserves) is higher than 
the international rate, adjusted for 
expectations of devaluation, thereby 
providing an incentive for capital inflows 
and promoting exchange rate appreciation, 
which jeopardizes the objective of 
protecting the economy's tradable sector. 
Conversely, if real domestic interest rates 
are allowed to fall, both objectives are 
thwarted, since the higher expenditure 
induced by lower interest rates will put 
pressure on prices and rapidly boost the 
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current account deficit, threatening to 
cause an unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalance. The authorities can resolve this 
conflict by acting directly or indirectly on 
capital flows, as some Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have been doing in 
the 1990s. 
73. One of the main questions faced by 
the region's governments in designing 
economic policy concerns the possibility 
of distinguishing, on the one hand, 
between domestic and external factors 
that explain the resurgence of capital 
movements in the region and, on the other, 
between short-term capital flows (which 
tend to be more speculative) and medium-
and long-term flows (more closely 
associated with productive investment). 
From this viewpoint, it would be desirable 
for external financing to contribute to the 
investment process needed to strengthen 
productive competitiveness, meaning that 
the entry of long-term capital should be 
stimulated and that of speculative capital 
should be discouraged. 
74. When the authorities are faced with 
an unexpected abundance of external 
financing which they consider to be partly 
transitory or as flowing too fast for the 
economy to absorb, they can intervene at 
three levels. At the first level, they can act 
to moderate this inflow's impact on the 
exchange rate through the purchase of 
foreign exchange (i.e., the accumulation of 
reserves) by the central bank. At the 
second level, they can adopt sterilization 
policies to mitigate the monetary impact of 
the accumulation of reserves at the first 
level of intervention. At the third level, 
they can adopt policies on incentives, 
surcharges or quantitative controls to 
regulate inflows of capital, thereby 
influencing the latter's composition and 
volume, the aim being to encourage flows 
whose volume is compatible with the 
economy's domestic absorptive capacity, 
channelling them into productive 
investment projects, and, conversely, to 
discourage the entry of short-term 
speculative capital. These measures are 
more effective when they are coupled with 
strict prudential supervision of the 
financial system. 
75. In sum, governments have two 
options. Some have adopted so-called 
non-sterilized intervention, meaning that 
they intervene at the first level by having 
the central bank buy foreign exchange, 
without sterilizing the resulting monetary 
effect. If the authorities choose this option 
while also liberalizing capital movements 
and maintaining a nominal exchange rate 
with a predetermined rate of variation, 
they may tend to lose control over 
monetary aggregates. The other option is 
the so-called sterilized intervention, which 
broadens the scope of the first option by 
offsetting the monetary impact of the 
accumulation of reserves with active 
operations to regulate the money supply. 
This is intended to keep the real exchange 
rate within desirable limits according to 
medium- and long-term objectives. 
76. The sterilization option entails 
certain costs, since the interest rates 
which the central bank must pay on its 
notes are higher than those it obtains on 
its placements in foreign currency. These 
costs are not necessarily permanent if the 
central bank maintains a real exchange 
rate, pegged to a currency basket reflecting 
the composition of the country's external 
trade, that is sustainable in the medium 
term. The bank can facilitate its task, 
and reduce its costs or even turn them 
into profits, by adopting a policy of 
"dirty" floating within an exchange rate 
band: it can earn profits by buying and 
selling foreign exchange, thereby 
offsetting losses attributable to the interest 
rate differential. 
77. Since most countries in the region 
have at some point opted for sterilized 
intervention, they have faced serious 
conflicts between exchange rate and 
monetary management. To moderate such 
conflicts, they have used complementary 
measures, such as providing for a degree 
of flexibility in fiscal policy to regulate 
aggregate demand; stabilization funds for 
the main export products to soften shocks 
in their price cycles (as in the case of 
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Chilean copper and Colombian coffee); 
and income policies to adapt the relative 
prices of factors to changes in 
productivity. 
78. As mentioned earlier, when fiscal 
policy has no instruments through which 
it can act flexibly, monetary policy 
(interest rates) and exchange rate policy 
(exchange rates) are the only means of 
controlling aggregate demand. To resolve 
the conflict that may arise in the 
simultaneous management of these two 
variables, the authorities have the option 
of intervening at the third level with 
measures intended to change the volume 
and composition of capital flows, giving 
priority to long-term flows through 
incentives (reserve requirements or taxes, 
and exchange rate measures that generate 
more uncertainty for short-term capital 
flows) or even via quantitative controls. 
79. Direct quantitative controls include 
requirements as to minimum maturity 
periods, minimum volumes for bond 
issues, ceilings on external borrowing by 
financial institutions, and regulations on 
the participation of foreign capital in the 
stock market. 
80. In the current circumstances of 
abundant external funds and 
comparatively low international interest 
rates, third-level intervention policies and 
sterilization measures act on monetary 
aggregates to prevent excess expenditure 
(especially private spending), forestalling 
artificial, temporary increases in domestic 
spending which could cause severe 
declines in national savings and excessive 
increases in external liabilities, without a 
corresponding increase in the capacity to 
produce tradables. 
b) Improvement of  domestic 
financial  markets 
81. The extent to which flows of foreign 
capital can further a strategy of changing 
production patterns with social equity 
largely depends on the characteristics of 
domestic financial markets. This 
observation is based on the experience of 
the external debt crisis, which resulted 
from large-scale inflows of bank credit. On 
that occasion, capital markets were unable 
to avoid generating "financial bubbles", 
adverse selection and moral hazards, 
features inherent in financial markets. 
82. The challenges involved in the 
prudential regulation and supervision of 
domestic financial markets become 
apparent when consideration is given to 
the speed with which external funds can 
flow into those markets. Unless financial 
institutions and instruments -including 
public regulatory and supervisory 
institutions themselves- are actively 
developed, the intermediation of these 
funds by fast-growing financial systems 
could cause distortions and macroeconomic 
instability by channelling them into 
high-risk credits ("credit bubbles"), sharp 
increases in the prices of existing shares 
("stock market bubbles") and steeply 
rising prices for real estate and other 
assets. 
83. As suggested in the comments on 
policies for productive development, the 
reorganization of financial systems, 
including the liberalization of capital 
movements, should give priority to 
channelling resources into savings and 
investment, in close coordination with the 
development of productive capacity. This 
role has not been sufficiently emphasized 
in the region's financial reforms. The 
relationship between the financial system 
and national savings and investment 
processes, and between that system and 
external financial markets, must be 
considered more carefully. 
84. As regards the relationship between 
financial markets and capital formation 
for development, an institutional 
framework is needed to complete or 
perfect markets according to three criteria. 
First, it must include a dynamic long-term 
segment of the financial market in order to 
finance productive projects. This involves 
discouraging speculative segments and 
concentrating on long-term international 
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capital accompanied by access to 
technology and to export markets. The 
impact of capital entering the region 
through foreign direct investment is 
important in this context. 
85. Second, it must promote access to 
financing for small and medium-sized 
firms hurt by the segmentation of the 
capital market. To that end, this market 
must operate with some selective criteria 
that target the training, development 
promotion and modernization needs of 
small production enterprises. Credit 
institutions and guarantee mechanisms 
are needed to do what the region's capital 
markets have failed to do spontaneously. 
The aim is not to subsidize the cost of 
credit, but to promote access to financing 
at normal interest rates, as well as the 
access to technology, inputs and services, 
marketing channels, long-term financing 
and infrastructure that will enhance the 
productive capacity of these sectors. 
86. Third, it must recognize that, in 
countries with "emerging" stock markets, 
financial liberalization of the capital 
account by opening it to international 
portfolio investment runs the risk of 
creating external over-indebtedness and 
excessive stock market and exchange rate 
fluctuations. Large-scale inflows of 
foreign capital to domestic markets can 
trigger both "stock market bubbles" 
and exchange rate appreciations at the 
same time. The subsequent decline in 
stock market levels can, in turn, 
cause capital outflows and upward 
pressure on the exchange rate. This means 
that financial institutions operating in 
capital markets must be regulated and 
supervised to ensure their stability. 
87. Prudential financial regulation can 
counter these risks and contribute to an 
orderly, stable process of attracting portfolio 
investments from abroad. To that end, as 
noted earlier, financial regulations can act 
on two key financial variables -interest 
rates and exchange rates- by establishing 
bands for these values, or certain rules 
governing their behaviour. These variables 
can also be influenced indirectly by means 
of regulations affecting the availability or 
cost of funds, including certain restrictions 
on access, reserve requirements and taxes. 
The norms governing a country's capital 
inflows and outflows, whether of foreign 
or national funds, are part of these 
regulations. In order to design such 
norms, the relevant institutions need to 
have statistical information on external 
flows (types of flows, volumes, costs and 
sources) and on the accumulation of stocks 
of external liabilities in the national 
financial market. 
88. Prudential regulation focuses 
mainly on ensuring the solvency of the 
banks, financial funds, insurance 
companies and other agents that manage 
resources or assume third-party risks on a 
large scale. Since the performance of these 
functions relies on public confidence, the 
solvency or stability of financial institutions 





TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
1. General considerations 
The international economy has undergone 
sweeping changes in recent times in such 
fundamental areas as production, marketing, 
transport, transfer of technology and 
international capital movements (Ohmae, 
1985; Porter, 1990; United Nations, 1991; 
and UNCTAD, 1993a). Attention has also been 
drawn to the challenges posed by the 
intensely competitive international 
economy for the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and the new opportunities 
that have opened up (ECLAC, 1990a and 
ECLAC, 1992a). This chapter discusses some 
of the more important trends as 
background for the rest of the volume. 
First of all, the international economy 
as a whole, and the main industrialized 
economies, have registered very modest 
growth rates in the last three years. At the 
time the present document was drafted, 
the United States economy was finally 
recovering, but growth rates of only 
around 3% were predicted for the next few 
years. Moreover, the difficulties of German 
reunification were preventing Europe 
from expanding as rapidly as had been 
expected, and the Japanese economy was 
experiencing a recession without precedent 
in the post-war era.1 The economic reforms 
in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet 
Union, originally expected to provide an 
important new market for the exports of 
Western countries, now constitute one of 
the factors explaining the slow evolution 
of the world economy (see table LI). 
The only area which has avoided these 
problems is a part of Asia. For more than 
a quarter century, the economies of East 
Asia have been growing at a rate well above 
the world average. Using highly pragmatic 
economic policies and a strategy based on 
investment in human capital, close and 
harmonious relations between business 
and the public sector, and competitiveness 
via exports, these nations have come to be 
ranked among the world's most dynamic 
economies. Japan, in particular, despite its 
current difficulties, presents the United States 
and Europe with challenges that would 
have heen unimaginable a few decades 
ago. Dut this is not only a Japanese 
phenomenon. Four newly industrializing 
1 Markets for the exports of developing countries are still mainly in the industrial world, in spite of 
the recent increase in trade among the developing countries and the exceptional boom in intra-Latin 
American trade. In 1992, for example*, 59% of the exports of the developing countries went to the 
United States, Japan, the European Community and eight other industrialized nations. The growth 
rates in these countries are therefore of great importance because they determine most of the demand 
for regional exports, the terms of trade and the extent of protectionism. 
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Table 1.1 
GROWTH ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1993 AND 1994 




b OECD c United Nations® IMF
b OECD' 
Output 
World output 1.2 2.3 2.2 3.1 
Industrialized countries 1.1 1.3 1.2 2.6 2.7 2.6 
United States 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.8 3.7 4.0 
Japan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 
Germany -1.2 -1.1 -1.3 2.4 2.3 1.8 
European Union -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 2.4 2.1 1.9 
Developing countries 5.1 6.1 4.8 5.6 
Africa 0.7 1.0 2.6 3.3 
Latin America 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.8 
Asia 5.4 d 8.5 6.4 d 8.0 
Economies in transition -8.6 -9.0 -10.3 -8.3 
World Trade 
(volume) 3.9 4.0 3.3 7.1 7.2 6.7 
1 United Nations, "The world economy at the start of 1995", Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy 
Analysis (DESIPA), New Vord, 20 December 1994, and World  Economic and Social Survey, 1994 (E/1994/65; ST/ESA/240), 
New York, 1994. United Nations publication, Sates No. E.94.II.C.1. The aggregate figures for groups of countries have been 
calculated using market exchange rates. b IMF, World  Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C., October 1994. The 
aggregate figures for groups of countries have been calculated using exchange rates based on purchasing power 
parity. c OECD, Economic Outlook, Paris, June 1994. d Etoes not include China, which grew at rates of 13.4% 
in 1993 and 11.5% in 1994. 
economies (the Republic of Korea, the 
Chinese Province of Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore) have demonstrated great 
skill in production and trade, and this 
group has now been joined by China and 
the countries of South-East Asia (see table 
1.2). Together, these countries form the region 
where the greatest dynamism is expected 
during the rest of the decade. 
All of the foregoing is occurring in an 
environment of increased globalization 
marked by a rise in the volume of trade 
vis-à-vis world production and great 
dynamism in foreign direct investment 
(FDi). It is characterized, likewise, by a 
growing role for transnational corporations 
in world production and trade, a much 
more flexible financial system and a new 
international organization of production and 
marketing characterized by an emphasis on 
subcontracting and an increase in the 
magnitude of intra-industry (and intra-firm) 
trade. At the same time, the intense debate 
which arose in the last months of 1993 
concerning the signing of the Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round and the ratification by the 
United States Congress of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
as well as the resistance to the deepening 
of the European Union, show that 
protectionist pressures and the risks of 
managed trade remain latent. The external 
imbalances in the OECD countries, especially 
the large surpluses in Japan and deficits in 
the United States, compound those risks. 
The effects of technological advances 
are also ambiguous. Technological 
change, introduced into dynamic 
economies, obviously helps to create jobs 
in the medium term. In the shorter term, it 
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Table 1.2 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN ASIA 
GDP 
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Hong Kong 9.3 7.2 5.0 31.0 30.8 28.2 29.0 119.5 22.6 
Republic of Korea 9.0 8.8 6.0 32.0 35.6 30.5 36.4 75.2 11.7 
Singapore 7.9 6.3 7.5 42.6 47.1 42.2 40.3 61.6 21.9 
Chinese 
Province of Taiwán 9.3 8.5 6.7 32.9 27.2 22.6 24.0 80.7 9.7 
China 7.9 10.4 11.5 34.4 36.6 32.1 35.4 69.6 16.2 
Indonesia 7.7 5.5 6.6 31.8 36.9 30.4 34.9 32.5 15.8 
Malaysia 7.8 5.2 8.2 33.0 35.0 30.7 34.8 39.6 21.3 
Thailand 7.9 7.9 7.8 27.2 35.7 30.6 41.9 32.1 25.6 
Pakistan 5.2 6.2 5.4 7.5 14.5 18.7 19.8 6.9 13.6 
India 3.7 5.8 3.0 21.4 23.6 22.8 24.7 18.6 13.5 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook, 1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
may produce the opposite results. Perhaps 
the most striking impact of the current 
technological cycle on employment is that 
it makes certain skills and know-how 
obsolete. Accordingly, some jobs 
disappear while others are created which 
require skills that differ from those of the 
currently unemployed or those displaced 
by technical or organizational change. A 
scenario of lower growth in the 
industrialized economies tends to make 
the short-term negative effects prevail 
over the longer-term dynamic potential. 
The current state of the world economy 
is characterized by a profound process of 
transformation. It is plausible that, in the 
coming years, global economic growth 
and trade dynamism will be slower than 
those of the preceding decades. 
Nevertheless, beyond the aggregate 
figures, it is clear that better results are 
obtained by those sectors and activities 
which accept the technological challenge 
of globalization and competitiveness. This 
is reflected in the Asian dynamism and in 
the high growth of international trade in 
services and foreign investment. 
Finally, competitiveness based on 
promoting and disseminating technical 
change and improving labour skills, with 
a view to coping with the globalization of 
the world economy, is the main challenge 
on the international scene. Accordingly, 
there is an urgent need for Latin America 
and the Caribbean to confront the challenges 
of increasing quality and productivity in 
order to participate effectively in the dynamic 
flows and zones of international trade. 
2. Trends in international trade 
Despite the sluggishness of world 
production and growing concern about 
the international trade system, in recent 
years the volume of trade has increased 
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Table 1.3 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE GROWTH 













East Asia Africa 
mies in 
transi-
tries tries tion 
1960-1970 
Real GDP 5.2 5.1 4.4 10.3 4.7 5.8 5.5 6.2 5.1 5.4 6.7 
Export volume 7.4 8.4 6.6 16.0 8.8 7.9 3.1 9.5 6.5 11.4 
Export value 9.3 10.1 7.8 16.9 10.4 7.4 5.7 9.3 6.7 9.0 
Import volume 8.6 9.5 9.3 14.4 8.9 5.3 4.9 6.3 6.0 4.2 
Import value 9.2 10.3 10.2 15.4 10.1 6.7 6.3 7.4 6.9 5.3 
1970-1980 
Real GDP 3.7 3.1 2.8 4.4 2.9 5.5 5.4 6.4 6.1 6.2 5.2 
Export volume 5.1 6.4 6.2 9.7 5.0 0.4 0.4 -1.3 8.3 -2.7 6.1 
Export value 20.3 18.8 18.2 20.8 19.3 25.9 20.8 34.3 25.8 21.7 14.9 
Import volume 5.4 4.9 4.7 5.0 5.5 7.8 5.1 16.3 7.6 7.8 8.3 
Import value 20.2 19.5 21.2 22.0 19.8 23.8 20.6 33.6 23.5 22.2 13.6 
1980-1985 
Real GDP 2.0 2.4 2.9 3.9 1.5 1.9 1.3 0.5 5.3 1.0 2.1 
Export volume 2.5 3.4 -0.2 7.4 1.7 -1.4 3.7 -12.3 7.4 -4.8 5.1 
Export value -0.6 0.5 -0.2 6.2 -1.1 -4.4 -0.8 -14.3 2.5 -8.3 0.5 
Import volume 2.7 3.2 6.8 1.7 1.8 0.2 -5.8 0.6 4.9 -2.5 3.1 
Import value -0.4 -1.4 7.1 -1.6 -3.0 -2.6 -8.0 -2.0 2.5 -6.3 -1.3 
1985-1990 
Real GDP 3.3 3.2 3.0 4.6 3.1 3.4 1.9 1.3 6.9 2.4 0.8 
Export volume 6.4 5.3 8.2 2.9 9.9 8.2 3.0 7.9 12.7 2.4 -1.6 
Export value 12.1 14.0 12.5 10.3 15.9 11.5 4.5 7.3 18.6 3.1 1.0 
Import volume 7.1 6.5 3.7 9.9 7.6 6.4 2.1 -3.5 13.5 0.0 0.6 
Import value 12.0 14.6 7.4 12.6 16.1 13.4 7.5 2.9 19.0 5.3 3.5 
1990-1993 
Real GDP 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.8 0.5 4.5 2.7 2.6 5.3 1.3 -10.9 
Export volume 4.3 3.1 6.7 0.9 1.5 8.5 5.8 7.3 13.7 4.1 -15.1 a 
Export value 2.1 0.9 5.2 8.0 -1.1 6.9 1.6 -1.4 12.7 -2.9 -14.4 a 
Import volume 4.4 2.8 7.8 2.0 0.8 12.1 16.6 11.4 12.3 3.4 -13.7 a 
Import value 2.3 -0.3 5.1 0.9 -2.6 11.6 15.2 10.2 12.1 1.5 -9.4 a 
^uuiLc. uin<_ ,j\u,iiurutuuKjiíijj  uiícirmiiurmi  i ruutarm ueveiopment statistics, mas (,l D/Sl Al.Ib), New York, 1989. United 
Nations publication. Sales No. E/F.88.II.D.11, and Handbook of  International Trade  and Development Statistics, 
1991 (TD/STAT.19), New York, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.92.II.D.6, and Trade and 
Development Report, 1994 (UNCTAD/TDR/14), New York, 1994. United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.94.II.D.26; United Nations, World  Economic Survey, 1993 (E/1993/60); ST/ESA/237), New York, United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.II.C.1; World  Economic and Social Survey, 1994 (E/1994/65; ST/ESA/240), 
New York, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.II.C. 1., and Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics, various issues, 
New York. 
a Refers to 1990-1992 only. 
only slightly less rapidly than during the 
two preceding decades. As shown in table 
1.3, trade volume grew at an average rate 
of 4.3% between 1990 and 1993 compared 
to an average of 4.9% between 1970 and 
1990. Only in the 1960s was the figure 
strikingly higher (8%). 
Although world trade volume has 
grown at a fairly constant rate, its value 
has fluctuated considerably. Table 1.3 
shows that trade value grew by around 9% 
annually in the 1960s, more than doubled 
this rate to 20% in the 1970s, but fell 0.5% 
in the first half of the 1980s. Beginning in 
2 These sharp swings are associated with changes in the exchange rate for the United States dollar (the 
unit of account used for these calculations) and with fluctuations in the rate of inflation registered in 
developed countries. 
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1986, the fluctuations continued, with 
average growth of 12% between 1985 and 
1990, but with a drop to 2.2% between 1990 
and 1993. 
In the 1970s the developing countries 
performed better than the nations of the 
Group of Seven as regards the value of 
exports; this trend slowed during the 
1980s, but it revived in the last few years 
(see table 1.3). Nevertheless, if the data on 
developing countries are disaggregated, it 
is apparent that their strong performance 
depended heavily on the Asian newly 
industrializing economies (NIES) and on 
China. Since 1980, exports from the other 
developing regions (for example, Latin 
America and Africa) have grown 
reasonably in terms of volume, but slowly 
in terms of value. The economies in 
transition (Eastern Europe and the 
republics of the former Soviet Union) 
suffered a spectacular downturn in the 
volume and value of their trade in 1991 
and 1992, and their GDP has continued to 
fall, especially in the former Soviet Union. 
The results of these variations in 
growth rates may be noted in the 
differences in regional shares of the value 
of world trade (see table 1.4). The 
developed countries raised their share 
from 66% in 1960 to 72% in 1992, whereas 
the developing countries raised theirs 
from 22% to 24%. This latter figure is 
explained partly by the drop in the share 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, but mainly by the good 
performance of Asia, whereas the Latin 
American share fell from 8% to 4%, and the 
African share from 4% to 2%. 
Naturally, the difference between the 
growth of trade volume and that of trade 
value is due to the behaviour of prices. The 
1970s were an exceptional period, in that 
the price rises increased the value of trade 
enormously. Except in that decade, prices 
generally have had a negative effect on 
export value for developing countries. In 
the 1990s, the impact has been particularly 
negative, since average prices have fallen 
more than in any other period covered by 
the present study.3 
Commodities are particularly 
vulnerable as regards both trends and 
volatility of prices. Figure 1.1, which covers 
the period 1983-1992, suggests that there 
has been considerable divergence among 
commodity prices: they range from an 
annual average decline of 15% for cocoa to 
an increase of 9% for manganese (in 
constant United States dollars). 
Nevertheless, the decline in prices far 
outweighs the increases. Consequently, 
the efforts to raise the volume of exports 
have been offset by the behaviour of 
prices. 
The situation of prices for mineral 
products was largely negative in the past 
decade. As indicated in figure 1.1, most 
mineral prices tended to fall as demand for 
these products was weakened by 
technological changes that led to the use of 
smaller quantities of raw materials per 
unit of production. Consequently, 
minerals and metals significantly reduced 
their share in world exports. However, in 
absolute terms, the sector continues to 
attract new investments and new mines 
are opening up; thus, countries with 
high-grade ore deposits and low 
production costs may benefit from this 
situation (see box 1.1. for further details). 
The experience of the agricultural and 
forestry sectors has been more diverse 
than that of the mining sector. In the 
former, the largest trade volume has 
traditionally been in cereals, which saw a 
general decline in their growth rate during 
the 1980s. This trend coincided with 
3 A weighted price index developed by the World Bank, which has a 1979-1981 base period and 
includes 33 commodities, excluding petroleum, showed that 1986-1990 was the worst period in terms 
of the prices of these products in the post-war period. The data for 1991-1993 indicate an additional 
downturn of 14% in that price index; 1993 was the worst year, following which a recovery in prices 
is expected by the year 2000. In that year, according to the projection, the index should show a 
recovery of 12% with respect to the present level, and thus will not have regained its average level 
for the 1986-1990 period (Avramovic, 1992). 
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Figure 1.1 
TRENDS IN THE MARKET PRICES OF THE MAIN NON-FUEL 
COMMODITIES, 1983-1992 
(Annual average  growth  rate,  in constant  dollars) 
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Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Commodity Yearbook, 1993, New York, 1993, 
table A.2. 
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Table 1.4 
SHARE IN WORLD TRADE 
(Percentage  in current  dollars) 
Exports Imports 
1960 1970 1980 1990a 1992a 1960 1970 1980 1990a 1992 a 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Developed countries 65.9 70.9 62.6 71.4 71.5 64.9 71.6 68.3 72.3 70.1 
Group of Seven 48.9 52.7 46.3 52.8 51.6 41.9 44.8 43.1 54.9 53.3 
United States 15.8 13.7 11.0 11.5 12.0 11.1 12.2 12.5 14.6 14.3 
Japan 3.1 6.1 6.5 8.4 9.1 3.3 5.8 6.8 6.6 6.0 
European Community 32.2 35.5 32.5 36.8 35.7 32.7 35.3 34.6 35.7 35.0 
Economies in transition 10.1 9.8 7.7 5.1 4.7 10.2 9.7 7.7 5.5 3.4 
Developing countries 21.9 18.4 28.7 21.6 23.9 22.6 17.9 22.9 20.4 23.4 
Latin America and 



























































































Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of  International Tradeand Development Statistics, 1991 (TD/STAT.19),New York, 1992. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.92.II.D.6; United Nations, World  Economic Survey 1993 (E/1993/60; 
ST/ESA/237), New York, United Nations publication,Sales No. E.93.II.C. 1; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Direction of  Trade  Statistics Yearbook,  Washington, D.C., 1993; European Communities, Project LINK, Short and 
Medium-Term  Development Prospects in the Asia-Pacific  Region, September 1993. 
a 1990 and 1992, updated on the basis of United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics, New York, July1993. 
b Developing Asian countries, including China. c ECLAC estimates. 
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BOX M 
WORLD MINERAL MARKET 
Owing to the effects of substitution and 
miniaturization, the growth of the world 
economy is no longer producing an increase in 
metal consumption. Substitution results in 
changes in relative prices» with the appearance 
of new materials, while miniaturization reduce;» 
demand for metallic inputs per unit of 
manufactured output, the automobile being the 
best illustration, financial globalization, in turn, 
accentuates the role of financial variables in 
inventory accumulation, which increases the 
volatility of international prices. 
Ï he slower growth of world consumption of 
leading metals contrasts with the striking 
dynamism which has marked consumption in 
the Asian Nil\. In the ly80s, the consumption of 
primary aluminium in the Republic til Korea 
grew by an average rate of 18%, refined zinc by 
13";. and refined copper by J2"!>; in the Chinese 
Province of Taiwan, the growth rates were 8%, 
7% and 12"-'.., respectively. 
The world's mineral supply was 
decentralized in the last two decades, owing lo 
a greater government role as a result of 
na tuina ligations, and to increases in the degree 
of processing and in smelting and refining 
capacity. Environmental constraints foster the 
opening of new deposits in developing 
countries and promote a relocation of smelting 
and refining capacities. 
Minerals and metals reduced their share in 
world exports from 7% at the beginning of the 
1970s to 4% at the end of the 1980s. In 1985 
dollars, however, mineral and metal exports 
more than doubled in the last two decades, 
generating around US$ 84 billion of exports per 
year. In absolute terms, they form a very large 
market which continues to stimulate the 
exploitation of new deposits. Current trends 
point towards a restructuring of supply through 
ever-decreasing margins between prices and 
production costs. Significant changes can be 
expected in decisions about the opening of new 
mines, with preference for those having large 
deposits, low infrastructure costs and, of course, 
higher-grade minerals. Accordingly, the 
principal mining districts of the region which 
meet <uch requirements will continue to receive 
large flows of foreign investment in expansions 
or new mines. 
SHARE OF MINERALS AND METALS IN WORLD TRADE 
("•« of  world totals) 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1970 1990 1970 1990 
Developed countries 67 8e» 76 
fXivekiping countries 32 25 7 18 
Latin America 14 12 2 2 
l-.cunomies in transition 9 8 ^ 4 
TRENDS IN WORLD CONSUMPTION OF MAJOR METALS 
(";.> of  annual average growth) 
1960s 1970s 1980s 
Refined aluminium 9.0 mXÊIÊIKIÊÈÊÊÊlMM 1.5 
Refined copper H I M B H H 9ÊÊÊIËÊËÊÈËÊËÊË 1.4 
Refined tin 
Refined zinc ¡¡¡!¡l¡l¡ii¡l«l¡i¡ii¡i^ ill¡¡¡¡®¡¡l o 2 l l l l l i l i 
Iron ore 4.0 2Í0 0.5 
Nil kel 6.0 2.0 2.0 
Refined lead 4.0 1.0 
In recent years, metal prices have shown a dropped at rates of 3% and 4"'n, respectively. At 
dear downward trend. Between 1983 and 1992, the same time, lead, zinc and copper prices rose, 
for example, tin prices fell by an average rate of although at rates of less than 3%. 
14% per year, and iron and aluminium prices 
Source- I niteJ li.'nsConleri'mf onTr.idf inrf Dewlopmrnti ' v v*ij:,iom'na¡iiii > nvh-A-h, W""., Now York, .'viehi! Stau-il:c\ 
¡•il l' I«m ;ind Me'.iil SiiHi-nrs, 1%2-h'":, NViv W k , \miTic;in Mot.il Mj ik . j l . ' l . imil i ld l'ubluntiiins, and lVi:i,',i Mi'lj! 
Statistics  Yearbook,  Wate, Hertford, United Kingdom, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, 1984,1990 arid 1993 editions, 
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greater self-sufficiency in the large 
countries, including India and China. 
Similar trends are apparent in other 
traditional export crops. At least two 
phenomena have contributed to these 
problems. One of them is the low 
income elasticity of traditional 
foodstuffs. The other has to do with 
the substantial intervention by 
industrialized nations in agricultural 
markets in response to internal political 
pressures. 
Non-traditional products have 
evolved much more favourably. For 
example, world fruit imports have grown 
rapidly in the industrial countries, where 
meat and carbohydrates now account for 
a lower share of the average diet. Similarly, 
imports of forestry products increased 
when ecology groups focused their 
attention on maintaining native forests 
(see box 1.2 and chapter II, section 5). 
In addition to the downturn in 
demand and, hence, in prices, the latter 
FOOD CONSUMPTION PREFERENCES 
IN THE DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
In the past three ducades, average per capita 
income in the industrialized countries doubled 
According to World Bank figures, per capita C,n¡> 
in high-income countries -in constant 1990 
dollars- rose from US$ 10,800 to U5$ 19,550 
between 1965 and 1990. This rise tn living 
standards has been accompanied by changes 
in both the composition and (he 
characteristics of families residing in lhe 
richest parts of the world. According to a 
recent study on Europe, among the changes 
observed as a result of higher incomes arc 
trends towards forming households with fewer 
members" and increased participation by 
women in the labour force. 
In addition to this structural recomposition oi 
households, there has been a change in 
consumption preferences: foods are health! ul, 
balanced, dietetic, natural and, moreover, 
diversified and ea¡.y to prepare. Thus, the 
demand for food 'products available in 
Individual ready-to-serve portion* has 
increased. This has led to lhe substitution of 
prepared foods for fresh products, higher 
consumption of tropical fruits and vegetables 
out of season and the development of 
food-marketing chains At the same time, easily 
prepared vegetables such as tomatoes and 
avocadocs, and substitute products such as 
lro/en  or canned vegetables and ready-tcMMl 
meals, have appeared more often m the markets. 
This has opened up possibilities for Latin 
America to sell new items in industrialized 
countries.. The figure below shows what can be 
called a "life cycle" foi some export fruits. In their 
first years on the market, these products 
generally enjoy rapid incieases m demand; they 
i hen tend lo decline. The length of the cycle 
depends on factors, as diverse aí the degree of 
substitution (cither with different products or 
new varieties), the volume of supply, the 
marketing structure, the status of aggregate 
demand and more cyclical factor";, *uch as: 
current fashion. 
At present many fruits and vegetables that 
die non-traditional" exports for Latin America 
seem to be in the first stages of the cycle in the 
industrialized countries, that is, in the Mages of 
Introduction and experimentation. Other 
products, especially those characteristic of 
temperate climates, could more likely be at the 
end of the cycle. Nevertheless, it should be kept 
in mind that the incorporation of several new 
countries into agricultural exporting has 
prompted increased competition and therefore 
shortened the life cycles ot these products (a 
typical example being the kiwi) 
* 6 » estimated that one third oí the hom-hoMs. tn some Ewpean iiliys now umMst ol oriy orw person 
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Boxl 2fconcl.) 
GROWTH OP EUROPEAN DEMAND FOR CERTAIN TROPICAL JPRU1TS. 
WÊÊÊM3MÈSÊÊÊ 
(Average  growth me 2376-1388) 
. . . . . . 




m ^ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i t t 
ïTlT^riTT-iM 1111111 - - ' 1111111 r • ' il 1 r r 1111111T • T • i i , i 1 , „f ,„ ,„„„„• 
«fttítíon tatwdecftm Growth Maturation Qecttoe 
Source bcuu* U nfVihim  u lot f¡mi*v  <tpoc\i>orMiVi>,  (IC-RU'W), Santiago, Chtte. fWMcm of I W u J m , Productivity and 
Management, l'l*XVinJ Uuropean I uirmmK Community, Lstmtuv ¿ti >w«srft> rff km puta ft  uius, effrm»  v hortalizas, vol 
%, Hruewls Cumwi^ nn «1 lhe l.iiropum Comnumftits, UWI 
Table 1.5 
VOLATILITY OF EXPORT PRICES, 1980-1993 
(Annual  average variation) 
Product Percentage 
Raw sugar 37.6 
Bananas 15.4 
Cocoa 12.1 
Coffee (mild) 16.1 
Beef 5.5 








Iron ore 9.1 
Lead 17.9 
Zinc 17.2 
Petroleum a 21.3 
Primary products index b 7.1 
Manufactured products index c 5.5 
Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, Supplement 1970-1989, Geneva, November 1989 and Monthly 
Commodity Price Bulletin, vol. 14, No. 4, Geneva, April 1994; Petroleum Intelligence Group, Petroleum Market 
Intelligence, New York; International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 
Washington, D.C., 1993; United Nations, World  Economic Survey, 1993 (E/1993/60; ST/ESA/237), New York. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.II.C.1; and Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics, New York, June 1986 and 
September 1994. 
a International Monetary Fund (IMF) index. b IMF index of 34 products (excluding petroleum and precious metals). 
c United Nations index of unit values of manufactures (SITC sections 5-8). 
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continue to exhibit a high degree of 
volatility. If the 17 commodities which 
appear in the Economic Survey of  Latin 
America and the Caribbean are taken as a 
sample, the annual average price variation 
between 1980 and 1993 ranged from 5.5% 
for frozen beef to 37.6% for raw sugar; tin 
was situated in the middle with a price 
variation of 14.7%. These figures for 
specific products compare with an annual 
average variation of 7.1% for an index of 
34 commodities (excluding petroleum) 
and of 5.5% for an index of manufactured 
goods (see table 1.5). The lower volatility 
of the commodity index, compared to 
individual primary products, suggests the 
utility of diversification, even among 
commodities themselves. Apart from 
diversification, producers have sought 
other ways of dealing with price 
volatility. Previously, these methods 
involved establishing buffer stocks and 
forming cartels; more recently, 
however, such efforts have tended to 
centre on futures markets (see chapter 
II, section 3). 
Another way of handling the volatility 
arising from the problems of export prices 
has been to shift from commodities to 
manufactured products. Table 1.6 shows 
that, during the last three decades, the 
importance of commodities in world trade 
fell and that of manufactures increased. 
This trend is seen in developed and 
developing countries alike. It is 
particularly apparent in Latin America, 
given the low level of the region's exports 
of manufactures at the beginning of the 
1960s. Although this level has increased 
considerably, only 39% of Latin American 
exports consisted of manufactured goods 
in 1992, compared to 83% for the Group of 
Seven and 80% for the Asian NIES. 
Naturally, this means that there is plenty 
of room for the region to upgrade its 
export basket. 
The concept of upgrading export 
quality is linked to the relative dynamism 
of the markets for different products. This 
dynamism, in turn, is related to the current 
technological revolution, which has 
brought about a significant change in the 
relative importance of different branches 
of production and nations. Although they 
function unevenly across sectors, the new 
technologies are cutting down on the use 
(per product unit) of energy, raw 
materials, time, capital and manpower, 
thus eroding the strategies of 
specialization based on low world prices 
of those factors. 
During the 1980s, for example, 
knowledge-intensive products saw their 
demand rising at annual rates of over 9%; 
natural resource-intensive products grew 
below the average (5.7% per year). The 
greatest dynamism was found in the 
services and manufacturing sectors and, 
among the latter, the highest growth was 
in electronic goods.5 
At the same time there was dynamic 
growth in some natural resource-based 
products, such as fish preparations, paper, 
furniture, wooden manufactures, toys and 
fruit preparations. In the medium term, 
however, the growth of natural 
resource-intensive exports will tend to 
reach a limit imposed by technological 
change and by lower income elasticities of 
demand. Moreover, possible trade 
barriers based on environmental 
considerations tend to affect those 
products in particular. (On the effect of the 
new emphasis on the environment, see 
chapter H, section 5.) 
In terms of specialization, product 
"quality" is not only a market concern. 
Specializing in products having markedly 
cyclical prices may increase external 
vulnerability and the probability of 
macroeconomic imbalances. By relying 
excessively on primary products with a 
4 Information based on figures published in GATT (1990a), for the period 1979-1988. 
5 In 1973, commodities accounted for 38% of the world's merchandise trade, including fuels. 
Manufactures accounted for 60% of world trade. In 1990, the respective shares were 27% and 70%. 
At present, trade in services amounts to about 20% of the world's trade in goods. Between 1970 and 
1990, international trade in services grew at annual rates of 13% (Rosales, 1990). 
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Table 1.6 
STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
1962 1970 1980 1990 1992a 
Total World b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 19.4 14.8 11.2 9.5 10.7 
Non-food agriculture 8.8 5.7 3.5 2.9 2.8 
Metals and minerals 6.6 7.3 4.6 3.4 2.9 
Fuels 9.1 9.1 22.1 7.8 6.0 
Manufacturesc 55.0 61.7 55.1 74.2 75.4 
Total Group of 7 b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 12.8 9.7 9.9 7.4 7.7 
Non-food agriculture 5.0 3.5 3.0 2.3 2.0 
Metals and minerals 5.3 5.4 4.4 2.8 2.3 
Fuels 4.2 3.2 5.4 3.1 2.8 
Manufactures0 71.0 76.2 75.9 82.2 83.0 
Total European Economic 
Community 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 11.1 10.5 10.3 9.8 10.7 
Non-food agriculture 3.4 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.5 
Metals and minerals 4.0 4.4 4.0 2.7 2.3 
Fuels 4.9 3.6 8.6 4.2 3.6 
Manufactures c 74.7 77.2 73.4 79.9 80.1 
Total United States b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 20.7 16.0 18.2 11.2 11.0 
Non-food agriculture 6.2 4.9 5.1 4.4 3.6 
Metals and minerals 4.0 5.2 5.1 3.1 2.3 
Fuels 3.8 3.7 ,3.7 3.2 2.6 
Manufacturesc 62.9 66.7 65.5 74.1 76.4 
Total developing countries b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 37.1 29.1 14.8 13.0 12.6 
Non-food agriculture 18.9 11.5 5.0 3.6 2.9 
Metals and minerals 10.0 14.2 6.1 4.5 3.5 
Fuels 19.3 18.8 37.0 13.3 10.7 
Manufactures c 14.5 25.7 29.4 64.4 69.3 
Total Latin America and 
the Caribbean 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 40.2 40.5 27.7 24.8 26.2 
Non-food agriculture 12.2 6.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 
Metals and minerals 13.1 18.2 10.4 11.7 9.7 
Fuels 29.1 22.9 40.6 26.5 21.6 
Manufacturesc 5.2 11.5 17.3 32.9 38.5 
Total newly industrializing economies b 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 19.8 15.3 10.2 7.3 7.2 
Non-food agriculture 34.6 20.9 9.4 3.4 2.9 
Metals and minerals 9.1 7.8 3.6 1.5 1.4 
Fuels 11.1 9.2 21.7 9.4 7.7 
Manufactures c 24.1 45.8 53.5 77.9 80.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Estimates. b The total includes the disaggregated groups plus SITC section 9. c Manufactures include srrc sections 
5 to 8, with the exception of chapter 68. 
TRENDS  IN THE  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMY 43 
low level of processing, taking advantage 
of low wages or an unregulated labour 
market, labour and environmental 
conditions are adversely affected and the 
country's achievement of systemic 
competitiveness is undermined. 
Competitive advantages today 
depend on high-quality services, which 
incorporate design, know-how and 
technology. Behind a product traded in 
international markets is a chain of 
activities, some involving a high level of 
value added -research, design, 
engineering, complex manufacturing, 
management and marketing strategy- and 
others involving a lower level of value 
added, such as storage, low-skill assembly 
and traditional sorts of unprocessed 
natural resources. To strengthen the 
competitiveness of the region, the 
productive and human resources base 
must be improved in order to stimulate 
these chains of activities. 
None the less, a simplistic dichotomy 
should not be set up between commodities 
and manufactures, whereby the features 
of quality and export dynamism would be 
assigned exclusively to the latter. There 
are cases of recent industrialization where 
it has been possible to reconcile the 
dynamic export of manufactured goods 
with the development of an agro-
industrial complex that exports high-
quality products.6 In Latin America also, 
there are cases of diversification and high 
export dynamism among non-traditional 
products in the agriculture, fishing and 
forestry sectors, which blurs the presumed 
dichotomy. What is clear is the need to 
incorporate more knowledge into natural 
resource products, strengthening 
backward and forward linkages with 
manufactured products and services and 
improving the variety, marketing, 
presentation, promotion and quality of the 
product. 
6 In the 1980s, for example, Thailand's exports of canned fish and shrimps grew at annual rates of 29% 
and wood products at 21%. Malaysia saw growth rates of 33% in exports of manufactures based on 
rubber and 10% in wood products (ECLAC, 1992b). 
Chapter II 
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
1. Trade rules and the GATT 
negotiations 
The most prominent aspect of the 
international trade environment is the 
recently approved Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on new 
trade rules. In principle, there is virtual 
consensus -on the part of developed and 
developing countries alike- on tine need 
for new rules governing key aspects of 
international trade. This consensus is 
based on estimates that the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round will 
increase international trade by some 
US$ 200 billion annually by the year 2002.7 
On the negative side, it is feared that, 
despite the aforementioned successful 
conclusion, protectionist sentiments are 
still strong, especially in industrialized 
countries. 
The Uruguay Round was much more 
ambitious than previous rounds of 
negotiations on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In addition to 
traditional negotiations on lowering tariff 
barriers, the range of issues subject to 
multilateral rules was broadened. Some 
related to the inclusion of categories that 
had previously been excluded from GATT 
rules, such as agriculture and textiles. 
Others concerned stricter types of 
J 
regulations, such as safeguards designed 
to forestall or replace the use of "grey area" 
measures (e.g., voluntary export 
restraints). Even more unusual was the 
consideration of some new topics, such as 
intellectual property or investment rules, 
that are not strictly trade-related. 
The inclusion of some of these new 
topics on the agenda of the negotiations 
tends to blur the borderline of the list of 
regulations that should be discussed in the 
context of trade talks. Today, trade 
negotiators are also scrutinizing labour 
and environmental conditions and have 
coined expressions, such as "labour 
dumping" or "social dumping", whose 
meaning is highly debatable. 
Before the initiation of the Uruguay 
Round, GATT negotiations had dealt with 
the growing liberalization of merchandise 
trade under multilateral, non-discriminatory 
principles based on the use of tariffs. In 
addition, efforts were made to replace 
non-tariff barriers with tariffs calculated to 
have an equivalent effect. The aim was to 
reduce and eliminate, through a process of 
multilateral negotiation, all trade barriers 
at national borders. Currently, however, 
the world economic situation is shifting 
the focus of the negotiations. The ongoing 
technological revolution is helping in 
various ways to increase the economic 
7 This figure was cited at a press conference by Peter Sutherland, Director-General of GATT, 26 
September 1993 and is based on Goldin, Knudsen and van der Mensbrugghe (1993). 
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interdependence of nations. The rapid 
expansion of informatics and telematics 
has opened up a large and extremely dynamic 
market in the area of services. 
International trade in these types of 
services requires direct investments in 
building their infrastructure. Consequently, 
investments related to trade and services 
became a subject for negotiation under GATT, 
on the basis of principles such as the right 
of establishment and the national or non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign direct 
investment. The negotiations in this round 
were therefore extended to legal regimes 
whose adoption had traditionally been the 
prerogative of the individual countries. 
From the viewpoint of developing 
countries, the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round produced a number of positive 
results which, however, fell short of initial 
expectations. First, the tariff barriers 
imposed on industrial goods are to be cut 
by over 30%, although they were already 
low in general. Most important, however, 
is the progressive elimination, over a 
10-year period, of quotas under the 
Multifibre Arrangement and the reduction 
of the corresponding tariffs; these barriers 
to textile and clothing imports in the 
developed countries were among the most 
damaging for incipient exporters of 
industrial products in developing 
countries. Second, agricultural subsidies 
and import barriers will be reduced over a 
six-year period. National agricultural 
subsidies will be lowered by 20%, while 
subsidized exports are to decline by 36% 
in value and 21% in volume. All import 
barriers will be replaced by tariffs and 
lowered by some 36%. Since these 
subsidies have been used to a lesser degree 
in developing countries, their reduction in 
the industrialized world should broaden 
trade opportunities for efficient 
developing-country producers. Third, 
antidumping measures will be made more 
transparent, thus limiting a country's 
ability to use them as a threat to its trading 
partners. Also, the dispute settlement 
system was made more automatic and the 
power to adopt unilateral measures was 
reduced. Since such measures have most 
often been applied by industrialized 
countries in the past, the limits placed on 
their use should benefit the developing 
nations.8 
At the same time, some developing 
countries are concerned about the possible 
negative effects of the Final Act. For 
example, some Governments feel that the 
developing countries have lowered their 
tariffs much more than their industrialized 
trading partners (Financial Times,  16 
December 1993). The relatively less 
developed countries, especially the ones 
that import food, are worried that higher 
food prices will hurt their economies 
(Goldin, Knudsen and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 1993). Some Latin 
American experts fear that the provisions 
of the Final Act will severely limit the 
region's capacity to promote its exports in 
the future. For example, although the Act 
recognizes that developing countries have 
special needs and should be exempt from 
certain obligations, it eliminates many of 
the special-treatment measures granted 
previously, except those applied to least 
developed nations. Moreover, unlike the 
Tokyo Round, the Uruguay Round does 
not allow developing countries the option 
of not accepting provisions they consider 
unfavourable. The rules on intellectual 
property are a particular cause of concern, 
since they may raise the prices of 
medicines and other patented products in 
the short term, but may also limit access to 
new technologies in the longer term 
(Agosin and Tussie, 1993; Leiva, 1994). 
Beyond these generalizations, it is 
difficult to analyse the consequences of the 
Final Act for developing countries as a 
whole. In addition, a striking feature of the 
negotiation process was the formation of a 
new set of coalitions that broke from the 
traditional alignment of developed 
countries versus developing ones. For 
example, the Cairns Group comprised five 
8 An extremely favourable view of the Final Act, from the perspective of the developing countries, 
appears in GATT (1993a). 
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Latin American countries and several 
countries in the developed world. The 
impact may also vary from one country to 
another, benefiting some and hurting 
others. It will be crucial for both the 
Governments and the private sector of the 
developing countries to analyse the 
provisions in detail to identify any new 
opportunities they offer. The Final Act's 
main provisions on the treatment of 
developing countries are set forth in box 
II.1. 
The main benefit of the GATT 
negotiations probably lies in the fact that 
they dealt a strategic blow to protectionist 
postures. This explains why they have had 
a favourable impact on the expectations of 
the world economic community, and have 
been welcomed, despite their limitations 
and risks, by the developing countries in 
general and those of the region in 
particular. 
Indeed, an updated set of multilateral 
rules on trade in goods and services, 
though imperfect as yet, can yield net 
benefits for the developing countries in a 
context of globalization. Conversely, the 
lack of such rules could lead to conflicts 
between trading blocs or the unilateral 
domination of the major trading powers. 
The consolidation of this institutional 
structure is manifested in the 
establishment of the World Trade 
Organization, which is to enter into 
operation in 1995. This organization's aims 
will be to facilitate the implementation of the 
legal instruments and arrangements 
agreed upon during the Uruguay Round, 
to serve as a forum for all negotiations on 
such matters, and to administer the 
mechanisms set up for the settlement of 
disputes and the analysis of trade policy. 
2. Special trade regimes 
The GATT rules on open multilateral trade 
based on the most-favoured-nation 
principle include a number of exceptions; 
one of these relates to the preferential 
trade regimes established by the 
developed countries, based on the 
internationally accepted principle of 
favouring developing nations. The most 
important of these regimes is the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
which is supported by all the 
industrialized countries. 
a) Generalized System of  Preferences 
In 1971 a large group of industrialized 
nations granted preferential tariff 
treatment to manufactures imported from 
developing countries. The aim was to 
stimulate the diversification of production 
in those countries and to incorporate them 
into the world manufactures trade. 
Although more than 20 developed 
countries grant preferences under this 
system, some 90% of all GSP imports to the 
countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) go to the United States, the 
European Community and Japan. 
To give an idea of the quantitative 
importance of the GSP, an "effective 
impact" index can be defined. This index 
shows the ratio of the value of goods 
imported under the GSP to the value of total 
imports from the country or region 
benefited. It thereby indicates the effective 
impact of the GSP on total exports from the 
beneficiary to the country that grants the 
preference. 
Table II. 1 summarizes the benefits 
thus received by the developing countries 
in general and the Latin American 
countries in particular. The degree of 
effective impact is very similar for the two 
groups: 15.4% and 15.6%, respectively. For 
Latin America, the preferences granted by 
Japan and the European Community have 
a greater effective impact than those of the 
United States. However, the absolute 
value of the exports covered is higher for 
the United States, since that country 
imports more Latin American products. 
The index reflecting the impact of the 
GSP may be low for various reasons. On the 
one hand, many products may be 
excluded because they enjoy duty-free 
entry under other systems of exceptions or 
another general regime (e.g., certain 
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URUGUAY ROUND: TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The provisions on this topic contained in the 
draft Final Act can be summarized as follows: 
1 ) Time-limited exceptions and longer periods 
for implementing obligations. 
a. Trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights, including trade in 
counterfeit goods: compliance with 
obligations in this matter may be delayed 
for a further period of four years for 
developing countries and 10 years for 
least developed countries. 
b. Technical barriers to trade: specified and 
time-limited exceptions in whole or in 
part from the obligations under the 
relevant agreement may be granted to 
developing countries. 
c. Import licensing procedures: developing 
countries may delay the application of 
provisions relating to automatic import 
licensing by not more than two years 
from the date of entry into force of the 
relevant agreement. 
d. Subsidies and countervailing measures: 
the prohibition against the granting or 
maintenance of export subsidies will not 
apply to the least developed countries, 
l or other developing countries, the 
phase-out period for export subsidies 
will be within eight years from the entry 
into force of the relevant agreement, and 
two years in the case of reaching export 
competitiveness in any given product 
(cri teria defining export competitiveness 
are formulated). 
e. Implementation of article VII on customs 
valuation: developing countries may 
delaj, application of its provisions for up 
to five years. 
I. Agriculture: the least developed 
countries are exempted from making 
reduction commitments; other 
developing countries will have the 
flexibility to implement their reduction 
commitments over a period of 1Ü years. 
g. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures: 
longer time-frames for compliance with 
these measures are granted to developing 
countries. Specified, time-limited 
exceptions in whole or in part from the 
obligations of the relevant decision may 
also be granted, upon request, to 
developing countries. The least 
developed countries are granted more 
flexible time-frames and conditions. 
h. Safeguards: developing countries will 
have the right to extend the period of 
application of a safeguard measure for 
up to two years beyond the maximum 
period of eight years, 
i. Trade-related investment measures 
(TRIM-.): developing countries may 
deviate temporarily from a general 
provision, and a longer time-frame of 
five years is provided for developing 
countries to eliminate TRIM? that are 
inconsistent with the relevant 
provisions, this period being extendable 
upon request. A time-frame of seven 
years is provided for the least developed 
countries, which is also extendable. 
2) More favourable thresholds for certain 
commitments. 
a. Subsidies and countervailing measures: 
a more flexible application of remedies 
against subsidization involving 
products from developing countries is 
envisaged. 
b. Agriculture: developing countries will 
be allowed to make smaller reductions in 
their tariffs and subsidies, provided that 
the result is no less than two lliirdsot that 
specified tor de\ eloped countries. 
c. Safeguard measures will not be applied 
against a product originating in a 
developing country as long as its share 
of imports of the product concerned does 
not exceed 3%, provided that developing 
countries with less than a 3% import 
share collectively do not account for 
more than 9% of total imports of the 
product concerned. 
d. Textiles and clothing: small developing 
suppliers will be accorded differential 
and more favourable treatment. 
3) "Best endeavour clauses", aimed at making 
a special effort to interpret and favour the 
interests and rights of the developing 
countries. 
a. Intellectual property rights: developed 
countries will provide incentives for the 
purpose of promoting technology 
transfer to the least developed countries. 
b. Anti-dumping agreement: developed 
countries must take a more tolerant 
attitude and explore alternative 
solutions in order not to affect the 
essential interests of developing 
countries. 
c. Non-automatic import licensing 
procedures: special consideration 
should be given to importers of products 
originating in developing countries and, 
in particular, in the least developed 
countries. 
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Box II-1 (cond.) 
d. Subsidies and countervailing measures: 
the relevant committee will seek to 
ensure that countervailing measures are 
in conformity with the need* of 
developing countries. 
e. Agriculture: developed countries will 
offer improved opportunities, and terms 
of access to their markets for agricultural 
products of particular interest to the 
developing countries, including special 
treatment for tropical products and 
products that can be substituted for illicit 
narcotic drug crops. Measures will also 
be adopted to ensure that the 
implementation of the results of the 
Uruguay Round on trade in agriculture 
does not adversely affect the availability 
of food aid, especially for the least 
developed countries. 
4) Flexibility in procedures. 
a. Balance of payments: consultation 
procedures may be simplified, to make 
them more expeditious, m the case of 
developing countries. 
b. Settlement of disputes: there is a wido 
range of provisions on differential, nuire 
favour able treatment of developing 
countries. They provide, niter aha, that 
where one or more of the parties 
involved in a disputo is a developing 
country, the panel's report will explicitly 
indicate the form in which account has 
been taken of relevant provisions on 
differential, more favourable treatment. 
If the case is brought by a developing 
country, the provisions adopted will take 
into account not only the trade coverage 
of measures complained of.butalsotheir 
impact on the economy of the country 
concerned. In all dispute settlement 
procedures involving a least developed 
country, the developed contracting 
parties will exercise due restraint in 
asking for compensation or suspending 
the application of concessions. Before 
initiating routine procedures, the 
Director-General will, upon request by a 
least developed contracting party, offer 
his good offices, conciliation and 
mediation with a view to avoiding a 
request that a panel be established. In 
addition, provision of legal advice to 
developing contracting parties and the 
organization of special training courses 
concerning i.Ali dispute settlement 
procedures and practices are envisaged, 
c. Functioning of the GAI'T system: longer 
intervals of trade policy ro\ ievvs for 
developing countries are envisaged. 
5) Provisions on technical assistance. 
a. Technical assistance for developing 
countries is envisaged in areas such as 
pre-shipmcnt inspection, technical 
barriers to trade, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and dispute 
settlement. 
Source: l'rcjuied on the bji^ -is o n v >'i. TVvi-lupmt>nb- and Issues in lhe Uruguay Round of Partwuldi Concern l« Developing 
Countries N<>ta'b> ihei v ,.\!'«»-i.ivt.uiai 
iTD/B/  )),Crncwu 15 March 1-W 
minerals) or because of political pressure 
exerted by producers in the countries 
granting the preference (e.g., textiles). On 
the other hand, use of the benefit may be 
limited, possibly owing to a lack of 
awareness of the GSP on the part of 
Governments and entrepreneurs. Another 
problem is that the countries that grant 
preferences impose quotas and other 
barriers to their use. Moreover, they may 
suspend the benefit for reasons such as the 
competitive need clause, invoked in some 
cases by the United States. They have also 
suspended benefits for non-economic 
reasons, as a kind of sanction against 
certain beneficiaries for alleged human or 
labour rights violations. 
The United States "graduates" 
countries from the system, excluding them 
from GSP benefits when their per capita 
gross national product exceeds a certain 
amount, which in 1990 was US$ 10,463. 
The provisions also stipulate that a 
country will automatically lose its GSP 
entitlement for a given product 
(eight-digit tariff item) if its share of 
United States imports within that product 
category exceeds certain pre-set limits and 
no exception has been granted. In 1990, the 
general limits were 50% of total imports of 
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a product and US$ 93 million. Countries 
that were already considered sufficiently 
competitive in 1986 are subject to tighter 
limits of 25% and US$ 36 million (GATT, 
1992a). Also since 1990, the rules of origin 
for products imported from the 
beneficiary countries have been applied 
more rigorously. Recently, the United 
States Government requested another 
extension of the GSP for one year while it 
considers more thoroughgoing reforms of 
the system's operation. 
Japan, for its part, applies the GSP to all 
developing countries, without exception. 
It adopted the GSP in 1971 and enacted 
10-year renewals in 1981 and 1991. The 
system covers most industrial products 
(except crude oil, some textiles, 
counterveneered wood, leather garments 
and footwear) and about half of all 
dutiable agricultural products. However, 
ceilings are placed on imports of many 
industrial products entitled to GSP 
treatment. The system is revised every 
year, and recently its coverage was 
broadened in terms of both products and 
beneficiaries. Among the developing 
countries, the least developed countries 
receive special treatment, since their 
duty-free products are not subject to 
quotas. Of all of Japan's imports 
entitled to GSP treatment, over half come 
from the Chinese Province of Taiwan, the 
Republic of Korea and China. With the 
addition of imports from the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, this proportion rises to 72%. 
Brazil and Venezuela are the main Latin 
American beneficiaries, with about 7% 
and 2% of the total, respectively (GATT, 
1992b). 
The European Community's GSP also 
dates back to 1971, and was renewed in 
1981. In 1990 it was renewed for another 
10 years, but will be adapted to the results 
of the Uruguay Round. Like Japan and the 
United States, the European Community 
applies ceilings and quotas in respect of 
this benefit, as well as a system of graduations 
according to the degree of competitiveness 
attained by potential beneficiaries or as a 
reprisal for restrictive measures 
Table II.l 
IMPACT OF GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES, 1991 
(Billions  of  dollars and percentages) 
(1) (2) (3) = (2)/(l) 
_ , Total imports Imports under the GSP Effective impact Preference- r r r 
giving 
country/ „ , . Latin „ . Latin „ . . Latin region Developing A m e r k a n Developing A m e r i c a n Developing A m e r k a n 
° countries . . countnes . . countries . . 
countries countries countries 
United States 
of America 96 59 13.7 7.6 14.2% 12.9% 
European 
Community 157 32 30.2 6.2 19.2% 19.4% 
Japan 111 9 12.1 1.8 10.9% 20.0% 
Total 364 100 56.0 15.6 15.4% 15.6% 
Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, Replies received from preference-giving countries: European 
Economic Community (EEC). Note  by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/B/C.5/PREF/56),  New York, April 1993; 
Replies received from preference-giving countries: Japan. Note by the UNCTAD secretariat 
(TD/B/C.5/PREF/52),  New York, October 1993; Replies received from preference-giving countries: United 
States of America. Note by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/B/C.5/PREF/55),  New York, November 1992. 
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implemented by the other party. 
Agricultural products exported from 
relatively less developed countries and 
included in the GSP enjoy free access to the 
European market. 
b) Other preferences 
The United States has other kinds of 
preferences in addition to the GSP. One of 
these, which applies to the maquila, grants 
preferential treatment to re-imported 
articles which have increased in value or 
been improved in quality abroad. Tariffs 
are not applied to the total value of the 
product, but are instead levied only on the 
value added outside the United States. 
These types of concessions for 
subcontracting or maquila regimes have 
become extremely important. They apply 
to over 15% of United States imports and 
have grown very quickly. About 50% of 
the country's imports from Mexico come 
under this regime, which is much more 
important to Mexico than the GSP granted 
by the United States.9 This regime is also 
very important for some Caribbean and 
Central American countries (see chapter 
V, section 3). 
The Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act applies to the five members 
of the Central American Common Market, 
the 13 members of the Caribbean 
Community, the Netherlands Antilles, 
Aruba, Haiti, the British Virgin Islands, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic, and 
to exports from Puerto Rico to which value 
has been added in those countries and 
territories. Tariff exemptions are granted 
to all products from that area, except those 
excluded by law (textiles, clothing, 
footwear, leather manufactures and some 
timepieces), and are accompanied by other 
advantages such as technical assistance, 
tax incentives for United States enterprises 
and programmes to promote trade and 
investment. In 1992, the products 
imported under the Act (excluding those 
that were also eligible for GSP treatment) 
amounted to US$ 645 million, or 7% of all 
United States merchandise imports from 
the Caribbean Basin countries (ECLAC, 
1992c). 
The system of trade preferences for the 
Andean countries is intended to help Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in their 
efforts to combat the production of 
narcotic drugs, specifically through 
incentives for producing alternative crops 
that can be exported to the United States. 
To that end, tariff exemptions will be 
granted to a group of products for 10 
years. It has been estimated that the 
programme will affect about US$ 300 
million worth of imports, representing about 
5% of total imports from those countries. 
The European Community also grants 
preferences outside the GSP, primarily to 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries that were once colonies of the 
nations that make up the Community. A 
second level of preferences benefits 
Mediterranean countries, and some 
preferences are also granted to Latin 
American countries. 
The African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries have signed the Lomé 
Conventions with the European 
Community. The latest of these 
agreements, Lomé IV, includes 69 
developing countries, which receive 
institutional, trade and development 
cooperation benefits. The trade benefits 
favour two types of products: industrial 
(which enjoy complete freedom from 
customs duties) and raw materials. The 
latter are subject to two specific systems: 
the Stabilization System for Export 
Earnings (STABEX) for tropical products, 
and the special financing facility for ACP 
and OCT mining products (SYSMIN). When 
any of these countries experiences a 
decline in its export earnings, the 
Community makes transfer payments to 
offset the deterioration in that country's 
trade balance. 
As regards the countries bordering the 
Mediterranean, all of them, with the 
9 These benefits will be phased out as a result of Mexico's Free Trade Agreement with the United States 
and Canada. 
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exception of Libya and Albania, have 
concluded bilateral agreements with the 
Community that provide, inter alia, for the 
elimination of tariffs on industrial 
products, though with some restrictive 
exceptions, as in the case of textiles. The 
Mediterranean countries, however, are 
excluded from the income stabilization 
mechanisms applied to the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States. Agricultural 
imports from these countries are also 
subject to quotas that limit the partial 
reduction of tariffs. 
In 1990 the Community adopted a 
series of exceptional temporary trade 
measures in response to the special 
programme of cooperation proposed by 
the Colombian Government in the context 
of the international anti-drug effort. A 
special trade regime was set up for Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru to exempt a 
special list of agricultural products from 
quotas and tariffs for a period of four 
years. In December 1991 these benefits 
were extended to agricultural products 
from the Central American Common 
Market and Panama to stimulate the 
process of democratization and economic 
reform. 
3. Price fluctuations md 
futures markets 
Clearly, a major problem for Latin 
American exporters is price instability, 
especially for commodity exports (see 
chapter I, table 1.5). With the general trend 
towards less State involvement in the 
economy, market-based solutions, such as 
futures and options markets, have begun 
to replace such schemes as buffer stocks or 
cartels. Indeed, the last two decades have 
witnessed spectacular growth in 
conventional commodity futures and 
options markets and in a variety of related 
financial instruments. Markets have also 
become much more complex in this 
period, thus increasing the risks and 
difficulties for relatively inexperienced 
traders, such as those in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
Not all products are suitable for 
futures markets. The commodities that 
lend themselves best to such operations 
are those that satisfy certain conditions, 
such as a large volume of supply and 
demand, homogeneity and fungibility, 
and storability. Thus, trading in fuels is by 
far the largest area, followed by 
aluminium, copper, gold and silver. The 
contract volume traded for agricultural 
commodities, particularly "soft" 
commodities such as coffee, cocoa, cotton 
and sugar, is much smaller (UNCTAD, 
1993a). 
Participation by developing countries, 
directly or through intermediaries, is 
limited but increasing. Latin American 
exporters of soft commodities are among 
the major developing-country users, 
hedging about a quarter of the region's 
cocoa, coffee and sugar exports on the 
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange in New 
York (López Huebe, 1990). Latin American 
exporters of cereals and soybeans also 
hedge on United States exchanges 
(Regúnaga, 1990). For metals, Latin 
American exporters are active users of the 
exchanges. The region's copper producers 
and processors of semi-finished copper 
products in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, 
have regularly used the London Metal 
Exchange and the New York Commodity 
Exchange (COMEX) (Bande and Mardones, 
1990), though for a rather small share of 
their total exports. Mexican and Brazilian 
authorities have participated actively in 
oil futures and options. 
The exchanges offer two main types of 
commodity risk management instruments. 
The first is a futures  contract, which is an 
agreement to purchase or sell a 
commodity at a price determined in the 
present, for delivery of the merchandise 
after a given period of time. The most 
frequently mentioned benefit to be 
derived from futures contracts is 
hedging. Hedging allows producers, 
traders and processors to transfer at least 
a part of the risk associated with price 
fluctuations to a speculator, who hopes 
to realize a profit as a result of price 
variation. 
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The other main instrument is an option, 
which gives the purchaser the right, but 
not the obligation, to buy (call) or sell (put) 
a commodity at a pre-determined price 
after a given period of time. While a 
futures contract is binding on both parties, 
the purchaser of an option can walk away 
from the contract if he deems this 
convenient. Like futures, options can be 
used by producers to shift the risk of price 
changes. 
Despite the benefits that are often 
attributed to the futures and options 
markets, they also pose certain problems. 
One relates to liquidity: the volume of 
trade in practically all commodity futures 
and options, especially for more distant 
months, is not very high. In general, the 
commodity exchange options traded have 
short maturities, with few transactions 
extending beyond one year. Over-the-
counter trade, an active trade in options of 
up to three years, is developing, but 
commodity risk management instruments 
offered by the exchanges with maturities 
greater than one year are generally 
difficult to acquire. 
Another problem is the high cost of 
using commodity futures and options 
exchanges, either directly or through 
intermediaries. To participate directly, it is 
necessary to become a member of an 
exchange. Also, a participant usually 
needs an office in the city in which the 
exchange is located, and must meet capital 
adequacy standards and acquire 
accounting services to comply with audit 
and reporting requirements. These costs 
tend to work to the detriment of smaller 
firms. Indirect use through intermediaries 
also involves costs, such as margin 
deposits and margin calls, commission 
fees and organizational costs (e.g., staff 
training and access to daily information). 
Whether or not commodity buyers and 
sellers will consider it worthwhile to incur 
these costs largely depends on their 
location, the size of their trade deals and 
the frequency with which they need to 
resort to these markets. 
In addition to these explicit costs, there 
are other implicit features that might deter 
potential traders from using the 
exchanges. One is the low reliability of 
futures market prices as predictors of 
future spot prices. In fact, a growing 
number of empirical studies tend to reject 
futures prices as predictors of future spot 
rates (see Choe, 1990).10 Typically, 
commodity futures prices forecast the 
subsequent spot prices poorly, owing to 
either market inefficiency or irrational 
expectations, or the existence of risk 
premiums (Thompson, 1983; Choe, 1990). 
It is also clear, however, that they can 
provide short-run stability, at a cost, to 
risk-averse producers. In this sense, 
futures and options are a "good thing". 
Futures markets are also said to be 
partially responsible for the increase in 
commodity price volatility (Thompson, 
1983). Excessive short-term volatility in 
futures markets may cause the 
relationship between physical and futures 
market prices to change frequently, 
exposing hedgers to excessive risks and 
higher transaction costs. Many 
speculators operate on the basis of an 
analysis that is founded on assumptions 
about the behaviour of market agents and 
prices. Basing themselves on information 
about prices, trading volumes and other 
indicators, these speculators take various 
positions in the market. When a large 
number of them take the same position, 
their activity tends to bear out their 
short-run forecasts. They are said to 
prompt price movements that run counter 
to trends in fundamental economic 
variables, thereby distorting long-term 
10 The most commonly used technique for testing for bias in futures prices is to regress changes in spot 
prices on the futures discount. Choe's analysis, based solely on commodities, clearly rejects the 
hypothesis that futures markets are good predictors of future spot prices, coinciding with the results 
of other studies of foreign exchange futures markets. In his test of eight commodities of great interest 
to Latin America and the Caribbean, for the period 1980-1988, he finds evidence against the rationality 
of futures prices. 
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market signals. This distortional effect has 
increased in recent years owing to the 
greater incidence of institutional 
speculators. These speculators take 
decisions by comparing the risks and 
returns offered by various instruments, 
and their reference is eminently 
short-term. The waves of commodity 
purchases or sales resulting from this type 
of reaction exaggerate price fluctuations 
unrelated to market fundamentals and 
thus increase volatility. 
In addition to these overall constraints 
at the world level, there are elements that 
might particularly limit the usefulness of 
futures markets for developing-country 
commodity exporters. Two such elements 
are mentioned here. 
i) Price trends on the exchanges of 
developed countries and in local markets 
of developing countries can vary 
substantially. In the case of grain, for 
example, a temporary imbalance between 
supply and demand in the major 
producing countries can lead to 
competition between local consumption 
and exports that will be reflected more 
markedly in f.o.b. prices than on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The 
cross-seasonality of the northern and 
southern hemispheres can cause 
unpredictable variations in premiums. 
Such differences are one of the main 
obstacles to participation by developing 
countries in futures and options markets. 
ii) Lack of information about and 
experience with futures markets hinders 
the advantageous use of these markets. 
For example, the level of optimal 
hedging can be substantially less than 
expected output when price and 
production uncertainties are high. 
Participants may find that the quantity to 
be hedged is a decisive variable, instead of 
always assuming completely hedged 
positions. Experience is necessary to take 
such decisions. More generally, 
developing- country participants are 
likely to have less information on trends 
which would enable them to take 
profitable decisions -or avoid heavy 
losses. 
In so far as futures markets can lower 
risk and price volatility, they have an 
important role to play for commodity 
producers. Their growing use by 
producers and exporters in developing 
countries indicates that these actors see 
benefits to be gained from participation 
in the markets. Clearly, however, 
futures markets have not completely 
solved the problem of risk (actually, 
they only help to partially reduce 
short-term risks), and in some instances 
they may even exacerbate it. Many more 
institutional measures must be taken to 
improve the operation of the markets, 
and economic agents in developing 
countries need to increase their 
knowledge of the markets' functioning 
in order to improve those countries' 
external linkages. 
4. Foreign capital and international 
trade 
Over the last decade, an increasingly close 
link has developed between foreign 
capital and international trade. First, much 
more foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
gone into export sectors than in the earlier 
postwar period. Second, an increasing 
share of international trade is being 
carried out by transnational corporations, 
either as intra-firm trade or through retail 
chains or trading companies. 
During the 1970s, FDI was 
marginalized as a source of external 
finance by private bank loans. Indeed, the 
1970s were a peak period of economic 
nationalism, and many foreign firms were 
nationalized. With the onset of the debt 
crisis and the cessation of private-bank 
lending, however, developing countries 
again became interested in attracting FDI. 
They not only instituted macroeconomic 
reforms, but also changed their rules on FDI 
to create a more hospitable atmosphere. 
For example, price and exchange controls 
were reduced, and profit remittance was 
made easier. Rules limiting the entry of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) into key 
industries were cut back, and foreign 
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investment codes were made more liberal 
(United Nations, 1991 and 1992). 
After a time, transnational 
corporations began to respond positively. 
Table II.2 shows the pattern of FDI flows 
between 1981 and 1993, illustrating the 
upturn in FDI to developing countries 
during the second half of the 1980s and the 
strengthening of this trend in the 1990s. 
The Latin American share was largely 
responsible for this stop-go pattern. 
Initially, FDI in the region picked up as a 
result of debt-equity swaps and 
privatizations. In recent years, "normal" 
FDI flows have also risen significantly (see 
chapter IX). 
An important characteristic of the new 
investment flows to developing countries 
is that they have gone primarily into 
export sectors, rather than production for 
the domestic market, as in earlier decades. 
In a few cases, this has meant investment 
in natural resources. Chile and Colombia 
are prime examples of countries where the 
bulk of recent FDI flows have gone into 
commodities (copper, forestry and fishing 
in Chile; oil and coal in Colombia). More 
often, FDI has gone into manufactures, as 
in East and South-East Asia. In addition, 
some Latin American countries 
-especially Mexico, but also Venezuela 
and Brazil- have been significant 
recipients of manufacturing investments. 
Services, including airlines and telecom-
munications, have attracted FDI on a large 
scale in recent years. 
Table II.3 links FDI to manufactures 
exports, focusing on United States and 
Japanese subsidiaries in developing 
countries in 1982 and 1989. The absolute 
value of exports produced by the two 
countries' TNCs increased rapidly, and 
export propensity rose from 22% to 33% 
among United States firms and from 33% 
Table II.2 
INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
BY REGION, 1981-1985,1986-1990 A N D 1991-1993 
(Annual  averages) 









1990 1991 1992 1993 
All countries 50 155 162 158 194 100 100 100 100 100 
Developing countries 13 25 39 52 80 26 16 24 33 41 
Africa 2 3 3 3 - 3 2 2 2 -
East, South and South-East Asia 5 14 20 29 - 10 9 13 19 -
Latin America and the Caribbean a 6 8 15 18 19 12 5 9 11 10 
Ten largest recipient countries 9 b 18° 28 d 3 9 d - 19 b 12 c 1 7 d 25 d -
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information presented by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World  Investment Report, 1993: Transnational  Corporations and Integrated International Production 
(ST/CTC/156),  New York, Programme on Transnational Corporations, 1993. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.93.II.A.14; and World  Investment Report, 1994: Transnational  Corporations, Employment and the 
Workplace  (UNCTAD/DTCI/10),  New York, Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment, 1994. 
United Nàtions publication, Sales No. E.94.II.A.14. 
a Includes 19 Latin American nations and 17 Caribbean countries or territories. b Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, 
Egypt, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria and Singapore. c Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Hong Kong, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Singapore, the Chinese Province of Taiwan and Thailand. d Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, the Chinese Province of Taiwan/Thailand  and Venezuela. 
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Table II.3 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MANUFACTURES EXPORTS BY UNITED STATES AND 






(millions of dollars) 
United States subsidiaries 
(percentages) 
Share Export propensity15 
Japanese subsidiaries3 
(percentages) 





















































Source: United Nations, World  Investment Report, 1992. Transnational  Corporations as Engines of  Growth (ST/CTC/130), 
New York, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.92.II.A.24. 
a Figures cover April 1982-March 1983 and April 1988-March 1989, and represent only a sample of subsidiaries in 
developing countries. b Export propensity is defined as the proportion of export sales in total sales by subsidiaries. 
" Some of the data are omitted by the source to avoid disclosure. 
to 39% among Japanese firms. For 
developing countries as a whole, the 
foreign share of manufactures exports fell. 
In the case of United States subsidiaries, 
the decline in their share of developing 
country exports (from 6.7% to 5.7%) was 
entirely attributable to the Asian 
countries. In Latin America, their share of 
exports rose significantly (from 10.5% to 
14.3%). 
In Latin America, data on the 1,000 
largest national or foreign firms in the 
region show that in 1991, TNCs generated 
22% of total exports and over 44% of 
manufactures exports of these firms 
(Calderón, 1993a). Particularly notable 
were chemicals, rubber products, 
electrical and non-electrical machinery 
and automobiles, industries where foreign 
firms accounted for over 75% of exports. 
Nevertheless, the domestic market 
continued to be the main attraction for the 
1,000 largest firms, since they exported 
only 17% of their total output. This figure 
was heavily influenced by Brazil; 
however, where the export coefficient for 
TNCs (exports as a proportion of total sales) 
was only 11%, compared to Chile and 
Mexico, where it was 33% and 29%, 
respectively (Calderón, 1993a). 
An important sub-category of TNC 
exports are those sold within the firms 
themselves, a practice known as intra-firm 
trade. The growing importance of 
intra-firm trade is a consequence of efforts 
to achieve international competitiveness 
(through economies of scale or the use of 
specific national advantages). 
A recent study shows that more than 
a third of United States foreign trade in 
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1989 took place within firms; no overall 
estimates are available for other countries 
(OECD, 1992). For Latin America, some data 
exist on intra-firm trade by United States 
corporations. In 1989, for example, 27% of 
Mexico's exports to the United States and 
42% of imports from that country were 
intra-firm operations of United States 
companies (United Nations, 1992). For 
Brazil, it is estimated that 14% of 
manufactures exports to the United States 
in 1990 were United States intra-firm 
transactions (Baumann, 1993). The motor 
vehicle and electronics sectors are 
especially important participants in this 
form of trade. 
The increasing importance of 
intra-firm transactions may pose certain 
problems for developing countries. Such 
operations involve the replacement of 
market transactions by those internal to 
firms. Among other consequences, trade 
flows may become less sensitive to relative 
prices, undermining the effectiveness of 
exchange rate policy, for example. At 
the same time, customs and fiscal policy 
can be adversely affected, since firms' 
internal operations facilitate the use of 
transfer pricing and make it more difficult 
to levy taxes and adopt anti-dumping 
measures.11 
Direct investment, however, is not the 
only way in which TNCs have increased 
exports from developing countries. 
Especially in East Asia, but also (though to 
a lesser extent) in Latin America, 
subcontracting has become increasingly 
important. Gereffi (1994) distinguishes 
among three levels of subcontracting. The 
lowest level is export processing zones 
(EPZs), which specialize in the assembly of 
simple manufactured goods, especially 
apparel and electronics. The second level 
is "component-supply subcontracting", 
which involves the manufacture and 
export of component parts for 
technologically advanced industries, with 
final assembly usually carried out in 
developed countries. The automobile and 
computer industries are prominent 
examples of activities that use this form of 
subcontracting. Finally, there is "original 
equipment manufacturing" (OEM) or the 
production of finished consumer goods by 
local firms. These goods are tailored to the 
specifications of large retail chains, 
which then market them abroad. Most 
of this kind of activity takes place in 
East Asia, where many backward 
linkages with the local economies have 
made it an important ladder to the highest 
level of exports: goods produced and 
marketed under the name of 
manufacturers themselves in newly 
industrializing economies (NiEs). (On 
subcontracting in the footwear industry in 
Brazil, see box ÏÏ.2.) 
The East Asian NIES have managed to 
confront the effects of high wages and 
import quotas, which could drive them 
out of subcontracting, by setting up 
"triangle manufacturing". In this process, 
retail chains place orders with NIE 
manufacturers, who then subcontract to 
factories in low-wage countries, such as 
China or Vietnam. The triangle is 
completed when the goods are shipped 
back to the industrialized country under 
the quota of the latter covin tries. These 
triangle networks are also being extended 
to Latin America and the Caribbean and to 
Africa. 
Trading companies are yet another 
means by which foreign capital has 
promoted developing-country exports. 
They are mainly an Asian phenomenon, 
but their impact has spread to other 
developing regions. The most important 
trading companies are Japan's giant sogo 
shosha, which have offices in virtually 
every country in the world and provide 
marketing, financial and information 
services to other firms. Initially, they 
helped Japan's own large manufacturing 
firms to move abroad, but when these 
firms outgrew their need for such 
assistance, the sogo shosha turned to 
smaller Japanese companies and firms 
11 Some recent evidence, while not denying that transfer pricing has occurred, plays down its 
importance as a reason for intra-firm trade (Blomstrom, 1990). 
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SUBCONTRACTING IN BRAZILIAN FOOTWEAR EXPORTS 
Brazil has bccome an important exporter ot 








1970 3,778 8,273 
198ft 49,030 386,872 
1989 169,979 1,238,280 
There were several factors that led to Brazil's 
success, when other potential exporters (such as 
Argentina) tailed First, Brazil has a comparative 
advantage in footwear beca use of its leather a nd 
cheap labour, although Argentina and Uruguay 
also have à comparativo advantage in leather. 
Second, Brazilian government policies 
encouraged exports. These policies included 
subsidies, an efficient exchange rate policy, 
credits and marketing assistance. These export 
policies alone, however, were not sufficient to 
enable the firms to make major headway into the 
United States market. Third, and arguably most 
important, United Slates importers decided lo 
make Brazil a major source of cheap footwear. 
Through their agents, they provided the 
necessary know-how, access to the United Slates 
market and protection against attempts by 
United States producers to limit the entry of 
Brazilian footwear to that country. 
United States agents are involved in every 
aspect of the production process in Brazilian 
footwear tirms They carry out fashion research 
and make prototypes ot particular styles, which 
are then turned into samples that are sold to 
wholesalers and retailers In the United States. 
After these lirms place orders, the export agents 
negotiate with the factories that will produce the 
shoes. Theyalso ensure that (he specified leather 
is purchased by the shoe factory. They supervise 
production to make sure that deliveries will be 
on time and, finally, they ship the shoes. 
At the global level, agents and importing 
firms have managed to prevent protectionist 
measures from being imposed against Brazilian 
footwear. This contrasts with the success of 
United States .steel manuiacturers in obtaining 
sanctions against Brazilian producers, which in 
lhe case ol steel are Stale firms and local private 
capitalists. There is no doubt that United States 
sleel firms are more politically powerful (han 
their counterparts m the footwear industry, but 
having allies In the importing market who have 
major interests al stake is also important for 
Bia/ihan  manufactuieis. 
While Brazilian producers dislike lhe power 
ot the export agents, most feel they do not have 
the capacity lo market on iht'ir own. This is 
especially true since mosl footwear firms are 
small (lhe average number of employees is 
under 50) Also, fashions change frequency, 
demanding constant knowledge of the market 
Il is also expensive lo sel up offices tn the United 
States and hire and train statf, The commissions 
charged by agents arc generally low, around 3%, 
but lhe highest profits are usually made by 
global produclion-maiketing chains! As a result, 
Latin American producers should try lo find 
marketing channels, whether national or 
international, instead of wailing for their 
products to be bought. 
Source; Jeffrey Cason, "Development StritCRy m Rrj/if  J V Pollina! Fi.momy of lmluMrw] Hpfifl Promotion PXM-IW, Ph IV 
draeridion, UnivwNily ol Wisconsin at Mailwin, 1 W 
from developing countries (Kojima and 
Ozawa, 1984). 
The Japanese trading companies have 
been especially active in Asia. Their share 
in the Asian and Pacific countries' total 
trade was estimated at 17% at the 
beginning of the 1980s (Kuwayama, 1992). 
In the late 1980s, the largest sogo shosha 
managed an average of US$ 2-3 billion per 
year of Latin America's exports and 
imports, meaning that the trading 
companies handled over half of the 
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region's US$ 18 billion trade with Japan. In 
addition, during the 1980s these firms 
began to promote Latin American exports 
to third countries, including the United 
States. It is estimated that they were 
responsible for roughly 10% of Latin 
America's total trade of US$ 200 billion in 
1989 (Stallings, 1991). 
In some cases, the sogo shosha simply 
act as intermediaries, assuming 
responsibility for shipping and financing 
goods produced by independent firms. In 
others, they take a small equity share in a 
firm in order to secure a source of supply 
or gain more influence over the quality of 
the products. A third function has been to 
discover investment opportunities and bring 
in other Japanese companies, which provide 
most of the capital. In the last few years, 
some of these investments have been joint 
ventures with United States firms (e.g., for 
the production of liquid natural gas in 
Venezuela and copper in Chile). Working 
through the trading companies has been a 
better way for developing countries to 
gain access to the Japanese market. 
5. International trade and 
the environment 
Environmental issues are rapidly 
becoming a major factor in international 
trade. Often, from the developing 
countries' point of view, environmental 
concerns have been regarded as just one 
more type of protectionism on the part of 
the industrial nations. However, the issue 
goes deeper than such an instrumental 
approach would imply. The environment 
is becoming an aspect of international 
competitiveness, which can confer 
advantages as well as impose costs. 
Environmental requirements are 
becoming increasingly stringent in the 
1990s, meaning that economic agents are 
having to change their strategies and 
decision-making practices. In the 
developed countries, clear indications of 
the direction this process is taking include 
the lower proportion of natural resources 
used and waste generated in the 
manufacture of the final product, the 
adoption of strict environmental 
regulations and increasing consumer 
concern for the environment. These 
facts are leading to the redesign of 
industrial processes, marketing channels 
and systems for the final disposal of 
products. 
In view of the critical volumes of waste 
and residues and the growing shortage of 
dumps and deposit sites, the disposal of a 
product at the end of its useful life is 
becoming increasingly costly, and 
recycling, re-using and minimizing waste 
therefore appears to be an economically 
viable option for producers. Consumers, 
for their part, are beginning to regard 
environmental quality as a distinctive, 
desirable product feature. One indication 
of this trend is that a recent survey in 
France found that consumers are 
willing to pay more if they are certain 
that the processes used in manufacturing 
the goods they buy are less polluting 
(France, Ministère de l'environnement, 
1993). 
Another sign of this trend, which goes 
beyond the problem of pollution and 
extends to the conservation of renewable 
natural resources, is provided by a 
number of market studies done in Europe 
on wood products. These studies show 
that a large and growing proportion of 
consumers would be willing to pay more 
for wood products from sustainable 
forestry sources (World Resources 
Institute, 1993). 
The foregoing trend is in keeping with 
a process of product differentiation 
representing a concern for both quality 
and control. This concern is illustrated by 
the combative attitude of the consumer in 
the most highly developed countries, by 
the action of "green groups" and 
neighbourhood organizations, and by 
increased awareness on the part of 
traditional political parties. In addition, 
industry itself has exerted pressure on 
Governments to prevent "unfair 
competition" from products originating in 
economies that do not have environmental 
protection policies. As a result of all these 
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pressures, Governments are beginning to 
impose limitations on the movement of 
goods harmful to the environment. 
Indeed, various quality control 
systems for production and products have 
been in the pipeline for some time. Two 
dynamic features of these systems stand 
out. First, as they are incorporated into the 
market, they are being standardized and 
are gradually changing from voluntary to 
formal and, in some cases, compulsory 
systems. Second, quality control systems 
are tending to focus less on product 
quality than on quality of management, 
since the former depends on the latter. 
Standards applying to a product's 
environmental impact during all phases of 
its life-cycle, from the production of its 
natural inputs to the final destination of 
the waste it generates once it has been 
consumed or its useful life has ended, are 
now being formulated. 
The fluidity and stability of world 
trade depend on the existence of a series of 
rules that have been duly harmonized on 
the basis of mutually agreed criteria and 
incorporated into international agreements. 
One instrument which is gaining in 
importance is the "environmental quality 
seal": it represents a new set of standards 
that are playing a growing role as external 
determinants of trade and that should be 
taken into account in any export strategy 
(see box II.3, on environmental labelling in 
Europe). 
Environmental quality labels are also 
being used as part of an effort to establish 
the world-wide certification of timber 
harvested from well-managed forests 
("wood marked with a green label"). One 
indicator of the possible consequences of 
this certification is the change that has 
occurred in the United States market: 
increasingly aware of the importance of 
protecting native forests, it has begun to 
reject furniture manufactured in Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia with native wood 
from virtually non-renewable forests. This 
new attitude has also had a positive 
impact on Chilean exports of products 
made with Monterey pine (from 
plantations), the demand for which has 
increased significantly in the United States 
market. In the case of wood, the "green 
seal" might even become a factor in the 
competitive advantage of this product, 
and wood that does not bear this seal 
might be excluded from a growing 
proportion of global markets. It is fairly 
likely that other goods produced from 
marine and other renewable natural 
resources will receive similar treatment, 
by either Governments or consumers. 
In the developed countries, pressures 
towards better environmental 
management have produced an 
internalization of the relevant costs. At the 
institutional level, these have resulted in 
the adoption by the OECD countries in 1985 
of the "polluter pays principle". The 
formulation of this principle is intended to 
quantify environmental impact and 
classify the generating sources on the basis 
of this impact, which until now has been 
uncontrolled economically. In contrast, in 
the developing countries, including those 
of Latin America, these costs are generally 
not included in the price of their main 
exportable commodity, raw materials 
(Biggs, 1992). This asymmetry tends to 
accentuate the deterioration of the terms of 
trade for such commodities. 
One of the causes of this asymmetry is 
the greater institutional weakness of the 
developing countries, the fragility of their 
legal and regulatory framework, and their 
limited capacity to monitor and control 
environmental damage. Perhaps a more 
basic cause is that these countries are less 
interested in internalizing the 
environmental costs in their main exports 
for fear of losing competitiveness in global 
markets.12 
The logic of world trade, therefore, is 
operating in such a way that, through the 
structure of international prices, all 
12 Strictly speaking, this is a spurious component of competitiveness, since the absence of environmental 
standards leads them to underestimate or even disregard a real production cost or a negative 
externality. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN EUROPE 
At the end of 1992, the em ironnient ministers 
of the European Community agreed to establish 
a system under which a uniform environ-
mental seal would be used throughout 
Lu rope. 
I'ach member State would have an 
organi7ation responsible for awarding the seal 
on the basis of a series of principles tobe defined 
by a committee composed of représentatives of 
Community governments, industries, consumers, 
non-governmental environmental organizations 
and trade unions. 
Currently being discussed is the 
establishment of these seals for a series of 
products based on their environmental 
friendliness, in terms of water and energy 
consumption and the recyclability of some of 
their components. These products are washing 
machines and dishwashers, light bulbs, hair 
sprays, paper for general use and toilet paper. 
The objective would be to label products with n 
detailed description of their features so that the 
consumer can choose freely what products he or 
she wilt buy on the basis of information on their 
environmental impact. 
This initiative is not immune to criticism. 
However, most of the arguments seek to correct 
and perfect the instrument, inU'r alia, bv 
establishing better criteria in relation to product 
life-cycle and recyclabilitv, suggesting certain 
assessment procedures and making a sort of 
life-cycle inventory in the European market. It 
appears that no one is questioning the need to 
inform consumers about these aspects of the 
"environmental quality" of the products they 
are being offered. 
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countries (all consumers) are bearing the 
monetary costs of controlling 
environmental degradation in the 
industrialized countries internalized in 
the price of their products for domestic 
consumption and for export and at the 
same time financing these countries' 
efforts to find new ways of adopting clean 
technologies, minimizing waste and 
saving energy and raw materials. On the 
other hand, environmentally related 
losses in the developing countries are 
being sustained by these countries alone. 
Since these costs are not transferred to the 
price of the product, these products are in 
fact being subsidized for consumers 
throughout the world, and this hidden 
environmental subsidy is discouraging 
the development and implementation 
of clean technologies and other 
environmentally friendly practices. 
To obviate this situation, the countries 
of the southern hemisphere must find a 
way of including in the prices of their 
products the costs of environmental 
protection, i.e., the outlays involved in the 
installation of decontaminating 
equipment, the adoption of clean 
technologies, and the achievement of 
sustainable modes of natural-resource 
use, especially in the case of 
non-renewable resources. The best 
solution would seem to be to resort to 
international negotiation, in which 
producers of natural resources in both 
developed and developing countries 
would be included. This would be a way of 
mitigating the fear of acting individually 
and possibly risking the loss of markets. 
If multilateral action is not feasible, the 
countries of the region could in any case 
begin a process of identifying certain clean 
products for which they can charge a 
premium. Agricultural products are 
especially promising in this sense, since 
consumers in developed countries are 
apparently willing to pay more for 
healthful foods. Moreover, as indicated 
above, it would be important to initiate a 
process in the region aimed at improving 
the countries' institutional capacity to 
monitor and control environmental 
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damage and ensure compliance with 
international agreements. 
Obviously, in the near future, these 
changes will become key components of 
international competitiveness, and the 
countries that are first to incorporate them 
will have an opportunity to acquire 
competitive advantages. The nations of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and of 
the southern hemisphere in general, have 
already fallen behind and should not wait 
any longer to move ahead in this field. 
Besides, trade liberalization and export 
promotion may aggravate the damage to 
ecosystems that is already being caused by 
the production system. In considering 
issues related to changing production 
patterns as a means of meeting the 
requirements of a more open, 
transnational system, special attention 




EXPORT PERFORMANCE IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
1. The new outward-looking 
orientation 
In the early 1980s the countries of the 
region adopted adjustment policies in 
order to cope with external constraints 
(ECLAC, 1984a). Gradually, however, the 
thrust of these measures came to be an 
overall reorientation of economic policy 
which included, inter alia, drastic trade 
reforms. After having made transitions 
entailing high social costs, most of the 
countries have succeeded in boosting their 
export coefficients and in considerably 
improving the management of their 
economic policy. These efforts have been 
reflected in lower inflation, a better fiscal 
performance and, since the beginning of 
the 1990s, somewhat of an upturn in 
growth rates and, to a lesser extent, in 
saving and investment rates. 
The higher real exchange rates 
resulting from the external debt crisis and 
the domestic recessions triggered by the 
adjustment policies of the early 1980s, 
followed by trade reforms, paved the way 
for a significant alteration of the 
production structure. This process 
involved the restructuring of some 
enterprises, the disappearance of others 
and the emergence of new activities. 
This gradual transformation of the 
production structure has been reflected in 
a higher ratio of exports to GDP, a 
diversification of exports, a greater 
competitiveness on the part of a growing 
number of firms, and a substantial 
improvement in entrepreneurs' ability to 
explore and gain access to external markets. 
This restructuring of production 
-which has been marked by an increase in 
the percentage of total output represented 
by exportable items- has shown signs of 
increased flexibility in adapting to 
changes in relative prices and to world 
market trends. Greater economic stability 
has encouraged a larger inflow of foreign 
direct investment and increased access to 
external financing in general, as well as the 
repatriation of capital in some economies. 
As a result, savings and investment rates 
have been moving upward, although they 
are as yet still too low. Last but not least, 
the shift in regional cooperation and 
integration schemes towards a modality of 
greater openness has made it possible for 
countries in the region to conclude a 
number of trade agreements designed to 
establish free trade zones or to permit the 
use of intraregional trade as a tool for 
improving their economies' linkages with 
the global economy. 
The region's economic performance in 
the early 1990s demonstrates that there has 
been some upturn in growth, and this 
trend has, to a large extent, been associated 
with the countries' new balance-of-payments 
position. An element of special 
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significance in this connection is the net 
transfer of resources to the region from 
abroad (amounting to about 3% of the 
region's GDP), which is helping to finance 
its deficit on current account (4% of GDP in 
1993); this deficit has widening since 1990 
in line with a similar trend in the 
merchandise trade balance (see table ffl.l). 
a) Exports: A long-term view 
In general, the correlation between the 
expansion of exports and overall economic 
growth in the countries of the region was 
weak during the 1970s and 1980s. The link 
between the two variables -which was 
already tenuous, in many cases, in the 
1970s- became even more so during the 
crisis of the 1980s, when the recession 
dampened the level of domestic activity at 
the same time that the need to bring about 
an external adjustment was acting as an 
impetus for export growth. With very few 
exceptions, the countries' liberalization 
processes -which have reduced the 
anti-export bias of economic policy- and 
their stabilization programmes -which 
have coupled export incentives with lower 
inflation rates and greater fiscal discipline-
are still in their early stages. On the other 
hand, in many cases there has been a 
tendency for the comparatively high real 
exchange rates with which these processes 
were begun to become eroded by the recent 
abundance of external financing. 
Thus, between 1970 and 1994, the region's 
volume of merchandise exports grew at an 
average annual rate of 4.2%. If Venezuela 
is excluded in order to factor out part of 
the effect of the changes seen in fuel prices 
and export volumes, then the rate of 
expansion was 6.5% per year (see table m.2). 
Table III.2 brings out at least two 
particularly important points. First, in 15 
of the 18 countries listed, the export effort 
(as reflected in the long-term growth rate 
of export volumes) was greater than the 
variation in the purchasing power of 
exports during the same period. 
The reasons for this differential are 
obviously associated with the type of trade 
specialization pursued by the countries of 
the region and with its implications in 
terms of the trends in the relative prices of 
the region's export basket. The second 
point is that, for 10 of these countries (and 
for the region as a whole), the growth rate 
of merchandise exports was higher than 
that of GDP during this 20-year period. 
Here again, however, considerable 
differences are to be observed between one 
sub-period and another. 
The countries turning in the strongest 
export performances, with growth rates of 
over 5% for the period 1970-1994, were (in 
descending order) Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Colombia and Uruguay. The expansion of 
exports has picked up speed in the 1990s, 
with the average rate for 1990-1994 
climbing to 7%. In fact, five countries 
-Costa Rica, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil and 
Ecuador- have actually achieved rates of 
over 9% per year. 
Table III.I 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT ACCOUNT AND TRADE BALANCES 
(Percentages  of  GDP) 
1983-1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Current account3 -1.0 -0.5 -1.8 -3.2 -4.1 
Trade balance 
(goods and services)b 3.3 2.5 07 -11 -1.7 
Source: ECLAC, in 1980 dollars, on the basis of official figures. 
a Equal to the net use of external savings. b The trade balance, at 1980 prices, plus the terms-of-trade effect. 
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Table III.2 
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS AND 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1970-1994 
(In 1980 dollars; annual growth  rates) 
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1994 
Exports Exports 
GDP Pur- GDP v j Pur-chasing " chasing cnasing 
ume ° ume ° ume ° 
power power power 
1970-1994 
Exports Exports 
- GDP Pur- GDP Pur-
hasing " chasing " chasing ° ume ° ume ° l  nn  power 
Argentina 2.8 2.1 3.2 -0.9 7.1 2.4 7.4 3.6 2.7 2.0 4.4 2.8 
Bolivia 3.9 -1.7 7.0 0.0 1.4 -2.4 3.8 11.0 1.1 2.2 1.6 2.8 
Brazil 8.6 8.2 5.3 1.5 6.5 4.2 2.0 9.6 11.0 4.5 7.7 5.8 
Colombia 5.4 3.7 5.5 3.7 6.4 4.9 3.8 7.5 4.7 4.4 5.4 5.1 
Costa Rica 5.5 3.8 4.1 2.3 4.3 3.9 5.0 13.6 11.8 4.0 5.6 5.3 
Chile 2.5 7.4 1.3 2.8 6.6 4.8 6.4 11.1 8.5 3.2 7.7 3.9 
Ecuador 8.9 14.6 13.3 1.9 6.2 3.6 3.6 9.5 4.7 5.0 10.2 7.8 
El Salvador 3.1 4.6 4.7 -0.1 -3.1 -9.5 4.6 4.8 7.1 1.8 1.3 -1.1 
Guatemala 5.7 6.4 6.3 0.8 -0.7 -1.8 3.9 3.7 4.3 3.3 2.9 2.5 
Haiti 4.7 6.7 6.5 -0.4 1.7 -3.4 -8.2 -28.0 -27.1 0.3 -2.1 -4.0 
Honduras 5.6 4.1 3.9 2.3 1.2 1.3 3.3 -2.4 1.8 3.8 1.7 2.4 
Mexico 6.7 10.2 14.4 1.6 8.8 4.8 2.5 5.4 3.0 3.9 8.8 8.4 
Nicaragua 0.2 -1.1 -1.6 -1.4 -0.7 -3.2 0.4 4.7 -5.0 -0.4 0.0 -2.9 
Paraguay 8.7 7.3 5.2 3.2 11.8 16.1 2.7 2.2 -14.3 5.4 8.3 6.0 
Peru 3.9 2.3 1.5 -1.2 -2.3 •4.7 4.3 6.8 3.9 1.8 1.1 -0.8 
Dominican Republic 7.1 4.9 3.9 3.0 0.2 -4.7 3.4 -3.1 -5.3 4.7 1.6 -1.4 
Uruguay 3.0 5.4 -0.5 0.5 5.0 4.7 4.2 4.8 2.3 2.1 5.1 2.1 
Venezuela 1.8 -5.8 10.1 0.4 1.6 -0.7 2.7 5.8 -3.7 1.4 -0.9 3.2 
Latin America 
18 countries 5.6 2.0 6.6 1.2 5.4 2.7 3.4 7.0 4.8 3.4 4.2 4.6 
Latin America 
17 countries 
(excluding Venezuela) 6.0 6.4 5.8 1.3 6.3 3.5 3.4 7.2 6.2 3.6 6.5 4.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Generally speaking, exports rose more 
sharply than GDP throughout the period in 
question and in each individual 
sub-period (see the regional total, 
excluding Venezuela, in table HI.2). 
The rapid GDP growth attained in the 
1970s was accompanied by an even 
steeper increase in the volume of 
merchandise exports (6% and 6.4%, 
respectively). 
The period 1980-1990 was one of 
recession or slow growth in the entire 
region owing to the adjustments that were 
made in domestic demand in order to cope 
with the debt crisis or for purposes of 
stabilization. The rapid expansion of 
exports which was observed in many cases 
could do little, on its own, to counter the 
effects of these adjustments on the level of 
activity. 
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During the period 1990-1994, there 
was a gradual resumption of growth, as 
a result of which the annual average rate 
of increase in GDP rose to 3.4%, after 
having been just 1.2% between 1980 and 
1990. Six countries registered export 
growth rates above the 7% regional 
average, and five of them also recorded 
GDP growth rates above the regional 
mean of 3.4% (see table III.2). As the 
region's macroeconomic environment 
returns to normal, the link between 
export growth and the expansion of 
production appears to be growing 
stronger. As will be discussed later on 
(see chapters V through VIII), this 
change is not a spontaneous 
phenomenon but instead has to do with 
the nature and quality of the countries' 
macroeconomic, trade and production 
policies. 
b) Recent export performance 
In the 1980s, the countries of the 
region drastically modified their 
development strategy. In line with world 
trends towards economic globalization, 
they steered their course back towards 
exports. This change of direction is 
reflected in the variations observed in 
their coefficients of export orientation. 
The most marked increases (over 50% of 
the coefficient) in export orientation 
between 1980 and 1993 -although from 
different starting points in terms of the 
economies' degree of openness to export 
trade- were achieved by Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay (see 
figure III.l). Chile and Uruguay had 
already made considerable headway in 
this direction during the 1970s.13 The 
region as a whole raised its export 
coefficient from 14% of GDP in 1980 to 21% 
in 1990 and to 23% in 1994. Although this 
figure is still low in international terms, 
when compared to the average for 
developing countries14 it represents a 
rapid increase in a brief time-span, and 
eight of the countries are now recording 
export levels equivalent to 30% of GDP or 
more. 
Latin America's reorientation 
towards exports has not been enough, 
however, to reverse the deterioration in 
the region's relative share of world trade 
(see table 1.4). 
2. Export effort and terms of trade 
The considerable export effort made by the 
region during the 1980s and early 1990s 
was seriously undermined -in terms of the 
purchasing power of exports- by the 
downturn in export unit values, which 
was the main cause of the deterioration 
seen in the terms of trade during the 
period (see figure III.2). Thus, in 
1980-1993, while the region expanded the 
volume of its exports by 103% (5.6% per 
year), their value increased by only 51% 
(3.2% per year) owing to a 26% cumulative 
drop in prices. This situation was largely 
due to what is still a heavy dependence on 
commodities involving a low degree of 
processing, whose prices have exhibited a 
downward trend along with sharper 
cyclical fluctuations. 
These trends in Latin America's export 
prices and terms of trade during the 1980s 
must be viewed within the context of the 
differing types of behaviour displayed by 
prices for oil, other commodities and 
13 Generally speaking, there is an inverse relationship between the size of a country's economy and its 
degree of export orientation. This was particularly noticeable in the region during the 1970s, when 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had the lowest export coefficients. In recent years, this relationship has 
been less direct as the countries have opted for export strategies that seek to boost their export 
coefficients as an economic policy objective, regardless of the size of the economy. For example, Chile 
and Mexico now have higher export coefficients than a number of smaller economies. 
14 The region's 1990 export coefficient of 21% of GDP is similar to the average export coefficient for the 
OECD, slightly higher than the average for low-income developing countries and lower than the 
average for medium- and high-income developing economies (World Bank, 1991a). 
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Figure III.I 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO BETWEEN EXPORTS OF GOODS 
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a The countries are listed in accordance with their coefficients for the period 1979-1981. 
manufactures on world markets. In the 
1970s, after the initial impact of higher oil 
prices on world inflation, the terms of 
trade for most Latin American countries 
hovered around a fairly constant level up 
to the end of the decade, and the 
purchasing power of exports increased, 
for the most part, in step with export 
volumes. 
From 1980 onward, these trends broke 
down. A second boom in oil prices was 
followed by a drop to real levels below 
those recorded during the first. 
Commodity prices tended to decline, in 
nominal terms, while the prices of the 
manufactures imported by the region 
climbed further, although slowly. The 
combination of these two trends triggered 
68 LATIN  AMERICA AND THE  CARIBEAN: POLICIES TO. 
Figure III.2 
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a sharp drop in the terms of trade of the 
non-oil-exporting countries in the early 
years of the decade. Between 1986 and 
1990 the prices of some Latin American 
commodity exports did recover, 
however;15 this slowed the decline, but 
could not reverse it. 
Later, up to 1993, the prices of most of 
Latin America's commodity exports 
(including oil) turned downward once 
again -quite sharply, in some cases. As a 
result, the terms of trade of nearly all the 
countries of the region fell below their 
1990 levels (see figure III.2). The decline 
observed in those last three years (-13%) 
only compounded the cumulative drop 
registered between 1980 and 1990 
(-21%). 
Since the mid-1970s, the decline in the 
terms of trade has had a greater impact on 
the non-oil-exporting South American 
countries than on those of Central America 
and the Caribbean, and especially than on 
the oil-exporting countries. The latter, 
however, witnessed a sharper decrease in 
the 1980s because of the high level reached 
by hydrocarbons prices early in that 
decade (see figure 1II.2). 
In 1994, as is well known, a 
widespread upturn was seen in export 
prices. This translated into a 3% 
improvement in the terms of trade during 
that same year. This trend in external 
prices also added further to the abundant 
supply of funds produced by the copious 
inflow of capital to the region (see chapters 
IX and XI). 
3. Sectoral export trends 
During the 1970s, the value of the 
manufactures exported by the region, with 
few exceptions, increased at a 
considerably faster rate than the value of 
total exports. A similar trend, although 
less marked in most cases, was seen in 
1A 
semi-manufactures. During the period 
1980-1987, when the value of exports 
exhibited zero growth or edged up only 
slowly due to sagging prices, few 
countries (Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and, especially, 
Mexico) were able to maintain a significant 
rate of increase in their exports of 
manufactures; instead, most of them had 
to rely on the growth of external 
commodity sales in order to prop up the 
value of their exports. 
Between 1987 and 1993, the region's 
economies saw a general improvement 
in export growth. Except in El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, which were 
held back by conflicts in the subregión, 
the countries recorded an appreciable 
increase in the value of their exports. In 
most cases, manufactures led the way, 
followed by semi-manufactures. In 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and 
Paraguay, commodity sales were very 
strong, however. In Chile, commodity 
sales expanded less rapidly than exports 
of manufactures but more sharply than 
semi-manufactures. In Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay, on the 
other hand, semi-manufactures were the 
growth leaders for exports (see 
table m.3). 
To sum up, the greater buoyancy of 
manufactures exports has become a 
medium-term feature of nearly all the 
countries of the region. This is in line 
with world-wide trends, since the 
volume of world trade in manufactures 
has climbed twice as fast as the volume 
of commodities in the last two decades. 
During this period world trade in 
manufactures has increased at an average 
annual rate of 6.3% and Latin American 
exports of manufactures have grown by 
15 Especially the prices of certain minerals (copper, iron, lead, zinc) and some agricultural raw materials 
(cowhide, wood, tobacco). 
16 During this period, however, Mexico experienced a disproportionate increase in its external sales of 
commodities due to the expansion of its oil exports, and Chile boosted the value of its commodity 
exports almost as much as the value of its manufactures, while the growth rate of its 
semi-manufactures (primarily copper) slowed. 
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Table III.3 
LATIN AMERICA: MERCHANDISE EXPORT TRENDS 
BY TYPE OF PRODUCT 
Annual growth rates Elasticity in relation 
in current dollars (%) to total 
1970- 1980- 1987- 1970- 1980- 1987-
1980 1987 1993 1980 1987 1993 
Argentina Primary products 13.7 -8.3 13.1 0.84 (2.52) 1.03 
Semi-manufactures 18.4 0.2 11.2 1.13 -0.06 0.88 
Manufactures 21.6 0.7 14.4 1.33 -0.21 1.13 
Total 16.3 -3.3 12.8 
Bolivia Primary products 19.1 -4.9 -4.3 1.17 (0.6) -0.72 
Semi-manufactures 13.7 -16.1 15.5 0.84 (1.96) 2.58 
Manufactures 5.5 -11.9 53.6 0.34 (1.45) 8.93 
Total 16.3 -8.2 6.0 
Brazil Primary products 12.8 0.4 2.1 0.58 0.10 0.32 
Semi-manufactures 28.8 1.6 5.5 1.30 0.41 0.82 
Manufactures 36.0 8.1 9.5 1.62 2.08 1.41 
Total 22.2 3.9 6.7 
Colombia Primary products 16.2 2.9 2.1 0.88 0.83 0.31 
Semi-manufactures 23.0 5.6 3.3 1.25 1.60 0.49 
Manufactures 29.5 3.7 19.2 1.60 1.06 2.83 
Total 18.4 3.5 6.8 
Costa Rica3 Primary products 13.5 3.8 6.2 0.87 1.81 0.60 
Semi-manufactures 17.2 -5.4 23.7 1.11 -2.57 2.29 
Manufactures 21.3 -0.3 10.0 1.37 -0.14 0.97 
Total 15.5 2.1 10.3 
Chile Primary products 19.3 6.9 11.8 1.38 5.31 1.08 
Semi-manufactures 12.5 -1.3 8.8 0.89 -1.00 0.80 
Manufactures 24.7 -0.7 25.4 1.76 -0.54 2.31 
Total 14.0 1.3 11.0 
Ecuador3 Primary products 26.8 -1.8 10.5 0.91 (0.62) 1.33 
Semi-manufactures 44.2 -6.7 -11.2 1.51 (2.31) -1.42 
Manufactures 33.4 -7.2 22.2 1.14 (2.48) 2.81 
Total 29.3 -2.9 7.9 
El Salvador 3 Primary products 10.5 1.1 -20.8 0.86 -0.48 1.70 
Semi-manufactures 15.3 -4.9 -1.0 1.25 (2.13) (0.08) 
Manufactures 14.3 -8.9 2.2 1.17 (3.87) -0.18 
Total 12.2 -2.3 -12.2 
Guatemala 3 Primary products 17.7 -6.0 1.6 1.00 (0.90) 0.21 
Semi-manufactures 20.8 -9.3 20.4 1.18 (1.39) 2.68 
Manufactures 15.6 -6.7 12.0 0.88 (1.00) 1.58 
Total 17.7 -6.7 7.6 
Honduras3 Primary products 17.4 0.3 -1.6 1.02 -0.33 2.29 
Semi-manufactures 12.9 -2.0 -9.2 0.76 (2.22) (13.14) 
Manufactures 20.7 -16.4 29.3 1.22 (18.22) -41.86 
Total 17.0 -0.9 -0.7 
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Table III.3 (concluded) 
Annual growth rates Elastidty in relation 
in current dollars (%) to total 
1970- 1980- 1987- 1970- 1980- 1987-
1980 1987 1993 1980 1987 1993 
Mexico a Primary products 37.2 -2.4 -0.3 1.27 -0.59 -0.05 
Semi-manufactures 17.0 9.7 5.0 0.58 2.37 0.86 
Manufactures 16.3 25.0 13.2 0.55 6.10 2.28 
Total 29.4 4.1 5.8 
Nicaragua13 Primary products 10.5 1.1 -20.8 0.86 -0.48 1.70 
Semi-manufactures 15.3 -4.9 -1.0 1.25 (2.13) (0.08) 
Manufactures 14.3 -8.9 2.2 1.17 (3.87) -0.18 
Total 12.2 -2.3 -12.2 
Paraguay Primary products 20.2 5.9 9.4 1.18 3.11 0.74 
Semi-manufactures 13.9 -9.0 19.9 0.81 -4.74 1.56 
Manufactures 15.2 7.4 21.1 0.89 3.89 1.66 
Total 17.1 1.9 12.7 
Peru Primary products 16.9 -8.6 -2.2 1.36 (1.46) -0.31 
Semi-manufactures 6.6 -4.1 11.2 0.53 (0.69) 1.57 
Manufactures 46.8 -5.4 6.8 3.77 (0.92) 0.95 
Total 12.4 -5.9 7.1 
Uruguay Primary products 11.4 -1.0 2.4 0.70 -0.53 0.49 
Semi-manufactures 18.2 3.2 7.6 1.11 1.68 1.56 
Manufactures 25.0 3.6 4.9 1.52 1.89 0.99 
Total . 16.4 1.9 4.9 
Venezuela Primary products 19.1 -10.4 4.3 0.97 (1.27) 0.70 
Semi-manufactures 21.0 -6.0 5.6 1.07 (0.73) 0.92 
Manufactures 25.0 14.2 19.9 1.27 -1.73 3.26 
Total 19.7 -8.2 6.1 
Items pro memoria: 
Unit value of Latin America and 
Caribbean merchandise exports 17.6 -2.6 1.7 
Unit value of developed-country 
exports of manufactures 11.1 2.2 2.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Notes: 1. Merchandise exports have been classified on the basis of the criterion discussed in ECLAC, "El comercio de 
manufacturas de América Latina: evolución y estructura, 1962-1989", Estudios e informes  de la CEPAL, No. 88 
(LC/G.1731-P),  Santiago, Chile, November 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.92.II.G.12, pp. 30-34. 
2. The figures in brackets represent the quotient of negative rates. 
a For 1970-1992. b For 1970-1991; the year 1988 was used in the place of 1987. 
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11%, although it should be noted that the 
levels from which the countries of the 
region started were quite low and that this 
overall figure was strongly influenced by 
the scale of Brazil's and Mexico's sales. The 
fact that, for each percentage point of 
increase in world output during the last 
two decades, trade in manufactures has 
risen by 2% while trade in commodities 
has climbed by only 0.6% (IDB, 1992) 
underscores the importance of the role to 
be played by manufactures in strategies 
aimed at maximizing the contribution of 
exports to growth. 
a) Agricultural exports 
During the 1980s, the volume of the 
region's agricultural exports increased at 
a rate of 2.3% per year, but their value 
rose by only 1.4% per year owing to the 
decline in their unit values. Following 
sharp price decreases in the early 1990s, 
the value of these exports as of 1992 was 
barely on a par with their 1979-1981 
average. 
This performance stands in contrast to 
the trend of earlier decades, particularly 
the 1970s, when the volume of external 
sales climbed by over 4% per year as 
exporters took advantage of booming 
prices. As a result, the value of the region's 
exports more than quadrupled during the 
decade. The slower growth of world food 
demand and the protectionist practices 
used in connection with traditional crops 
in the developed countries led to steep 
decreases in the international prices 
brought by staple crops, especially in the 
1980s (see figures 1.1 and m.3). Under 
these circumstances, the region's exports 
of traditional crops rose very slowly, and 
this situation prompted substantial efforts 
to diversify agricultural exports and to 
penetrate new markets. 
The agricultural export drive 
launched in the 1980s, in the face of a 
pronounced downturn in the international 
prices of traditional products, is 
noteworthy for the strong expansion of 
non-traditional exports which it has 
brought about. A number of countries 
have succeeded in capitalizing upon new 
market opportunities for tropical and 
subtropical fruit and related products, as 
well as for out-of-season vegetables and 
fruits. Growers have also made use 
of advances in food-preservation 
technologies in order to develop new 
varieties that are easier to transport and 
store. With few exceptions, the 
producers in the modern sector of the 
economy are the ones who have taken this 
enterprising approach to non-traditional 
exports and who have been the main 
beneficiaries of government export-
promotion efforts. 
This stronger performance of 
non-traditional agricultural exports has 
been made possible both by the 
improvement in relative prices resulting 
from currency depreciation, deregulation 
and, in some cases, tax cuts, and by major 
advances in extractive and processing 
technologies, biogenetics and biomass 
management techniques, which have 
pushed back the frontier of commercially 
viable agricultural resources (see chapter 
VI, section 3). 
Consequently, substantial changes are 
occurring in the composition of the 
region's agricultural exports. The value of 
non-traditional products (e.g., fresh,17 
frozen and processed fruits and 
vegetables, flowers, beverages and wine) 
trebled during the decade, rising from a 
20% share of the agricultural exports of the 
Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI) countries in 1983 to one third of the 
total in 1990 (ECLAC, 1993a). 
17 It is important to note that the conventional category of fresh, unprocessed produce does not 
necessarily entail a lower level of value added. Fresh produce often requires quite complex processes 
of production, harvesting, selection, classification, quality control, conservation and transportation. 
Furthermore, the final consumers of these products tend to be very demanding as regards their 
quality and appearance. This creates a need for a wide range of ancillary services in the production 
process that add value to the product (ECLAC, 1993a). 
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Figure ÏÏI.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL PRICES 
OF EXPORT PRODUCTS a 
(Percentage  variations  from  the 1975-1976  average) 
A v e r a g e s for: 
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Some of the most outstanding 
examples of non-traditional exports of 
products closely related to the region's 
agricultural resources18 are fresh, frozen, 
dried and salted crustaceans and 
molluscs (Argentina and Panama); 
soluble meal and similar animal feeds 
derived from marine species (Chile and 
Ecuador); frozen shrimp (Ecuador); 
salmon (Chile); grapes (Chile and Mexico); 
apples (Chile); pineapples (Costa Rica and 
Dominican Republic); orange juice 
concentrate (Brazil); fresh poultry 
(Mexico); cut flowers (Colombia and Costa 
Rica); and lumber and cross-ties (Chile). In 
each of these cases, the increase in these 
countries' sales during the period 
1970-1990 far surpassed the average 
growth rate for world exports of the 
products in question (ECLAC, 1992d). 
b) Industrial exports 
Between 1980 and 1992, the value of 
the region's industrial exports 
(semi-manufactures and manufactures) 
rose by 7% annually. In the case of Mexico 
and Chile, the increases were 14% and 
8% per year, respectively, while the 
rates for Brazil and Argentina were 7% 
and 5%. 
The greatest surge in exports during 
this period, for the region as a whole, was 
in basic inputs (14% annually), whose 
growth rate was twice as high as the 
average increase in both labour- and 
capital-intensive traditional and new 
industries. Semi-manufactures expanded 
more slowly (4% per year)19 (see table 
III.4). Mexico stood out not only because 
its industrial exports exhibited the most 
rapid expansion but also because it 
achieved the most balanced growth 
among the various types of industries. In 
Chile, the steepest increase in exports was 
in traditional industries, while in Brazil 
and Argentina basic inputs were the 
growth leader. 
The strong, rapid expansion of exports 
of basic-input manufactures was due to 
three factors: i) this was the industrial 
activity that achieved the greatest gains in 
productivity in the 1980s (3% per year, 
which was almost double the productivity 
growth registered by the manufacturing 
sector overall during this period); ii) the 
fall in domestic demand spurred foreign 
sales because, since this is a 
capital-intensive production process, its 
variable costs, regardless of the exchange 
rate, tend to be much lower than its 
average costs; and iii) its products are 
relatively homogenous "industrial 
commodities" and are therefore easier to 
sell on world markets. 
The fairly strong expansion of the 
region's industrial exports during the 
1980s had two notable features: i) it 
occurred within a context of slow growth 
in industrial output (1.1% per year, as 
opposed to an annual average of 6.4% in 
the 1970s); and ii) in nearly all cases, it led 
to an increase in the share of manufactures 
in total exports. 
As a consequence of this latter 
phenomenon, in two economies -Brazil 
and Mexico- manufactures accounted for 
close to half of total exports in 1993. In 
another two -El Salvador and Uruguay-
they amounted to more than one third of 
18 These products are defined as those which are not included in the Integrated Programme on 
Commodities of UNCTAD, do not belong to the category of energy resources, constitute a new export 
activity for the country in question, involve a new market for the product, may appear outside the 
traditional season and are of some sectoral importance in the relevant national economy (ECLAC, 
1992d). 
19 For the purposes of this discussion, the term "manufactured goods" is understood to refer to the 
articles listed in sections 6,7 and 8 of the SITC, except for those included in chapter 68. In the remainder 
of this chapter, products will be categorized as semi-manufactures, traditional industries, basic 
inputs, new labour-intensive industries and new capital-intensive industries. A more detailed 
explanation of this classification may be found in ECLAC (1992e), pp. 30-34. 
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Table III.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL 
EXPORTS BY TECHNOLOGICAL CONTENT, 1980-1992 


















Argentina 5.4 5.6 2.2 12.9 3.7 1.9 
Brazil 6.6 2.3 8.1 20.8 3.8 2.0 
Chile 8.4 8.6 17.8 8.2 10.9 1.4 
Mexico 14.0 10.9 14.9 13.9 15.6 16.9 
Other countries f 4.4 0.6 7.6 11.4 1.9 -0.7 
Latin America 
and the Caribbean 7.2 3.8 7.9 13.6 6.2 6.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the COMTRADE database and ECLAC-designed software for the analysis 
of industrial growth. 
a Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, wood and wood products, paper and paper products, industrial chemicals, petroleum 
refineries and petroleum and coal products (isic groups 311, 313, 314, 331, 341, 351, 353, 354). b Textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather and leather products, footwear, rubber products, ceramic products, glass and glass products, and 
miscellaneous manufactures (ISIC groups 321,322,323,324,355,361,362,390). c Plastic products, other non-metallic 
mineral products, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals (ISIC groups 356,369,371,372). Furniture, printing and 
publishing, non-electrical and electrical machinery (isic groups 332, 342, 382, 383). e Pharmaceuticals and other 
chemical products, metal products, transport equipment, and professional and scientific equipment (ISIC groups 352, 
381,384, 385). f Includes Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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the total. In the cases of Argentina, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, 
more than 20% of total exports were 
manufactures. On the other hand, in 
countries such as Chile, Ecuador or 
Venezuela in which a single natural 
resource is exploited intensively, exports 
of manufactures were no more than one 
tenth of the total (see table III.5). 
In terms of the technological content of 
exports of manufactures, traditional 
industries were at the forefront in Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. In the cases 
of Nicaragua and Venezuela, industrial 
exports of basic inputs were the dominant 
category. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Mexico, new industries had the largest 
share, although the levels of these 
countries' total exports of manufactures 
varied widely (see table III.5). 
The heterogeneity of the region's 
exports of manufactures from the 
standpoint of both production and 
technological content is illustrated by the 
fact that, as of 1993, Brazil and Mexico 
accounted for a full 75% of the regional 
total; if Argentina's, Colombia's and 
Venezuela's exports of manufactures are 
20 In El Salvador, the main such exports were medicines sold to other Central American countries, textiles 
and manufactures of paper and paperboard; in the case of Uruguay, they were chiefly textiles and hides. 
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Table III.5 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COMPOSITION OF 
EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES (1970,1980,1991-1993) 
(In percentages  and in millions of  dollars) 
Exports Manu-
of factures 
Traditional Basic New Total manu- as a % of 





Argentina 1970 25.9 16.8 57.3 100.0 232 13.1 
1980 36.7 12.5 50.7 100.0 1,645 20.5 
1993 29.7 16.8 53.4 100.0 3,872 29.6 
Bolivia 1970 4.6 94.8 0.6 100.0 13 5.8 
1980 24.4 1.5 74.2 100.0 23 2.2 
1993 82.3 0.4 17.3 100.0 127 15.7 
Brazil 1970 21.8 36.9 41.7 100.0 312 11.5 
1980 23.6 17.4 58.9 100.0 6,740 33.6 
1993 22.3 27.6 50.0 100.0 20,071 51.9 
Colombia 1970 52.9 15.9 31.2 100.0 48 6.6 
1980 54.4 10.4 35.2 100.0 636 16.1 
1993 47.4 16.1 36.5 100.0 2,356 31.6 
Costa Rica 1970 34.9 14.4 50.7 100.0 37 16.1 
1980 40.9 13.8 45.3 100.0 253 26.1 
1992 42.0 17.3 40.7 100.0 400 21.8 
Chile 1970 0.6 29.6 69.7 100.0 27 2.2 
1980 6.4 40.0 53.6 100.0 241 5.3 
1993 30.7 13.4 55.4 100.0 890 9.5 
Ecuador 1970 47.3 0.2 52.5 100.0 3 1.6 
1980 36.5 1.9 61.7 100.0 54 2.2 
1992 40.8 7.2 52.0 100.0 87 3.0 
El Salvador 1970 57.6 9.7 32.7 100.0 57 25.2 
1980 57.5 9.9 32.6 100.0 219 30.5 
1991 54.3 7.1 38.5 100.0 125 34.3 
Guatemala 1970 49.9 12.9 37.2 100.0 76 26.3 
1980 41.4 10.8 47.8 100.0 326 22.0 
1992 37.4 15.9 46.7 100.0 354 26.9 
Honduras 1970 56.0 4.2 39.8 100.0 12 6.8 
1980 35.0 4.4 60.5 100.0 76 9.3 
1992 40.3 7.4 52.3 100.0 78 10.6 
Mexico 1970 22.4 11.0 66.3 100.0 326 27.8 
1980 22.5 6.7 70.7 100.0 1,469 9.5 
1992 10.4 11.4 78.3 100.0 12,966 47.6 
Nicaragua 1970 45.4 19.7 34.9 100.0 24 13.7 
1980 27.6 45.2 27.2 100.0 46 11.2 
1991 22.5 48.9 28.5 100.0 19 7.2 
Paraguay 1970 4.1 7.6 88.3 100.0 5 7.1 
1980 24.7 0.0 75.2 100.0 19 6.1 
1993 67.3 13.2 19.5 100.0 98 13.5 
Peru 1970 36.1 36.1 27.8 100.0 11 1.0 
1980 60.9 12.1 27.0 100.0 494 14.7 
1993 73.3 4.8 21.9 100.0 496 14.3 
Uruguay 1970 76.9 11.8 11.3 100.0 40 17.4 
1980 71.1 10.3 18.5 100.0 377 35.6 
1993 62.6 7.8 29.6 100.0 643 40.1 
Venezuela 1970 4.7 77.2 18.0 100.0 23 0.7 
1980 2.7 59.3 38.0 100.0 216 1.1 
1993 11.5 48.0 40.5 100.0 1,625 10.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. Merchandise exports have been classified on the basis of the criterion 
discussed in ECLAC, "El comercio de manufacturas en América Latina: evolución y estructura, 1962-1989", 
Estudios e informes  de la CEPAL, NO. 88 (LC/G.1731-P),  Santiago, Chile, November 1992, pp. 30 - 34. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. S.92.II.G.12. 
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added in, then this figure rises to 92% of 
the total. Moreover, the relative weight 
of Brazilian and Mexican exports grows 
as the technological complexity of the 
export item increases: these two 
countries accounted for close to 60% of 
traditional exports, three fourths of the 
region's exports of basic inputs and 85% 
of the exports produced by its new 
industries. 
As the region increased its industrial 
exports during the 1980s, it also boosted its 
share in imports of manufactures by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries from 
about 2.7% in 1980 to 3.7% in 1990.21 
Inasmuch as OECD may be considered the 
most demanding and competitive market 
in the world as regards both price and 
quality, the fact that the region has been 
able to expand its share of this market 
indicates that it has made headway in 
raising its level of industrial 
competitiveness. The region's share of 
both traditional manufactures and basic 
industrial inputs grew, but its larger share 
in imports of new low-, mid-range and 
high-technology manufactures was 
essentially a reflection of Mexico's 
performance in that area. 
c) Services 
With exports amounting to US$ 890 
billion as of 1991, services constitute one 
fifth of world trade in goods and services 
(GATT 1993b). In the period 1970-1991, 
commercial services expanded at a yearly 
rate of 13%, measured in current dollars. 
The main sectors were transport and 
travel, but the fastest growth rate was 
seen in the category of other private 
services.23 
The countries of the Group of Seven 
(G-7) accounted for 52% of the world's 
service exports, while the newly 
industrializing economies (NlEs) of Asia 
had a 6% share; only 2.5% of the world 
total came from the six Latin American 
countries ranked among the 50 main 
suppliers of services: Mexico (1.4% of 
world exports); Brazil (0.4%); Chile, 
Argentina and Colombia (0.2% each); and 
the Dominican Republic (0.1%) (GATT, 
1993b). 
The region's exports of services 
increased at an average annual rate of 10% 
between 1985 and 1993, which means 
that its service exports rose from 15% to 
21% of its total exports of goods and 
services in the space of those eight years 
(see table IH.6). 
4. Diversification of exports and 
patterns of specialization 
As a result of the region's search for new 
markets, the existence of favourable 
exchange rates, the implementation of 
promotion policies designed to broaden 
and diversify the supply of tradables, and 
the conclusion of trade agreements, the 
composition and destinations of the 
region's exports have changed radically. 
Indeed, a number of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries have succeeded 
in reducing the degree to which their 
exports are concentrated in a limited 
number of products. In 1970, the region's 
10 main export items represented 56% of 
the total value of its exports, but by 1990 
this figure had fallen to 40%.24 During this 
period, the reduction in the relative weight 
of the 10 main export products was very 
substantial in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, 
21 Version 1.1 of the Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) software was used for these calculations. 
22 There is no internationally agreed definition of tradable services, GATT defines "commercial services" 
as transport, travel and other services and rents in the private sector (see GATT (1993c), p. 68). 
23 This category includes insurance, commissions and brokerage services, construction and 
engineering, communications, consulting, marketing, advisory services and banking. 
24 In contrast to the situation as of 1970, this category also includes two industrial products which have 
a high technological content: motor vehicles (2.3% of total exports) and internal combustion engines 
(2.1%). 
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Table III.6 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Millions  of  dollars at current prices) 
1980 1985 1990 1993 
A. Goods 88.6 92.0 121.9 133.7 
B. Services (non-financial) 16.3 16.6 28.7 36.7 
C. Total exports 104.9 108.5 150.6 170.4 
(B/C)*100  a 15.5 15.3 19.1 21.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Percentage of total exports corresponding to services. 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru (between 
21 and 31 percentage points). In fact, in 
Brazil this proportion was only 37% in 
1991, as compared to 68% in 1970. More 
moderate reductions were observed in 
Bolivia, Argentina and El Salvador. In a 
number of other countries, however, the 
share of total exports accounted for by 
these major items remained constant and, 
in some (Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay), it 
actually increased.25 Thus, whereas the 10 
main export products brought in two 
thirds or more of export earnings in 15 
countries as of 1980, in 1991 this was true 
of only seven countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Venezuela) (ECLAC, 
1993b). 
a) Changes in patterns of  specialization 
In the last two decades the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean have 
made major changes in their patterns of 
specialization. In a large group of 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay 
and Venezuela), the percentage of total 
exports represented by commodities has 
fallen off sharply while the shares of 
semi-manufactures and manufactures 
have risen. In the cases of El Salvador and 
Guatemala, the ground lost by 
commodities was taken over by 
semi-manufactures. In a third group of 
countries (Chile, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Paraguay) the relative share of primary 
exports expanded at the expense of that of 
semi-manufactures, but there was an 
increase in the relatively small share 
represented by exports of manufactures 
(see table III.7). 
Most of the countries that changed 
their patterns of specialization by shifting 
their focus towards manufactures and 
away from commodities or semi-
manufactures registered smaller declines 
in the real prices of their exports26 over the 
two decades in question than the countries 
where this did not occur. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that the 
acquisition of competitive advantages in 
manufacturing improves a country's 
position within the international 
economy. 
Of the countries that turned in the best 
export performances in the 1980s, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico did so by 
25 In Mexico, this was due to the incorporation of oil exports, which led to a steep rise in the 10 main 
products' share of the total between 1970 and 1980; this proportion subsequently declined, however. 
26 Defined as the ratio between the unit value of the merchandise exports of the country in question 
and the unit value of the manufactures exported by developed countries. 
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Table III.7 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COMPOSITION OF 
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (1970,1980,1991-1993) 




Argentina 1970 61.3 25.6 13.1 0.1 
1980 48.9 30.6 20.5 0.0 
1993 34.4 36.0 29.6 0.0 
Bolivia 1970 48.4 45.8 5.8 0.1 
1980 61.3 36.5 2.2 0.0 
1993 42.6 32.6 15.7 9.1 
Brazil 1970 67.0 21.2 11.5 0.3 
1980 30.2 36.0 33.6 0.2 
1993 18.3 28.7 51.9 0.1 
Colombia 1970 85.1 7.7 6.6 0.6 
1980 70.3 11.3 16.1 2.3 
1993 51.5 10.6 31.6 6.3 
Costa Rica 1970 72.0 11.9 16.1 0.0 
1980 60.2 13.7 26.1 0.0 
1992 55.8 14.1 21.8 8.2 
Chile 1970 12.9 84.9 2.2 0.0 
1980 20.2 74.4 5.3 0.1 
1993 30.9 55.0 9.5 4.5 
Ecuador 1970 90.5 7.9 1.6 0.0 
1980 74.3 23.5 2.2 0.0 
1992 90.1 6.7 3.0 0.2 
El Salvador 1970 63.2 11.4 25.2 0.2 
1980 54.2 15.0 30.5 0.3 
1991 45.5 20.0 34.3 0.1 
Guatemala 1970 60.1 13.5 26.3 0.1 
1980 60.2 17.6 22.0 0.2 
1992 47.6 25.3 26.9 0.2 
Honduras .1970 75.0 18.2 6.8 0.0 
1980 77.8 12.8 9.3 0.0 
1992 81.1 7.6 10.6 0.7 
Mexico 1970 45.3 26.7 27.7 0.3 
1980 80.7 9.7 9.5 0.1 
1992 38.2 13.5 47.6 0.6 
Nicaragua 1970 68.3 18.0 13.7 0.1 
1980 73.1 15.7 11.2 0.0 
1991 68.4 21.3 7.2 3.1 
Paraguay 1970 43.7 49.2 7.1 0.0 
1980 56.7 37.2 6.1 0.0 
1993 62.1 24.4 13.5 0.0 
Peru 1970 30.5 68.4 1.0 0.0 
1980 44.9 40.3 14.7 0.1 
1993 21.1 57.5 14.9 6.5 
Uruguay 1970 61.6 20.9 17.4 0.1 
1980 ., 39.8 24.5 35.6 0.1 
1993 28.1 31.2 40.1 0.6 
Venezuela 1970 70.0 29.0 0.7 0.2 
1980 66.6 32.2 1.1 0.0 
1993 50.9 37.0 10.8 1.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. Merchandise exports have been classified on the basis of the criterion 
discussed in ECLAC, "El comercio de manufacturas en América Latina: evolución y estructura, 1962-1989", 
Estudios e informes  de la CEPAL, No. 88 (LC/G.1731-P),  Santiago, Chile, November 1992, pp. 30-34. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. S.92.II.G.12. 
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reorienting their export profiles towards 
industrial products. Costa Rica also 
reduced the share of commodities in its 
exportable supply and increased the 
proportion of manufactures and other 
goods. The solid export performances of 
Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay were based 
mainly on a strengthening of their 
commodity-oriented export profiles, 
although some diversification of products 
and markets was also observed (see table 
III.7). 
Within world trade in manufactures, 
new industries have been comparatively 
more buoyant. In this respect, there is a 
marked contrast between different groups 
of countries. Brazil and Mexico recorded 
substantial increases in their exports of 
these types of products, which have come 
to represent 26% and 37%, respectively, of 
their merchandise exports. Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Uruguay occupied an intermediate 
position, with new industries providing 
between 8% and 16% of total exports. 
Venezuela, Paraguay, Chile, Ecuador and 
Bolivia, on the other hand, as yet have only 
a very small part of their total exports in 
this category (see table III.5). 
An examination of how selected 
economies' export specialization profiles 
have influenced their trading patterns 
reveals the persistence of trade surpluses 
in commodity trade which help to finance 
a net deficit in the industrial sector. Brazil 
is the exception to this rule, in that it runs 
deficits in its commodity trade and 
surpluses in all the other categories except 
new industries (see table III.8). The 
country actually does have trade 
surpluses in agricultural and mining 
products, but these two positive balances 
are outweighed by its deficit in energy 
products. Chile, too, has had a favourable 
trade balance in industrial products 
because its surplus in semi-manufactures, 
especially those based on mining 
resources, has outweighed its deficit in 
manufactures. 
Of the countries with a trade deficit in 
industrial products, Colombia and Mexico 
show a deficit in manufactures and 
semi-manufactures whereas Argentina 
runs a deficit only in manufactures. Under 
the heading of exports of manufactures, 
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia are net 
exporters of traditional industrial 
products and Brazil is also a net exporter 
of basic inputs. Under the heading of new 
industries, all the countries considered 
here are net importers. However, since the 
mid-1980s Brazil has became a net 
exporter of the goods produced by new 
capital-intensive industries. 
b) Diversification  of  products and markets 
A comparison of the present 
composition of exports by technological 
categories and destinations27 with the 
export mix that existed in the early 1970s 
reveals significant changes in the export 
specializations of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries with regard to their 
various markets (see table III.9). 
i) In the region's exports to the United 
States, the proportion of commodities was 
reduced and exports of mining products 
almost disappeared altogether. This 
change was accompanied by an increase in 
exports of primary energy products. 
Semi-manufactures fell off sharply and the 
share of manufactures nearly trebled. This 
change was primarily due to an increase in 
exports of both labour- and capital-
intensive new industrial products. 
ii) In the case of Europe, too, the share 
of commodities (particularly agricultural 
products) declined while the share of 
manufactures rose. Among the latter, the 
increase in exports by new industries 
(mostly those with a mid-range 
technological content) was particularly 
notable, as these items climbed from 2% to 
10% of the region's total exports to Europe. 
iii) In exports to Japan as well, the 
relative share of commodity exports 
declined, falling to under 50% in 1992; this 
27 For the purposes of this analysis, five destinations were defined: United States, Japan, Europe (EEC 
and EFTA), Latin America and the Caribbean, and other regions. 
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Table HI.8 
LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): TRADE BALANCE AND 
PATTERN OF SPECIALIZATION 














Argentina + - + - + - -
Brazil - + + + + + -
Colombia + - - - + - -
Chile + + + - - - -
Mexico + - - - n.s. - -
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. The trade balance sign is the average for the period 1980-1992, in 1985 
dollars. 
reduction was the result of decreases in 
exports of agricultural and mining 
products, since the proportion of energy 
products rose considerably. In this case, 
the corresponding expansion of industrial 
exports was due to an upturn in 
mineral-based semi-manufactures and 
basic inputs. New industries increased 
their share in regional exports to Japan 
only marginally. 
iv) The profile of intraregional exports 
reflects a drastic shift away from the 
once-predominant category of primary 
energy products and towards industrial 
products, which now account for three 
quarters of all trade among the countries 
of the region. One fourth of this amount is 
represented by semi-manufactures, whose 
share has remained fairly constant. The 
notable increase in industrial exports is 
therefore attributable to manufactured 
goods (which now account for one half of 
tiie total), especially basic inputs and new 
industries (particularly capital-intensive 
ones). 
v) In sum, the region's exports within 
Latin America are clearly oriented 
towards industrial products and 
especially those from new industries; in 
the cases of Japan and Europe, they are 
skewed towards commodities and 
semi-manufactures, with greater 
opportunities for exports from new 
industries being observed in the European 
market. However the United States offers 
the greatest opportunities of all the major 
industrialized markets for exports from 
new industries. 
The diversification of products and 
markets has assumed different forms 
within the region. Brazil and, to a lesser 
extent, Uruguay and Colombia have 
achieved the highest degree of 
diversification. These countries have 
substantially reduced the relative weight 
of their 10 main export items in their total 
external sales, have increased the number 
and volume of different raw materials and 
semi-manufactures, have begun to export 
a succession of different types of 
manufactures and have diversified the 
regional destinations of their exports. 
Mexico concentrated its trade activity on 
one destination (the United States) but 
diversified its exports, especially 
manufactures, by incorporating new 
products. Argentina's diversification 
process has been somewhat erratic as a 
result of the policy changes and recessions 
of the 1980s. Be that as it may, it has sought 
-although less intensively than Brazil and 
Mexico- to incorporate manufactures and 
to diversify its supply of raw materials and 
semi-manufactures as well as the 
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Table III.9 
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES):3 COMPOSITION OF 



















A. Commodities 47.0 39.8 66.1 48.3 51.0 25.1 59.6 43.8 53.6 36.3 
1. Agricultural products 25.5 15.1 32.8 17.4 11.7 9.4 46.9 26.6 29.9 16.6 
2. Mining products 6.3 0.9 31.5 20.0 1.0 2.0 6.7 6.9 6.2 4.4 
3. Energy products 15.2 23.8 1.8 10.9 38.3 13.8 6.0 10.3 17.6 15.3 
B. Industrial products 52.6 58.9 32.0 50.4 48.8 74.4 40.0 54.1 46.0 62.1 
1. Semi-manufactures 40.1 22.1 27.1 38.0 23.3 25.1 33.6 34.2 33.6 28.5 
1.1 Agriculturally-
based, labour-
intensive 5.6 5.1 3.1 7.8 7.5 7.8 15.8 17.0 9.5 10.2 
1.2 Agriculturally-
based, capital-
intensive 8.6 1.8 6.1 6.6 3.1 3.6 2.6 4.6 6.0 3.9 
1.3 Mineral-based 6.7 6.2 17.2 23.6 6.4 8.2 13.5 11.1 9.2 9.1 
1.4 Energy-based 19.2 9.1 0.7 0.2 6.2 5.5 1.7 1.4 8.9 5.3 
2. Manufactures 12.5 36.8 4.9 12.4 25.5 49.4 6.4 19.9 12.4 33.6 
2.1 Traditional 
industries 5.0 8.6 2.0 1.4 4.8 8.4 3.6 6.3 4.3 7.3 
2.2 Basic inputs 1.6 4.5 1.1 5.8 4.8 10.7 0.7 3.7 1.9 7.3 
2.3 New labour-
intensive 
industries 3.9 11.0 1.5 4.1 8.7 13.0 1.0 5.8 3.6 9.1 
a) Low technological 
content 0.4 1.3 0.1 2.3 1.7 2.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.3 
b) Mid-range 
technological content 1.6 5.7 0.2 0.4 4.1 6.7 0.4 3.9 1.6 4.8 
c) High technological 
1.4 content 1.8 4.0 1.2 1.4 3.0 4.2 0.4 1.3 3.0 
2.4 New capital-intensive 
industries 2.0 12.6 0.4 1.1 7.2 17.3 1.1 4.1 2.6 9.8 
a) Low technological 
content 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 
b) Mid-range 
technological content 1.3 10.4 0.3 0.5 5.0 14.4 0.6 2.9 1.7 8.1 
c) High technological 
content 0.4 1.6 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.8 0.4 1.0 0.6 1.3 
Other 0.4 1.3 1.9 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 2.0 0.4 1.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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destinations of its exports. Chile's and 
Peru's exports are concentrated in 
commodities and semi-manufactures, but 
these countries have diversified the 
destinations of their exports. Chile greatly 
increased its exports of manufactures, but 
was starting from a very limited base, as 
well as diversifying its exports of raw 
materials and semi-manufactures. Peru, 
for its part, began to sell some 
manufactures which it had not exported 
before, but did not modify any of the 
essential features of its pattern of 
specialization. Exports from Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Paraguay were still 
concentrated in a few commodities and 
were routed to one major market in each 
case: the United States for Ecuador, and 
Latin America for Bolivia and Paraguay. 
The concentration of products and 
markets is somewhat less marked in the 
cases of Costa Rica and Guatemala, but is 
still considerable. 
Mexico constitutes a special case in 
terms of export diversification by product 
and destination because virtually all of its 
exports go to the United States. In all other 
cases, Europe continues to be a major 
market for the region's commodities and 
semi-manufactures. While this market's 
relative weight has declined (partly as a 
result of a process of product 
diversification which, in the case of the 
bigger countries, has reduced the share of 
commodities), it continues to be the largest 
market, absorbing more than 30% of the 
exports of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Paraguay and close to that percentage in 
the cases of Bolivia, Colombia and Uruguay. 
The United States is the main buyer of 
the region's fuel and petrochemical 
exports, while Europe and Japan are 
supplied mainly by the Middle East and 
Africa. Latin America is an important 
market for natural gas (Bolivia and 
Argentina). 
Latin America and the Caribbean are a 
very important and rapidly growing 
market for manufactures. For Colombia, 
Chile and Ecuador this is by far the biggest 
market for such goods, regardless of 
whether they are produced by traditional, 
basic-input or new industries. This 
concentration is slightly less marked in the 
cases of Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, which have a fairly diversified 
range of markets for their traditional 
industries and, in the case of Argentina, for 
basic inputs as well. However, Latin 
America has been and continues to be 
virtually the only destination for exports 
from new industries in these countries, as 
is the subregional market for exports from 
new industries in Costa Rica and 
Guatemala. Brazil has channelled its 
exports of manufactures to different 
markets. The United States continues to be 
the main buyer of traditional products, 
followed by Europe. In the case of basic 
inputs, other developing regions have 
displaced Latin America as the main 
destination, but in the case of new 
industries, the region is the largest market; 
Mexico is an exception in this respect, 
since the regional market is of less 
importance for it than the United States.28 
5. Intraregional trade and technological 
intensiveness 
Forms of development based on growing 
and sustained international compe-
titiveness are buttressed by the dynamic 
effects of technological learning processes. 
For their part, strategies aimed at 
improving international linkages based on 
the development of the production sector 
emphasize the role played by trade in 
stimulating activities which make 
intensive use of knowledge and 
technology. Consequently, trade among 
28 Regressions carried out for the period 1970-1991 show a strong positive correlation between the 
importance of Latin America as a destination and the share of total exports represented by products 
from new industries in the case of Argentina, as well as a positive but weaker correlation in the case 
of Brazil. For Chile, these calculations revealed a strong positive correlation for manufactures as a 
whole. For Mexico, however, no significant correlation was found to exist. 
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developing countries is generally thought 
to be concentrated in goods that are more 
technology-intensive than those traded 
between developing and industrial 
countries. 
A number of studies which are wholly 
based on foreign trade data (ECLAC, 1992e; 
Barbera, 1990) substantiate this argument. 
It has also been corroborated by a recent 
ECLAC study (Buitelaar, 1993a) which looks 
at both foreign trade data and production 
data. The figures show that products for 
which a fairly substantial share of demand 
comes from the regional market are 
precisely those whose technological 
characteristics are more likely to generate 
externalities than those sold on 
9Q 
extraregional or domestic markets. 
Three main conclusions are to be 
drawn from the research carried out to 
date: 
a) The production of those goods 
which are more heavily dependent on 
intraregional trade is more technologically 
sophisticated. Such goods primarily 
comes from the chemical, non-electrical 
machinery and transport equipment 
sectors. These sectors are also ones in 
which international demand tends to be 
more dynamic and in which price 
movements tend to be more stable and 
more positive over the long term. 
b) Sectors that make a strong export 
effort vis-à-vis the regional market also do 
so (simultaneously or subsequently) in 
respect of extraregional markets, which 
suggests that the promotion of 
intraregional trade is complementary to 
the promotion of extraregional exports. 
c) These are also sectors in which the 
region is heavily dependent upon 
extraregional imports; therefore, 
intraregional trade in the products of these 
sectors benefits by gaining access to the 
inputs and equipment that may then be 
imported from third countries. 
In sum, intraregional trade -precisely 
because of its special characteristics, which 
have to do with proximity and the contacts 
of all sorts that facilitate such trade- is 
complementary to the development of 
linkages with the global economy and 
provides an environment that stimulates 
technological learning processes which, in 
turn, lead to greater international 
competitiveness and a more diversified, 
balanced pattern of specialization in the 
world economy. 
29 For a thorough discussion of this subject, see ECLAC (1994a). 
Chapter IV 
EXPORTS AND CHANGING 
PRODUCTION PATTERNS 
1. Exports and growth 
In the present international context, an 
increasing ability to compete and to 
achieve more dynamic linkages with 
world markets have become essential for 
sustained growth. In the framework of the 
proposal put forward by ECLAC (ECLAC, 
1990a; 1992a), several conditions are 
necessary for successfully changing 
production patterns as an impetus to 
growth. First, a change in relative prices 
that favours the production of exportables 
and the equilibrium of the export sector; a 
real exchange rate that depreciates pari 
passu with the gradual reduction of 
protection against imports, incentives and 
drawbacks for exporters; and safeguard 
mechanisms to offset unfair competition 
from external suppliers. Second, a 
macroeconomic environment favourable 
to investment and technological 
innovation; among other requisites, this 
presupposes a level of economic activity 
close to the production frontier and 
"reasonable" real interest rates which are 
compatible with the profitability of 
productive capital. Third, an endowment 
of production factors which is capable of 
responding to the demand from producers 
of exportables and efficient producers of 
import substitutes. Many of these factors 
come from markets that are currently 
imperfect, incomplete or non-existent. 
Therefore, what is needed is an active, 
efficient policy of government support so 
that liberalization will lead to 
self-sustained growth, which includes 
improving or creating the markets or 
institutions needed to steadily enhance 
productivity. 
At least three ways can be 
distinguished in which exports can help to 
increase a country's economic growth 
rate.30 
The first is the role which export 
earnings play in generating foreign 
exchange, making it possible to acquire the 
imports that every country needs to fuel its 
economic expansion.31 
30 A great number of econometric studies have tried to find a statistical link between export growth 
and output. A survey of these studies yields no definitive conclusions as to the exact role played by 
exports in the growth process. Rather, they show a complex link that does not operate in the same 
way or in the same terms in all cases. Results depend, decisively, on the quality of public policies and 
the external environment (Moguillansky, 1994; Rivas, 1994). 
31 Given the heavy dependence of developing countries on imported machinery and equipment, the 
availability of foreign exchange can also considerably affect the investment rate (Taylor, 1988; 
Diaz-Alejandro, 1976). 
86 LATIN  AMERICA AND THE  CARIBBEAN: POLICIES TO. 
Only a good export performance can 
ensure a sustainable supply of foreign 
exchange over the medium and long term. 
This entails promoting exports, but 
bearing in mind that this is not just a 
question of volume but also of price: what 
is important from the standpoint of 
generating foreign exchange is not only 
the volume of exports but also the return 
obtained from them. Thus, it is important 
to promote exports of goods and services 
whose prices (by unit of inputs) are likely 
to rise, rather than fall, over time. 
It is also important to reduce 
fluctuations in the supply of foreign 
exchange, in order to avoid the 
repercussions that the cyclical nature of 
international goods markets can have on 
domestic activity. In this regard, a number 
of instruments designed to mitigate 
abrupt fluctuations have been used in 
recent years to supplement traditional 
policies aimed at diversifying the basket of 
export goods and target markets. These 
new instruments include stabilization 
funds for products that account for a high 
percentage of export earnings and the 
development of incipient futures markets 
(see chapter II). 
The second way in which exports 
influence development is through 
so-called "linkages". In a ground-breaking 
study, Hirschman (1978) identified 
"backward" and "forward" production 
linkages. A backward linkage involves the 
possibility that the development of a 
particular activity might lead to the 
emergence or expansion of local 
suppliers of inputs and capital goods for 
that activity (for example, the 
development of canned fruit exports can 
stimulate the expansion of tin can 
manufacturing, or the installation of an 
automotive plant can lead to the 
development of an automotive parts 
industry). A forward linkage, on the other 
hand, involves the possibility of increasing 
the degree of processing or incorporating 
more value added into an existing 
production line (for example, wood pulp 
production based on the availability of 
forestry resources). 
Obviously, the more highly processed 
the exports and the more integrated the 
production chain, the greater the 
dynamism of the economic activity 
generated by foreign sales. In this sense, 
the contribution that exports make to 
growth will depend on the level of 
development of the economy's production 
structures. It is important in this regard to 
emphasize that linkages represent a 
potential whose realization is by no means 
guaranteed. This is where public policy is 
important -not to establish such linkages 
artificially, but to provide the technology, 
training and infrastructure needed to 
facilitate that process. 
Besides production linkages, there are 
other effects as regards the impact on 
consumption and fiscal revenues. Thus, 
the more labour-intensive the export 
activity (considering the direct and 
indirect employment created) and the 
better distributed the income generated 
within and among firms, the greater the 
effect on domestic demand. Tax policy can 
also help to increase the positive effects on 
output growth when exports produce 
high economic rents. This obviously 
depends, however, on what the 
Government does with the revenues 
obtained. 
The third way in which exports can 
affect the output growth rate has to do 
with export activities' greater contact with 
the international economy and the 
pressures they face tobe competitive. This 
may not only lead to a more efficient 
utilization of available resources but also 
help raise productivity in other areas of the 
economy. As shown by some studies on 
the performance of firms in the region, 
enterprises that export tend to be more 
innovative than average as regards both 
technology and management (Guerguil, 
Macario and Peres, 1993). Although no 
similar studies have been made of the 
impact of the experience of export firms on 
activities geared to the domestic market, 
certain suggestions can be made as to how 
that influence might be increased. 
Clearly, the more export firms and 
export-producing sectors there are, the 
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greater their impact. The number of 
contacts between exporters and domestic 
producers increases, and there are more 
opportunities to share information, 
designs, management methods, etc. This 
kind of feedback can take place through 
explicit channels (such as links with 
suppliers and agreements with 
subcontractors) or through more informal 
channels such as personnel movements 
and demonstration effects. On the other 
hand, the more export activity is limited to 
a few products and producers, with few 
links to other areas of the economy, and 
the more it becomes like an "enclave", the 
more limited its impact is likely to be. 
The impact will be proportionately 
greater when the capacity of the country to 
absorb the lessons learned by export firms 
is greater. Innovations will be more easily 
adopted and stimulated if there are 
mechanisms to expedite technology 
transfer, if the educational level of the 
workforce is high, if there are functioning 
systems for training and retraining 
personnel, if business associations are 
active in promoting exchanges of 
information and knowledge among their 
members, in short, if there is an 
institutional framework which stimulates 
adaptation and innovation among firms, 
whether or not they are exporters. 
In some cases, export activities are 
carried out by transnational corporations, 
which tend to adopt innovations more 
easily but may have less incentive to pass 
them on to others. In some countries (the 
Republic of Korea is a good example), 
access to foreign investment is tied to 
technology transfer agreements (Anglade 
and Fortin, 1987). Even though the basic 
concern in many Latin American and 
Caribbean countries today is simply to 
attract investments, they should still 
explore ways of encouraging the firms that 
come into the region to transfer more 
innovations. 
In sum, there are many reasons why a 
country should increase its exports. In 
general, exports are the main source of 
foreign exchange, which is essential for 
financing imports. Through linkages, 
exports can also help activate material and 
human resources that are available but 
underutilized because of a lack of demand. 
Also, resources are likely to be more 
productive if they are used for export 
activities, since installed capacity can be 
used more intensively, economies of scale 
are easier to achieve (particularly in small 
countries), and rapid access to imported 
inputs and external competition lead to 
greater efficiency and a more rapid 
adoption of innovations by producers of 
exportable goods and services. In 
addition, exports can generate positive 
externalities for the rest of the economy by 
demonstrating the benefits to be obtained 
from the more sophisticated practices 
used by export firms; by moving to other 
sectors of the economy managers and 
employees who have learned to cope with 
the demands of international 
competitiveness; and by the actual 
demands which export firms make on 
their domestic suppliers in terms of 
quality and ability to meet deadlines. 
Lastly, various authors have pointed out 
that further external liberalization would 
also have the advantage of promoting 
more efficient management of overall 
economic policy (Krueger, 1980; Mussa, 
1987). This is because the more linkages 
there are between the domestic economy 
and the international economy, the greater 
the costs of introducing severe market 
distortions or making mistakes in 
macroeconomic management. 
These various ways in which exports 
can contribute to economic growth justify 
the increasing efforts being made to 
promote them, both in the region and in 
other parts of the world. 
2. The transition period of liberalization 
Generally speaking, trade reforms have 
taken place in the context of sweeping 
changes in which international 
competitiveness and exports play a key 
role. The main instrument of reform in 
Latin America has been the more or less 
indiscriminate and rapid liberalization of 
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imports. The purpose of opening up the 
economy has been to expose domestic 
producers of importable items, who have 
frequently enjoyed in the past 
considerable protection to external 
competition. Liberalization would 
enhance productivity and reduce 
inefficiency by allowing the economy to 
absorb new technologies and increase 
specialization. In extreme situations, those 
producers who did not adapt to external 
competition would be driven out of the 
market. The resources thus released 
would be absorbed mainly by the 
production of exportables. 
Indirect export incentives include the 
lower cost and greater variety of 
importable inputs to which producers 
have access, and the eventual depreciation 
of the national currency which import 
liberalization would tend to generate in 
the exchange market. 
All of these are effects that tend to 
occur to some extent. What matters is how 
fast they occur, and how the positive and 
negative effects are distributed in the 
course of the economy's adjustment to the 
reforms. The outcome is not a single 
trajectory or goal, since much depends on 
the point of departure, the other economic 
policies adopted during the process, and 
the external context. 
The response of producers of import 
substitutes depends on the magnitude of 
changes in relative prices, the rapidity of 
the changes, and the capacity of the 
producers to adjust. The ideal situation is 
one in which producers are given enough 
time to restructure, but only the time 
Strictly necessary, so that they are 
effectively pressured to increase their 
productivity. For example, "water" or 
redundant nominal protection should be 
removed immediately. However, except 
for reasons of political feasibility, it is 
preferable that the phasing out of effective 
protection should be paced so as to give 
producers the time they need to introduce 
innovations, increase specialization and 
reallocate resources. 
The response of exports depends on 
how much they use importable items and 
the trade barriers applied to these items 
before the reform. Inputs and capital 
goods imported by exporters have 
normally enjoyed certain tariff 
exemptions, but there are also numerous 
cases where exports were discouraged by 
an inoperative or arbitrary import regime. 
More specifically, the development of 
non-traditional exports was constrained 
by a lack of access to crucial inputs, since 
import exemptions were normally 
available to exporters only in already 
established activities. 
For reform to be successful the net 
effect of changes in incentives must be to 
boost the production of tradable goods. 
One determinant of how production of 
both exportables and importables will 
respond is the evolution of the real 
exchange rate. 
The combination of changes in relative 
prices, their credibility and gradualness, 
and the macro- and meso-economic 
context in which reform takes place 
determines whether the stimuli given to 
resource allocation are primarily positive 
or negative, in other words, whether being 
exposed to competition during the 
adjustment process is creative or 
destructive. This in turn determines 
whether restructuring expands the 
frontier of production, as it did in the 
Asian NIES, or whether its initial effect is a 
drop in economic activity or a slower 
recovery of a recessive market, in an 
adjustment process that moves below the 
production frontier. 
In the last-mentioned case, the stimuli 
arising from a drop in import substitution 
are stronger in the beginning than the 
positive effects of an expansion of exports. 
The enterprise that survives under the 
second strategy may be stronger and more 
dynamic on average than in the first case. 
However, in the short term there is more 
destruction than creation: more businesses 
fail than are set up. Consequently, during 
the first years of adjustment there will be 
fewer productive resources available and 
in full use, since businesses are either 
failing or cutting back: this could mean 
further underutilization of resources, and 
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the stimulus for total investment would 
tend to be weaker. Therefore, greater 
"microeconomic efficiency" would tend to 
coexist with less "macroeconomic 
efficiency". The hysteresis of the process 
determines the final outcome. Indeed, 
what happens during the transition 
decisively affects the well-being and the 
production structure attained by the end 
of the adjustment process. Countries such 
as Japan, the Republic of Korea and the 
Chinese Province of Taiwan solved this 
problem by first promoting exports 
(which tend to expand capacity) and only 
later, gradually and in a context of high 
capital formation, opening up to imports 
(which during rapid liberalization tend to 
destroy capacity). 
The speed of the adjustment will depend 
on the credibility of the timing of the change, 
particularly the initial situation, the initial 
level and the evolution of the exchange 
rate, and on producers' access to the resources 
needed to restructure: available skilled 
manpower, technology, accessible 
long-term financing at reasonable interest 
rates, suitable infrastructure, receptive 
external markets and a domestic market in 
a context of macroeconomic equilibrium. 
For example, in a highly distorted 
environment, with imports severely and 
arbitrarily suppressed by quantitative 
mechanisms, replacing these mechanisms 
with tariffs could considerably improve 
efficiency. Import regime reform could 
make it easier to expand both exports and 
import substitution, which had been 
constrained by an inadequate supply of 
intermediate goods and services and capital. 
3. The impact of exchange rate policy 
on the growth of exportable supply 
One of the main instruments affecting the 
growth of exportable supply is exchange 
rate policy. A devaluation increases the 
net return in local currency to exporters 
and therefore stimulates export activity. 
However, it is known that sporadic 
devaluations alone do not encourage 
exports. The export sector needs constant 
incentives in order to develop, since 
investment resources must be reallocated. 
Large inflows of external capital, a 
phenomenon of the late 1970s that has 
resurfaced in recent years, have led many 
countries to revalue their currencies, which 
may have helped to stabilize the inflation 
rate but has also tended to discourage the 
allocation of resources to export 
production. However, recent reforms in 
trade policy have in many cases helped to 
offset the effect of revaluation on the export 
sector by lowering tariffs on imported 
inputs needed to produce exportable goods 
and services or by granting direct subsidies 
to such production activities. 
Table IV. 1 presents, for some countries, 
trends in the volume of industrial or non-
traditional exports (which have shown the 
most significant growth) and in the 
exchange rate and trade policy indicators 
between 1980 and 1993. The table shows 
steady growth in export volume during 
the period 1985-1989 in Colombia, Chile 
and Mexico, and fluctuating trends in 
Argentina and Brazil. Towards the end of 
the decade, the real exchange rate and 
subsidies to the sector declined. Revaluation 
is clearly seen in Argentina from 1989 
onwards, in Brazil between 1987 and 1990, 
in Mexico from 1988 onwards and in Chile 
from 1990. However, in all these countries, 
revaluation took place after a considerable 
number of devaluations in the preceding 
years, associated with the external debt 
crisis, which not only had a short-term 
impact but also affected long-term trends 
in exports. In Brazil's case, the real 
exchange rate had been depreciating since 
the mid-1970s; exchange rate policy 
therefore benefited the export sector over 
a long period of time. 
In order to evaluate the impact of 
changes in the exchange rate and related 
instruments on export trends in the short 
and long term, the magnitude of response 
and speed of adjustment to variations in 
these policies must be measured. 
Econometric studies, which have been 
available for several decades in several 
countries of the region, can provide that 
information. 
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Table IV. 1 
EXPORT VOLUME, REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND TRADE POLICY a 
(Indexes:  1985 = 100) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Argentina 
Industrial exports 84.8 100.0 82.1 82.3 111.5 139.2 184.4 157.2 162.2 193.6 
Real exchange rate 62.0 100.0 105.8 129.3 137.0 151.1 105.6 88.2 81.5 77.1 
Drawbacks 116.0 100.0 104.0 110.0 106.0 103.0 105.0 111.0 115.0 
Brazil 
Industrial exports 40.9 100.0 87.3 91.6 114.1 111.9 101.0 107.2 130.1 141.8 
Real exchange rate 94.5 100.0 107.2 104.6 95.5 72.3 66.7 78.4 85.8 76.8 
Subsidies 91.6 100.0 109.3 111.9 108.9 98.0 88.2 92.6 
Colombia 
Non-traditional exports 




Non-copper exports 71.2 100.0 118.5 130.6 143.6 165.5 184.8 204.9 235.9 247.2 
Real exchange rate 71.0 100.0 124.2 135.3 143.3 135.5 140.5 138.9 133.1 135.0 
Tariff index 39.1 100.0 77.9 77.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 50.8 43.0 43.0 
Mexico 
Industrial exports 51.1 100.0 123.9 146.7 174.0 179.9 193.6 209.3 240.5 281.3 
Real exchange rate 80.0 100.0 136.9 142.0 115.5 108.4 105.0 95.9 88.3 82.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
3 Export series correspond to volume indexes. The real exchange rate, calculated by ECLAC, corresponds to the nominal 
exchange rate inflated by the external price index of the main trading partners and deflated by the consumer price 
index. Subsidies and tariff indexes are calculated on the basis of nominal averages. 
99.3 100.0 126.0 142.0 176.7 214.2 265.6 336.7 347.9 387.1 
87.7 100.0 129.2 143.0 145.3 149.1 167.9 168.4 150.7 141.7 
57.2 100.0 69.7 59.1 53.4 56.1 48.1 40.2 - -
73.3 100.0 94.0 97.7 95.6 93.5 68.0 64.4 54.1 41.2 
A review of these studies reveals 
certain limitations: i) they use different 
methodologies to measure the real 
exchange rate relevant to the export sector, 
i.e., the one that affects its profitability; 
ii) there is no homogeneous index of 
incentives with which to measure the 
impact of liberalization, tariff reduction or 
promotional mechanisms; iii) they use 
different econometric models and 
methods;33 consequently, results are not 
strictly comparable and could be 
considered weak. However, a review of 
these models gives some idea of the effect 
of these variables on export growth. 
Table IV.2 gives the results of recent 
studies on short- and long-term price 
elasticities of aggregate exports. These 
32 The normal procedure is simply to consider the nominal exchange rate against the dollar, deflated 
by a domestic price index or by an index of average exchange rates against the currencies of the main 
export-absorbing countries. This latter index can also be inflated by an index of external prices or by 
the unit value of exports in order to obtain a measure of relative prices between the external and 
domestic markets. Some studies have adopted a real effective exchange rate, adjusting it by an index 
of subsidies and other export incentives. 
33 Generally speaking, the model normally used in Latin America, under the small-country assumption, 
is that of partial adjustment for a supply equation, and the method of estimation used is ordinary 
least squares. This assumption does not apply to Brazil, where supply and demand equations are 
estimated through least squares in two and three stages. Also, recent models for correcting estimated 
errors use the method of maximum likelihood with complete data. 
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elasticities have been calculated using the 
real exchange rate, as measured by one of 
the methods described in footnote 32, and 
are based on estimates of the supply function 
for non-traditional exports for some 
countries.34 
Table IV.2 shows the difference 
between the short- and long-term effects of 
exchange rate policy.35 Elasticity with 
respect to an exchange rate variation in the 
short term is well below one in all the 
countries, which indicates a certain 
inelasticity of supply, or little reaction to 
short-term devaluations or revaluations. 
However, the reaction is much stronger in 
the long term, in which elasticity is close to 
or slightly above one, indicating that in the 
period in which economic agents take 
their investment decisions, profitability is 
an important variable, so that a variation 
of 1% in the real exchange rate generates a 
1% or slightly higher increase in export 
supply. It should be noted that the effect of 
exchange rate policy on the trade balance is 
actually even greater than this, since the 
observed export elasticities are compounded 
by the impact on imports. 
The behaviour of exports in relation to 
exchange rate policy in the region contrasts 
with that of some economies in South-East 
Asia, such as the Republic of Korea and 
Hong Kong, where the growth of exportable 
supply between the late 1960s and the 
mid-1980s coincided with a competitive, 
stable real exchange rate in comparison 
with Latin American rates (Balassa and 
Williamson, 1987). Studies of those 
economies show that short-term elasticity 
of aggregate export supply was very high: 
Balassa's estimates (1991) for the Republic 
of Korea fluctuate between 1.9 and 2.2 for 
the period 1965-1987, while Riedel (1986) 
estimates a real exchange rate elasticity for 
Hong Kong of 5.0 for the period 1972-1984. 
The first conclusion that can be drawn 
from the above is that the region's 
exchange rate policy has a significant 
long-term impact, although, given the 
magnitude of the reaction (the elasticity is 
slightly greater than one), other 
instruments are needed to promote rapid 
growth. Likewise, the relatively low 
elasticities of exports in relation to the 
exchange rate reveal the problems faced 
by Latin American exporters, in terms of 
financing, technology, human resources 
and infrastructure, in their efforts to take 
advantage of these better relative prices. 
Thus, the purpose of a systemic effort to 
enhance competitiveness is precisely to 
gradually raise these elasticities. This 
effect is clearly evident in the countries of 
East Asia and, to some extent, in the region's 
more highly developed economies. 
Sectoral studies show how 
important it is to differentiate the 
effects of changes in profitability by 
kinds of activity. 
Indeed, a comparison of tables IV.2 
and IV.3 shows that short- and long-term 
elasticity in the manufacturing sector is, in 
every country studied, higher than that of 
aggregate exports. Adjustment velocity 
also differs from product to product, with 
manufacturing being the fastest. An 
analysis of the results at the level of 
industrial subsectors shows that the 
response to exchange rate policy in some 
of them is very high (an elasticity 
substantially greater than one), even in the 
short term, indicating that these export 
activities can be very negatively affected 
by a rise in the real exchange rate. This is 
the case, for example, in the food, textile 
and chemical industries in Colombia, and 
the textile, metal products, electrical 
machinery and automotive industries in 
Mexico.36 
34 For a definition of export supply functions see Moguillansky and Titelman (1993). 
35 In this context a short-term response is defined as one which takes place within the same period 
(quarter or year) as the policy variation. 
36 A study conducted by Cohen (1989) on industrial subsectors in Mexico, disaggregated to four digits, also 
shows that price elasticities are positive and significant for 23 of the 28 sectors studied. This is consistent 
with the results obtained for the aggregate manufacturing sector by Mendoza (1993), but contrasts with 
the lack of sensitivity of aggregate non-petroleum exports, as estimated by Peñaloza Webb (1988). 
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Table IV.2 
TOTAL EXPORT SUPPLY ELASTICITIES IN RELATION TO THE REAL 





































Source: For Argentina: F. Navajas, "Una estimación de la función agregada de exportaciones. Argentina: 1970-1992", 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, ECLAC office in Buenos Aires, August 1993, unpublished; for Brazil: A. Zini, "Funções 
de exportação e de importação para o Brasil", Pesquisa e planejamento económico, vol. 18, No. 3, Rio de Janeiro, 
December 1988; for Bolivia: R. Ferrufino, "El tipo de cambio real y la balanza comercial en Bolivia durante el 
período de post-estabilización", Análisis económico, vol. 6, La Paz, Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE), July 
1993; for Colombia: L. Villar Gómez, "Política cambiaria y estrategia exportadora", document presented at the 
Thirteenth Symposium on the Capital Market, Santa Fe de Bogota, Asociación Bancaria de Colombia, October 
1992, unpublished; for Costa Rica: E. Gaba and R. Araya, "Determinantes de las exportaciones globales de 
Costa Rica", Comentarios sobre asuntos económicos, Central Bank of Costa Rica, June 1993; for Chile: G. Moguillansky 
and D. Titelman, "Análisis empírico del comportamiento de las exportaciones no cobre en Chile: 1963-1990", 
Working  Paper series, No. 17, Santiago, Chile,ECLAC, May 1993; for Ecuador: ILPES/CONADE (Latín American and 
Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning/National  Development Council) (1989), "Modelo 
macroeconômico de Ecuador", Quito, CONADE, July 1989; for Mexico: R. Peñaloza Webb, "Elasticidad de la 
demanda de las exportaciones: la experiencia mexicana", Comercio exterior, vol. 38, No. 5, Federal District, May 
1988. 
Notes: 1. A dash (-) indicates zero or insignificant quantity. 
2. n.e. = not estimated. 
a Annual. b Quarterly. c Includes all exports except coffee, petroleum, ferronickel and gold. Non-traditional 
exports. e Total non-copper exports. f Non-petroleum exports. 
In the case of Chile, fresh fruit and 
agricultural exports are slow to react to 
short-term changes in the exchange rate; in 
that sector, the effects of such changes and 
the velocity of adjustment are 
considerably less significant than in the 
manufacturing sector. This is to be 
expected, given the nature of investment 
in fruit growing and the number of years 
before output is ready to harvest. This 
means that if an attempt is made to use 
exchange rate policy to stimulate this 
sector in a temporary crisis situation, there 
will be no visible results in the short term. 
In the manufacturing sector, however, the 
exchange rate stimulus elicits a greater 
response. 
The results of the study of Brazilian 
industry show that while changes in the 
exchange rate have a delayed impact on 
manufactured products, their impact on 
semi-manufactures is instantaneous. 
Long-term elasticity also differs; it is 
greater than one for manufactures, 
whereas exports of semi-manufactures do 
not show any significant positive 
long-term correlation to the real exchange 
rate. This is because of the characteristics 
of these industrial commodities and the 
timing of the maturation of large 
investments made in the mid-1970s. In this 
case, foreign sales had more to do with the 
need to cover investment costs in a context 
of domestic recession than with relative 
prices between the domestic and foreign 
markets. 
This analysis shows that the 
sensitivity of exports to real exchange 
rate fluctuations varies according to the 
sector or kind of product and that the 
repercussions are mixed. Estimates show 
that elasticity increases in direct 
proportion to the value added to 
production. It can also be seen that 
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Table IV.3 
ELASTICITIES AND ADJUSTMENT VELOCITY IN RELATION TO REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES IN SECTORAL EXPORT FUNCTIONS 



















































































Manufactures 2.34 n.e. 1970-1988 
Source: For Brazil: G. Moguillansky, "Factores determinantes de las exportaciones industriales brasileñas durante la 
década de 1980", Working  Paper series, No. 22, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1993; A. Zini, "Funções de exportação e 
de importação para o Brasil", Pesquisa e planejamento económico, vol. 18, No. 3, December 1988; for Colombia: 
G. Alonso, "Determinantes de la oferta de exportaciones menores colombianas", Santa Fe de Bogotá, Banco 
de la República, May 1993, unpublished; for Chile: G. Moguillansky and D. Titelman, "Análisis empírico del 
comportamiento de las exportaciones no cobre en Chile: 1963-1990", Working  Paper series, No. 17, Santiago, 
Chile, ECLAC, May 1993; for Mexico: A. Cohen, "Trade policy in Mexico: an analysis of structural change", 
Berkeley, University of California, Ph.D. dissertation, 1989, unpublished; for Peru: C. Paredes, "Trade policy, 
industrialization and productivity growth: the case of Peru", Brookings Discussion Papers in International 
Economics, No. 94, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1992. 
Notes: 1. A dash (-) indicates zero or insignificant quantity. 
2. n.e. = not estimated. 
a Quarterly. Annual. c Certain industrial subsectors were chosen to illustrate the range of variation in intersectoral 
elasticities. 
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exports from countries whose industrial 
development and diversification are more 
advanced permit stronger and more 
immediate responses to changes in 
exchange rate policy. 
Lastly, since the measurement of the 
real exchange rate for exports should be 
corrected by a weighted average of 
external prices, a basket of currencies of 
the country's main trading partners is 
taken as a benchmark. This is important, 
since the countries of the region have 
frequently been guided only by variations 
in the United States dollar in designing 
their exchange rate policies. 
Table IV.4 shows the contribution of 
real exchange rate variations to export 
growth in Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
during the period 1980-1991, taking into 
account estimated long-term elasticities. 
In Brazil's case, manufactures exports 
could have grown by a further 18% if the 
real exchange rate had not been revalued 
by 15% between 1980 and 1991. As some 
studies show (Bonelli, 1992; Baumann, 
1994 and Moguillansky, 1993), especially 
during the second half of the 1980s, 
manufacturers in Brazil turned to the 
export market because of the recession in 
the domestic market, external demand (in 
some cases ensured by the links between 
transnational export firms and their 
parent company or subsidiaries located in 
other countries) and enhanced 
competitiveness, rather than because of 
the profits to be made during that 
period. 
In Chile, on the other hand, the 94% 
depreciation in the real exchange rate 
for non-copper exports accounts for 
80% of their growth over the past 11 
years, and the same is true in Colombia: 
more than a third of the enormous 
growth in non-traditional exports is 
attributable to a 91% depreciation in 
the real exchange rate during the 
period. 
4. Exchange rate policy, competitiveness 
and trade policy 
Greater competitiveness reduces the costs 
of exports in relation to the corresponding 
international costs. This relationship 
depends on wages, tariffs and other 
domestic costs as compared with external 
costs, the exchange rate and especially the 
productivity of local industry, which in 
turn depends on innovations, organizational 
improvements and technological 
development.37 Under the systemic approach 
to international competitiveness outlined 
by ECLAC -which entails simultaneous, 
integrated advances in a number of 
variables- it is nonetheless worth 
investigating whether any of these 
variables has had more impact than others 
on the competitiveness of the export sector. 
This question has been researched at 
least in Brazil and Mexico. For Brazil, 
Bonelli (1992) indicates that the 
competitiveness of industrial exports rose 
significantly in the first half of the 1980s, 
owing both to productivity gains and to 
exchange rate and wage fluctuations. 
During the second half of the decade, 
however, a deteriorating exchange 
rate/ wage ratio clearly contributed to the 
fact that the gains in competitiveness of 
manufactures exports -although still 
positive- increased far less than in the 
previous period. 
Casar's study of Mexican industry 
(1993) shows that in most of the subsectors 
that increased their competitiveness in the 
period 1980-1989, the determining factor 
was a rise in labour productivity. In the 
more backward subsectors, on the other 
hand, competitiveness was associated 
with low wages and the real exchange rate. 
Few estimates have been made in 
Latin America of the impact of 
competitiveness (i.e., the ratio between the 
relative cost of a product and its 
international market price) on export 
37 ECLAC emphasized these points in its proposal on changing production patterns with social equity 
(ECLAC, 1990a and 1992a), according to which competitiveness is sustainable in the long term if it is 
genuine, i.e., if it is not overly dependant on the favourable evolution of the exchange rate/wage 
ratio. 
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Table IV.4 
CONTRIBUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
VARIATIONS TO EXPORT GROWTH, 1980-1991 
Cumulative effect 






























(B)(C) /(A) % 
Brazil 
Manufactures 
exports 155 -15 1.16 -18 -12 
Chile 
Non-copper 
exports 119 94 1.26 118 80 
Colombia 
Non-traditional 
exports 239 91 0.93 85 36 
Sourcc: For Brazil: G. Moguillansky, "Factores determinantes de las exportaciones industriales brasileñas durante la 
década de 1980", Working  Paper series, No. 22, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1993; for Chile: G. Moguillansky and D. 
Titeiman, "Análisis empírico del comportamiento de las exportaciones no cobre en Chile: 1963-1990", Working 
Paper series, No. 17, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1993; for Colombia: L. Villar Gómez, "Política cambiaria y estrategia 
exportadora", document presented at the Thirteenth Symposium on the Capital Market, Santa Fe de Bogotá, 
Asociación Bancaria de Colombia, October 1992, unpublished. 
development. Econometric estimates of 
demand functions for industrial exports in 
Brazil (historically the most developed in 
the region) show strong short-term 
elasticity, much higher than the impact of 
profitability on exportable supply of both 
manufactured and semi-manufactured 
products. In order to maintain 
competitiveness when an exchange rate 
revaluation is unavoidable and fiscal or 
financial incentives are lacking, the 
alternatives are to increase productivity or 
accept lower profit margins. This is what 
apparently took place in Brazil in the 
second half of the 1980s, when the fiscal 
crisis made it impossible to continue to 
finance the same level of incentives as before. 
Trade reforms have greatly reduced 
costs, especially when the export sector 
previously had no tax exemptions on 
imported inputs. Trade liberalization also 
made it possible to import a greater variety 
and higher quality of inputs, which in turn 
often led to higher profitability and helped 
stimulate export supply. In other 
instances, liberalization or tariff 
exemptions partially offset the decline in 
profitability brought about by the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate that 
resulted from stabilization policies or 
inflows of external financing. 
With respect to this last point, figures 
IV.l to IV.4 show the evolution of the real 
exchange rate and an index of tariffs on 
imported inputs and incentives for four 
countries.38 Figure IV.l, for Argentina, 
shows that while export drawbacks on 
manufactures remained steady, the real 
38 As in measurements of the real exchange rate, indexes of tariffs and incentives are not homogeneous 
among countries. In the case of tariffs, they are nominal averages. With regard to incentives, they include 
subsidies, drawbacks, tax exemptions, etc. Export incentives in Brazil and Colombia represent the 
potential total share, i.e., what would happen if all exporters benefited from all the incentives. 
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Figure IV. 1 
Argentina: Real exchange rate and 
trade potcy 
Real exchange rate  — ~Du»es and s»p»t 
Figure IV.3 
Colombia: Real exchange rate and 
trade policy 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
exchange rate appreciated sharply from 
1989 onwards, without there being any 
compensation between the two policies. 
In Brazil, export benefits and subsidies 
moved in the same direction as exchange 
rate policy from 1985 onwards, so that 
during the revaluation period the export 
sector received no compensatory 
incentives. However, producers have 
benefited from the trade reform 
implemented gradually from 1987 
onwards, which shortened the list of 
prohibited imports, simplified red tape 
Figure IV.2 
Brazil: Real exchange rate and 
incentives 
Figure rV.4 
Chie: Real exchange rate and 
tariffs 
and lowered tariffs: the average duty on 
imports was reduced from 51% in 1987 to 
14% by the end of 1993. 
Figure IV.3, on Colombia, shows a 
sharp drop in subsidies for non-traditional 
exports, but this was offset by a 
depreciation in the real exchange rate and 
by the gradual reduction of tariffs. A 
similar evolution in exchange rate policy 
took place in Chile from 1985 onwards, 
accompanied by a gradual reduction of the 
average tariff level, which had risen in 
1982 in response to the external debt crisis. 
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5. Exchange rate uncertainty and 
export growth 
Uncertainty about exchange rate policies 
and their instability has an impact on 
production for the export market. If 
entrepreneurs are unsure about the future 
real exchange rate or its possible range of 
variation (which in turn determines 
expectations of profitability), they are 
hardly likely to invest in the export sector. 
Exchange rate instability is also often 
associated with trade policies that are 
ephemeral and have little credibility, and 
this neutralizes the intended incentives to 
economic agents. 
Since exchange rate policy does not 
exist in a vacuum from other economic 
policies, such as monetary and fiscal 
policies, it is bound to be subject to some 
instability. For example, a devaluation in 
a highly unbalanced fiscal situation, which 
forces an unprogrammed increase in the 
money supply, quickly triggers an 
inflationary situation that neutralizes the 
authorities' attempt to devaluate or 
maintain the real exchange rate; this 
uncertainty about exchange rate trends 
affects export performance. 
One way of empirically measuring the 
impact of exchange rate volatility is by an 
indicator of real exchange rate 
variability.39 Table IV.5 gives the results 
obtained for some countries. 
We can see that the elasticities 
observed in different studies are high and 
negative in the short term. This is because 
an increase in instability raises costs 
without allowing them to be transferred to 
export prices, and this acts as a 
disincentive to selling in foreign markets. 
As mentioned above, long-term 
instability influences investment and 
reduces exportable supply. The strong 
estimated impact in Peru (-4.7) is 
consistent with the degree of instability 
measured by the coefficient of real 
exchange rate variation during the period 
1960-1985.40 On the other hand, as a result 
of the reduction seen in the instability of 
the exchange rate in Colombia since the 
reforms of 1967, this variable has had no 
statistically significant impact on exports. 
In the case of Chile, the lower short-term 
elasticity found in Paredes' study (1989) 
for the period 1963-1983 coincides with 
greater exchange rate stability throughout 
the 1960s, while the study by Caballero 
and Corbo (1989) concentrates more on 
years of high instability (1970-1985). 
These results, together with those 
mentioned in the previous section, 
confirm the need to ensure stable 
exchange rate policies in order to maintain 
long-term growth in the export sector. 
6. Other factors influencing exports 
Along with exchange rate policy, tariff 
reforms and direct benefits that affect the 
profitability of the export sector, other 
factors have intervened in the growth of 
merchandise sales in foreign markets. 
These include pressures from domestic 
demand on available supply, the role of 
regional integration processes and trends 
in external demand. 
The purpose of some econometric 
studies is to find out to what extent 
pressure from domestic demand 
determines export-oriented production. 
The indicator of short-term pressure from 
domestic demand that is used is the rate of 
utilization of productive capacity, which 
measures the gap between actual and 
potential output. 
39 Empirical studies carried out since the mid-1970s show a significant negative relationship between 
real exchange rate volatility and exports: see Diaz-Alejandro (1976) for Colombia and Coes (1979) for 
Brazil. The most important studies of the 1980s are those by Paredes (1987), Caballero and Corbo 
(1989) and Alonso (1993). 
40 See Paredes (1989) and Alonso (1993). The coefficient of variation was taken to be the average annual 
standard deviation divided by the mean, calculated on the basis of monthly data. 
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Table IV.5 
ELASTICITY OF EXPORTS IN RELATION TO REAL 












Chile -5 .4 - 1970-1985 








Source: For Colombia: G. Alonso, "Determinantes de la oferta de exportaciones menores colombianas", Santa Fe de 
Bogotá, Banco de la República, May 1993, unpublished; for Chile: R. J. Caballero and V. Corbo, "The effect of 
real exchange rate uncertainty on exports: empirical evidence", The World  Bank Economic Review, vol. 3, No. 3, 
May 1989; for Peru: C. Paredes, "Exchange rates regimes, the real exchange rate and export performance in 
Latin America", Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics, No. 77, Washington, D.C., The Brookings 
Institution, August 1989. 
Note: A dash (-) indicates zero or insignificant quantity. 
a Paredes, in fact, found high elasticities (-1.5 for the short term and -3.6 for the long term) also for Brazil, but his results 
are distorted by the period of analysis. Compare, for example, with the data compiled by Nogués (1990) who, in 
analysing eight Latin American countries in the period 1978-1987, observed that Brazil was the country whose real 
exchange rate had varied the least. Like the present study, Nogués believes that stabilizing the real exchange rate is 
more important than providing export incentives. 
Of the studies that exist, only those on 
Brazil confirm the impact of fluctuations 
in domestic demand on exportable 
supply. 
Historically, there has been a 
significant negative correlation in Brazil 
between the rate of utilization of 
productive capacity and industrial 
exports, with very high elasticities.41 This 
implies that entrepreneurs have turned to 
export markets more as a defence 
mechanism against domestic recession 
than as a conscious effort to develop their 
export activity. This is confirmed by the 
results of surveys of the industrial export 
sector (Baumann, 1994). 
Moreover, the estimated long-term 
elasticities of capacity utilization were 
higher than those obtained for potential 
output, suggesting that manufactures 
exports will be limited, in a context of 
economic growth, by the need to meet 
domestic demand, unless investments are 
made which increase productive capacity. 
The magnitude of the impact of 
external demand on exports differs 
according to the type of product. 
Traditionally, the income elasticity of 
commodity exports has been low when 
measured against the level of activity of 
the industrialized countries, while the 
income elasticity of industrial products 
depends on the kind of goods exported. 
The "small country assumption" has 
been used in estimating export functions 
for manufactures. This means that 
41 See the summary of results drawn up by Zini (1988) and those obtained by Moguillansky (1993). 
EXPORTS  AND CHANGING  PRODUCTION  PATTERNS 99 
exporters can sell to the external market as 
much as they are able to produce. 
Consequently, export prices are not 
affected by the quantity exported, since 
they are determined by the international 
market. 
However, this assumption has been 
found to be invalid for some countries. In 
the case of Brazil's manufactures exports, 
for example, the best adjustments were 
obtained on the basis of an estimate of 
simultaneous models of export supply 
and demand. The demand equations show 
high, significant coefficients for income 
elasticity,42 indicating that industrial 
exports are affected by trends in the 
external market. 
In Villar's (1992) estimates for 
Colombia, elasticity with respect to an 
index of real GDP of the countries to which 
Colombia exports is high in the short term. 
He also suggests that the underestimation 
of non-traditional exports generated by 
the econometric model for 1991 can be 
partially explained by the rapid process of 
trade integration between Colombia and 
Venezuela, which caused exports to 
Venezuela to increase by 152% that year 
and helped maintain that rise in 1992. 
Similar effects occurred in trade between 
Argentina and Brazil, Bolivia and 
Ecuador, Chile and Argentina and Peru. 
This requires looking at another factor 
that has influenced recent export 
performance, namely, regional integration 
processes. 
Data for different countries of the 
region show that positive performance in 
intraregional exports and exports to third 
countries are in fact complementary. 
There is a significant positive, correlation 
between the coefficient of intraregional 
industrial exports and the proportion of 
domestic demand met by imports from 
other regions. This shows that the ready 
availability of quality inputs at 
competitive costs is a decisive factor for 
productivity in producing non-traditional 
exports. Moreover, empirical evidence 
shows that exporting to markets in the 
same region can offer learning 
opportunities for entering extraregional 
markets.43 
7. Conclusions 
The above points can be summarized in 
the following general conclusions. First, a 
look at the impact of changes in the real 
exchange rate on aggregate exports, 
except for certain countries, shows a 
long-term elasticity close to or somewhat 
above one. Thus, exchange policy can be 
seen to have a significant effect. 
Nevertheless, there is an implicit need to 
also use other stimuli to ensure rapid 
development of the export sector. Gradual 
elimination of anti-export biases and 
deficiencies in infrastructure, technology, 
financing, human resources and external 
promotion should gradually increase the 
response of exports to the exchange rate. 
This is evident even in the short-term 
elasticity of exports in relation to the 
exchange rate in the Asian economies. 
Second, both the real exchange rate and 
other stimuli should be stable. Uncertainty 
about exchange rate policy discourages 
investment in the export sector, while 
unstable incentives appear unreliable and 
economic agents ignore them. 
Third, a disaggregation of the export 
sector by type of product shows that the 
effects of exchange rate policy are mixed, 
and that also the greater the diversification 
and installed capacity in industry, the 
more sensitive the response to exchange 
rate policy: exports from more industrially 
diversified and developed countries 
respond more strongly and more 
immediately to exchange rate policy. 
The elasticity of the manufacturing 
sector is in all cases higher than that of 
42 The GDP of the main importing countries or an index of those countries' imports was used as an 
indicator of external demand. 
43 For more on this point, see chapter III and ECLAC (1994a). 
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aggregate exports, in both the short and 
the long term, and this sector also 
responds more quickly, especially in 
countries which historically have achieved 
greater industrial diversification and have 
developed greater productive capacity. 
Exchange rate policy elicits little 
short-term response from agricultural 
activities; any attempt to stimulate this 
sector in a temporary crisis will therefore 
be ineffective if exchange rate policy is the 
only instrument used. 
An evaluation of policy at the level of 
industrial subsectors shows high 
elasticities in both the short and the long 
term in certain cases, indicating that some 
export activities can be seriously hurt by a 
revaluation of the real exchange rate. 
Fourth, in the countries studied, tariff 
reforms have been beneficial for export 
development, but once they are 
implemented, they cease to be 
determining factors in further export 
development. 
Fifth, domestic demand has an 
important impact on branches of industry 
not specifically geared to the export 
market. To maintain exportable supply in 
these cases, new investment resources 
must be allocated, or investment 
incentives provided, for these activities. 
Lastly, trends in external demand are 
crucial to the performance of 
commodities, but are also significant for 
some countries' industrial exports. 
Chapter V 
TRADE POLICY 
1. Recent trade liberalization processes 
After more than half a century of 
protectionism, the mid-1980s saw the 
emergence of a clearly-defined school of 
thought that called for a radical change in 
development strategy and in its associated 
policies. As shown in table V.l, reforms 
aimed at liberalizing trade have been quite 
widespread in the region in recent years. 
Of the nine countries listed in the table, the 
great majority have implemented reforms 
that can properly be described as both 
drastic and sudden, with import trade 
being liberalized in as little as two or three 
years. 
These reform processes are not easy to 
pigeonhole, but two broad categories can 
be distinguished. The first comprises the 
attempts observed in some countries 
-such as Chile since 1974, Argentina in 
1976-1981 and again in 1988, and Bolivia 
since the mid-1980s- to liberalize both 
their trade and capital accounts at the 
same time as part of a larger process of 
economic liberalization. The second 
category consists of experiences 
-particularly in Brazil, Colombia and, 
initially, Mexico- where high levels of 
protection for import-substitution 
activities were kept in place for several 
decades, with these protection 
mechanisms' adverse effects on other 
production activities being largely offset 
by strong export incentives. 
These trends in the region's trade 
policies have been complemented by a 
concomitant wave of bilateral trade 
liberalization agreements, some of which 
entail the adoption of common tariff 
structures (ECLAC, 1994a). In some 
countries, such as those of Central 
America (e.g., Costa Rica and Guatemala), 
the combination of subregional 
integration agreements and structural 
adjustment programmes have strongly 
influenced national tariff-reduction 
processes, especially since the mid-1980s. 
To a great extent, all of these reforms 
have provided for the elimination of most 
quantitative restrictions and substantial 
tariff reductions. Thus, in general, they 
have represented an appreciable change 
from pre-reform tariff protection levels 
(see table V.l) and have dramatically 
diminished the spread in rates of effective 
protection. No country has yet adopted a 
zero tariff rate, however, and only Chile 
has a uniform tariff (currently 11%). 
a) Experiences in comprehensive 
liberalization 
Until recently, one of the common 
features of the countries of the region was 
the practice of imposing sizeable, highly 
dispersed tariffs and of adding on 
surcharges and specific duties during 
certain periods, along with various types 
of non-tariff barriers. For manufactures, 
the resulting levels of effective protection 
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Table V.l 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): OVERVIEW 
OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESSES 
Country 
Maximum Number of 





















1989 65 30 
1985 150 10 
1988 105 35 29 
1990 100 20 14 
1986 100 20 
1973 220 10 57 
1985 35 11 1 
1985 100 20 10 
1990 108 25 56 
1989 135 20 41 
39e 15c In 1988 the value of industrial output -49 
subject to restrictions was reduced 
from 62% to 18%. In 1989-1991 
non-tariff barriers, additional 
temporary duties and specific duties 
were eliminated. 
12d 7 a With few exceptions, all import bans 92 
and licence requirements were 
discontinued. 
51e 14e In 1990 the list of banned imports 44 
and prior-licensing requirements 
were eliminated. However, 
national-content requirements for 
intermediate and capital goods will 
be maintained. 
44d 12d Nearly all prior-licensing -4 
restrictions were lifted in late 1990. 
27e 14e Import permits and other 10 
restrictions were phased out in 
1990-1993. 
94e 10e In the 1970s, quantitative limits on -10 
imports were eliminated. 
35e I I e Price bands were re-introduced 
and an anti-dumping system was 32 
established. 
24e 12c The coverage of import permits -15 
was reduced from 92% in June 1985 
to 18% by December 1990, and 
official import prices were 
eliminated. 
66e 18e Import licences, quotas and bans -28 
were discontinued in September 
1990. 
35d 10d The number of categories subject 15 
to restrictions was reduced from 
2,200 in 1988 to 200. Specific duties, 
which in some cases had raised the 
tariff ceiling to 940% prior to the 
liberalization programme, were 
eliminated. 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of national figures. 
a Between the year prior to the initiation of the liberalization programme and 1993; the exchange rate for exports has 
been used. b Tariffs include surcharges. c Weighted by domestic production. d Weighted by imports. 
e Simple average of tariff items. f Chile's first trade liberalization programme was completed in 1979. The 10% 
uniform tariff remained in force until 1982. Therefore, the information given in the first row corresponds to that period 
(1973-1982). The second row contains information on the reduction of import duties, which, after being raised to 35% 
in 1984, were reduced to 20% in 1985, to 15% in 1988 and to 11% in 1991. 
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were in most cases notably higher than 
nominal levels. 
Often, however, the impact of these 
measures was partly offset by equally 
broad systems of various kinds of 
exceptions (especially as part of regional 
and sectoral promotional schemes); this 
resulted in considerably lower or even 
negative levels of effective protection for 
many producers of industrial inputs or 
capital goods. 
Exchange rate policy -which often 
provides for fixed nominal exchange rates 
or controlled devaluations- often 
accentuates the biases of trade policy. This 
effect is compounded by changes in the 
rules concerning the capital account of the 
balance-of-payments, whose net results 
are fluctuations in the real exchange rate, 
a lack of production incentives for 
exportables and -in addition to other 
factors- macroeconomic instability, 
whose best-known manifestation in Latin 
America has been high inflation. 
Some countries have tried to turn this 
situation around by adopting packages of 
what are conventionally described as fiscal 
and structural reforms of the price system 
(in particular, trade liberalization and 
the deregulation of the treatment 
accorded to foreign capital). In several of 
the cases considered, such reforms 
constituted the backbone of policy 
packages designed to stabilize prices and 
revive production. 
Chile's trade liberalization scheme is 
the oldest and longest continuously-
applied programme in the region. In late 
1973, before the reforms were introduced, 
nominal tariffs averaged 94% and ranged 
from 0 to 750%; in addition, countless 
non-tariff restrictions and a complicated 
multi-rate exchange system were in force 
(Ffrench-Davis, Leiva and Madrid, 1991; 
Meller, 1993) (see box V.l). 
The more pragmatic approach to trade 
policy that began to emerge in Chile in 
1982-1983 has been extended to include 
exchange-rate policy and the capital 
account of the balance of payments. Since 
the late 1980s, Chile has had to cope with 
a renewed inflow of foreign capital. 
During the first trade liberalization 
programme (1974-1981), the authorities 
allowed the currency to appreciate for an 
extended period of time; this decision was 
associated with an increasingly liberal 
policy on private capital inflows. In 
contrast, since 1989 they have tried to curb 
the currency's appreciation in order to 
safeguard the forward momentum of the 
production of tradables. Specific measures 
have included the application of reserve 
requirements and the levying of taxes on 
foreign financial loans. These policies have 
proved to be successful in slowing the 
upward trend in the currency's real value 
which began in 1988 and intensified in 
1991-1992. 
Some of the conclusions drawn from 
an analysis of the Chilean experience 
suggest that the second trade reform 
(1985-1991) has yielded more positive 
results than the first. The steep tariff 
reductions and the elimination of 
quantitative limits carried out as part of 
the first trade liberalization programme 
gave exports a bigger boost than did the 
modest tariff reductions implemented 
during the second programme, since the 
first trade reform took place in a situation 
that left a great deal of room for cutting 
costs by substituting imported inputs for 
domestic ones, as well as providing ample 
opportunity for bringing about changes in 
relative rates of profitability. However, 
given the recessionary environment in 
which the reforms were implemented, the 
abrupt nature of their introduction and the 
behaviour of exchange and interest rates, 
this expansion of exports was achieved at 
an extremely high cost, and the export 
sector's buoyancy did not carry over into 
the rest of the economy; thus, per capita 
GDP (between the maximum levels for 1974 
and 1981) rose by less than 1% per year, 
investment stood far below its historical 
levels and an intensive de-industrialization 
process took place44 (see box V.l and 
table V.2). 
44 For a more detailed discussion of the subject, see Ffrench-Davis, Leiva and Madrid (1991). 
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CHILE: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO TRADE REFORM PROGRAMMES 
Thanks to the fact that Chile has a long history 
of trade reform, more reliable lessons regarding 
such reforms' effects can be drawn from its 
experiences. To this end, it is important to bear 
in mind that Chile actually implemented two 
different trade reform programmes: a radical 
scheme in 1974-1979 and a more moderate one 
in 1985-1991. Although the policies of refraining 
from the use of non-tariff barriers and of 
establishing a uniform tariff have not changed 
since 1979, tariffs had returned to relatively high 
levels by 1984 and were accompanied by 
measures designed to guard against unfair 
competition and bv price bands for some 
agricultural products. Indeed, the tariff rate 
averaged 20".. in 1984-1989, which was twice 
what it had been in 1979-19S2. liut the essential 
difference between the two programmes is that, 
during the tirst liberalization exercise - within 
ail environment marked by an redoubled effort 
to curb inflation and an increasingW abundant 
supply of external finance- lhe currency 
appreciated steadily, loi lowing an initial 
depreciation. By contrast, in the 1980s the 
reduction of tari ft s from a maximum rate of 35% 
in September 19K4 to the current level of 11'.'» in 
lune 1991 was accompanied by a sharp real 
devaluation (associated with the debt crisis), 
which sent positive signals to exporters and, at 
the same time, more than offset the slightly 
negative impact of the tariff reduction on the 
production of gtwds that compete with imports, 
l'or this reason, during the .second programme 
non-traditional exports grew more steadily and 
the production of import substitutos made a 
strong reio\ ery, primarily between 1984 and the 
end of the 1980s. In evaluating Chile's two trade 
reforms, it is interesting to note the performance 
of capital formation and of the industrial sector. 
Although gross fixed capital formation and 
capital efficiency increased once the crisis of the 
early 1980s was over, the coefficient of fixed 
investment was far below what it had been in 
the 19b0s; in fact, it was not until 1993 that this 
coefficient finally surpassed its average level for 
that decade. The economy's inability to raise its 
investment rates above that level prevented it 
from attaining significant growth between 1974 
and the end of the 1980s, during whuh time its 
cumulative rate of growth averaged less than 
per year. 
During the first trade liberalization 
programme, the economy fell victim to a 
significant degree of de-industriali/.ation,  and 
this was reflected in a decrease of fix o 
percentage points in the share of manufactures 
ini.ui' Manx potentially strong manufiuluring 
firms went bankrupt as a result ol the particular 
mix of trade and exchange policies in force at 
that time. 
Despite the successes of the second 
programme, the de-industrialization process 
which was spurred onby the first reform has not 
been reversed. Exports remain concentrated in 
natural resource-intensive product lines. 
Nevertheless, items involving a higher level of 
value added have been gaining ground, 
investment has continued to rise, and the 
creation of new production opacity ha* begun 
-although not until the 1990s- to expand at a 
sustainable rate that is substantially higher than 
the rate recorded in the 1960s. 
Source: R Hivn. h -D j \ i s P l .m.1 .<ru! K Vt.uirul, Tisiif Litmlr.-ih-m m \~>Hiï  ixpmtnctsand Piv^iwb. Trndtf IVI i . y Si-nes, No 1 
( U N ' C I A D / I I I' 'o^'i, Now V u k, Unik'd Njl ions ConhTt-nkS on I r j ih -a tu i [Jevelnpmi-nt :i-v : W l . L'mied Ninons 
publi ahu.n solrhNn 1 "1 II I ) IK ,M ARosinan.lK I'tren. h- I ) . i \ is , 'Tr . idcl i lvr . i l i /a t innui lJt inAnwru.r . i .  l.l'Al Rovifvv, 
N'.-i ? : w l C / t , l~tv-Pl. S,mliJ;',.>, Chile. August I W 
Starting in 1984, the economy first 
made a recovery and then embarked upon 
a sustained growth path based on an 
expansion of the exportable supply being 
produced by non-traditional sectors. The 
chief cause of the buoyancy of 
non-traditional exports has not been lower 
tariffs, however, since the reductions were 
quite moderate and exporters have 
drawback mechanisms at their disposal. 
During the second programme, the 
depreciation of the currency was the main 
reason for the success of Chilean exports; 
in fact, the real exchange rate more than 
doubled between 1981 and 1988. In 
addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has played a vital role in the country's 
export activity. As a result of the changes 
being made in the Chilean economy, 
exports have come to represent a 
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substantially larger share of GDP -more 
than 30% in recent years (see table V.2). 
Chile's perseverance in carrying 
forward this reform process has brought 
about changes in the country's production 
patterns that have entailed a 
reorganization of its sectoral structure. 
The unique features of Chile's experience 
in this regard would make it very difficult 
to reproduce under other circumstances, 
however, particularly in view of the 
amount of time it has required and 
its initially high economic and social 
costs. 
Two other cases in which trade and 
capital movements have been liberalized 
at the same time are those of Argentina in 
1976-1981 and Bolivia since 1985. 
In 1976, the Argentine Government 
launched a trade reform programme to 
which it soon added an all-out financial 
liberalization drive and, immediately 
thereafter, an anti-inflation policy based 
mainly on the control of the exchange rate. 
At that point in time, the Argentine 
programme bore some similarities to 
Chile's programme of the 1970s. In 
1976-1978, the authorities started out by 
dismantling non-tariff barriers and 
slashing tariffs (from 94% to 44%, on 
average). At the same time, a 
compensatory devaluation was put into 
effect. 
As in Chile, the objective of making a 
structural adjustment in the economy to 
further the internationalization of the 
production system was gradually 
supplanted by the goal of lowering 
inflation through exchange rate lags; this 
was facilitated by financial liberalization 
measures and abundant liquidity in 
international financial markets. In 1979 
and 1980, a policy was implemented to 
create a lag in the real exchange rate 
through nominal devaluations below the 
rate of inflation. As a result, a decrease in 
the average tariff from 44% to 35% was 
accompanied by a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate of over 30%. As in the case 
of Chile -although here it occurred one 
year before the external debt crisis spread 
throughout the region- when the supply 
of external credit needed to finance the 
growing current-account imbalance 
evaporated, the authorities were forced to 
discontinue the programme. 
In recent years, Argentina has carried 
out a second liberalization experiment. 
Beginning in October 1988, a notable trend 
towards trade liberalization emerged with 
the elimination of a surcharge and the 
introduction of a new tariff regime. In the 
period between the adoption of those 
measures and the reforms of April 1991, 
tariffs were revised downward on 11 
different occasions. The trade and 
financial liberalization process culminated 
in the adoption of a package of measures 
that included a convertibility act, a total 
opening of the capital account and a 
consolidation of trade reforms. 
The programme has been highly 
successful in terms of drastically reducing 
the country's spiralling inflation, giving a 
strong boost to production and generating 
more optimistic expectations. The 
introduction of a fixed nominal exchange 
rate has translated into a real appreciation 
of the peso, which has been validated by a 
large inflow of foreign capital. Protection 
for producers of tradables has declined 
considerably, owing both to the tariff 
reductions and the dismantling of 
non-tariff barriers as well as to the 
extraordinarily strong appreciation of the 
peso. Industry has suffered a decrease in 
profitability rates in both domestic and 
foreign markets. As long as favourable 
business expectations are reflected in 
higher investment and gains in efficiency 
and productivity, however, these effects 
may progressively offset the decrease in 
the profitability of tradable sectors caused 
by the appreciation of the currency. In fact, 
GDP is showing a vigorous recovery that 
has already lasted four years. On the other 
hand, however, the country's trade and 
current-account deficits have been 
widening considerably. 
In 1985, Bolivia also launched an 
ambitious trade liberalization programme 
which is still in effect as part of the 
country's plan to stabilize and reorganize 
its economy in order to stem the country's 
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Table V.2 
CHILE: SELECTED GROWTH INDICATORS, 1961-1993 ' 
(Percentages) 
1961-1971 1971-1974 1974-1981 1981-1989 1989-1993 
Growth rates/GDP  4.7 0.3 2.8 2.5 6.2 
Real exports b 
Total 3.4 9.1 7.1 8.5 9.1 
Non-copper 4.7 8.5 12.8 11.5 10.6 
1961-1970 1971-1973 1974-1981 1982-1989 1990-1993 
Average shares 
Gross fixed investment/GDP 20.2 15.9 15.7 15.1 19.9 
Manufactures/GDP 25.4 27.2 22.2 20.7 20.9 
Exports C/GDP 12u0 93 2 1 4 2 7 0 33.2 
Source: For the period 1961-1980, calculations have been based on figures from the Central Bank of Chile and 
R. Ffrench-Davis and O. Muñoz, "Desarrollo económico, inestabilidad y desequilibrios políticos en Chile: 
1950-1989", Colección Estudios CIEPLAN,  NO. 28, Santiago, Chile, Economic Research Corporation for Latin 
America (CIEPLAN), June 1990. For the period 1980-1993, they are based on figures from the Central Bank of 
Chile, Cuentas nacionales de Chile, 1974-1985, and the chaining of 1985 data with official national accounts for 
1986-1992; growth rates (computed in pesos at 1986 prices) for 1993 were obtained from the Central Bank of 
Chile, Cuentas nacionales trimestralizadas, 1986-1993, Santiago, Chile, 1994. 
a At 1977 prices. b Exports of goods. c Exports of goods and services. 
hyperinflation and restore growth 
(Morales, 1992). 
Prior to the introduction of the 
liberalization programme, tariffs were 
highly dispersed, with a maximum level of 
150%. Import bans and licensing 
requirements were also in force. The 
authorities began by establishing a single 
exchange rate, returning to total 
convertibility, scrapping quantitative 
restrictions and cutting tariffs. They also 
opened up the capital account almost 
completely. Since then, the real effective 
exchange rate has undergone significant 
devaluations (see table V.l). 
Bolivia simplified its tariff system in 
1986 by establishing a uniform tariff of 
20%. In 1990 the tariff rate was reduced to 
5% for capital goods and 10% for other 
goods; thus far, these levels have been 
maintained. Bolivia now has one of the 
most open economies in Latin America 
and, indeed, in the world. 
This reform effort has achieved its 
objectives in terms of stabilization, but the 
expected recovery of economic 
performance has been slow in coming; 
since hyperinflation was quelled in 1986, 
the Bolivian economy's growth rates have 
been modest, especially in comparison to 
those of the 1970s, and investment, 
measured as a percentage of GDP, 
remained low for many years following 
the reforms. 
In addition to the drastic reduction of 
inflation, another positive change has been 
the diversification of exports, although 
they remain concentrated in mineral and 
agricultural products and the total still 
falls short of the levels reached in the early 
1980s. 
In the last two years, however, exports 
have expanded considerably and are now 
approaching their 1980 level. This 
substantial increase has also entailed 
a greater degree of diversification. In 
addition, during this biennium GDP has 
grown at the reasonable pace of over 
4% per year and investment has 
picked up. 
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Bolivia's experience suggests that, in 
an economy marked by low levels of 
diversification and productivity, a reform 
that alters market signals in order to align 
national prices with international ones, 
though necessary, is not enough in and of 
itself to fuel a rapid process of 
growth-oriented structural change. 
b) Experiences with high countervailing 
trade incentives prior to liberalization 
The experiences of other countries of 
the region have differed from those 
described above. In these economies, high 
levels of protection have been maintained 
for long periods, but at times their 
distortive effects on relative prices have 
been offset, at least partly, through the 
adoption of various export incentives 
(such as drawbacks, special import 
regimes, tax exemptions and preferential 
financing for exporters). 
Certain limitations, both in the 
domestic sphere (especially fiscal 
constraints) and on the external front 
(reactions on the part of trading partners), 
have reduced the authorities' 
maneuvering room in terms of the use of 
export incentives, however. At the same 
time, a recognition of the potential benefits 
associated with an ability on the part of 
local firms to stand up to foreign 
competition and the successful 
experiences of some developing countries 
have prompted a proliferation of trade 
liberalization processes since the end of 
the 1980s. In fact, in recent years a shift in 
the direction of liberalization has been 
observed even in countries that have 
traditionally preferred to keep import 
barriers in place while neutralizing their 
effects on the export sector. 
From the 1960s until the time when the 
reform process began to be stepped up in 
1988, Brazil's trade and exchange regime 
exhibited three main features: a highly 
restrictive import policy based on import 
licences and bans, which were an essential 
component of the country's industrial 
policies; an active export promotion effort 
which included the use of fiscal incentives, 
various lines of financing and drawbacks 
on imported inputs (Baumann and 
Moreira, 1987); and a crawling peg which, 
except for brief periods, succeeded in 
preventing the overvaluation and 
excessive fluctuations of the real exchange 
rate that have plagued other countries in 
the region (Fritsch and Franco, 1993). This 
last factor paved the way for a strong 
export performance despite the Brazilian 
economy's high levels of inflation. 
Trade policy was closely linked to 
sectoral industrial policies, which were 
administered by a variety of agencies, 
including the business associations in each 
sector. Another salient feature of the 
Brazilian trade system was the 
neutralization of the widespread 
anti-export bias of protectionist policies 
through hefty subsidies for the exports of 
selected industries. In addition to these 
fiscal incentives, some exporters of 
manufactures enjoyed access to inputs and 
capital goods imported under special 
programmes, in exchange for a 
commitment to export and to maintain a 
positive balance in the use of foreign 
exchange. In point of fact, of all the 
countries of the region, Brazil's trade 
policies are some of the most similar to the 
policies implemented by the Republic of 
Korea and the Chinese Province of 
Taiwan. 
In 1985 the country began to reform 
some aspects of its trade policy. Tariffs 
were reduced a number of times from 1988 
on, and in 1990 a programme to further the 
liberalization of trade was launched. This 
was followed by the dismantling of 
quantitative controls and, later, the reform 
of the external trade regime and the 
streamlining of its administration. 
In 1991 Brazil announced a new 
timetable for tariff reductions -which had 
brought tariffs down to an average of 14% 
by mid-1993- and the elimination of 
various export incentives. Another 
important change made in 1990 was the 
addition of a "dirty" float applying to 
current international transactions to 
complement the crawling peg already in 
existence. 
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Until the early 1990s, Colombia's trade 
policy called for a combination of import 
substitution (based on fairly high, 
differentiated tariffs and import licensing) 
and the promotion of non-traditional 
exports through subsidies and drawbacks 
aimed at mitigating the anti-export bias of 
import policies. Tariffs were accompanied 
by a complex system of prior licensing, 
although there were also special regimes 
for certain sectors which lowered the 
amount of duty actually paid. The various 
attempts to liberalize external trade in 
recent decades have not altered the 
essential features of the prevailing regime 
(Ocampo and Villar, 1992a). 
In the 1960s, Colombia became the 
second country (Chile was the first) to 
adopt a crawling-peg regime based on 
strict exchange controls. Trade reforms 
were launched in 1990, after Colombia's 
currency had undergone a number of 
sharp devaluations in real terms starting 
in 1985 which prompted a considerable 
increase in exports other than coffee. The 
first phase of the reform programme called 
for the removal of quantitative 
restrictions, although their protectionist 
effects were replaced by higher tariffs and 
devaluations. Tariffs were subsequently 
lowered. 
The trade liberalization process was 
completed in Colombia in early 1992. The 
average nominal level of protection had 
decreased to 12%, compared to 44% in 
early 1990, and effective protection of 
domestically-produced goods had fallen 
from 91% to 29%. The degree of tariff 
dispersion had also been drastically 
reduced (Ocampo, 1993, p. 17). 
In the financial sphere, a series of steps 
were taken to halt the appreciation of the 
currency (Cárdenas and Barrera, 1993); 
these measures included the application of 
reserve requirements to financial flows. In 
practice, the system still provides for a 
significant degree of regulation by the 
Banco de la República. 
In 1985, Mexico implemented a 
programme to liberalize imports and 
phase out the traditional instruments of 
industrial policy. It should be noted that 
the liberalization process in this country 
was preceded and followed by sharp real 
depreciations (in 1982-1983 and 1986-1987) 
which gave the industrial sector a thick 
buffer that helped it make the necessary 
adjustment (Ten Kate, 1992). These steep 
devaluations were necessary in order for 
the country to be able to cope with the fiscal 
and balance-of-payments crises touched 
off by the suspension of foreign credit (in 
1982) and the drop in oil prices (in 
1986-1987).45 
Before it embarked upon its trade 
liberalization programme, Mexico used a 
wide variety of instruments to control 
imports, stimulate industrial production 
and orient the manufacturing sector 
towards external markets. Local 
production was protected not only by a 
highly dispersed tariff structure with a 
ceiling of 100%, but also by the 
requirement of import permits for 92% of 
all foreign purchases and the use of 
officially appraised values that were 
higher than actual purchase prices in the 
case of 19% of total imports. 
Exporters of non-traditional goods 
enjoyed tax breaks, which partially offset 
the anti-export bias of trade policy. In 
addition, for many years Mexico 
successfully used industrial promotion 
programmes to boost import substitution 
in sectors considered to be of strategic 
importance, sometimes in conjunction 
with export promotion programmes (Ros, 
1993). 
The country's trade liberalization 
programme began in 1985 with the 
removal of quantitative restrictions on a 
large number of tariff items. Liberalization 
measures focused on intermediate and 
capital goods, but also applied, although 
on a more selective basis, to some 
consumer goods. At first, tariffs were 
45 It should be recalled that in Mexico, as in Chile, devaluations contribute to fiscal equilibrium, since 
earnings from the country's main export product are an important source of fiscal revenue and make 
the public sector a net supplier of foreign exchange. 
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raised to compensate for the elimination of 
direct controls. In 1987, the authorities 
carried the trade reform process further by 
eliminating the requirement of advance 
permits for imports of many consumer 
goods, discontinuing the use of officially 
appraised values in the remaining cases, 
and simplifying the tariff structure by 
reducing it to five rates ranging from 0 to 
20%, with the average rate -weighted by 
output- being 12% (6% if the weighting is 
based on imports). 
Trade reforms were then extended to 
include exports. Permit requirements 
have been eliminated in many cases, and 
the remaining quantitative restrictions on 
exports are those called for by the 
existence of price controls (for some 
agricultural products) or by the provisions 
of bilateral or international agreements. 
Traditional export subsidization 
mechanisms have been eliminated, partly 
as a consequence of Mexico's accession to 
GATT and its bilateral negotiations with the 
United States. 
The use of industrial incentive policies 
has also been significantly reduced. The 
remaining programmes, which still 
include quantitative restrictions on 
imports, are concentrated in a few specific 
sectors, such as the motor vehicle and 
microcomputer industries. 
The sharp real devaluations of 1986 
and 1987 made it possible for the 
Government to launch the Economic 
Solidarity Pact, under which the exchange 
rate was frozen, the trade liberalization 
process was intensified and a policy of 
wage restraint was instituted in an 
attempt to lower annual inflation to 
single-digit levels; this goal was 
achieved in 1993. 
Mexico's exports of manufactures are 
growing rapidly, and the industrial 
sector's share of GDP has risen slightly. 
However, Mexico's post-reform growth 
rates for the economy asa whole have been 
modest (see table V.3), and the deficit on 
current account has been climbing sharply 
(the projected figure for 1994 was over 
US$28 billion). 
c) Experiences involving subregional 
agreements and structural 
adjustment programmes 
Trade liberalization programmes 
create special sets of circumstances when 
they coincide with subregional integration 
processes, particularly if they entail the 
adoption of a common tariff. The case of 
Costa Rica and Guatemala is one example 
of just such a situation. 
These two countries effected a 
gradual, three-stage reduction in their 
levels of protection between 1986 and 
1993. In both countries, trade liberalization 
was combined with sizeable real 
devaluations and with an increase in 
industrial output which was linked to the 
expansion of intra-Central American 
trade. This cushioned them somewhat 
from the potentially negative impact of 
trade liberalization with respect to third 
countries. 
Although the two countries embarked 
upon the liberalization process at the same 
time -as part of a reform of Central 
America's common external tariff carried 
out in 1986- their paths subsequently 
diverged as a result of prior multilateral 
commitments made by Costa Rica with 
respect to structural adjustment and trade 
liberalization. None the less, by 1993 the 
two countries' tariff rates had converged 
towards equivalent levels. 
Prior to 1986, Costa Rica and 
Guatemala had average (unweighted) 
nominal protection levels of about 50%, 
with higher rates of up to 100% for 
consumer goods and lower rates or 
exemptions for inputs and capital goods. 
In general, both countries' markets had 
been more open -as measured in terms of 
imports as a proportion of GDP or the level 
of effective protection- than those of other 
countries in the region (Rapoport, 1978), 
and non-tariff barriers had not -except for 
brief periods, such as 1982-1984 in 
Guatemala- been very significant in either 
country. 
The first tariff reform to be carried out 
simultaneously by the two countries, in 
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Table V.3 











(billions of dollars) 
tures/GDP 




1970-1979 6.5 23.4 22.8 _ _ 85.9 
1980 9.2 24.8 22.1 6.0 0.8 40.0 
1985 2.6 17.9 21.4 6.9 1.3 35.6 
1986 -3.8 16.4 21.0 9.7 1.3 63.6 
1987 1.9 16.1 21.3 12.0 1.6 61.8 
1988 1.2 16.8 21.7 14.1 2.3 71.3 
1989 3.3 17.3 22.5 15.0 3.1 69.9 
1990 4.4 18.7 22.8 16.9 3.6 67.4 
1991 3.6 19.6 22.9 18.7 4.1 73.6 
1992 2.8 21.1 22.8 19.2 4.7 74.2 
1993 0.6 20.7 22.5 22.6 5.4 79.1 
Source: ECLAC, Preliminary overview of  the economy of  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994 (LC/G.1846),  Santiago, Chile, 
December 1994; Statistical Yearbook for  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1993 Edition (LC/G.1786-P),  Santiago, 
Chile, February 1994. United Nations publication, Sales No. E/S.94.II.G.1;  J. Ros, "La reforma del régimen 
comercial en México durante los años ochenta: sus efectos económicos y dimensiones políticas", Reformas  de 
política  pública, series, No. 4 (LC/L.743),  Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, April 1993; and Banco de México, Informe  anual, 
various issues. 
a At 1980 prices. Does not include exports from maquiladoras. c Share of total merchandise exports plus maquila 
services represented by non-oil merchandise exports plus maquila services. 
1986, was primarily aimed at rationalizing 
their systems of protection. As part of this 
reform, the countries eliminated 
exemptions which, when applied to 
imports of inputs and capital goods, had 
substantially raised their levels of effective 
protection. They also did away with the 
surcharges which had been agreed upon 
by all the Central American countries, and 
lowered their highest tariffs. These 
measures brought average nominal tariff 
protection down from 50% to about 25% in 
both countries, as well as narrowing their 
tariff spreads. 
These reforms do not seem to have had 
any significantly adverse effects on 
production activities. First of all, there was 
"water" in these tariffs; i.e., they were so 
high that, given the existence of 
competition from regional firms, it was not 
in producers' interest to make full use of 
them. Second, devaluations took place in 
both countries: in 1986, Guatemala's real 
exchange rate46 depreciated by some 42%, 
while Costa Rica's did so by 7% that year 
and by another 10% the following year. 
Levels of tariff protection in Costa Rica 
and Guatemala began to diverge in 1987, 
when Costa Rica initiated a second 
tariff-reduction programme in accordance 
with the commitments it had made as part 
of a structural adjustment programme 
agreed upon with the World Bank; this 
was, in part, reinforced by the concessions 
made by Costa Rica in connection with its 
accession to GATT in 1990. The country 
agreed to cut its tariffs to an average level 
of 20% by 1990, while it continued to 
narrow its tariff spread and eliminated a 
national surcharge which it had justified 
as being an instrument for defending its 
balance-of-payments position. This tariff 
reduction process was accompanied by a 
gradual depreciation of the real exchange 
46 The exchange rate weighted by the relative prices of the relevant country's main trading partners. 
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rate between 1987 and 1990 as a result of 
the adoption of a crawling-peg regime. 
In 1990 Guatemala carried out a 
reduction of its nominal level of tariff 
protection (which, although later in 
coming, was also sharper), reducing its 
average level to 19%; in this case, too, these 
measures were linked to forthcoming 
agreements regarding structural 
adjustment and entry into GATT, which 
took place in 1991. However, the effect of 
the greater reduction of protection against 
importables was neutralized by a sharp 
devaluation (17%) of the real exchange 
rate in 1990. 
In general, the steep devaluations of 
1986,1987 and 1990 in Guatemala, as well 
as the more gradual depreciation seen in 
Costa Rica, created favourable conditions 
for the production of tradable goods and 
services. This mitigated the negative 
effects of the third phase of tariff reduction 
undertaken by the two countries in 1992 
and 1993, despite the very sharp 
appreciation of the real exchange rate in 
Guatemala in 1991 and the more moderate 
rise recorded in Costa Rica in 1992 and 
1993. Moreover, capital inflows and the 
appreciation of the two countries' 
currencies, together with the economic 
recovery observed in both 1992 and 1993, 
helped to boost intra-Central American 
trade, thus enabling the industrial sector 
to carry out an expansionary adjustment 
despite the reduction of its levels of 
protection. 
The end result of the third round of 
tariff reductions was equivalent tariffs in 
Costa Rica and Guatemala, with a 
maximum of 20% for finished goods and a 
minimum of 5% for inputs and capital 
goods. Guatemala's entry into GATT, which 
occurred later than Costa Rica's, involved 
stiffer tariff concessions, inasmuch as the 
former's tariffs were consolidated at 45%, 
whereas the latter's were consolidated at 
60%. The tariff reductions made by other 
Central American countries under similar 
structural adjustment agreements 
facilitated the conclusion of an agreement 
on a new common external tariff in 1993 
having these same rates of 20% and 5%. 
Two lessons can be drawn from a 
comparative analysis of the experiences of 
Costa Rica and Guatemala, which serve as 
an illustration of the situation surrounding 
the conclusion of integration agreements 
between two or more countries. First, such 
an analysis confirms the desirability of 
reducing protection gradually, with a 
clear sense of direction, and of combining 
it with a gradual depreciation of the local 
currency in real terms. The case of Costa 
Rica demonstrates that this can be achieved 
through the use of a crawling peg, while 
Guatemala's experience indicates that, 
although devaluations can offset the 
impact of a decrease in protection, the 
exchange rate can become extremely 
volatile in the absence of a policy based on 
either a crawling peg or clearly defined 
parities. The combination of a gradual 
approach, on the one hand, and a clear 
sense of direction, on the other, is probably 
the main reason why Costa Rica has one of 
the highest investment coefficients and 
best export performances in Latin America 
and has recorded the highest GDP growth 
rate of the entire subregión for the 1980s 
and 1990s (ECLAC, 1994d). 
Second, both countries' experiences 
illustrate the complex relationship that 
exists between international and subregional 
trade liberalization agreements. In particular, 
the international commitments made 
under structural adjustment programmes 
can play a decisive role both in fostering 
the abandonment of a common external 
tariff (CET) agreed upon at the subregional 
level and in promoting a convergence of 
levels conducive to the conclusion of an 
agreement on a new CET. In turn, a CET may 
lend greater credibility to national trade 
liberalization initiatives, since it can help 
to consolidate or "lock in" tariff reductions 
through the joint commitment of a number 
of countries (ECLAC, 1994a). 
2. Export promotion policies 
This section will present a comparative 
study of the different mechanisms used 
during the past two decades to promote 
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exports in nine countries of the region 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and 
Uruguay). The aim of this analysis will be 
to describe the practices adopted in those 
countries, observe the trends that have 
emerged over time and, insofar as 
possible, compare these two elements with 
their counterparts in other regions. 
A review of the export-incentive 
profiles of these nine countries from the 
standpoint of the process of changing 
production patterns suggests that, in 
general, the region suffers from several 
weaknesses in this area. 
The most frequently used incentives 
are those that furnish access to imported 
inputs and tax exemptions on domestic 
value added. Export policies are generally 
defined in strictly commercial terms, and 
few countries provide incentives for 
upgrading the supply of exportables and 
access to foreign markets through 
promotion, marketing, quality and brand 
differentiation activities, or the creation of 
export trading companies (characteristic 
of the aggressive trade strategy of the 
Asian countries) or the celebration of 
export contracts, with incentives being 
differentiated according to the types of 
commitments made with regard to the 
value of exports (another prominent 
feature of the approach taken by Asian 
countries). Much the same is true of the 
promotion of overseas investments in 
marketing activities and participation in 
wholesale distribution chains, all of which 
are important factors in promoting the 
internationalization of production. 
a) Fiscal incentives 
A comparative analysis of fiscal 
incentives in these nine countries of the 
region leads to the following conclusions 
(see table V.4): 
i) The most frequently used 
instruments for stimulating exports are 
fiscal incentives (tax exemptions or 
drawbacks) rather than financial 
mechanisms. Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia have employed various sorts of 
incentives since the 1960s; other countries, 
such as Guatemala, have not adopted such 
measures until more recently. 
ii) Since the second half of the 1980s, 
and concurrently with import 
liberalization processes, the use of a 
number of these instruments has been 
discontinued, including profits-tax 
exemptions and export performance-
based incentives (in Argentina and Brazil), 
and exemptions from indirect taxes other 
than the value-added tax (VAT) (in 
Mexico). 
The reasons for these changes vary. In 
some cases, it has simply been that the 
structure of incentives had to be adapted 
to conform to the conditions agreed to 
within the framework of GATT; in others, as 
in the case of Mexico, plans to sign a 
bilateral trade agreement required the 
elimination of certain mechanisms. In still 
other cases, such steps were taken for fiscal 
reasons and for reasons of efficiency in 
terms of an effective means of stimulating 
the export sector, or simply because of the 
more general desire to reduce the role 
played by public policy. 
iii) The most commonly used 
instruments have to do with the provision 
of preferential access to imported inputs 
(drawbacks) and exemptions from 
domestic value-added taxes. These types 
of measures afford a minimum level of 
export promotion, i.e., they eliminate 
barriers to the importation of inputs and 
taxes on exportable products. 
iv) The differences observed among 
the various countries are linked to the 
nature of their respective domestic fiscal 
structures (e.g., the existence or absence of 
indirect taxes)47 and the composition of 
their exports: only two of the nine 
countries grant incentives to export 
marketing firms. 
v) Export performance-based 
incentives -which are traditional in 
Colombia and have been introduced more 
recently in Mexico- have been eliminated 
47 Or the absence of an income tax, as in Uruguay. 
Table V.4 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): SUMMARY OF FISCAL EXPORT INCENTIVES (1992) 
Incentives Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Guatemala Mexico Paraguay Uruguay 
Rebates Leves similar to 
tariffs (new ma-
nufactures) 
No Levels similar 
to tariffs 





No No No Excludes tradi-
tional products 
Up to 30% of ex-
ported value 
No No No No 
Drawbacks Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges(1960) 
Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges (1964) 
Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges(1988) 
a Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges (1972) 
Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges(1983) 
Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges (1972) 
M e c a n i s m 
planned but not 
operative 
Refund of im-
port duties and 
charges 


























No Excludes some 
products 
No No Until 1985 Yes Up to 10% of ex-
ported value 
E x e m p t i o n 
from tax on pro-
fits 
In effect from 
1985 to 1989 








In effect from 
1986 to 1993c 
In effect from 
1972 to 1990 




Since 1985 (not 
operative) 
Since 1972e No No No No Since 1986 No No 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a The facilities provided for in the Vallejo Plan are classified as export performance-based incentives. b The CERT exemption is classified as a tax credit certificate. 
c Reintroduced for the motor vehicle industry d Not subject to export contracts; incentive proportional to the amount exported. e The same incentives as are given to 
other exporters. 
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in recent years in Argentina,48 Brazil49 and 
Costa Rica as part of these countries' 
economic reform programmes. 
b) Financial mechanisms 
International conditions have a 
decisive influence on export financing 
policies owing to the industrialized 
countries' efforts to impose a certain 
discipline on competition among lenders 
regarding the finance terms they offer and 
the reduction of the degree of 
subsidization implicit in those terms. The 
countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) follow explicit guidelines in this 
connection,50 thereby defining parameters 
on which other countries base their 
decisions. The use of a number of new 
types of private-sector credit 
instruments51 is also on the rise, making 
the utilization of export credits 
increasingly common52 in countries 
whose financial and insurance markets 
run fairly smoothly. 
In Latin America, export financing has 
played a crucial role in expanding and 
diversifying external sales of 
non-traditional items. Empirical evidence 
shows a strong positive correlation 
between the availability of export 
financing and an increase in the share of 
total exports represented by sales of 
non-traditional products (especially 
manufactures) (Rhee, 1989). 
The export financing mechanisms 
employed in the countries of the region 
have traditionally involved the direct or 
indirect use of public resources: 
i) financing by government agencies; 
ii) rediscounting of notes purchased from 
exporters; iii) refinancing, at preferential 
rates, of private-sector credits granted to 
exporters; iv) coverage of the spread 
between market interest rates and fixed 
rates set at a lower level in order to 
promote exports; and v) provision of 
insurance and credits, especially in the 
case of financing extended to foreign 
buyers. 
In the case of virtually all of these 
mechanisms, commercial banks play a key 
role in export financing in most countries 
of the region. Given the absence of any 
parallel insurance policy, especially with 
regard to pre-shipment credits, only those 
exporters who are in a position to offer 
guarantees actually have access to credit; 
this works to the detriment of most small 
and medium-sized enterprises. 
A second consequence is that, in most 
countries, the bulk of such financing goes 
to final exporters. Few mechanisms exist 
for the domestic suppliers of inputs to the 
export sector. Third -owing to the 
shortcomings of the countries' capital 
markets, especially as regards long-term 
credit- the short-term lending in which 
commercial banks engage has the effect of 
limiting the financing of fixed capital 
investment for export activities as well as 
the post-shipment financing of capital 
goods and other products, thereby 
hindering efforts to achieve export 
diversification.53 
48 This type of incentive has been reintroduced for the motor vehicle industry. 
49 Such incentives are available only in the case of some contracts signed before 1990. 
50 Since 1978, the OECD countries have observed the provisions of the Arrangement on Guidelines for 
Officially Supported Export Credits. 
51 One example of such an instrument is the mechanism known as "forfaiting" (a private-sector mode 
of lending to buyers that enables exporters to obtain post-shipment financing and to discount 
medium-term promissory notes). Another is "securitization" (a mechanism enabling groups of small 
enterprises to form a pool in order to obtain pre-shipment credit by reducing their individual risk). 
52 In some industrialized countries, official support for exports is limited to the provision of insurance 
and guarantees. 
53 Some exceptions are financing that has an impact on supply, such as lines of credit for exports of 
consultancy and engineering services and of capital goods, and financing for enterprises with export 
potential and programmes for the development of exportable supply. 
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This suggests that an appropriate 
export finance policy should include: 
i) channels providing access to credit; 
ii) insurance systems to enable firms 
having fewer guarantees to offer for 
pre-shipment financing to obtain credit; 
iii) mechanisms for providing long-term 
lines of credit; and iv) the necessary 
insurance structure to cover post-shipment 
risks. 
Table V.5 summarizes some of the 
financial incentives provided for exports 
in the nine countries studied. 
The most marked differences among 
the various financial incentive structures 
relate to lines of credit to supplement 
supplier credits and financing for the 
production of exportable goods. For 
example, not all the countries have lines of 
credit specifically intended to serve the 
purpose of trade promotion or for 
investments by exporters in fixed assets, 
nor do they have mechanisms that 
facilitate access to financing for agents 
involved in the various stages of the 
production process. These are areas in 
which -because of the high level of risk 
entailed in export activities and the 
lengthy periods of time they involve-
inputs of government resources or lines of 
financing from international bodies are 
generally required. Even so, this does not 
eliminate the bias against small and 
medium-sized enterprises or the difficulty 
of channeling benefits to indirect exporters. 
The lower section of table V.5 
illustrates the magnitude of the 
shortcomings that exist with regard to 
export credit insurance. In all the countries 
-except Mexico since 1987- insurance for 
pre-shipment financing is furnished by 
private companies, as is the insurance 
needed to cover commercial risks in 
post-shipment stages. Mechanisms for 
covering exchange risk are not highly 
developed, and often no coverage is 
available for extraordinary risks. Given 
the existing limitations on access to major 
financial markets, it is often difficult to 
obtain the reinsurance that insurers need 
in order to diversify their securities 
portfolios. 
For purposes of comparison, tables 
V.4 and V.5 present only those incentives 
that are similar in a number of different 
countries. However, a descriptive analysis 
should at least make mention of other 
existing mechanisms, some of which have 
had clearly positive effects on the export 
sector, as well as still others which have 
been adopted more recently and have been 
welcomed by the various agents. These 
include: i) the stimuli generated by a more 
efficient use of trade promotion services in 
diplomatic missions and by the provision 
of greater access to information and more 
streamlined processing procedures 
through integrated computerized systems 
for foreign trade (SISCOMEX54 in Brazil) and 
"random customs selections" (Mexico); 
ii) incentives granted in exchange for 
certain commitments in terms of the value 
or volume of exports (Commission for the 
Extension of Fiscal Benefits to Special 
Export Programmes (BEFIEX) in Brazil, the 
Vallejo Plan in Colombia, and the 
Programme for Consensus-Building with 
Major Export Enterprises (ALTEX) in 
Mexico); iii) mechanisms such as the 
"export card" (Mexico), which gives the 
various agents involved in production and 
export activities easy access to domestic 
credit; iv) lines of credit not included in 
table V.5, such as those used to finance 
services exports, the export of turnkey 
production plants, the acquisition of 
storage facilities abroad, the preparation 
of market surveys, and the shipment of 
commercial samples (Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia); and v) other types of 
incentives, such as temporary clearances, 
administrative facilities and differentiated 
customs treatment for warehoused 
exportables, and initiatives such as 
the Chile Foundation, a semi-public 
organization that conducts projects aimed 
54 SISCOMEX has considerably simplified administrative procedures relating to exports and imports by 
taking the place of a number of documents and has made possible a computerized integration of the 
activities of the main agencies involved in foreign trade. 
Table V.5 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL EXPORT INCENTIVES (1992) 
Incentives Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Guatemala Mexico Paraguay Uruguay 
Pre-shipment 
credit 
a. Public Existed from No For some Since 1967 Since 1983 For some Since 1985 Since 1985 
resources 1963 to 1991 products products 
b. Private Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi-
resources tions tions tions tions tions tions tions tions 
Post-shipment 
credit 
a. Public Existed from For some For some For some Since 1983 For some For some 
resources 1965 to 1991 products products products products products 
b. Private Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi- Market condi-
resources tions tions tions tions tions tions tions tions tions 
Trade promo- Only for small No Sercotec- Since 1967 No No Since 1985 No No 
tion and medium- CORFO line of 
sized enterpri- credit 
ses (FOPEX 
resources) 
Fixed asset fi- No No No % varies accor- Since 1983 Yes Since 1985 No No 
nancing for ex- ding to ex-
porters port/sales  ratio 
Financing for No No Sercotec- Since 1967 Yes No Since 1985 No No 
development of CORFO line of 
exportable credit 
products 
Letter of credit No No No No No No Since 1985 No No 
for exports 
INSURANCE: 
Pre-shipment fi- Private insurers No Private insurers Private No No BANCOMEXT No No 





risk Private insurers Private insurers Private insurers Private No No BANCOMEXT Private insurers Private insurers 
insurers guarantee 
b. Extraordinary Treasury Treasury Existed until 
No 
BANCOMEXT 
No No risk resources resources 1986 No guaranteee 
c. Exchange rate No No No No No No No No No 
risk 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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at developing new exportable products, 
after which -once such products' 
economic viability has been 
demonstrated- it auctions them off to the 
private sector (see box V.2). 
c) Non-price-based promotion 
mechanisms 
i) The institutional structure for export 
policy. Policies providing institutional 
support for exports vary as to the 
decision-making levels involved in the 
different countries of Latin America. In 
some countries (Mexico, Guatemala, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Brazil between 1965 
and 1990), general guidelines are defined 
by ministerial councils that are specifically 
responsible for matters of foreign trade, 
while in others, foreign trade is the 
province of one (Argentina) or more 
(Brazil) secretariats or departments of 
ministries in charge of economic affairs. 
There are also differences as to the 
kinds of agencies that administer 
foreign trade policy: Mexico and 
Colombia have foreign trade banks with 
powers relating to policies on export credit 
insurance and financing, while in other 
countries these functions are performed 
by non-bank agencies whose job is 
essentially one of administering 
budgetary resources (Brazil); in still other 
cases, there simply is no centralized trade 
policy but instead an agency charged with 
the development and promotion of 
exports (Chile). 
Other differences have to do with the 
degree to which private agents are 
involved in the formulation of foreign 
trade policy. In some countries (Mexico, 
Colombia, Brazil until 1990), private 
agents take part in this activity on a 
routine, formalized basis via the 
representation of producers' organizations 
on ministerial councils for foreign trade 
and other special-purpose commissions. 
In other cases, the private sector 
participates indirectly via sectoral 
agencies (such as the sectoral chambers in 
operation in Brazil since 1990) or 
consultative bodies, such as the Foreign 
Trade Council which has been in existence 
in Chile since 1990. 
For the most part, the agencies 
responsible for backstopping Latin 
American exports have concentrated 
primarily on promoting trade rather than 
on influencing supply conditions. 
Initiatives aimed at fostering the creation 
of export trading companies, making 
intensive use of the facilities of diplomatic 
missions for commercial purposes or 
establishing trade representatives' offices, 
either in the countries' major markets or in 
their potential markets, have been few and 
far between. Some of the reasons for this 
may be found in the lack of trade 
promotion incentives, while others are 
linked to the absence of a tradition of 
involving private agents in foreign trade 
policy-making. 
ii) Quality control policy. As an 
export-promotion mechanism, this type of 
policy represents a new and increasingly 
important issue in the region, since quality 
is becoming a key aspect of 
competitiveness in international markets. 
Including this policy among the array 
of incentives used by a country to improve 
its exportable supply can facilitate gains in 
productivity and the adaptation of supply 
to conform to stricter standards of 
international demand (see box V.3). 
This type of adaptation is quite a high 
priority as regards environmental and 
phytosanitary standards, particularly in 
order to obtain access to the EEC market, 
which demands official certification for its 
imports of horticultural and fruit 
products. 
From a more general vantage point, 
encouraging firms to set up quality control 
systems permits them to modernize their 
management techniques and, particularly 
in the case of small and medium-sized 
55 In some countries (such as Costa Rica since 1986), there are specific ministries for foreign trade, while 
in others -the majority- such matters are handled by agencies linked to Ministries of Finance, 
Industry, Trade or Agriculture. 
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Box V-2 
THE CHILE FOUNDATION 
The origin*, of the Chile Foundation go back to 
the nationalization of the Compañía de 
Teléfonos de Chile, a subsidiary «t U*f, during 
the administration of Salvador Allende. During 
the following administration, lhe Chile 
Foundation was created as part of a 
compensation agreement; under the terms of 
that agreement, each of the two parties was to 
invest US$25 million of seed capital in this joint 
venture. The idea was for the Foundation to 
gradually become self-supporting by pro\ iding 
services to the private sector and establishing 
lucrative production companies that would 
employ new technologies. 
The Foundation's first projects wi re directed 
mainly at improving the qtulitj. ol processed 
iruil and vegetables and providing technical 
assistance to the edible oils industry, including 
advisory services regarding methods for 
rctining fis-h oil and using othet by-pmducts 
Few of these early piojccts got beyond the 
pilot stage. In view ol this problem, the 
Foundation decided it needed to gain mon» 
experience by launching business project:» of its 
own. 
The idea was to determine which activities 
might benelit from now technologies, and then 
to acquire and adapt Ihesv technologies. Once a 
technology was assimilated, the Foundation 
would take charge ol commercial production 
and marketing through a subsidiary. When the 
.subsidiary became profitable, it would be sold, 
thereby completing the technology-transfer 
process Using this procedure, the Foundation 
has set up more than 20 Subsidiaries, primarily 
in the agricultural and lisheiies sectors. 
Salmon farming is one example of a \t>ry 
successful initiative. In 1981, the Foundation 
derided to carry out a pilot project using a 
cage-based technique of freshwater salmon 
farming In the course ol the project, a number 
of pioblems were solved in relation to the 
feeding of the fish, disease control, changes in 
currents and water temperature, techniques lor 
the handling ol eggs and fry, the selection of 
species and the behaviour ol lhe fish in thecages 
Conimi'icidl pioduction began in the period 
IWf-v-lW7, and output doubled in the lollowing 
period. The project began to turn a protit in 1988, 
and the technology-transfer cycle was 
completed that same year when the Foundation 
sold the project to a Japanese fish and shellfish 
company 
The Foundation's salmon-farming project 
gave a definite boost to overall salmon output 
in Chile, which increased from 94 tons in 1983 
to over 4,000 tons in ll>88. The technological 
capacity developed within the Foundation 
was so gieat that the organization was able to 
provide technical assistance to more than 
hall ol the new projects undertaken in this 
Source" T l l u» i " f ranslcr dl InhimUi^ lhe L,v-t> ol (lu- Chile i'oimd.ilum'', i 7 PAI Rn un, \ i> 41 i l C'C Ifõ4-I'). Sanlup). 
I hile April 1W1. 
enterprises, to rationalize costs and make 
better use of available incentives, which 
often go unused due to a lack of 
knowledge of their existence or to poor 
business management. Promoting the 
creation of private firms specializing in 
quality certification also encourages 
competition in the sector and motivates 
the public sector to concentrate on 
regulation and supervision. By the same 
token, this type of competition also gives 
the public sector more options when the 
time comes to designate testing 
laboratories. 
3. Export processing zones (EPZs) 
Some Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have accorded differential 
treatment to export processing units on 
quite a large scale as a way of boosting 
their external sales and, in addition, of 
heightening labour absorption and the 
internationalization of technical progress. 
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Box V-3 
CHILE: EXPORT QUALITY 
The Government has submitted a bilí lo the 
legislature proposing the establishment ol a 
national quality control system to promote the 
standardization oí export products and the 
creation of certification mechanisms lor those 
products. The idea is to move towards d system 
of export quality ceitification that would In-
sufficiently flexible so «is not to fundei expoit 
activity but that would also provide the 
necessary incentives to bring about genuine 
improvements in the quality of exported items. 
This ts the concept that was behind the 
creation of the National Quality Programme, 
whose operations initially focused tin the areas 
oí technical standardization, sectoral 
authorities, mctiology and quality certification 
The proposal now being adv a need under this 
Programme calls for the establishment of a 
National Quality System under which sectoral 
quality-contiol autlu.uties would Ir-
responsible foi dcci editing the ceil dying 
agencies of the corresponding ministries and a 
technical service agency would be in chaige ol 
standardization, metrology and the monitoring 
of accredited agencies. The system would be 
coordinated by a National Quality Sucietaiiat, 
which would in Lurn be the executive arm of 
a National Quality Council composed ot 
representatives of the public and private 
scctors. 
Preliminary studies have revealed the 
existence ot a wide range ol functions relating to 
quality, safely and health that are scattered 
among a number ol dillorent ministries, the use 
Of relatively obsolete technical standards and an 
overlapping of regulations with, in many cases, 
others that have not been Joimally repealed 01 
whose legal status is unclear. 
OciRin (the Production Development 
Corpoiation) recently created a technical 
assistance fund lor'quality control and 
technology transfer whose aim k to support 
such lunctions in small and medium-sized 
enterprises The fund operates on the basis of 
five modules: baseline analysis, training 
regarding the concept of quality, planning, 
administration and production processes in 
quality-control and product-design systems. In 
each ot these modules, firms can apply for a 
subsidy equivalent to 73/!.  of the tost of the 
consultants they hire, up to a limit o» nearly 
US$ 2,000 The modules are cumulative in order 
to encourage business enterprises to set up 
integicited quality control systems. The Initial 
lunding tor the programme amounts to 
USS 232,(KW 
A national quality award has been created 
and is presented to outstanding tirms in this 
area eaih October, which has been designated 
national quality month' 
At the sectoral level, the difltcullies 
encountered by Chilean fruit exporters in 
gaining entry into the ll.c market in 1 W 
prompted an active national debate on quality 
control lor l'ruit exports. This led to a plan for 
regulating the truil industry which was drawn 
up by the Association of Exporters, the 
Federation ot Fruit Growers and the National 
Agi ¡cultural Society. The plan envisages a 
lompulsory quality-ceititication system based 
on ptedeU-rmtnud standards, verification of the 
condition ol the truil upon arrival at its 
destination, and a shipment scheduling system 
that would avert situations of oversupply and 
would organize the timing of the fruit's arrival 
in the mam expoit markets. 
Source' ,t*-wnoe,T<;t.hfiolog\-andOualilv-Cynlr<>ll'ioi;ramnKMiUhi-Mini'.ln  vIlAcinoniK. Anj in- . lMcbpmem <vndRiwnslruük>n 
Any analysis of this policy instrument 
must make some sort of comparison 
between the incentives granted to these 
units and the benefits received by other 
producers/exporters; this topic goes 
beyond the bounds of this chapter, 
however. Our purpose here is simply to 
discuss some of the factors that provide an 
indication of just how important the 
maquiladora industry has become in the 
region and to draw some conclusions 
based on specific country experiences. 
a) Export processing zones 
Export processing zones (EPZs) are 
physical and economic enclaves where 
free-trade and export-promotion policies 
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can be applied without altering the trade 
regime or the structure of protection in use 
in the rest of the country.56 These zones 
are delineated areas that are placed 
outside the jurisdiction of the country's 
customs authority. Although most of the 
firms operating in these zones tend to be 
subsidiaries of transnational corporations, 
there are also many joint ventures and 
national firms that are serving as 
subcontractors of companies which 
operate in importing countries. Generally 
speaking, EPZs produce labour-intensive 
goods such as light manufactures 
(wearing apparel, electronics, processed 
foods, etc.) whose transport costs are low. 
There are more than 200 EPZs in 
developing economies, the first of which 
were set up in southern and eastern Asia. 
Their creation is not linked to the size of 
the domestic market, but rather to the 
existence of a supply of relatively cheap 
labour, the availability of services and 
infrastructure, and the absence of trade, 
exchange and administrative barriers. For 
example, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, EPZs exist in Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Saint Lucia 
and other countries. Table V.6 shows the 
relative significance of EPZs in terms of the 
total exports of some countries of the 
region. 
The most commonly used incentive in 
these zones is an exemption from duty on 
imports of foreign merchandise, both 
consumer goods and industrial goods for 
use in the zone itself. Nearly all the EPZs 
also offer exemptions from indirect taxes 
on such operations and from income taxes, 
and some also permit a limited percentage 
of output to be sold on the domestic 
market subject to the payment of the 
corresponding import duties. Another 
hallmark of EPZs is that they offer a free 
exchange market, in that foreign exchange 
earnings from exports are not subject to 
restrictions. In general, these incentives 
are granted for a fairly long period of time 
(usually about 20 years). 
The most successful EPZs exhibit a high 
degree of operational efficiency. In 
addition to quality infrastructure and 
communications capabilities, the success 
of the main types of promotion policies 
depends less on the existence of generous 
tax and financial incentives than it does on 
the streamlining of such procedural 
matters as port and customs formalities, 
among others, and the minimization of red 
tape. 
One of the EPZs' chief drawing cards is 
that they permit the consolidation of 
commercial and administrative transactions 
into a single service (or "window") which 
centralizes all formalities, intercedes with 
other government offices, takes decisions 
and solves administrative problems. This 
streamlining of processes and decision-
making allows the investor to spend less 
time on procedural matters, thereby 
reducing the investor's administrative 
costs and improving the competitive 
environment. 
EPZs may, of course, entail both 
benefits and costs. In those cases where 
developing countries have fostered the 
creation of EPZs, they have done so to 
promote a net inflow of foreign exchange, 
increase productive employment and 
attract foreign direct investment and 
technology; to open up opportunities for 
upgrading labour and management skills; 
and to further the establishment of 
linkages between firms located in the EPZs 
which are in closer contact with the 
international competition and more 
sensitive to technological innovations and 
domestic firms. 
The benefits of EPZs should be assessed 
in the light of their potentially changeable 
nature. One possible scenario is that these 
zones may generate rising levels of value 
added and foreign exchange, along with 
increasingly stringent requirements in 
56 The definition of EPZs as physical enclaves is not entirely accurate in all cases. In a number of countries, 
some export-processing plants enjoy differential treatment in respect of fiscal and exchange matters 
even though they are located in various parts of the country. 
TRADE POLICY 121 
Table V.6 
IMPACT OF MAQUILADORAS/EXPORT  PROCESSING ZONES ON 
TRADE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1980-1992 
1980 1985 1990 1992 
Mexico3 
Total exports (A) 15.5 26.8 40.7 46.2 
Maquiladora-EPZ exports (B) 2.5 5.1 14.1 18.9 
Exports of manufactures (Qb 3.0 5.0 13.9 16.7 
B / A (%) 16.1 19.0 34.6 40.9 
B/(B+C)c (%) 45.5 50.5 50.4 53.1 
Jamaicad 
Total exports (A) 963 610 1,323 1,275 
Maquiladora-EPZ exports (B) - 70 289 384 
B / A (%) - 11.5 21.8 30.1 
Dominican Republicd 
Total exports (A) 1,079 954 1,574 1,757 
Maquiladora-EPZ exports (B) 117 215 839 1,191 
B / A {%)  10.8 22.5 53.3 67.8 
Saint Luciad 
Total exports (A) 46 83e 127 
Maquiladora-EPZ exports (B) - 7.5e 19.1 
B / A (%) - 9.0e 15.0 
Costa Ricad 
Total exports (A) 1,003 1,090 1,668 2,171 
Maquiladora exports (B) 4 149 307 453 
B / A W 0.4 13.7 18.4 20.9 
Source: Banco de México, México: Indicadores económicos, Mexico, City, various issues, and The Mexican Economy-1993, 
Mexico City; Larry Willmore, "Export processing in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Saint Lucia: 
ownership, linkages and transfer of technology", Working  Paper series, No. 25, Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 1995; Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean/External  Trade Data Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/BADECEL); International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
"Billions of dollars. Totals include gross value of exports by maquiladoras. b Excluding manufactures produced in 
maquiladora plants. c Estimated relative weight of maquiladoras in total exports of manufactures. Millions of 
dollars. e 1986. 
terms of skilled labour, and may 
constantly update their management 
techniques in line with the best 
international practices. Alternatively, 
however, these zones may stagnate or 
diminish in importance if they become 
less attractive than EPZs in other 
countries due to the presence of a less 
competitive workforce, inadequate 
infrastructure or political instability. It 
may be useful to determine exactly 
which types of circumstances encourage a 
strong performance on the part of EPZs, 
as well as looking at the possibility of a 
transition towards the formation of an 
" export processing country or territory", 
as has occurred in Singapore and Hong 
Kong. 
Various aspects of these zones need to 
be examined. The level of net exports from 
EPZs is considerably lower than their gross 
exports owing to their high content of 
imported inputs. The infrastructure 
required for the establishment and 
operation of EPZs entails a direct cost that 
may considerably raise the cost of the jobs 
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they create. In addition, there are implicit 
subsidies in the prices of the land, 
industrial sites, public services and other 
business services.57 Finally, the 
concessions and incentives granted to 
firms located in EPZs have in some cases 
crowded out local producers whose 
facilities were originally located outside 
this special zone. 
The creation of EPZs may serve as an 
initial stage in a process of export-oriented 
industrialization in developing countries 
or in given areas of such countries. In fact, 
special zones are often found in remote 
areas in which there are few alternative 
means of labour absorption.58 
It is also possible that the development 
of production activities in EPZs may remain 
confined to assembly operations. This may 
have two possible consequences. First, the 
absence of linkages can limit the impact of 
EPZ exports on the income and 
productivity of the rest of the economy, 
although the importance of this factor will 
depend on the relevant country's type of 
production base, its level of competitiveness 
and the presence of policies that encourage 
or discourage the formation of such 
linkages. Second, a lack of systemic 
competitiveness -particularly in the form 
of a dependence on low wages and 
preferential access to external markets-
raises the possibility of disinvestment or of 
the sudden curtailment of new 
eg 
investments in these zones.1 
It should be noted that, in order to 
promote linkages between firms located 
within EPZs and domestic firms, the 
economy needs to have effective 
mechanisms for the provision of financing, 
technological support and human 
resources training so that it can take 
advantage of the stimuli generated by EPZ 
activities. 
b) Export processing in the Caribbean 
i) Effects on employment and labour 
markets. Together with the tourist 
industry, export processing plants have 
been a major source of jobs in several 
countries of the Caribbean. Employment 
in the export processing plants of the 
Dominican Republic's EPZs climbed from 
20,000 workers (23% of total employment 
in the manufacturing sector) in 1981 to 
141,000 workers (63% of total employment 
in manufacturing) in 1992. EPZs accounted 
for 1.3% of all jobs in 1980 but for 6.6% in 
1991. In Saint Lucia, the largest of the seven 
members of the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS), it is estimated that 
export processing firms employ more than 
2,800 persons in 17 plants, which is one 
half of all the jobs in manufacturing and 
6% of the total number of jobs in the 
economy. Finally, the Jamaican economy 
employs more than 900,000 persons, of 
whom 31,000 (mainly young women) 
work in export processing plants. Export 
processing accounts for 3% of all jobs in the 
economy, and 30% of employment in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Wages, benefits and working 
conditions tend to be better in the EPZs than 
in the rest of the country. Employers in the 
EPZs are subject to the same labour laws as 
employers elsewhere. However, although 
labour unions in the Caribbean countries 
are by law guaranteed the freedom to 
operate, there is little union activity in any 
of the EPZs. In the Dominican Republic a 
minimum level of fringe benefits is 
required by law (mainly social security, 
57 It should be noted that private EPZs also exist (e.g., in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic) which 
do not receive subsidies. 
58 The absence of adequate infrastructure may curtail the development of this type of EPZ, however; it 
is therefore advisable to limit the number of the EPZ's objectives in order to increase the probability 
of attaining them. 
59 This is a danger which, as repeatedly pointed out in the Caribbean and Central America, may result 
from the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement if it leads to an erosion of the 
preferential access to the United States market enjoyed by the countries participating in the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative. 
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paid sick leave and holidays, and a 
Christmas bonus equal to one month's 
pay). Most of the firms in Caribbean EPZs 
provide more benefits than the minimum, 
however, as well as numerous bonuses for 
punctuality and productivity. In Saint 
Lucia, incentive pay actually exceeds the 
regular wage in some cases. In Jamaica, 
fringe benefits are even more generous; in 
fact, this is so much the case that only 
about half of local expenditure goes to 
wages, with the remainder being for 
water, electricity, local transport, rent, 
imports from territory under the 
jurisdiction of the Jamaican customs 
authority, and the like. 
ii) Linkages and technology transfer. 
Overseas assembly is universally 
recognized as a means of employing large 
numbers of relatively unskilled workers, 
but its usefulness as a vehicle for the 
transfer of technology is frequently 
overlooked. The importance, for a given 
economy, of introducing workers to the 
rigours of an industrial environment and 
to the concepts of punctuality, quality 
control and deadlines should not be 
underestimated. In addition, different 
policies may represent incentives or 
obstacles to technology transfer, as is 
demonstrated by the experiences of the 
Dominican Republic and Jamaica as 
compared to that of Saint Lucia. 
In the Dominican Republic, export 
processing and tourism have been the only 
buoyant sectors of the economy during the 
past decade. During the period 1982-1991, 
GDP grew by an average of only 1.2% per 
year, merchandise exports from the 
territory under the jurisdiction of the 
customs authority fell in both volume and 
value, and manufacturing production 
outside the EPZs diminished. Over this 
same period, expenditure by tourists rose 
at an average rate of 14% per year to 
US$ 877 million, exports from the EPZs 
climbed by 23% per year to more than 
US$ 1 billion, and foreign exchange 
earnings of the customs-free zones 
increased by an average of 17% per year to 
US$ 249 million. 
The range of products produced in the 
EPZs of the Dominican Republic has 
expanded a great deal over the years, yet 
the degree to which output is concentrated 
in the textile industry has actually risen 
slightly, with the result that more than two 
thirds of the companies and employees 
working in the EPZs are now engaged in the 
manufacture of textile products. 
Assembly of electronic and electrical 
equipment has grown rapidly, but still 
accounts for less than 5% of EPZ 
employment. Data processing is another 
new area of export activity, and this export 
service is now being marketed in such 
fields as airline reservations and the 
processing of health insurance claims for 
foreign clients (see box V.4). 
EPZ exports from Jamaica grew steeply 
until 1989, but have since stagnated. By the 
same token, local expenditures by EPZ 
firms also rose steadily until 1989 but 
thereafter began to decline. The United 
States is the main source of investment and 
the largest market for export processing 
firms in the EPZs of these Caribbean 
countries. 
Seventy of the 79 locally-owned 
companies in the Dominican Republic are 
in the textile and garment industry, and 
most of the remainder are in "low-tech" 
industries producing footwear, leather 
articles, ceramics and furniture. In the 
case of the apparel and footwear 
industries, the local companies are 
subcontractors that assemble products 
for overseas firms. 
Firms in the Dominican customs-free 
zone are well managed, use the best 
conventional production practices and are 
able to meet stringent quality standards 
and short deadlines. Quality and manpower 
qualification levels are high. In contrast, 
the technically backward producers for 
the domestic market have not benefited 
from the presence of exporters in the EPZs 
owing to the weak linkages existing 
between the two kinds of producers. Firms 
producing for the domestic market 
operate at low levels of efficiency and use 
antiquated quality-control systems. 
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DATA PROCESSING: A NEW TYPE OF MAQUILA IN SELECTED 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
In Î989 the island ol Grenada  managed to attract 
a United States-owned company that employ1-
150 data entiy opeiators and has another 30 
people in training. One reason lor the success of 
this venture is that lhe investois installed a 
satellite dish in Grenada so that could send and 
reccive images of documents on their own 
equipment rather than having lo use the mails 
or pay high lees to lhe local telephone company. 
Last year, the parent company acquired'a 
corporation in Dominica which had previously 
been owned by the local telephone company 
The numbci of |obs provided by the firm grew 
from 85 to 115, and a satellite dish was installed 
Poor communications restrict Saint Lucia's data 
processing activities lo articles lor medical or 
legal journals and lhe like, which do not require 
fast lurn-around times, whereas lirins in 
Grenada and Dominica are able to serve clients 
such as Federal F.xpi ess, Bank of America, Xerox 
and Blue Cross ol Cililornia 
Ten years ago, then? were only five dala 
processing firms in ¡atnafca  ami, for the most 
part, they served lhe domestic market. The 
induslrv began lo grow rapidlv, however, when 
lhe Govern men 1 oflered incentives lo firms lhal 
were willing to specialize in export maikels and 
to refrain from maintaining any domestic 
clients. These exporters of services now einploj 
more than 2,500 workers. In 1985 the 
Government changed this policy, ruling that in 
the ease ol data entrv terviocs -unlike 
manufactures-, lax exemptions and duly-lree 
import privileges would be restricted to 
companies located in the customs-tree /ones. 
Jamaica's shortage of skilled labour hinders 
ils data processing industry, which prefers to 
hire high school graduates who know how to 
type Owners and managers of firms in this 
sector complain that they have dillicully 
rccruiting dala entry operators and that lhe 
people who they do hire have such a poor level 
of general knowledge that they require a 
minimum of from three to four months of 
training. During lhe training period they must 
be paid the legal minimum wage even though 
their productivity is close to /ero  Once (rained, 
operators often switch over to another 
employer, as there is ficrce competition lor the 
limited pool ot trained dala entry operators due 
to the tact th.it -unlike manufacturing firms in 
the gdiment Industry- data processing 
companies do not have a policy of cooperating 
with one another m the labour market This 
provides a classic example of externalities, a 
company that incurs the expense of training a 
woiker is not able to it-coup its investment, and 
all of the firms in this industry therefore invest 
very little m training new workers It would be 
belter lo conduct basic (raining acliv ¡lies outside 
the tirm, with all firms in the industry sharing 
the costs Morc'o\ ei, if this v\ ere done most of the 
cost would be borne by the trainee, as he or she 
need not be paid a minimum wage while 
undergoing training. The data processing lirins 
in the Kingston aiea ha\e, in tact, begun a 
piogiamnie of this t>pe for high school 
gradua le* in cooperation with Human 
Employment and Resouices Trainfng, a 
government-run vocational Iniining 
programme 
The growth prospects ol the data processing 
industry in Jamaica are quite good because it is 
supply-constrained rather than demand-
constrained Managers oí firms in Ihis industry 
claim that they could employ many more 
operators if they were available. The 
qualifications required lor these positions are 
the ability to read, write and type; candidates 
who start oil with a basic commercial education 
can easily learn to use the data-entry and 
word-processing programmes involved. This is 
a highly competitive industry, however, in 
which Jamaicans must compete with firms 
throughout the world, so wages are low despite 
the seveie shortage of personnel. 
Data processing firms must keep abreast ot 
technological advances in both software and 
hardware if they are lo remain competitive, and 
they appear to be doing this successfully in 
Jamaica. Many ol the companies are now 
incorporating image scanners m their 
operations, since these devices gieatly increase 
productivity for some types of dala enlry. 
Source. Larry Willmore, "Bxport pro«<iMnR in lhe Onbtwan, 1 he Jamaican i-xfvrK-niv1,  (TP 1/. S o w , No 52 (I C/Ç 1824-1'), 
Santiago, Chile, Kctmom* CommtsMrtn tor I j t u l Ameriu and thii Caribbean (KM At"), April 1994 
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Backward linkages between EPZs and 
the customs territory of the Dominican 
Republic are almost non-existent. 
Bureaucratic requirements (e.g., export 
licenses) hamper sales by firms under the 
jurisdiction of the customs authority to 
companies in the custom-free zones. 
Although there has been a law on the 
books since 1979 that provides for the 
temporary import of goods that are to be 
incorporated into exports (Export 
Incentives Act No. 69), this has never 
worked in practice as it was intended. 
Nor is there any drawback mechanism 
that would allow an exporter to recover 
the duty paid on imported raw materials 
and intermediate inputs, quite apart 
from the costs occasioned by delays in 
their clearance through customs. This 
makes the products of firms located 
within the customs territory 
uncompetitive on the open market, 
including that of the custom-free zones. 
The high costs and enormous difficulties 
involved in meeting quality standards and 
delivery deadlines constitute a formidable 
obstacle to the formation of such linkages 
(see box V.5). 
In Jamaica, EPZ companies are almost 
never allowed to sell their goods on the 
domestic market. Firms operating outside 
the EPZs under the provisions of the Export 
Industry Development Act encounter 
formidable obstacles if they attempt to 
produce for the local or subregional 
market; consequently, all of these firms 
have chosen to export the whole of their 
output to markets outside the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM). The only way 
they could legally supply the local 
market would be to maintain a physical 
separation in the factory between goods 
processed for export and goods destined 
for the local and CARICOM markets. The 
small size of the local market makes this 
option an unattractive one. 
As a result of this regulatory 
environment Jamaica's garment industry 
is segmented. One segment is modern, 
operates on a large scale, is efficient and 
highly productive, and produces 
exclusively for the export market. The 
other segment operates on a small scale 
and, for the most part, is unspecialized; its 
productivity is low and it produces for the 
domestic and, to a very limited extent, 
CARICOM markets. There is virtually no 
contact between the two segments; neither 
workers nor managers move from one 
segment to the other. 
For Saint Lucia, on the other hand, 
export processing may represent a useful 
first step along the path of 
industrialization. Much of the work 
performed by the country's export 
processing companies cannot be described 
as simple assembly. In the garment 
industry, nearly 75% of the employees 
work in factories that are engaged in 
cutting, making up and trimming 
garments rather than sewing pre-cut 
pieces. The largest electronics firm on the 
island produces wire-wound resistors to 
exacting specifications using sophisticated 
equipment; it then coats and labels them. 
Another company uses plastic injectors to 
produce a variety of novelty items 
-including souvenir coasters and key 
chains for Euro-Disney- from PVC pellets 
and waste plastic. Considerable 
technology transfer also takes place at the 
managerial and supervisory levels of 
export processing companies, where all 
the supervisors and most of the managers 
are citizens of Saint Lucia. 
Saint Lucia's export processing 
companies have been able to develop 
backward linkages for several reasons: 
i) local businesses can sell goods and services 
to enclave and free-zone factories without 
first obtaining an export license; ii) backward 
linkages from the banana industry (the 
production of plastic bags and cardboard 
boxes) indicate that intermediate goods 
are produced on a large enough scale for 
costs not to be excessive; iii) producers of 
intermediate goods pay no tax other than 
a 3% customs service charge on the raw 
materials they import, and sales to 
exporters are automatically exempt from 
the excise tax that is charged on goods 
destined for the local market. In sum, Saint 
Lucia's policies are conducive to the 
formation of backward linkages, in 
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GARMENTS: TRADITIONAL EXPORT PROCESSING 
In Saint Lucia the garment industry now 
provides 72% of total employment in export 
processing companies, up Iróm 65% in 1989 
This industry also accounts foi muie than 80 £í 
of all imports ,ind exports ol goods by export 
processing plants in the period' 1986-1990. 
Because of its small si/.e,  Saint Lucia is not 
subject to mandatory quotas in the United 
States, its main export inaiket. Pet haps lor this 
reason, six of the nine factories and three 
quarters of the workers cut, sew and trim cloth 
imported from Asia rather than assembling cut 
pieces imported from the United States under 
item 807 of the United States customs schedule 
even though the lornier lace lull customs duties 
in the Uiuted States. 
The garment industry also accounts lor .i 
majority ot export processing activity in himaioi 
(74 of'the 109 firms and nearly 90'", ol 
employment). Data processing ¡s the next largest 
export activity, but these linns are mute small 
compared to the mani.tactunng plants 
Employment in lamaica's garment 
industry has increased Irom approximately 
f-,000 persons in 1983 to 28,000 today, this 
means that tho average rate of growth: 
between 1983 and 1992 was 19'{ per annum, 
but the industiy's expansion actually 
proceeded al a much taster pace through the 
end of 1987 than in later years All the grow th 
in employment has occurred in companies 
that export their products exclusively to 
noil-CMtfCOM countries. These exports 'lose 
steadily from USJ> 11 million in 1983 to 
US$ 384 million in W2, with the steepest 
increase occurring in the earlier yeais (1983 to 
1987) More than hall the exports are garments 
made up Irom pieces cut in the United Slates in 
ordortotakcadvanlagoofitem 807ol tho United 
Stales customs schedule (renamed HS 
9802.00.80), under which duty has to be paid 
only on the value added in Jamaica Less than 
halt the value of exports is of the "cut, make and 
trim" variety, which creates more jobs in 
Jamaica per dollar's worth ol exports even 
though all thecloth used is imported. 
Increasingly, the cloth utilized in foreign 
assembly plants under the provisions ol item 807 
is made and cut in the United States so that the 
manufacturer will be eligible for the Caribbean 
B.isin Initiative's Special A c c e s s Program 
(807A '9802A), under which the United Stales 
has granted geneious quotas to Jamaica In 1992, 
Knnaica was the largest supplier of "807" 
women's hosiery and underwear to the United 
Slates market 
Although the Dominican Republic has been a 
benoliciary ol the terms presided by the 
European Ltonomic Community under the 
Lome Con\ention since 1989, the United Slates 
and its possessions continue to receive nearly 
9.Vi. ol the exports Irom tho customs-free '/ones. 
Since the United Slates is the largest buyer ot 
its exports, the Dominican Republic is 
understandably concerned about the ellccl that 
the toi mat ion of a >ree trade area under the 
Morlh American Free Trade Agreement tNAKI A j 
may have on those sales, inasmuch as clothing, 
along with most textiles, leather producís, 
footwear and glows, .ire specifically excluded 
from the Caribbean Basm Economic Recovery 
Source- Uirry Wdlnwre Tupurt puM-ewne; m lhe CiribbiMH. lhe j.imau.in expi-rioiui", t 11' iJ Rrwi . \<> ~->2 il C, C. 1824-P) 
Sdnlú^o, Chile Konomi i Commii-imi loi I .itm \im-ru.i «nd l lv I dtiHk.in (I ("1 M i, \prtl 
contrast to the policies in effect in Jamaica 
ortheDominicanRepublic. 
c) The maquiladora industry in Mexico 
i) Employment and foreign exchange. 
Maquiladoras have been in operation in 
Mexico since 1965.60 Imported materials 
and components enter the country 
duty-free and are exported primarily to 
neighbouring countries after having been 
partially processed or assembled in a 
registered plant. These firms are 
60 It is important to note that in Mexico the term "maquiladora" is applied to firms which are subject 
to a certain legal regime. Although in some cases it is also used to refer to assembly operations 
involving a low content of locally-produced parts and components, not all activities of this type can 
be classified as maquiladoras from a legal standpoint. 
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authorized to sell up to 20% of their output 
on the domestic market, and import duties 
on the foreign components and inputs 
contained in such products is applied to 
these sales. 
In the second half of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, the maquiladora industry in 
Mexico boomed. Between 1980 and 1993 
the number of plants jumped from 620 to 
2,142 in 29 of the 32 federal states of 
Mexico; the number of jobs they created 
rose from 124,000 to 532,000; and the value 
added (net exports) by this industry 
soared from US$ 772 million to US$ 5.9 
billion. Since the late 1980s, the 
maquiladora industry has become the 
country's second-largest source of foreign 
exchange and its fastest-growing 
employer, with the maquiladoras creating 
about 17% of the jobs in the manufacturing 
sector (SECOFI, 1992a). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, slightly 
over 50% of the maquiladora plants set up 
in Mexico were either wholly-owned by 
United States investors or such investors 
held a majority interest in them; about 40% 
were totally or primarily Mexican-owned; 
and the rest were controlled by Japanese, 
German or Spanish investors. Data for 
1992 show that the main production 
activities of the maquiladora industry in 
terms of local value added were the 
following: transport equipment (28%), 
electric and electronic materials and 
accessories (25%), electric and electronic 
machinery and appliances (11%), other 
manufactures (10%) and textiles (7%). In 
terms of value, 80% of the total output of 
the maquiladora industry comes from the 
area along Mexico's border with the 
United States, while only 20% comes from 
plants located in the country's heartland 
(see table V.7). 
ii) Linkages and technology transfer. 
The maquiladoras have not significantly 
increased their use of Mexican-produced 
materials, parts and components; only 4% 
of the inputs used since the programme 
was launched in 1965 have been of 
domestic origin. This negligible degree of 
integration with other industries located 
in Mexico is a consequence of the 
concentration of potential domestic 
suppliers in areas far from the northern 
border (e.g., in the Mexico City 
metropolitan area); an inadequate 
communications infrastructure (until 
recently) between the border area and the 
rest of the country; and still unresolved 
problems with domestic vendors in regard 
to price levels, quality and delivery dates. 
Above and beyond these factors, one of the 
chief reasons for the isolation of the 
maquiladoras from the rest of Mexican 
industry has been the government policies 
that were applied during the long period 
when the maquila was regarded as an 
activity of little value (see box V.6 and 
Grunwald, 1989). 
Although maquiladoras have some of 
the same features as enclave enterprises, 
they have played a highly positive role in 
upgrading the skills of the labour force at 
various levels (manual workers, 
supervisors, technicians and 
administrative personnel).61 The very 
reason that maquiladoras were set up in 
the first place (labour cost savings) leads 
these firms to use the smallest possible 
number of foreign workers (both manual 
and non-manual). With the exception of 
top management positions -and in some 
cases even this exception is not necessary-
the staff of the maquiladoras are Mexican 
nationals. 
The situation with regard to 
technology transfer in the maquiladora 
industry is determined by its very nature 
as an export activity. Available data show 
that maquiladoras are no longer devoted 
to unskilled labour-intensive assembly 
activities as they were in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, but have instead moved into 
manufacturing and assembly activities 
61 It is often said that the workers in maquiladoras carry out technically unspecialized tasks. This may 
be true if these tasks are compared with the work being done in maquiladoras and similar industries 
in the United States; however, the technical training required by Mexican maquiladoras is on a par 
with the requirements of other Mexican industries (Sklair, 1989). 
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Table V.7 
STRUCTURE OF THE VALUE OF OUTPUT IN THE 
MEXICAN MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, 1993 
(Percentages) 
Wages and benefits 
Domestic raw materials, 
containers and packaging 
Miscellaneous expenditures 
in Mexicoc 



























(value added in Mexico) 
Imported raw materials, 
containers and packaging 
Gross value of output 
Regional structure of value 

















Source: National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics  (INEGI), Avance de información  económica: industria 
maquiladora de exportación, Mexico City, May 1993 and August 1994. 
a Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas. b These figures cover the period up to Apr i l 1993. 
c Includes rental of machinery, equipment, buildings and sites, electric power, telephone, telegraph and telex; customs 
formalities, freight and transport; maintenance of buildings and equipment; and other expenses. 
THE MEXICAN MAQUILA INDUSTRY AND ITS INTEGRATION 
WITH OTHER DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES 
A detailed analysis of the cost structure ol the 
Mexican maquiladora industry shows that the 
percentage of local value added and of 
physical and service components ot domestic 
origin is much higher m plants located in the 
intorior of the country than in those along the 
border (see tdble V.7). Although they 
represent only a small percentage of the 
maquiladora industry (0.3% of the total), the 
plants operating tn Mexico's most 
industrialized zone (the Federal District and 
the state of Mexico) exhibit higher percentages 
of domestic integration. Precisely because the 
northern part ol Mexico is a very attractive area 
lor maquiladoras due to its proximity to the 
United States, it is not economically feasible to 
increase this activity's integration with an 
industrial structure that is concentrated in the 
central region ot the country. The northward 
shitt ol a portion of the national industrial 
st rucl u re, ashasoccu rred i n a nu mber of sectors, 
maysomewhatreducclheproblcmsinvolvedin 
increasing the integration of the maquiladora 
plants located in the north with the domestic 
production structure, but it is not likely to 
eliminatelhosedifficultiesaltogelher. 
Source; W Peret, 'horn Qobati/aljon to Rc^iondliwlion The Mexican tase', Technical  J\ipcn sews, Mo 24, Pans, « « 
Usvolopmenl Centra, 1990 
TRADE POUCY 129 
involving a fairly intensive use of skilled 
labour. This shift is due to the change in 
the industry's sectoral composition as its 
main focus has switched from sewing 
garments to the production of electronics, 
electrical equipment and components, and 
motor vehicle parts. 
There is also evidence of a widespread 
application of modern management 
techniques in the maquiladoras belonging 
to these new industrial sectors (Carrillo, 
1989). Just-in-time inventories, statistical 
process control, zero-defect techniques and 
team-based work patterns are now in 
common use; these practices have led to 
increased training efforts and to a reduction 
in the high personnel turnover rates 
prevalent in this activity (8% -15% per month). 
To sum up, subcontracting arrange-
ments have both advantages and 
disadvantages for developing countries. 
Those countries that have not been able 
to move beyond the EPZ stage suffer from 
all the well-documented problems of low 
wages, long workdays, high staff 
turnover and job insecurity. On the other 
hand, subcontracting has played a 
decisive role in helping the newly 
industrializing Asian economies to move 
up in the production hierarchy and to 
become successful industrial exporters. 
The difference between these two types 
of cases is attributable to many factors. 
These factors, which are discussed in 
another section of this study, include 
investment in human capital, tech-
nological innovation and government 
support in creating a propitious 
environment that will help firms 




Import liberalization or rationalization is 
only one of the ingredients of a compre-
hensive trade reform effort. As noted in 
earlier chapters, most of the countries of 
the region have carried out extensive tariff 
reforms. Trade policy includes many other 
dimensions besides tariff policies as such, 
however. It also covers export promotion 
instruments such as exemptions and 
drawbacks. The changes now taking place 
in international trade norms are exerting a 
strong influence on the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in terms of the amount 
of leeway those countries have in designing 
their export promotion policies. Past policies 
tended to focus on exports of manufactures 
while often neglecting products based on 
natural resources and thus failing to take 
full advantage of existing production 
potential. A comprehensive approach should 
consider the entire production system, as 
well as taking into account the fact that, for 
most of the region, a majority of exports 
will continue to be based on natural resources 
for a long time to come; furthermore, there 
are ample opportunities for developing 
comparative advantages in non-traditional 
exports based on natural resources. 
1. Some general rules for trade policy 
One essential rule for trade policy is that it 
should be highly selective. The main 
problem with import substitution policies 
was not their selectivity but rather the fact 
that they ended up being quite general in 
nature, thus leading to a lack of clarity and 
transparency as to exactly what was being 
promoted or what purpose was being 
served by intervention. In addition, the 
fact that the State is subject to major 
constraints in terms of information and 
management needs to be recognized. This 
means that government action must focus 
on a few strategic, carefully selected areas. 
Since most industrial activities are 
subject to dynamic externalities of a more 
or less diffuse nature, it can be argued 
(Rodrik, 1992) that it is usually best to 
benefit broad categories of manufacturing 
activities rather than getting embroiled in 
trying to "pick winners". It is also true 
that, since competitiveness can be 
acquired, a flat tariff no longer makes 
sense. Some graduation of tariffs (as in 
other policy instruments) has become 
desirable. In fact, as noted earlier, most of 
the countries of the region have opted for 
a non-uniform tariff. The degree of 
differentiation -which is now 
considerably less- and the average level of 
the tariff will depend on a series of factors, 
including a country's stage of 
development, the chances of contraband 
trade occurring and the size of the 
economy in absolute terms. None the less, 
for reasons of administrative efficiency 
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and transparency as well as in order to 
avoid corruption and unproductive 
activities, it is best to limit the number of 
tariff brackets. 
Two other general observations are in 
order. First, the higher tariffs (or incentives 
for specific activities) should be strictly 
temporary, with a pre-announced 
timetable for lowering those tariff rates (or 
reducing the subsidies). Second, the tariff 
structure should be similar to the structure 
of export incentives in order to block the 
anti-export bias generated by the tariff. 
On the assumption that it is better to 
promote certain categories of economic 
activities than to focus on specific product 
lines, "automatic graduation" policies 
could be applied to a large number of 
sectors and then suspended once those 
policies' objectives have been reached. 
Automatic graduation affords an 
appreciable advantage, given the 
weaknesses of Latin American States and 
the difficulties they have in dissuading 
entrepreneurs from seeking easy profits. 
In addition, when such a mechanism is 
applied to a range of activities rather than 
to specific products, the market then has a 
great deal of latitude in choosing which 
activities are to be promoted. 
A particularly fruitful area for 
applying selective policies is that of 
incentives for non-traditional exports that 
are equipped with a "self-destruct" 
mechanism , i.e., incentives that 
automatically cease to apply once a certain 
target has been reached. 
2. Export promotion policies 
Although the anti-export bias has been 
greatly reduced in the region as a result of 
trade reforms, it continues to exist, to a 
greater or lesser extent, in all the 
economies of the region. This is why it is 
important to promote exports, 
particularly those that are knowledge-
intensive or involve a high level of value 
added. If such promotion efforts are not 
pursued, then the volume of exports, as 
well as the number of exporting firms and 
products, will be smaller than desirable, 
and export activity may tend to be 
concentrated in a limited number of firms 
and in products for which the demand on 
world markets is more sluggish and 
vulnerable. 
In such cases, the level and quality of 
exports will be sub-optimal owing to the 
strong externalities that are characteristic 
of this activity. Firms that begin to sell new 
types of exports generate more benefits 
than they can assimilate (e.g., in terms of 
knowledge and prestige); thus, they 
generate externalities that accrue to other 
firms and to the economy as a whole as 
export activity becomes an established 
area of endeavour and the reputation of 
the country's new export products grows. 
These externalities justify government 
support for pioneering export firms. 
The shortcomings of capital markets 
are another good reason for backstopping 
export activity. If the region's banking 
institutions are reluctant to provide long-
term and venture capital for investments 
in their own countries, for example, then 
their reticence will be even greater when it 
comes to export credits. If the Government 
does not act, the level of financing made 
available for exports will be sub-optimal. 
There are a number of considerations 
that reinforce and complement the 
well-known argument in respect of 
economies of scale within a context of 
economic globalization. Exporting makes 
it easier for firms to gain know-how and is 
conducive to increased competitiveness, 
thus enabling them to stay in closer touch 
with changes in demand, to read market 
signals and obtain information on new 
products and to keep abreast of the latest 
technological and organizational changes. 
Generally speaking, export promotion 
efforts need to be buttressed by a 
sustainable macroeconomic framework, a 
high, stable exchange rate and clear-cut, 
reliable rules regarding the operation of 
the economy. The promotion of 
non-traditional exports, however, calls for 
a certain degree of selectivity. In designing 
mechanisms for the promotion of non-
traditional exports, care must be taken to 
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ensure that they will be moderate in 
nature; it is also important to establish pre-
announced time limits and provisions for 
periodic evaluation to correct their course 
and to make sure that firms have ample 
access to incentives. These measures 
should therefore be selected in close 
coordination with private-sector bodies in 
order to ensure a systematic form of 
cooperation between the public and 
private sectors in conducting export 
promotion activities. Otherwise, there is a 
danger that these programmes will lose 
touch with the chief concerns of the 
business world and thus become less 
effective. 
In any sustained effort to promote 
non-traditional exports, there are three 
priority areas: access to inputs at 
competitive prices, the promotion of 
exports of new products or to new 
markets, and institutional support. 
a) Access to inputs at competitive prices 
A basic condition for enhancing export 
firms' competitiveness is to make sure 
they have access to inputs on competitive 
terms. The experiences of the majority of 
countries that have become successful 
exporters indicate that this factor is of 
crucial importance. Firms that want to 
import inputs for the purpose of 
producing exports should have access to 
these inputs on an automatic basis once 
they have fulfilled certain basic 
requirements. A number of countries in 
the region have mechanisms that allow for 
the temporary importation of inputs for 
the production of export goods. It has been 
observed that these types of measures 
function more smoothly and have a 
greater impact in terms of the level of 
exports when they operate on an 
automatic rather than discretionary basis. 
In contrast, the impact on export levels is 
less notable in countries where firms are 
required to submit new applications each 
time they want to import inputs and must 
then wait for discretionary approval. 
Mechanisms that provide tariff 
exemptions for the importation of inputs 
that are to be used to produce export 
goods are preferable to drawback 
mechanisms for reimbursing firms after 
the fact. This is because the former are 
simpler to administer and entail lower 
financial costs for the firm in question (the 
latter consideration is a decisive factor in 
high-inflation economies). 
The temporary importation of inputs 
for use in producing export goods should 
be accompanied by training programmes 
for customs personnel and by 
informational campaigns, since in some 
countries, temporary import mechanisms 
have proved to be inefficient because 
customs officials actually hinder the 
process or because there is a lack of 
information about how these mechanisms 
work. Ways should also be sought to 
include indirect exporters (domestic 
producers of inputs for exporters) in the 
system. 
b) Incentives for  developing new export 
products and markets 
The public sector usually cannot 
afford to run a large-scale drawback 
programme. At times, the success of such 
programmes has actually forced 
Governments to discontinue them because 
of their high fiscal cost. One efficient 
response to this type of situation would be 
to provide incentives only for new export 
products or for the penetration of new 
markets. Chile's simplified drawback for 
non-traditional exports is one example; in 
order to be eligible for this incentive, the 
exports of a given product must not have 
exceeded a pre-determined value during a 
certain period. This mechanism has three 
advantages: i) it encourages exports of 
new products; ii) it automatically ceases to 
apply once it has met its objectives, and 
thus has a limited fiscal cost; and iii) it 
requires exporters to complete only one 
short and simple formality. 
In all cases, export incentives should 
have simple application procedures; they 
should be moderate, i.e., designed to help 
place competitive or nearly competitive 
products on external markets; they should 
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have specific time limits; and they should 
be required to produce definite results 
in terms of new products, sums or 
markets. 
The new GATT agreement on subsidies 
allows the developing countries much less 
leeway than was available to the newly 
industrializing economies (NIES) of Asia. It 
is also true, however, that importing 
countries are less likely to impose 
countervailing duties if subsidies are 
moderate, expressly temporary 
(especially those that are automatically 
graduated) and used by countries whose 
share in the world market for the 
subsidized products is small. The Latin 
American and Caribbean countries will 
have to examine this agreement carefully 
in order to determine how they can 
promote new activities for international 
markets. 
c) Institutional support for  export activity 
Since promotion efforts are more 
effective when they are coordinated, it 
is advisable to consolidate a country's 
export promotion agencies -i.e., those 
in charge of information on exports, 
export finance and insurance, 
participation in international trade fairs, 
development of exportable supply, etc-
into a single institution. In a number of 
countries of the region, export promotion 
agencies are widely scattered, were 
established at different times under 
differing types of legal provisions and are 
not always well-coordinated with one 
another. 
An entity that provides comprehensive 
support for non-traditional exports 
should have stable financing, a qualified 
professional staff and close ties with the 
private sector, all of which will enhance its 
impact on policy decisions affecting 
exports. 
d) Other aspects of  export promotion 
policies 
In addition to the aspects mentioned 
above, a number of other areas exist in 
which government action can play a 
decisive role in helping to improve export 
performance. 
i) Information.  One of the first 
problems facing firms that are attempting 
to export their products is a lack of 
information. Strong externalities exist in 
this area, and the help of the public sector 
is crucial. This is why it is so important to 
create or establish information centres 
covering a wide range of variables, such as 
tariff levels abroad, potential export 
markets, prices, product specifications, 
export contacts and forthcoming 
international trade fairs. 
ii) Export finance  and insurance. In a 
number of countries of the region, 
financial support for exports is virtually 
non-existent and is therefore available to 
only a very few firms. Without financing 
to provide working capital and credit for 
foreign customers, firms are at a 
competitive disadvantage with respect to 
other countries where firms receive such 
support. In fact, there is evidence that the 
competitiveness of the exports of some 
countries of the region is, in part, 
attributable to their firms' access to credit 
for foreign customers. It is also often the 
case that competitive firms may even lose 
markets because they are unable to offer 
credit to buyers. 
In addition, firms need to have full 
access to export insurance, both against 
commercial risks to their customers and 
against political risks in target markets. 
The cost of information -often one of the 
most expensive components of the total 
cost of export insurance- could be cut by 
using regional information networks. 
iii) Management training. One of the 
areas in which an export promotion 
agency should be active is management 
training. The attitude of entrepreneurs 
towards exporting and their knowledge 
about potential business opportunities in 
foreign markets and about mechanisms 
for promoting non-traditional exports are 
pivotal factors in their decision as to 
whether or not to invest in the production 
of exportables. Often, entrepreneurs have 
little interest in exporting because they are 
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accustomed to producing for a protected 
domestic market, and this attitude may be 
reinforced by a lack of knowledge about 
export-related variables. 
iv) Overseas promotion efforts.  The 
promotion of a country's exportable 
supply in other parts of the world is an 
area involving strong externalities which a 
number of Governments in the region are 
currently addressing. In most countries, 
however, public-sector support in this 
connection is insufficient. In some cases, 
this is due to a lack of financial resources. 
Export-promotion agencies need to have 
enough resources to fund the participation 
of firms in international trade fairs, and the 
expertise of trade advisers serving in 
diplomatic missions abroad should be 
used more effectively. It is also important 
for export promotion agencies to work in 
close cooperation with private-sector 
organizations such as exporters' 
associations and business groups in order 
to marshall their efforts while avoiding 
duplications of work and a dispersion of 
energy. In a number of countries, the 
organization of exporters' associations is 
weak, and this is reflected in the scant 
amount of technical and financial 
resources devoted by export promotion 
associations to the design of private 
marketing strategies for regional 
(markets) and sectoral (products) export 
drives. This lessens the chances of 
achieving an improved form of 
coordination between the public and 
private sectors in the areas of overseas 
promotion and marketing, quality control, 
and standardization. An effort might be 
made to encourage entrepreneurs to 
organize and coordinate their export 
efforts, which would enhance technical 
interchanges between exporters and 
Governments. 
v) Development of  exportable supply. The 
promotion of a country's exportable 
supply abroad also requires a more active 
form of support on the domestic front in 
order to develop that supply and gear it to 
the demands of external markets. 
Promotion efforts should not be limited to 
existing products, but should also help to 
adapt the exportable supply to respond 
swiftly to signals of international demand. 
The timely dissemination of up-to-date 
information on demand in export markets 
in terms of quality, standardization, 
deadlines and volumes would make this 
task easier and could encourage new firms 
to enter the export business. 
One way of gradually adapting 
exportable supply to the requirements of 
foreign markets, while at the same time 
fostering ties between domestic firms and 
international buyers, is to select specific 
sectors in which the country has export 
potential and then, in conjunction with the 
private sector, to endeavour to create an 
exportable supply in those sectors while 
promoting contacts with marketing firms 
and importers in target markets. In 
addition to laying the groundwork for 
strategic export alliances between 
domestic and foreign firms, this would 
encourage a systematic improvement in 
quality and stimulate the development of 
new products as a flexible response to 
commercial opportunities. The 
programme for the development of 
exportable supply being carried out by the 
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior of 
Mexico (BANCOMEXT) is a good example of 
such an initiative. 
3. Prospecting and development of 
natural mining and agricultural 
resources 
It is usually assumed that exports of 
natural resource-based products reflect 
the presence of static comparative 
advantages. Actually, there are 
opportunities for acquiring and 
strengthening dynamic comparative 
advantages in this field as well. The 
systematization and intensification of 
national efforts to determine the quality 
and volume of a country's natural 
resources (including climate and 
seasonality) can make a very valuable 
contribution to the development of new 
lines of production. In point of fact, a 
number of countries in the region have 
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managed to achieve a considerable 
diversification of their exports of products 
based on non-traditional natural 
resources. 
The search for new natural resources 
is closely associated with the major 
scientific advances of this century. 
Technical progress has not only led to the 
substitution of these resources and a 
reduction of their share in the 
consumption levels of many industries; it 
has also helped to cut the costs of 
exploration and of evaluating resource 
quality. 
In the case of mining, the rapid 
expansion of exploration activity is linked 
to the depletion of the deposits that are 
now being mined and the need to lower 
the costs of further exploitation. In the 
agricultural sector, new technologies have 
made it possible to inventory existing 
resources more accurately; this has led to 
better resource management, which is, in 
turn, conducive to improved forms of 
environmental protection. It has also 
facilitated the compilation of official land 
registers in which land is classified 
according to its use capacity and current 
use. These registers have helped 
determine patterns of land division and 
characteristics of the agricultural land 
tenure system for purposes of 
development and, in some cases, tax 
assessment. 
Mining exploration methods have 
also changed, and today it is possible to 
cover vast areas and concentrate on 
specific sites with a minimum of physical 
contact, which was very difficult to do 
using direct methods that required the 
movement of materials, sampling and 
measurements in the field. Today's 
prospectors spend more time in their 
offices than in the field. They concentrate 
on studying the geological features 
observable in satellite images and, with 
the help of computers, manipulate a vast 
number of variables in order to arrive at 
a more precise evaluation and 
determination of size. Technical progress 
has made more accurate information 
available more rapidly at a relatively low 
cost, considering the large volume of data 
that can be processed. 
All this has been made possible by the 
great technological leap represented by 
remote sensing via satellite, which has 
revolutionized the exploration of natural 
resource potentials and become a 
mainstay for practical applications of the 
geosciences. 
These images are obtained from 
remote sensors positioned on space 
platforms and even spaceships and have 
revolutionized the study of soils, 
vegetation, freshwater resources, river 
basins, the dynamics of marine and 
land-based ecosystems and the status of all 
the components of the natural 
environment in general. This information 
makes it easier to perform a number of 
tasks: prospecting for natural resources; 
preparing land inventories that include 
soil characteristics; drawing up land 
registers or current inventories that are 
highly appropriate tools for assessing 
forestry resources, permanent or 
long-cycle plantations and livestock 
populations; detecting problems of 
deforestation and desertification; 
improving land-use planning; observing 
the movement of tectonic plates and 
volcanic activity; controlling plant 
diseases and pests; and upgrading urban 
development planning. 
In addition, satellites provide mining 
prospectors with large-scale magnetic-
band photographs, which help define 
geological and geophysical features of the 
land that are invisible to the naked eye. 
Geophysical techniques can be used to 
obtain information about areas that are 
covered by soil, vegetation or transported 
material, thus facilitating the selection of 
sites that warrant closer examination. 
Geochemistry, using highly 
sophisticated analytical methods and 
equipment, facilitates the study of the 
occurrence and dispersion of the elements 
that are found on earth and has perfected 
techniques for identifying minerals 
through the sampling and analysis of the 
various means of dispersion, such as soils, 
sediments, stream flows and rock. 
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These technological changes have 
been fostered by the development of 
computer technology, which enables 
scientists to process and analyse a large 
number of variables. Thus, for example, 
there is software available today that 
makes it possible to obtain models of the 
future development of deposits; specify 
the clearing radius of mines and simulate 
the mining operation; study geological 
features and ore content; project flows to 
dressing plants; and calculate the volume 
of barren material that must be moved 
during the mining operation. On the basis 
of this data, operating costs and all sorts of 
financial calculations can be determined 
with a greater degree of precision. In 
addition, large stretches of farmland can 
be surveyed for the purpose of compiling 
registers of production units and 
scheduling planting in accordance with 
the best agro-ecological options. This 
information is also very useful for tax 
administration purposes, since it makes it 
easier to identify potential taxpayers as 
well as allowing for the design of 
land-based taxation alternatives. 
These data are of considerable interest 
to economic decision makers in the 
relevant markets and have helped 
countries to acquire comparative 
advantages in non-traditional export 
products. 
4. Promoting efficient import 
substitution 
There has been a notable increase in the 
number of export firms in the countries of 
the region in recent years. These include 
many firms that were formerly engaged in 
import-substitution activities. As a 
country strives to promote its exports, it is 
equally important to encourage 
competition among firms within the 
country itself.62 
Many manufacturing firms in the 
region are undergoing a process of change 
and are making efforts, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to become more competitive. 
However, many potentially competitive 
firms will cease to exist if programmes to 
support their efforts are not 
implemented.63 These firms need help in 
order to improve their competitive 
position, especially in the following areas: 
gaining access to skilled labour and 
long-term financing at a reasonable cost; 
acquiring inputs at competitive prices and 
quality in international markets; 
designing products that are geared to 
market trends; organizing their 
production processes; revamping their 
quality control systems; and ensuring 
distortion-free conditions in which to 
compete. 
One of the constraints faced by firms in 
their efforts to restructure and export is a 
financial one. To become more 
competitive, they must invest heavily in 
improving various aspects of the 
production process. However, they must 
make these investments precisely at a time 
when anti-inflationary policies have 
driven up interest rates sharply. The fact 
that trade liberalization processes and 
stabilization programmes are being carried 
out simultaneously has caused interest 
rates to soar in a number of countries of the 
region. Access to credit at non-subsidized 
but internationally competitive interest 
rates is an important component of current 
efforts to restructure and enhance business 
enterprises' competitive positions. 
Without sources of financing for working 
capital and export credits, manufacturing 
firms find it difficult to compete with firms 
in other countries where such financing is 
available. 
62 In a study conducted in a number of Latin American countries, most of the entrepreneurs who were 
interviewed said that their first priority was to become competitive in the domestic market, after 
which they would attempt to export their products (Guerguil, Macario and Peres, 1993). 
63 In the case of firms that are in great distress but nevertheless do have competitive potential, retooling 
programmes should be developed to upgrade their competitive position (see chapter VIII, section 4). 
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It is also important to rectify the 
shortcomings of the countries' weak, 
segmented capital markets. Measures that 
merit consideration include the promotion 
and development of a long-term capital 
market and lines of credit for the purchase 
and lease of capital goods, especially for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
5. Quasi-tariff measures and unfair 
competition 
There are a series of trade policy measures 
that are frequently employed in industrial 
countries but which, with the exception of 
quantitative restrictions, have been used 
very little in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. These quasi-tariff and 
non-tariff barriers have been exhaustively 
debated in the Uruguay Round, and the 
countries of the region would do well to 
examine them carefully. They consist of 
anti-dumping measures, countervailing 
duties to correct the distortions produced 
by subsidies, and safeguard clauses for 
dealing with unexpected increases in 
imports. Each of these types of measures 
fulfils a different function and is governed 
by different rules at the international level. 
Anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties seek to correct the distortionary 
effects of unfair competition. 
Anti-dumping measures are used when a 
distortion is generated by the actions of a 
foreign firm which is using price 
discrimination to crowd domestic 
producers out of the market so that, once 
it is in a monopolistic position, it can then 
raise prices, thereby hurting the consumer. 
Countervailing duties are intended to 
counteract the distortionary effect of 
government export subsidies. The need to 
resort to these duties will probably decline 
as, thanks to the export subsidy agreement 
concluded under GATT, the use of such 
subsidies becomes less frequent in the 
international marketplace. The safeguard 
clause included in the General Agreement 
grants the right of self-protection against 
imports in specific cases for domestic 
reasons unrelated to unfair competition. 
Until now, anti-dumping measures 
have mainly been used by industrial 
countries. The agreement contained in the 
Final Act provides for a more rigorous 
approach as regards the price comparison 
used to ascertain whether or not dumping 
is taking place, the determination of the 
extent of harm done to national producers 
and the decision as to how long the 
measures taken by the affected country 
shall remain in effect. It also stipulates that 
consumers of the product in question must 
be consulted prior to the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties. Lastly, the 
agreement includes a de minimis clause to 
protect small exporters. From the 
standpoint of Latin American countries as 
users, the anti-dumping agreement will 
allow them to protect themselves from 
unfair trade practices stemming from the 
actions of business enterprises; such 
practices tend to increase during economic 
slumps in the countries that supply their 
imports. 
Much remains to be done in the region 
in this respect. Most of the countries lack 
regulations in this crucial field, and in 
those countries which do have them, such 
regulations suffer from many flaws as 
instruments of protection against unfair 
competition. 
The Latin American and Caribbean 
economies -especially now, after their 
recent import liberalization programmes-
may find themselves faced with problems 
in regard to dumping practices that could 
seriously impair the operations of firms 
having far less economic power than the 
transnational corporations which usually 
supply imports to the region. A distinction 
must be drawn between the type of 
competition that normally takes place in 
any market economy and predatory price 
policies that seek to eliminate competitors. 
The optimal solution would therefore be 
to address this issue within the context of 
policies on competition, which suffer from 
serious defects in most of the economies of 
the region. As a partial solution, it is 
recommended that an attempt be made to 
introduce anti-dumping mechanisms that 
are in keeping with the way the 
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international norms in this area have 
changed following the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. The public agencies 
administering these mechanisms will 
need to possess a high degree of technical 
expertise so that they can measure up to 
exacting professional standards and hence 
ensure that they and their decisions have 
credibility and are held in high regard. If 
these agencies have highly qualified 
officials who are committed to the 
principle of competition, the danger of 
encouraging protectionist practices within 
the country can be avoided. 
The safeguard clause has rarely been 
invoked because most of the developed 
countries regard it as a very restrictive 
provision. Article XIX of GATT authorizes 
the contracting parties to withdraw tariff 
concessions which they have granted to 
the other parties when a sudden increase 
in imports, for reasons unrelated to 
unfair trade practices, is doing serious 
harm to that country's producers. The 
increase in tariffs must be temporary 
and must apply equally to all the 
relevant imports regardless of their 
country of origin; in addition, a country 
that decides to take this step must be 
willing to compensate the exporting 
nations which are adversely affected by 
the measure. Modification of the 
safeguard clause and the elimination of 
grey- area measures that may be used in 
its place (e.g., "voluntary export 
restraints") were intensely debated in the 
Uruguay Round. There is an urgent need 
to adopt regulations on this topic in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, especially in 
relation to regional integration. 
The Final Act of GATT prohibits all 
voluntary export restraints and other 
grey-area measures which industrial 
countries have used rather than resorting 
to the safeguard clause of the General 
Agreement. Each trading partner may 
retain only one measure of this type until 
the end of 1999. Although the use of 
quantitative restrictions as a safeguard 
-even, in exceptional cases, against 
individual countries- is still permitted, the 
agreement establishes a limit of four years 
for their application, which may be 
extended up to a maximum of eight years 
in exceptional cases, and 10 years for 
developing countries. Any measure 
imposed for a period of more than one 
year must be gradually relaxed during the 
period of its application. Safeguards 
against exports from developing countries 
having a market share of less than 3% 
are prohibited, unless the combined 
share of all developing countries 
exceeds 9%. 
If, under the agreement on safeguards, 
the industrial countries replace the 
restrictive practices they have applied 
until now with temporary safeguard 
measures subject to international 
monitoring, then developing countries 
will definitely benefit in a way that will, 
to some extent, make up for their having 
been obliged to accept the imposition of 
quantitative safeguards on a de jure 
basis. 
The safeguard clause of GATT must 
also be assessed from the point of view of 
the developing countries as importers. 
This clause, which has almost never been 
invoked by the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, is one more type of 
protectionist mechanism, and as such is 
important to domestic producers when 
they must face a sudden increase in 
competition from imports. 
The dismantling of non-tariff barriers 
and sharp reductions in tariff levels and 
spreads in most of the countries of the 
region have left domestic producers very 
vulnerable to competition from imports. 
While it is true that greater competition 
will help boost efficiency, it is equally true 
that the economies of the region are highly 
vulnerable to short-term external shocks, 
which makes the exchange rate very 
volatile. As a result of the recent 
liberalization of trade, the vulnerability 
of producers of tradables will become 
more apparent. It is therefore essential 
that the above-mentioned regulatory 
mechanisms, which have been used very 
little until now, be given a much more 
important place than before in the region's 
trade regimes. 
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6. Conclusions 
Those cases in which trade liberalization 
programmes have been complemented by 
export promotion policies suggest that the 
various characteristics and status of each 
economy at the time of liberalization 
should be taken into account in any 
analysis. Factors such as the initial level of 
the exchange rate, export performance, 
investment rate and macroeconomic 
situation will play a very influential role in 
determining the ultimate effects of trade 
reforms. An analysis of experiences 
outside Latin America, such as that of East 
Asia (see box VI.1), supports this 
conclusion. 
In short, the basic lessons to be learned 
from these experiences are: 
i) There is no "blueprint" for 
liberalization; the results vary according to 
the structural features of each country. The 
existing economic situation and the policy 
mix used are what will determine the 
outcome of the process and its evolution 
over time. In every case, however-setting 
aside the debate as to which methods of 
liberalization are the best- the 
intensification of linkages with the 
international economy is the path that 
most of the region's economies are 
choosing to take. Aside from the gains in 
terms of efficiency, entrepreneurial spirit 
and macroeconomic discipline that this 
option affords, the main point is how to 
take advantage of the progress that has 
been made in order to ensure that these 
liberalization processes serve to promote 
exports. Part of the answer obviously lies 
in exchange policy, but there must also be 
a commitment to export activity which is 
reflected in the creation of incentives and 
institutions. 
ii) Tariff reductions should be 
accompanied (if not preceded) by a 
compensatory adjustment of the real 
exchange rate, and this rate should then be 
maintained during the period that follows. 
An increased access to imports in 
conjunction with an appreciation of the 
currency (as well as the use of exchange 
policy for anti-inflationary purposes) is a 
dangerous combination in terms of the 
equilibrium of the balance of payments 
and the development of production. 
iii) Most of the countries that 
liberalized imports during the 1980s were 
pressured by the international economic 
environment to depreciate their currencies 
in real terms. This contributed to a more 
efficient adjustment in countries such as 
Costa Rica, Chile (in the second stage) and 
Mexico. In contrast, under the conditions 
prevailing since the early 1990s, as 
international capital markets have begun 
to regard the Latin American countries in 
a positive light, liberalization of the capital 
account has led to significant currency 
appreciations (see Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart, 1993) at a time when trade 
reforms are making a depreciation 
imperative. The challenge facing 
economic policy makers is to find a way to 
carry on with trade liberalization while 
bringing about a depreciation of the 
currency in a situation marked by sizeable 
capital inflows. This means that they must 
regulate those inflows and boost domestic 
saving in order to maintain the real 
exchange rate at a competitive level in 
keeping with its medium-term 
determinants. Thus,. aggregate 
expenditure and aggregate output need to 
be brought into line with one another, and 
incentives should be provided for 
increasing investment and the production 
of tradables. 
iv) During the transitional phase of 
trade reform processes, misleading 
short-term signals may be sent out (e.g., a 
temporary increase in exports resulting 
from a recession at the outset of the 
process, or a temporary rise in imports, 
which do not react immediately to 
liberalization measures). Experience has 
shown that imports, like exports, take 
some time to gather momentum in cases 
where there were no pre-existing 
marketing channels, where consumers 
have not yet become aware of the existence 
of new products and have thus not yet 
changed their preferences, and where 
producers have not yet restructured their 
production systems to adapt them to new 
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TRADE REFORMS AND EXPORT PROMOTION IN THE ECONOMICALLY 
DYNAMIC COUNTRIES OF ASIA 
Despite their marked diversity, the Asian 
countries that export manufactures have certain 
characteristics in common. Their varied 
experiences offer useful lessons that are relevant 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, the most 
important of which are the following: 
1) All these countries have provided a 
favourable climate for growth through the 
implementation of stable, export-oriented 
policies. They all had low inflation rates, a 
balanced fiscal situation and high rates of 
saving and investment. 
2) In all cases, the aim was to carry forward an 
export-oriented form of industrialization 
rather than simply to mount nn export drive. 
Incentivei- were stronger and broader in 
scope in the early stages of the export 
promotion effort and coincided with 
upswings in world trade; as the countries' 
industrial structures became more complex, 
incentives tended to become more general in 
nature. After 25 years of expanding 
production and export growth, economic 
liberalization and deregulation programmes 
were launched and limits were placed on 
direct action by the State. 
3) The economies' export orientation shaped the 
impact of subsidies and controls on 
economic efficicncy by imposing the 
discipline of international competition. Even 
when support measures deviated from 
market prices, they tended to be applied for 
I imited periods of time and were conditional 
upon the achievement of specified export 
targets. 
4) Investment in the expansion of production 
capacity for exports was facilitated by public 
policies that lowered the relative prices of 
investment goods and by the considerable 
degree of efficiency exhibited in channelling 
savings towards productive investment. 
Investment subsidies took the form of both 
preferential interest rates or the direct 
allocation of credit to specific sectors and 
direct subsidies. 
5) Private entrepreneurs played a key role in 
modernizing production, but were 
invariably subject either lo a severe 
competition-generated form of discipline or 
to government regulation. 
h) Labour markets tended to be uncompetitive, 
either because trade union aclivitv vvas 
repressed or because unions were co-opted. 
7) High priority was gnen to infrastructure, 
education and technology. In some cases, the 
emphasis in public investment was on the 
transport sector; in others, the focus was on 
housing or industrial zones. In all cases, 
education was a priority. 
8) The foregoing was coupled with financial 
and exchange policies aimed at preventing 
any major appreciation or sharp fluctuations 
in the exchange rate, in contrast with what 
has occurred in Latin America. 
Source; P. Petri. "The NK S: Pragmatic policymakers", International  Kcommuc Insights,  Washington, U.C., Institute for International 
Economics, March-April 1 W , O. Rosales, "Desempeño reciente de tos Nio. asiáticos- politisas e instrumentos de fomento 
competitivo", Santiago, Chile, ft i At, 19"M. unpublished; L E. Wevtphal, "Industrial poliev in an export-propelled economy: 
I csions from South Korea'* experiente", /punía,' oft  cimomic Perspectives,  vol. 4, No 3,1990. 
inputs. Once marketing agents, 
consumers and producers have adjusted 
their behaviour, then a protracted and 
rapid process of import growth tends to 
emerge, whereas the expansion of exports 
will obviously be slower, since it involves 
investment shifts whose completion takes 
a longer period of time. It is, of course, 
important to avoid an excessive 
restructuring involving a bias towards 
importables and to send out clear signals 
as to the advisability of expanding export 
capacity. Here, too, a well-balanced 
management of the exchange rate, a 
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gradual reduction in overall protection 
levels and the various export promotion 
mechanisms will all play a crucial role. 
v) The experiences studied suggest 
that opening up the economy to imports 
and devaluing the real exchange rate are 
not enough in and of themselves to achieve 
high export and output growth rates. The 
results achieved by these means tend to be 
very slow in coming and entail needlessly 
high costs during the transitional phase. 
Complementary measures, geared 
directly to these objectives, are clearly 
needed. This may be illustrated by citing 
various examples: the Asian economies, 
for instance, have used integrated 
packages of instruments and have taken 
care to proceed gradually (see box VI. 1); 
the results of Chile's programme took 
quite some time -despite its successful 
export performance- to engender a rapid 
expansion of production capacity; and 
Bolivia had difficulty in bringing about a 
sharp rise in its exports. 
vi) Experience has shown that gradual 
reform processes based on decisions 
reached by common accord with private 
agents are less traumatic because they 
make it possible to adjust to the new 
conditions at the micro-economic and 
sectoral levels. If trade liberalization is 
accompanied by coherent macroeconomic 
policy and credibility in government 
action, there will be a better chance that the 
relevant agents can work together to 
reduce the costs of the adjustment. 
Furthermore, in order for liberalization to 
result in substantial increases in exports 
and output, import liberalization must be 
accompanied by explicit export 
incentives. 
vii) The need to expand 
non-traditional and particularly pioneer 
exports justifies the maintenance of a 
higher effective exchange rate than the rate 
applying to import substitutes, since 
today's infant industries are the ones that 
are geared towards winning a place in 
external markets. Moreover, even if tariffs 
are low and a neutral approach is adopted, 
exports have to be compensated 
proportionately with direct or indirect 
drawbacks or lower tax rates, since the 
tariff amounts to a tax on exports. 
International competition also makes it 
necessary to provide financing for 
non-traditional exports at international 
interest rates. Cases of successful export 
drives outside the region have involved 
the granting of incentives for pioneering 
firms' efforts to open up foreign markets 
and a marked emphasis on external 
marketing activities, including overseas 
investment in wholesale distribution 
chains and the establishment of import 
houses in target markets that deal in the 
relevant country's products. 
viii) On this basis, once the most 
obvious anti-export biases have been 
eliminated, the challenge will be to adapt 
incentives and the institutional 
framework to the behaviour of the global 
economy. To this end, the links between 
trade policy and policies on technology, 
production and human resources should 
be strengthened with a view to refining 
product designs, standards and quality 
along with trade and business 
management techniques and technical 
assistance and training in research and 
development (R&D), all of which are key 
factors in increasing productivity and 
competitiveness. The current process of 
rapid economic globalization also 
demands new types of export promotion 
instruments. For example, investment in 
overseas production activities and in 
marketing chains is becoming an 
increasingly important factor in 
penetrating markets, diversifying risk, 
reducing protectionist barriers and 
reaping the benefits of economies of scale, 
while the systematization and 
intensification of national-level efforts to 
assess the quality and quantity of 
available natural resources may 
contribute to the development of new 
export products. 
ix) As trade policies and import 
regimes have been liberalized, economies 
have become more vulnerable to unfair 
trading practices. Trade reform policies 
must therefore be accompanied by the 
adoption or improvement of 
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anti-dumping regulations, countervailing 
measures and safeguard clauses. 
x) The adoption of the new regulations 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round could 
make it more difficult to implement an 
aggressive trade policy. These regulations 
do, however, provide for favourable 
treatment of developing countries in 
certain types of special situations, and the 
countries of the region should take 
advantage of these provisions in order to 
promote their exports without infringing 
upon the multilaterally negotiated rules 
on such matters; in addition, the countries 
of the region should seek to take an active 
part in setting up the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and should explore the 
potential benefits of that participation in 
terms of dispute settlement procedures 
and other such mechanisms. 
Part Two 
PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
r 
Chapter VII 
BASES OF A PRODUCTIVE 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
1. The productivity gap and its 
implications 
Policies that affect production systems 
are a factor in improving linkages 
between the economies of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the international 
economy. This subject has been dealt 
with systematically in previous 
documents (ECLAC, 1990a and 1992a), 
which discuss the interaction between a 
coherent, stable macroeconomic policy, 
on the one hand, and micro-economic 
and meso-economic policies1 and 
institutional reforms, on the other. Those 
documents focused on describing how 
technical progress can be applied to the 
production process with a view to 
raising productivity. 
There are four general features of 
productivity in Latin America and the 
Caribbean which must be mentioned: 
First, there is a gap on the order of 2.5 
to 1 between Latin America and the 
developed countries (Hofman, 1993) with 
regard to total factor productivity (TF?).2 
This gap is apparent both in the use of 
outdated equipment and obsolete 
production methods and in a deficient 
organization of labour, vertical and 
sometimes confrontational industrial 
relations, failure to improve quality, 
excessive inventories, unsystemic and 
unsophisticated marketing techniques, 
outdated after-sales services, etc. In fact, it 
shows an obvious failure to use 
internationally available "hard" and 
"soft" technologies. 
Second, this gap grew markedly wider 
during the post-war era (see figure VII.l). 
In the period 1950-1989, the increase in TFP 
in the region was equivalent to one 
seventh of that of the Asian newly 
industrializing economies (NlEs) and at 
1 In this text, macroeconomic policies are not only those which maintain the basic macroeconomic 
balances, but also those which establish the key prices of the economy. The term "micro-economic 
policies" refers to those which directly affect the operation of the firm, especially the use of the best 
"hard" and "soft" technology. Meso-economic policies are those which affect the firm's "habitat" 
and environment, i.e., they are the "horizontal" policies which influence the systemic 
competitiveness within which the firm operates (infrastructure, linkages with the scientific and 
technological system, training, finance and promotion of new exports or new markets). 
2 Total factor productivity is the production component which is not the result of either the quantitative 
or the qualitative accumulation of the factors of production, capital and labour. It may be considered 
an approximate measure of the effect of disembodied technical progress on long-term growth 
(Hofman, 1993, pp. 128-129). 
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Figure Vn.l 
LATIN AMERICA, OECD a AND ASIAN COUNTRIES: 
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY, 1950-1989 
(Indexes  1950=100) 
Annual growth, rate 
Source: A. Hofman, "Capital accumulation in Latin America: a six country comparison for 1950-1989", Review of  Income 
and Wealth,  vol. 38, No. 4, December 1992. 
a Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
b Newly industrializing economies. 
least a fifth of that of the developed 
countries. Moreover, even during the time 
of greatest economic expansion in the 
region (1950-1973), TFP growth reached 
little more than half that of the Asian NlEs, 
it then stagnated between 1973 and 1980 
and subsequently fell, owing to the 
macroeconomic imbalances produced by 
the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
Third,  these productivity gaps 
between the region and the developed 
countries occur at both the global and the 
sectoral levels. The available data suggest 
that the differences in total factor 
productivity among different countries 
are due not so much to concentration in 
low-productivity sectors as to the fact that 
almost all industrial subsectors, even 
those of intermediate and capital goods, 
are working far below the level of the best 
international practices. For example, data 
provided by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO)3 show 
that, while in some subsectors -such as 
petroleum refineries and related 
products- the region's productivity is very 
3 These data were taken from UNIDO (1992) but refer to the value added per worker -a concept distinct 
from that of total factor productivity. It is obvious that sectoral productivity shows important 
country-to-country differences in the region. It should be borne in mind that this traditional "value 
added per worker" measurement tends to overestimate effective differences in productivity, chiefly 
because it does not take into account differences in the capital stock held by countries of varying 
levels of development. Nevertheless, even if the various sectors of each country are treated separately, 
the sectoral productivity differences among the countries of the region -even the most advanced-
and the developed countries continue to be very significant. 
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similar to that of the United States, and in 
non-ferrous metals it is 64% and in rubber 
products and iron and steel it is around 
50% of that of the United States, in the 24 
remaining industrial subsectors (which 
represent nearly 75% of industrial value 
added), the region's productivity is less 
than 35% of that of the corresponding 
subsectors in the United States, the 
average being 30%. 
Fourth,  such sectoral averages of 
course hide enormous productivity 
differences within the same category 
deriving from the tremendous structural 
heterogeneity of the region. On the one 
hand, there are marked productivity 
differences depending on the size of the 
firm. For example, in the case of Mexico, 
data for 1980 show that whereas small 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector 
had a productivity equivalent to only 69% 
of the sectoral average, in large private 
domestic firms productivity was 20% 
higher than the average, and in 
transnational corporations it was 78% 
higher. Moreover, just as there is an 
incomplete process of technological 
dissemination at the international level, so 
too the domestic dissemination process is 
slow, giving rise to considerable 
differences in productivity among 
same-sized firms in the same sector. 
Actually, in the great majority of 
subsectors there are some firms whose 
practices are very similar to the best 
international practices. This means that 
the average for the remaining firms would 
be substantially below the sectoral 
average, reflecting the tremendous 
structural heterogeneity of the many 
economic activities carried on in the 
countries of the region. If the process of 
disseminating the best practices within a 
country is also slow, the average 
productivity of the sector will be less. 
2. Policy implications 
The situation described above has five 
important implications for defining a 
productive development policy. 
First, while the productivity gap is a 
reflection of a relatively lower level of 
development, it is also the factor that 
would enable countries to initiate a rapid 
growth process if they were able to use 
internationally available technologies, 
thereby skipping intermediate stages. In 
fact, late development makes it possible to 
take full advantage of these technologies, 
and the lower the point of departure, the 
faster the growth. That is why, sometimes, 
the further a country is from the 
technology frontier, the more quickly it 
will grow. At present, China is expanding 
at a faster rate than the Asian NiEs (8% to 
10% as compared with 6% per capita per 
year), just as the latter grew more quickly 
than Japan and the Nordic countries 
(whose take-off was in the late nineteenth 
century), the last-mentioned countries 
grew more rapidly than Germany and 
France (which took off around 1840 and 
grew more quickly than the United States 
which took off in 1800), and the slowest 
growth was recorded in the country where 
the Industrial Revolution began (England) 
(see figure VIL2). 
Second, in the past it was customary to 
attribute this wide gap to the fact that 
production was concentrated in 
low-productivity sectors, especially 
agriculture. This was an argument in 
4 Although part of that difference can be explained by the kind of sector in which each type of firm is 
concentrated, there are also important elements deriving from the capacity to use economies of scale. 
For a more detailed analysis, see Casar and others (1990). 
5 Nevertheless, it is not the degree of backwardness alone that determines the speed of growth. On the 
contrary, current data suggest that there is not always a leap forward in growth. To achieve it, other 
conditions are required; only after crossing a certain threshold (not of per capita income but of 
stability, market consolidation, managerial capacity and general know-how, and a development 
"ethos") can an economy take off towards a steady growth period in which the rate is proportional 
to the initial degree of backwardness. 
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favour of industrialization, but it did not 
stop there; instead, it extended to the types 
of industries to be promoted. There was 
therefore a tendency to identify a 
productive or industrial development 
policy with the establishment of new 
sectors which were not included on the 
input-output table and whose effective or 
potential productivity was greater than 
that of most of the "traditional" sectors of 
finished goods. This largely explains the 
emphasis placed, in the second stage of 
import-substitution strategy, on the 
sectors producing intermediate inputs 
and capital goods and the mechanical 
engineering industry. 
Nevertheless, the notable differences 
in sectoral productivity between the 
countries of the region and the developed 
countries suggest that this sectoral or 
"vertical" policy approach, characteristic 
of the past, has serious defects. It is not so 
much a matter of establishing new sectors 
which do not at present appear on the 
input-output table (as if all productivity 
came automatically out of them, which is 
not usually the case), as of improving total 
factor productivity in existing sectors. 
Third,  the enormous heterogeneity 
existing among firms in the same sector 
suggests that the main challenge to a 
productive development policy is for the 
great mass of enterprises that work with 
obsolete equipment and outdated 
methods to rapidly adopt, adapt and 
disseminate the technologies at present 
available internationally. This is more 
important than the high targets for 
investment in research and development 
(R&D), which are of interest only to a small 
number of domestic firms that are already 
working near the frontier of the best 
international practices.6 The essence of a 
productive development policy -at least at 
the present stage of development so far 
below the international technological 
frontier- is to expedite the process of 
disseminating better practices. 
Fourth, since the great majority of 
sectors are working with a total factor 
productivity that is far below the 
international technological frontier, the 
concept of comparative advantage is 
relatively difficult to predefine, except in 
obvious cases such as that of rents derived 
from natural resources. Actually, with 
such wide differences in productivity 
among sectors, those which can more 
quickly close the productivity gaps which 
separate them from the developed 
countries will ultimately have a 
comparative advantage. This may be 
acquired by one sector, provided it is 
capable of bridging the productivity gap 
with the more developed countries more 
rapidly than the other sectors of the same 
economy. 
Fifth,  the decline in productivity in the 
1980s shows the importance, in designing 
a productive development policy, of 
keeping basic macroeconomic equilibria 
within tolerable margins. Actually, the 
instability produced by the external debt 
crisis and exacerbated, in general, by badly 
designed or implemented stabilization 
and adjustment policies, led to severe 
drops in output, which had a negative 
effect on the use of installed capacity, 
investment, engineering and design 
equipment, and efforts at innovation. The 
serious setbacks caused by these 
macroeconomic imbalances could not be 
offset by better efficiency at the corporate 
level, with the result that total 
productivity collapsed almost throughout 
the region during the 1980s. This shows 
6 This certainly does not negate the importance of a minimum scientific and technological 
infrastructure, because without it firms will be unable to identify more appropriate technologies or 
to acquire, transfer or adjust them quickly and conveniently. What it does indicate is that, at the 
current stage of development of the countries of the region, the main point is to identify the 
international practices most suitable for the various national economies, adapt them to the reality of 
each country and rapidly disseminate them. Research and development proper are more important 
at a later development stage, when imitation and dissemination have advanced and firms are 
approaching the frontier of the best world practices. 
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Figure VII.2 
LATE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHEMATIC HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 
(Logarithmic  scale of  per capita income) 
Logtrithmie sc»l« ol PW QtPt* Incom* 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
that the achievement of greater 
competitiveness requires both 
micro-economic efficiency and 
macroeconomic stability. 
3. Obstacles to overcoming the 
productivity gap 
On the basis of the foregoing 
considerations, it may be wondered why 
Latin America and the Caribbean have not 
been able to use their advantage as late 
developers to skip stages, make use of the 
available technology and grow at much 
faster rates. The three standard responses 
to this question are, in theory, 
complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive. 
a) Economic policy failures 
Under this approach, the 
macroeconomic instability which has 
characterized the region, the distortion of 
key prices, particularly that derived from 
the strategy of industrialization through 
import substitution, and the weight and 
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preponderant intervention of the public 
sector in managing the economy explain 
the comparatively poor performance of 
the region during the period in question. 
As a result, this orthodox approach argues 
for macroeconomic stability, trade 
opening and privatization, while restoring 
the private sector to its prime role in the 
economy. 
b) Problems at the level of  firms 
This second approach focuses the 
analysis at the opposite extreme: in firms. 
On the one hand, it claims that the region 
has suffered "capitalism without 
capitalists", i.e., it has lacked a forceful 
entrepreneurial class. This explains the 
existence of such large differences in total 
factor productivity between Latin 
America and the developed world. 
Moreover, it was this absence of 
innovative entrepreneurship that 
prompted so many governments to 
intervene increasingly in the economy to 
offset the lack of entrepreneurial drive. On 
the other hand, it emphasizes the difficulty 
(cost) for each individual enterprise to 
identify, and subsequently internalize, the 
technology, processes and most suitable 
production methods available at the 
international level and the most 
appropriate market niches for producing 
competitively. There is a notable 
underinvestment in this area, therefore, 
with the great majority of enterprises 
waiting for others to act first, so as to 
imitate them. Since the identification and 
dissemination of hard and soft 
technologies is a "public good", there 
would be ample room for adopting 
macroeconomic policies designed to 
promote the "socialization" of costs and 
the rapid dissemination of such 
technologies among firms. 
c) Market failures,  externalities, public goods 
and problems of  industrial organization 
This third approach refers to the 
advantages of emphasizing policies which 
improve the functioning of factor markets 
(meso-economic or "horizontal" policies), 
rather than policies designed to develop 
the markets for specific products. The 
need to focus State action on the most 
critical bottlenecks explains the 
desirability of emphasizing the correction 
of the more serious failures of factor 
markets, which affect all sectors. Likewise, 
there will always be room for policies 
aimed at internalizing significant 
externalities, providing public goods, and 
regulating oligopolistic markets for non-
tradable goods (especially, in the last case, 
most infrastructure: telecommunications, 
ports, irrigation, electricity, etc.) which 
seriously affect the systemic 
competitiveness of tradables. 
4. Theoretical justification of an active 
productive development 
policy 
Nowadays in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, there is broad consensus 
concerning some general parameters 
which facilitate the implementation of 
measures for modifying the supply of 
exportable goods. These include the 
maintenance of basic macroeconomic 
equilibria and trade opening aimed at 
utilizing economies of scale and incentives 
for healthy competition. The debate tends 
to centre on how to define these policies 
more precisely, determine the pace and 
intensity of their application and, in 
particular, decide whether they by 
themselves are sufficient incentive for 
promoting a change in production 
patterns. 
ECLAC has maintained that, in order to 
overcome the productivity gap referred to 
above, macroeconomic and trade policy 
ought to be complemented by a mix of 
active policies which make use of the 
technological and organizational 
advances of the more developed countries 
in order to skip stages, as generally 
happened in the successful late 
developing countries. More specifically, it 
considers that productive development 
requires, in addition to sound 
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macroeconomic and liberalization 
policies, two groups of complementary 
actions: "meso-economic" or horizontal 
policies focused on improving markets 
and filling the existing gaps therein, and 
micro-economic policies which help to 
internalize externalities related to the 
identification, adjustment and 
dissemination of the best internationally 
available technologies and practices. 
Without such micro-economic and 
meso-economic policies, and without 
suitably pragmatic forms of macroeconomic 
management and international 
integration, the restructuring necessary 
for initiating accelerated growth will be 
unnecessarily slow and inefficient. 
Indeed, liberalization and 
restructuring will either benefit or clearly 
hurt some firms and activities in both the 
short and the long term. Nevertheless, the 
effect of these processes on other firms and 
activities may be very ambiguous: first, 
because it is not clear whether the key 
prices prevailing at the time the measures 
are taken will remain unchanged over the 
long term, and second, because many 
potentially competitive enterprises and 
activities may be adversely affected in the 
short term until they are able to identify, 
introduce and assimilate the changes 
necessary for acquiring competitiveness in 
the domestic market and even abroad. 
This may be the case both for enterprises 
and activities that are potentially 
competitive in efficient import 
substitution and for potential producers of 
non-traditional exports. The speed of their 
restructuring and, in some cases, their 
very survival will depend on the 
information and human and financial 
resources at their disposal. Hence it is 
important that key markets -those for 
technology, capital assets, human 
resources and foreign currencies- operate 
at optimal levels. Otherwise, the more 
imperfect these markets and the greater 
the uncertainty with regard to the 
seriousness of the adjustment and 
liberalization process and the permanency 
of the key prices in force, the more likely 
it is that potentially competitive firms 
will be unable, for lack of time and 
resources, to neither carry out the 
restructuring necessary to compete at the 
national level or to penetrate external 
market niches in which they could acquire 
a competitive advantage. This situation 
may be aggravated if there is a recession 
and abnormally high interest rates. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it maybe 
concluded that the restructuring process 
that followed the outbreak of the debt 
crisis was very costly at the beginning and 
slower in the recovery phase, because 
macroeconomic and trade policy was 
virtually unaccompanied by productive 
development policies (micro-economic or 
meso-economic). Moreover, when 
liberalization was complemented by a 
sound updated industrial policy, it 
contributed to a number of the region's 
most notable export successes, including 
those in the sectors producing 
automobiles and parts, wood, paper and 
pulp. Nevertheless, these cases were 
exceptional. Generally speaking, with 
liberalization almost all the industrial 
rj 
policy of the past was eliminated, most of 
the time without being replaced, instead of 
being adapted to the new requirements; 
for example, it would have been possible 
to adopt policies linking incentives to 
export performance or to productivity 
improvements and promoting 
non-traditional exports, the development 
of human resources, technological 
dissemination and efficient sources of 
financing. 
The main theoretical and empirical 
arguments in favour of a productive 
development policy more in line with the 
requirements of the 1990s are presented 
below. 
7 This was a reasonable decision, because the policy tended to have no time-limits, often led to the 
production of items with scant possibilities of developing comparative advantages and was basically 
oriented towards the domestic market, which for many activities, except in Brazil and Mexico, was 
too small to permit the minimum scales required for an efficient output. 
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a) Market failures 
i) The technology market. Modern 
versions of development theory 
emphasize the concept of endogenous 
technological change in firms, generated 
by their investment both in acquiring and 
transferring technology and in research 
and development. This approach refers 
both to "hard" technology, i.e., that 
incorporated into machinery and 
equipment, the day-to-day efforts being 
made in the field of engineering to 
improve productivity or product design, 
and to "soft" technology, which includes 
improved management techniques, quality 
control, industrial relations, "just-in-time" 
production, and other elements. 
This is a field in which market forces 
on their own tend to behave suboptimally. 
First of all, there is an intrinsic asymmetry 
with regard to information between the 
technology supplier (who knows what it is 
really worth) and the buyer (who is 
ignorant of the real value of the new 
technology since he is unfamiliar with it, 
and depreciates it when he learns more 
about it because he can then try to 
reproduce it), and this makes it difficult for 
the market to arrive at a correct valuation. 
Secondly, whereas in an ideal world the 
optimal decision would be to develop or 
acquire, all at once, all the technical 
know-how available and to ensure that the 
other economic agents had access to it 
immediately, in the real world all agents 
would prefer that the others absorb the 
costs of developing a new technology or of 
identifying the technology most suitable 
for introduction into a developing 
country, so that they could then imitate it 
at a marginal cost. Thirdly, even where 
there is a private interest in developing a 
new technology, this technology may be so 
specific to the firm in question that the 
latter is not afraid that the technology will 
be imitated and disseminated but the 
firm's scale of production may be 
insufficient to justify making significant 
research and development efforts, with 
the result that there will tend to be 
underinvestment both in the acquisition 
and in the development of new 
technologies. 
Indeed, technical know-how and 
information are goods, whose benefits 
cannot be completely appropriated by 
those who create them; moreover, they are 
non-exclusive goods which may be used 
simultaneously by several users (Romer, 
1990).8 This results in underinvestment by 
the private sector in the introduction of a 
new technology into a country or in the 
development by that country of its own 
technology. This underinvestment can be 
offset -partially and inadequately- by 
direct or indirect State investment in 
research on and the development of new 
scientific and technical know-how and by 
the establishment of institutions as 
mechanisms for protecting patents and 
trademarks. 
Similarly, a country's capacity to 
adapt international technology to its own 
conditions, make better use of available 
natural resources, climate (in the case of 
agriculture and tourism) and the size of its 
markets, and deal with the relative 
shortage of factors depends on the 
quantity and quality of its researchers and 
on the interrelationship between scientific 
and technological research centres and the 
production system. The opportunities of 
acquiring and retaining competitive 
advantages will ultimately depend on the 
quality of the scientific and technological 
infrastructure and its links with 
enterprises in the production system. 
ii) The human capital market. A strong 
demand for technology requires a 
8 Exclusion from the use of these goods is not always feasible, even when there is an appropriate 
institutional and regulatory framework for industrial property matters. Exclusion is much more 
complex if such an institutional framework does not exist, or if the courts only pay it lip-service. The 
prevailing market structure in each industrial branch is influenced by the appropriability of, or 
exclusion from, the fruits of technological change, and this raises problems which the competitive 
model cannot solve. Government regulation and coordination then come to the forefront. 
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dynamic supply of skilled manpower that 
is capable of absorbing new know-how 
and productive innovations. Although 
public investment in human resources is 
adequate, private investment in such 
resources tends, intrinsically, to be 
insufficient. 
For one thing, firms are unwilling to 
finance general training services which 
benefit only the worker; in other words, a 
firm will tend to concentrate its 
investment in training in its area of 
specialization so that it can derive the full 
benefit, while its investment in general 
training will tend to be suboptimal. 
Although general training raises labour 
productivity in many enterprises, it 
usually benefits the worker more than the 
enterprise itself. The result is that firms 
tend to limit training, at this level, to the 
minimum needed to teach workers how to 
use new equipment or procedures 
properly. For the same reason, small firms 
will tend to offer little formal training, 
because virtually all they could provide 
would be general education and that could 
be used by the worker in numerous other 
firms. Therefore, training in small 
enterprises tends to be limited to learning 
by doing, and the worker pays indirectly 
for this type of implicit training since he 
receives a lower wage than that paid in 
bigger firms. 
Investment by the potential 
beneficiaries -the workers- is also 
inadequate because they cannot offer the 
necessary financial guarantees in order to 
borrow money to pay for training for 
themselves or their family members, and 
this hinders the development of a private 
lending market for human resources 
training (ECLAC/UNESCO,  1992). As a result, 
private investment in human resources is 
insufficient; the fact that it is limited to the 
family's capacity to finance itself is a 
serious obstacle, since in order to obtain 
training a family must pay both the direct 
cost of the courses and the opportunity 
cost (income not received) of the time 
devoted to study. 
iii) The long-term financial  market. 
National financial markets are inadequate 
and embryonic, even in countries without 
large macroeconomic imbalances and 
with a significant amount of institutional 
investment. First of all, in practice, there is 
no long-term financial market except for 
the few enterprises with access to stock 
exchanges. The problem is not limited to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
but affects the bulk of a country's firms. 
Secondly, both the domestic and 
international financial markets are 
asymmetrical (see Part Three of this 
document): there is access to finance in 
times of boom, but such access tends to 
disappear when resources are needed to 
deal with restructuring in difficult 
situations. Third, access to the financial 
market is very segmented, because it 
depends more on guarantees (the result of 
past performance) than on projections of 
future profitability. Thus, the bulk of 
investments by firms are self-financed, a 
situation which causes productive inertia 
instead of restructuring in favour of 
enterprises with better prospects.9 Fourth, 
there are serious obstacles to the financing 
of new enterprises and to technological 
innovation in the area of either products or 
processes. 
One of the main factors that explains 
the above-mentioned bias in the financial 
system is the conflict between the 
obligation on this system to correctly 
gauge the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers and the difficulties it faces in 
obtaining the information it needs to 
perform this task effectively; the 
seriousness of the problem increases in 
activities which require long financing 
terms. If the information available to the 
financial agent to evaluate the future cash 
flows of a project is insufficient or if access 
9 For a discussion of a series of proposals for creating markets or filling the large gaps in the region's 
financial markets, see chapter VII of ECLAC (1992a). In the case of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
specific proposals such as leasing, factorization, risk capital funds, secondary stock-exchange 
markets and credit cards for small businessmen are included. 
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to such information raises the transaction 
costs, the agent is likely to make use of the 
guarantees brought by the borrower as a 
critical indicator of his creditworthiness. 
Thus, in the case of new, short- or 
long-term projects, the requirement of 
guarantees may be increased, and this 
consolidates the bias. This procedure may 
hinder the implementation of profitable 
projects and lead to underinvestment and 
a lower rate of effective growth. 
The above situation may be 
aggravated when financial deepening 
coincides with the presence of financial 
conglomerates. Together with presenting 
new challenges of regulation associated 
with systemic risk, conflicts of interest, 
cross subsidies or implicit endorsement, 
the action of these conglomerates can 
increase the above-mentioned biases. 
Finally, the development of long-term 
financial markets is discouraged, on the 
one hand, by macroeconomic instability 
and, on the other, by a lack of institutional 
investors, such as pension funds and 
insurance companies, with an interest in 
assuming long-term commitments, and a 
shortage of specialized bodies capable of 
evaluating longer-term instruments, 
projects and investments. 
iv) The foreign  exchange market. There is 
also underinvestment in the generation of 
new exports and in the opening of new 
markets abroad, since such activities entail 
high costs in terms of time and resources 
for producers, while the first producers to 
open a new market or introduce a new 
export cannot reap the full benefits of such 
activities; obviously, these costs are 
proportionately higher for SMEs. Likewise, 
the absence of a medium-term futures 
market for foreign exchange increases 
uncertainty as regards the permanency of 
the key prices in force, particularly the real 
exchange rate. This necessitates an 
exchange rate policy which serves to 
signal to exporters foreseeable 
medium-term macroeconomic trends. As 
stated above, exchange rate uncertainty 
tends to have a greater negative effect on 
non-traditional exports and on domestic 
and less diversified firms. 
b) Problems of  industrial regulation and 
organization 
The aforesaid problems are 
particularly serious in the case of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Actually, 
there is very little incentive to invest time 
or resources in penetrating new markets 
or in studying how to acquire new and 
better technologies, because such costs are 
not justified at the level of a single small 
firm, although investment would be very 
appropriate for the firms in that sector as 
a whole. This would justify programmes 
to encourage the relevant association or 
chamber of commerce to carry out surveys 
of external markets and look for more 
efficient technologies for subsequent 
dissemination via extension programmes. 
Conversely, these problems do not 
greatly affect transnational corporations 
or those belonging to economic groups. 
Although enterprises that form part of 
national economic groups or 
conglomerates solve the problem of access 
to finance by grouping together, this 
privileged access may prompt them to 
increase their economic power by buying 
up very diverse enterprises with good 
prospects but little capital, so that they 
receive monopoly rents rather than 
generating wealth. The activities of 
conglomerates therefore require a 
regulatory framework that ensures or 
increases competitiveness. 
In the case of transnational 
corporations, there is no problem with 
penetrating external markets, since one of 
their attributes is that they have access to 
these markets; in general, they also have 
no problems of access to capital markets or 
to modern technologies. The difficulty in 
such cases is that the corporate strategy of 
globalization may not coincide with that of 
the countries in which they are 
established. Reconciling these interests is 
a fundamental objective of a national 
economic policy aimed at attracting a 
great number of transnational 
corporations, of diverse origins and 
well-adapted to the country, to the sectors 
which are deemed to have priority and 
the activities which offer the best 
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learning and dissemination opportunities 
(ECLAC/UNCTAD,  1993C). 
c) Increasing returns and strategic 
complementarities 
A firm's competitiveness depends not 
only on its own productivity but also on 
that of its environment, because the latter 
determines systemic productivity. Thus, 
no matter how efficient a firm may be, its 
competitiveness depends on the 
productivity of its suppliers (in terms both 
of quality and of prices and timely 
delivery); the overall level of education 
and, consequently, the efficiency and 
speed with which its workers can be 
trained; the extent to which the financial 
system to which it has access meets its 
needs; domestic transport costs and the 
efficiency of the country's port system (as 
regards the cost both of imported inputs 
and of shipments abroad); the costs and 
efficiency of the electric power generation 
system and of other public utilities which 
affect its costs; and the telecommunications 
system, in terms of charges, speed and 
efficiency. 
All these factors, although external to 
the firm and hence beyond its control, may 
be just as important as its productivity 
in determining its international 
competitiveness. Indeed, these factors are 
in a sense public goods because, since they 
generate externalities and are not subject 
to the firm's full control, it is not in the 
firm's interest to take unilateral action 
with regard to them. These are functions 
which require collective action, whether 
by trade unions or by the regional or 
national government. 
Increasing returns to scale at the level 
of the firm generate external financial 
economies at the aggregate level, and hence 
produce strategic complementarities 
which make it possible to justify 
coordinating the activities of private 
agents with the economic authority. The 
presence of economies of scale and of 
strategic complementarities produces 
externalities and coordination costs which 
decentralized market signals cannot take 
fully into account. No doubt these 
anomalies vary considerably from one 
industry to another, and, as Krugman 
(1986) states, "if there are important rents 
in certain sectors, trade policy can raise 
national income by securing for a country 
a larger share of the rent-yielding 
industries". The same could be said for 
actions aimed at productive development. 
The presence of increasing returns at 
the level of the firm precludes working 
with competitive models. Therefore, the 
consideration of alternative scenarios 
(such as imperfect competition or 
oligopoly) is a distinctive feature of 
modern theories of growth and 
international trade. The State's role, which 
is regulatory as well as coordinating, has 
again become of vital importance in terms 
of, for example, topics related to industrial 
property, anti-trust legislation and 
anti-dumping regulations. 
5. Practical reasons for a policy of 
productive development 
In the first place, in most latecomers to 
development, the State has played an 
active, efficient role in perfecting or 
improving markets, providing substitutes 
for them and creating an environment 
conducive to investment and innovation. 
In the past, Germany and France, for 
example, took measures to promote a close 
relationship between the banking and 
industrial sectors. Japan also, at the end of 
the nineteenth century and again 
following the Second World War, 
promoted imitation or licensing of 
technology with the support of the 
Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry in order to concentrate resources 
on priority sectors. Similar actions were 
taken more recently in the Republic of 
Korea and, to a lesser extent, in the Chinese 
Province of Taiwan and in Singapore, 
where high export performance incentives 
were established. 
Secondly, these successes are not 
automatic, nor are they always assured. 
However, they may function in the 
latecomers to development precisely 
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because the road to be followed is fairly 
clear. Although the technological frontier 
continues to advance in unexpected 
directions, since these countries are so far 
behind, they do not have to make efforts 
to be at the forefront of technology; rather, 
it is more a matter of mastering modern, 
mature technologies on which future 
technological advances will be based. 
Third, the public sector also has its 
defects: it does not have unlimited or 
privileged knowledge. Its efforts should 
therefore extend only so far as its real 
capacities allow. Consequently, 
determining how much State intervention 
is warranted is an empirical matter, not a 
theoretical one, and depends on the real 
capacities of the public sector and the 
scope of market failures. Experience 
suggests that State intervention will be 
more effective when it is i) "market 
friendly" and does not try to supplant the 
market, and ii) selective and transparent, 
because of the State's limitations and 
because there is a need to prevent an 
avalanche of private demands which seek 
to control easy rent-seeking activities 
instead of creating wealth. 
Fourth, experience also indicates that 
there is a wide variety of alternatives 
regarding State intervention, including: 
i) development led by conglomerates 
(Republic of Korea) or by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (Chinese 
Province of Taiwan); ii) growth led by 
domestic firms (Republic of Korea, 
Chinese Province of Taiwan and Japan) or 
by direct investment by public enterprises 
and transnational corporations (Singapore) 
which must comply with certain 
performance requirements; iii) promotion 
of comparative advantages which stress 
the importance of both supplying mass 
markets and concentrating on niches or 
specialized segments; iv) development 
propelled by exploitation and processing 
of natural resources with the later 
establishment of backward or forward 
1 n 
linkages, or even sideways linkages 
(Denmark, Sweden and Finland, among 
others in the past; Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia at present), or an initial 
development of manufacturing when 
significant natural resources are not 
available (Japan, Republic of Korea and 
Chinese Province of Taiwan); v) exporting 
since the beginning of the industrialization 
process or import substitution at an early 
stage, subject to increasing external 
competition, in order to export 
subsequently; vi) an initial opening based 
on promoting exports while liberalizing 
imports of inputs and capital goods, 
followed only later by a wider trade 
opening (in the case of most of the Asian 
NIES) or a free market almost from the start 
(Hong Kong and Singapore). 
Fifth, although a large part of the 
import substitution strategy lacked 
economic rationality (frequently "each 
sector was given the protection it needed" 
without linking it with the social benefit), 
it permitted important advances in the 
region's industrial development. In fact, 
there are sectors -even technologically 
sophisticated ones- which show that a 
dynamic advantage can be acquired in a 
reasonable amount of time. The Mexican 
and Brazilian automobile industries are 
good illustrations of this. Also, there are 
many "traditional" labour-intensive 
sectors (food processing, apparel, 
footwear and textiles, and production of 
durable goods such as appliances, inputs 
and even capital goods, especially if they 
are custom-made) which have become 
internationally competitive, either in the 
domestic market, through efficient import 
substitution, or in the international 
market, through exports. 
10 Sideways linkages are movements towards the production of i) complementary products (e.g., from 
garments to footwear because they have similar distribution channels); ii) different products which 
use a similar technological base (e.g., from bovine insulin to porcine insulin and then to human 
insulin, or from specialized machinery for separating and selecting different grades of coffee beans 
to electronically selecting all kinds of beans by colour, texture or size); and iii) close substitutes (e.g., 
from single- to multi-flavoured juice or from regular to "light" beer). 
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Sixth, experience suggests that 
competitive advantages can be acquired 
through productive development policies 
which strengthen market forces rather 
than supplanting them, provided that 
several requirements are met, including 
the following: 
i) That the incentives are transitory, for 
only when the obligation to compete 
internationally is established is it feasible 
to persuade entrepreneurs to adopt a 
favourable attitude towards productive 
activities and not towards those that are 
merely rent-seeking. 
ii) That the scale of production is 
sufficiently large, i.e., that there is a large 
domestic market (e.g., traditional firms in 
most countries or the automobile 
assembly industry in Brazil and Mexico), 
that exports have been taken into account 
from the start (automobile engine plants 
installed in Mexico since the end of the 
1970s, or other product lines aimed at 
foreign markets as a result of export-
promotion policies, as in Brazil and 
Colombia) or that an industrial 
commodity is produced which is easily 
exportable if there is insufficient domestic 
demand (a considerable part of the 
production of intermediate inputs in 
Argentina and Brazil). 
iii) That, generally speaking, the use of 
obsolete or rapidly evolving technologies 
is avoided. In the case of the former, this is 
because the comparative advantage 
would be based only on maintaining 
low labour costs and could be quickly 
lost as the technology changed. 
Likewise, sectors where technology is 
making giant leaps forward should 
generally be avoided because, by the 
time this technology has been mastered, 
the best international practice will have 
already moved forward significantly; this 
would appear to be the case in the field of 
information sciences in Brazil, the 
pharmaceutical industry in other 
countries, or the production of spare parts 
or capital goods for producers of 
intermediate inputs, where few plants of 
this last category exist and where 
investment in them is sporadic. 
Experience therefore points to the 
importance of adopting a relatively 
advanced but already proven, mature 
technology, as in the case of automobile 
engine manufacturing in Mexico, so that 
the technology can be mastered and even 
adapted before it is replaced by a very 
different one. Technology should 
therefore be relatively advanced and 
proven and should allow a country, 
within a reasonable period of time, to 
start producing according to the 
standards of the best world practice and 
to remain on the international 
technological frontier. 
6. Summary 
The traditional industrial promotion 
instruments used in the region, such as 
high or non-time-limited tariffs, import 
quotas, local subsidies and the provision 
of goods and services by State 
corporations at subsidized prices (for 
example, electricity, petroleum, steel) are 
no longer valid. The loss of importance of 
these instruments was due to several 
factors: i) the lack of economic rationality 
in their levels and periods of application; 
ii) the abuses to which they gave rise 
during part of the period when the 
industrialization strategy based on import 
substitution was in force; iii) the tight 
financial constraint on the public sector 
during the adjustments of the 1980s; and 
iv) the fact that most of the policies which 
involved the use of these instruments 
came into conflict with the policies that 
began to apply in the mid-1980s (trade and 
financial liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation). 
As for alternatives, an analysis of 
several experiences and policies designed 
to increase the competitiveness of the 
production system indicates that future 
policies in the region will need to have a 
high degree of flexibility and pragmatism, 
combine elements of different scope 
(segments, sectors and neutral policies) 
and give priority to solving specific 
market-related and institutional 
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problems. An appropriate mix of private 
and public efforts is, of course, a pre-
condition for effectively implementing 
and correctly designing these policies. The 
productive development policy proposals 
formulated within and outside the region 
in recent years, as discussed in the 
following chapter, make it possible to 
identify a series of elements which should 
be taken into account in elaborating and 
implementing future competitiveness 
policies (Peres, 1993). 
Chapter VIII 
PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s 
There is a wide range of instruments for 
achieving faster and more effective 
production restructuring. In particular, 
there are some instruments which fulfil 
the three conditions of avoiding the 
excesses of the past, complying with the 
consensual principles referred to in the 
preceding chapter, and having been 
successfully tested, above all in the Asian 
NIEs. 
What is required in order to promote 
competitiveness and close the 
productivity gap with the developed 
countries is not only sound 
macroeconomic and trade liberalization 
policies but also an active productive 
development policy which includes: 
i) "Horizontal" or meso-economic 
policies, that is, policies which support the 
systemic competitiveness of the 
environment in which the enterprise 
operates, especially those focused on 
filling the gaps and overcoming the most 
critical bottlenecks in the factor markets, 
such as policies for innovation and the 
dissemination of technology, training, 
export promotion, financing and 
infrastructure development. 
ii) Micro-economic policies which 
directly support the operations of 
enterprises and, in particular, the use of 
the best technologies. Learning and 
restructuring in the areas of technology, 
organization, quality control and 
marketing all require a heavy investment 
of time and physical and human capital. 
The essential role of a modern industrial 
or productive development policy is to 
facilitate this learning and restructuring, 
reinforcing rather than replacing the 
market forces. 
In order to apply this set of policies it 
is necessary to get away from the idea that 
when it comes to meeting the challenge of 
competitiveness there are only two kinds 
of firms: those which cire prepared to 
restructure and transform themselves into 
competitive enterprises, as many are 
already doing, and those which will 
disappear because of the difficulties they 
encounter in adapting to new 
circumstances or because of their lack of 
motivation to do so. Although the attitude 
that giving the market forces free rein is 
sufficient of itself to ensure that inefficient 
enterprises will disappear and 
competitive enterprises will survive is not 
always explicit, the lack of support policies 
which would help enterprises to become 
competitive shows that this attitude still 
prevails in practice. Nevertheless, reality 
shows that a large proportion of the 
region's enterprises belong to a third 
group: those which have the potential to 
be competitive, but which need support in 
order to improve their product design, 
reorganize their production processes and 
acquire the capacity to respond quickly to 
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changes in demand: in short, to strengthen 
their competitiveness. These are the 
enterprises on which policies to promote 
competitiveness should concentrate. 
1. Policies to further innovation and 
the dissemination of technology 
a) The situation of  enterprises at the 
beginning of  the 1990s 
Entrepreneurial performance in the 
region is tending to display increasing 
dualism. In order to overcome the 
challenges and take full advantage of the 
opportunities referred to earlier, Latin 
America and the Caribbean must 
considerably increase their efforts in the 
area of technology. 
On the one hand, there are large 
private national groups, subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations and many 
small and medium-sized enterprises 
(which often act as subcontractors for the 
first two types of companies) which are 
engaged in an intensive process of 
modernization reflected in the growing 
competitiveness of such activities as the 
automotive industry in Mexico, the 
aluminium industry in Argentina, the 
paper and pulp industry in Brazil or the 
domestic appliances industry in Chile. 
Even in traditional sectors, many 
companies have shown a great capacity 
for modernization, as in the cases of the 
ceramic products and leather industries in 
Uruguay, the footwear industry in Chile, 
textiles and clothing in Colombia, and 
textile and canned food in Central 
America. Even in situations of acute and 
prolonged macroeconomic crisis 
combined with trade liberalization, as in 
the case of Brazil at the beginning of the 
1990s, substantial restructuring processes 
and increases in competitiveness are to be 
observed (see box VTII.l). 
In contrast to this relatively promising 
picture, however, it is clear that in a 
number of countries and sectors the 
competitiveness of regional 
manufacturing is still only incipient and 
that innovation is the rule only in ^very 
limited number of enterprises. In 
particular, for the three largest economies 
of the region, the change in their trade 
structure points to a relative loss of 
international competitiveness in the 1980s 
in production sectors that are know-how 
and capital goods-intensive, in spite of the 
considerable advances achieved in sectors 
producing natural resource-based goods 
or in the motor industry (Gurrieri, 1993; 
Katz, 1993). 
At the enterprise level, the slowness 
with which many firms in some important 
production sectors have responded to the 
new pressures of the more competitive 
environment created by the increasing 
trade liberalization of the region's 
economies is cause for concern. This is 
especially true in the case of enterprises 
which do not carry on export activities, 
either because of problems of internal 
competitiveness or for systemic reasons. 
An example of this situation, even in a 
modern activity producing goods based 
on abundant natural resources, is the 
Venezuelan chemical and petrochemical 
industry. Out of a total of 113 enterprises 
highly representative of the production 
and employment generated in this 
industry in 1988 and 1992, about 40% 
lacked basic information on technological, 
commercial, organizational and even 
accounting problems, and one-fifth did 
not even attach importance to this fact or 
showed no awareness of the^eed for such 
information (Pirela, 1993). 
11 Some recent data point to growing private participation in the costs of research and development; 
in the case of Mexico, for example, data for 1992 indicate participation of 22%, which, although still 
far below desirable levels, marks a clear advance compared with the figures below 10% registered 
in the 1980s. 
12 Although this description could also be applied to some enterprises in developed countries, the 
situation is particularly serious in a context -like that of the region- marked by increasing 
international competition and a tendency towards an appreciation of the currency (see chapter XI). 
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ADJUSTING FOR SURVIVAL IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF SEVERE MACROECONOMIC 
IMBALANCES AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION:THE PROGRESS OF BRAZILIAN 
ENTERPRISES TOWARDS GREATER COMPETITIVENESS 
During 1993, I.CIAC cooperated with the 
Government of Brazil in a broad study carried 
out by Brazilian specialists on the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. 
The study showed that big domestic and foreign 
firms had an extraordinary capacity for 
achieving substantial increases in productivity 
and quality in order to cope with the economic 
turbulence of recessions, four-digit inflation and 
trade liberalization experienced over the past si \ 
The study confirmed the trends suggested in 
the last two years by a series of isolated 
indicators, all of which pointed to important 
improvements during that period in the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. 
Tor example, not only has there been a sharp 
increase in the activity ol technological 
consulting enterprises but also, accoiding to the 
data provided bv the Brazilian Geographical 
and Statistical Institute iiw.r.i, during the 
period 1491-1943 productivity increased by 
more than 25"«, in contrast with the stagnation 
of labour productivity during the previous 
five years. This study has contributed 
enormously to an understanding of the 
process, as ii provides a detailed examination 
of its internal operation. 
The macroeconomic discquilibria are 
limiting progress by restricting investment in 
fixed capital. Moreover, there has not been much 
progress in certain areas which are critical for 
long-term competitiveness, suchas training and 
technological research, although improvements 
are foreseen in the near future in most of the 
enterprises included in the study. 
Nevertheless, the data given by the study 
indien to substantial progress in a series of basic-
determinants of competitiveness. Considerable 
rationalization of costs is being achieved 
through: i) contracting of support services 
outside the enterprise; ii) specialization in fewer 
product lines, but at the same time incorporating 
more models and more rapid changes within 
them in areas where the firms have 
comparative advantages; iii) de-verticalization; 
iv) elimination of bottlenecks; v) more efficient 
use of inputs and consequent reduction in waste; 
and vi) reduction in levels of authority (from 6 
to 5). Moreover, enterprises have placed great 
emphasis on measures to ensure and control 
quality, including greater technological 
refinement, better adjustment to technical 
specifications, better use of consultants, and a 
radical change of attitude towards suppliers. 
Lastly, production has begun to concentrate 
much more on the customer, as is demonstrated 
bv greater durability of products, shorter 
delivery times and quicker preparation and 
introduction of new products. | 
Given the stagnation ol demand, it is natural 
that these efforts should ha\e been concentrated 
oil certain areas which require little new 
investment in fixed capital. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of the current adjustment should not be 
underestimated, as it has spread throughout the 
manufacturing sector and has advanced very 
rapidly sina- 1990. Moreover, it has helped to 
avoid a serious collapse of the sector by increasing 
the capacity of Brazilian enterprises to cope with 
trade liberalization, in an unfavourable 
international environment and a difficult 
macroeconom ic si tua tion, by achievi ng substanti al 
increases in competitiveness. Furthermore, 
although it has not contributed to significant 
technological progress -for example, there are few 
examples of flexible automation-, it represents a 
good beginning which will ensure the 
introduction of technological progress in the 
future, once investment increases and enterprises 
begin to invest in die so-called third industrial 
revolution and reap its benefits to the full. 
Source-R IWlschowsky,''Adiu^tinRtorsurvivjl domestic .Hid tornan m.inuf.utur'n£ firms in Br«/.il m the e^rly lQQi V.TveSíw.íie.-
i'ii Trjtbntnwmi!  Cpqvrdhi'iii m the l¡ra::¡t¡iu \hinuf;J<  luniig sn h'r. Tin•  I'WOs muí l'iirlij W'n... Dusjrn-.lo piodiutivo berus. 
N o 1H(L.C/C> 1K42I,Santiago,finie, t lonomie Commission for I.,itm Ameiic.i ,ind theCarihlv.ni ,n - v :, 1 Vcrml-cr 1 
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Moreover, nearly two-thirds of the 
enterprises exhibited characteristics, both 
before and after the structural changes 
initiated in 1989, which justified describing 
them as "passive" or "isolated from the 
sources of technological dynamism" (see 
table Vm.l).13 In addition, out of a subgroup 
of enterprises (54) which formed part of 
the sample in both 1988 and 1992, only a 
little more than one-third made positive 
changes and tended to become more 
active, while the rest regressed, in that their 
learning capacity diminished or they did 
not see the need to change their behaviour. 
Other studies with similar goals show 
that in very important sectors there has 
still not been sufficient adaptation of the 
prevailing business culture to the new 
reality of international competition to 
enable production units to perceive that 
there is a clear and direct relationship 
between their technological behaviour 
and their economic performance.14 
Although there may well still be some 
uncertainty about the wisdom of seeking 
to adapt to a new environment which may 
be reversible, it would seem that the main 
reason for the relative passivity observed 
is inertia, the correction of which will require 
policy measures that recognize the structural 
dualism evident from the examples given. 
The perception by enterprises that they 
are confronting an increasingly competitive 
environment plays an important role in their 
technological modernization decisions. Thus, 
in the garment production sector in Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela in the early 1990s, 
we can observe growing concern by firms 
toacquire modern machinery andequipment. 
This is due to the combination of trade 
liberalization, exchange rates with a tendency 
towards revaluation, sales pressure from 
international enterprises facing recession or 
slow growth in their main markets, and the 
progressive development of marketing 
channels that make it possible to take greater 
advantage of international prices. All these 
factors reduce the trading opportunities of 
the customary suppliers of the domestic 
market. The increased competitive pressure 
is reflected in efforts to reduce costs, and in 
doing this there is naturally a tendency to 
concentrate on those costfactors which can be 
reduced by introducing modern machinery. 
Accordingly, as economies stabilize, 
wage costs rise and there is less room for 
increasing competitiveness through 
significant exchange rate devaluations, 
enterprises in these sectors confront the need 
to adapt their technologies. This process of 
reaction by enterprises would naturally be 
easier in a climate of economic growth, 
with access to financial resources at 
reasonable cost. 
The above analysis indicates that an 
appropriate system of incentives is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
stimulating technological innovation, and 
must be supplemented with the 
development of a special set of institutions. 
b) Institutional experience 
Although a number of problems still 
persist in the technological culture and 
behaviour of the region's enterprises, there is 
a wealth of institutional experience in the 
13 "Passive" enterprises are those which show considerable technological backwardness and do not 
carry out internal technological activities or develop external linkages which would enable them to 
overcome that backwardness, while "isolated" firms are those which make technological efforts but 
do not link them up with sources outside the enterprise that would make it possible to give them a 
boost. The latter firms, which have an interesting record of technological learning in the past, seem 
to be over-adapted to an economic environment which is becoming less and less relevant to their 
activities, while they have been unable to establish linkages with outside sources of technology (as 
enterprises which are "technologically dependent on the outside world" have done) or to transform 
themselves into "active" enterprises (i.e., enterprises well adapted to the present environment and 
with close links with national research centres). 
14 See, for example, Prochnik (1989) in the case of the Brazilian textile and garment industry and 
Guerguil, Macario and Peres (1993) in respect of the garment industry in Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela. 
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Table VIII. 1 
VENEZUELA: TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM OF CHEMICAL AND 
PETROCHEMICAL ENTERPRISES, 1988 AND 1992 
Type Number Number in 1988 in 1992 
Technological 
characteristics Comments 
Active 28 20 Some capacity for design and 
technological experience. Main 
competitive strength is 
customer service 
Large enterprises suffer 
from shortage of qualified 





32 New products are the key to 
their competitiveness. Greater 
weight of competitive markets 
Produce mass-consumption 
goods. Many foreign enterprises 
or joint enterprises with foreign 
control 
Passive 19 18 Technological lag of 5 to 15 
years. Competition based on 
prices 
Concentrate on producing one 
line of goods with mature 
technology 
Isolated or 44 
non-differentied 
43 Adaptation to the environment 
based on customer service. The 
"professional challenge" still 
exists 
Good technological level, but 
are isolated 
Total 113 113 
Source: A. Pirela, "De la taxonomía empresarial a la política industrial: los efectos del ajuste estructural en la cultura 
tecnológica de las empresas", paper presented at the international seminar on "Entrepreneurial conduct and 
technological culture in Latin America: the chemical and petrochemical industry", Caracas, 
ASOQUIM/Centro  de Estudios del Desarrollo, 1993. 
development of national science and techno-
logy systems, technology management, 
linkages between universities and industry, 
"enterprise incubators", technology parks 
and local systems of innovation and 
international cooperation, and these 
initiatives deserve special attention as 
successful and intra-regionally transferable 
policy instruments (Peres, 1993; Dirá and 
Peres, 1994). The following conclusions can 
be drawn from this experience: 
i) The development of direct action at 
the enterprise level is the key to promoting 
organizational change and the absorption 
of new technologies. What most restricts 
the introduction of new technologies is the 
insufficient demand by firms for them, 
and this is particularly true for important 
industrial sectors in the region which 
utilize mature technologies, readily 
available in the international market, but 
lack adequate information on the available 
international supply and its potential 
impact on their profitability. The problem 
therefore is how to fill this gap and 
stimulate demand by firms. There are two 
successful examples in the region of 
institutions directed towards this end: 
Costa Rica's experience with "technology 
management nuclei" shows that these can 
be an efficient and transferable 
1 R 
instrument, while Chile's experience 
15 This initiative, carried out by the Centre for Technology Management and Industrial Information 
Systems (CEGESTI), is based on teams of experts in technology and management who work directly 
with the senior management of enterprises to improve their competitiveness by means of increased 
productivity, organizational changes and technology management in general. 
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with the establishment of "pilot" 
enterprises shows that they can stimulate 
new private investment in areas which 
have been insufficiently developed 
because of the inadequate information 
available in that sector and thereby create 
a demand for technology transfer and 
adaptation services.16 
ii) Technology-based enterprises 
originating from major public research 
and development centres have proved to 
be an efficient instrument for spreading 
technological capacity; in some cases it has 
been observed that the development of 
"enterprise incubators" or technology 
parks has helped such enterprises to 
mature. The science and technology 
bodies of some countries of the region and 
their associated funds have contributed 
financing for such efforts on the basis of 
shared benefits and risks.17 
iii) National science and technology 
bodies have tended to establish closer 
links with the production sector, although 
much remains to be done before their 
activities can have a significant impact on 
productive activity as a whole. These 
bodies have concentrated their attention 
on policy instruments connected with the 
financing of training and research and 
development at the enterprise level, 
particularly in small-scale and 
micro-enterprises. The conditions of this 
financing (interest rates and guarantee 
requirements), although better than those 
prevailing in the market, in many cases 
still do not fully incorporate the risk factor 
and the externalities present in 
technological activity. 
iv) The management of cultural 
variables is decisive in efforts to link 
production firms with top research 
centres. The most important factors 
involved are the development in such 
centres of an environment more conducive 
to interaction with enterprises and the 
consolidation of broad, long-term policies 
and institutional support to regulate that 
relationship. 
v) The most important role of 
international cooperation in the 
technological field is to act as a catalyst for 
promoting joint technological efforts 
between centres of excellence, between 
centres and enterprises, and between 
enterprises located in different 
countries.18 
vi) The development of local systems 
of innovation in countries of the region, 
despite the successes achieved, has run 
into major problems: first, neither 
businessmen nor policy makers fully 
recognize the role that cooperative efforts 
can play in the effective implementation of 
policies for promoting such systems, 
particularly those made up of small firms; 
second, the weakness of local economic 
and social structures, combined with the 
limited capacity for implementing State 
policies, promotes a tendency on the 
part of enterprises to take advantage of 
the collective effort without contributing 
to it ("free riders"); third, the public 
institutions responsible for promoting 
innovation have centralized management 
structures which are not efficient for 
identifying the needs of enterprises in 
unstable and dynamic contexts; and 
16 A well-known example of "pilot" enterprises is provided by the Chile Foundation, whose initiatives 
in the creation of enterprises have demonstrated the potential profitability of activities which the 
country's business class did not perceive as profitable (see box V.2 and Huss, 1991). 
17 Two examples of the promotion of enterprise incubators are the Incubator Programme for 
Technology-Based Enterprises (PIEBT) of the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) 
of Mexico, and the Technological Enterprises Programme of the National Council for Scientific and 
Technological Research (CONICIT) of Venezuela. 
18 Two important experiments in this field are the Bolivar Programme for Regional Technological 
Integration, Innovation and Industrial Competitiveness, and the Iberoeka Programme being carried 
out within the framework of the Science and Technology for Development (CYTED) Programme of the 
Spanish external cooperation system. 
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fourth, there is a conspicuous lack 
of coordination between promotion 
policies and the specialization and 
complementation needs of the firms 
participating in efficient local systems of 
innovation. 
c) Policy lines 
A review of technological behaviour 
and institutional experience in the region 
leads to the conclusion that the strategies 
outlined by ECLAC in 1992 for developing 
the capacity for the assimilation, 
adaptation and development of 
technology remain valid, especially as 
regards: i) strengthening social capacity 
for the absorption of knowledge by 
increasing the integration between 
technological and human resources 
development systems; ii) promoting 
firms' own research and development 
activities; iii) promoting cooperative 
research among firms and supporting the 
establishment of research and development 
consortia; and iv) encouraging stronger 
links between industry and research 
institutions. 
Recent developments also suggest that 
these strategies must be supplemented by 
four additional elements: i) preventing 
technological lag due to the adjustment 
policies, since loss of local engineering 
capacity can give rise to permanent tech-
nological backwardness; ii) introducing 
policies on domestic competition which go 
beyond the liberalization of trade, since 
the small size of the market in most 
countries of the region would allow the 
few producers in the domestic market to 
prevent the entry of new suppliers or 
suppliers of substitutes, even for 
internationally tradeable products; 
iii) supporting the development of 
strategic alliances between large national 
firms and international technological 
leaders, as this is a key mechanism both for 
rapid technology transfer and for 
increased international linkages; and iv) 
acting in a way which takes account of the 
impact of current regional and 
subregional integration processes, 
especially as regards the coordination of 
technological policies and policies on 
intellectual property rights which reduce 
the scope for disseminating potential 
technology "spill-overs", a situation 
which could have serious repercussions 
on some production sectors. 
Finally, three factors should be taken 
into account: i) the problems of 
technological policy in the region (like 
those of production development policy in 
general) are due much more to the failure 
to implement policies than to the absence 
of instruments to propose or policies to 
support; ii) the instruments applied and 
the institutions established have reflected 
a low level of commitment to 
technological change, leading to the 
development of institutions which have a 
positive effect on only a few enterprises 
and which channel only marginal 
resources; and iii) there are many 
businessmen in the region who do not 
even know that policies of technological 
modernization are in effect or who, if they 
do know this, very often write them off as 
inaccessible without first carrying out an 
in-depth evaluation. 
Three sets of proposals are made 
below which emphasize the enterprise 
dimension and are particularly important 
for taking advantage of the technological 
know-how currently available and 
thereby closing more rapidly the great gap 
in factor productivity between the 
countries of the region and the developed 
countries. 
The first proposal, which would 
permit a qualitative leap forward in this 
area, requires the initiation of 
programmes to speed up and generalize 
the dissemination of "best practice" 
technologies. 
As was done during the 
reconstruction of Europe through the 
Marshall Plan technical assistance 
programme, it would be very useful to 
establish programmes for co-financing 
medium-length visits (between 6 and 8 
weeks) to "best practice" plants abroad by 
businessmen, engineers, foremen and 
trade union leaders from the various local 
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production sectors, who would later pass 
on what they had learnt to enterprises in 
their own countries.19 In the case of 
Europe, increases in productivity of 
between 25% and 50% were achieved at 
very low cost (some US$ 20 million per 
country at 1993 values to send between 20 
and 40 people from each of 50 selected 
sectors) and with very little additional 
investment.20 It should be noted that the 
gap between the total factor productivity 
of the developed countries and of Latin 
America (of the order of 2.5 to 1) is much 
greater than that existing between the 
United States and Europe in the late 1940s. 
Because it would cost little and would 
lead to big productivity gains, such a 
programme could have a high cost/ 
benefit ratio. Moreover, with the same 
91 
multiplier as the Marshall Plan, it would 
serve to disseminate experience to 
between 5,000 and 10,000 firms in each of 
the participating countries, making it possible 
for the region to take advantage of its late 
development and skip intermediate 
stages, thus moving more rapidly towards 
the global technological frontier. 
This proposal has two additional 
advantages: i) it would increase national 
awareness of the importance of 
productivity, making productivity a 
national effort and not just the 
responsibility of firms or certain trade 
associations, so that productivity would 
become a unifying issue by being 
presented as a national challenge and as 
the principal source of solid and lasting 
improvements in the standard of living of 
the entire population; and ii) it would be 
open to all sectors wishing to participate, 
or at least to the first ones each year which 
submit a programme for their sector and 
are prepared to participate in its 
co-financing. 
In addition, this programme could be 
supplemented with another one 
successfully tried in Singapore, based on 
granting incentives to the first companies 
to introduce significantly new 
technologies in a particular category (both 
technologies that reduce costs and those 
that improve quality), since, in the last 
analysis, the first company to acquire a 
new and appropriate technology in its 
country is a "Schumpeterian innovator" 
that generates an externality: other 
companies can profit by its experience 
without incurring costs or risks of equal 
magnitude. 
The second group of measures 
includes proposals which, taken 
individually, would not have a significant 
immediate impact but which, taken 
together, would have such an effect in the 
long run because they reinforce each other 
and have a cumulative effect: 
i) Continuation of efforts to improve 
technological and management 
information systems and networks. 
Efficient systems with low-cost access for 
their users are an essential complement to 
efforts to modernize and heighten the 
awareness of enterprises. Moreover, it is 
essential to make progress in the 
development of an information 
infrastructure which makes possible the 
execution of ongoing sectoral studies to 
monitor the changes taking place on the 
international technological frontier. 
Permanent contact by regional producers 
19 This idea is taken from a proposal by Carl Dahlman, a World Bank staff member, for the restructuring 
of the productive sector of the former Soviet Union on the basis of a report prepared for that institution 
(Silberman and Weiss, 1992). 
20 Co-financing might mean, for example, that enterprises would continue to pay the salaries of those 
of their workers who participate in the visits and prepare the corresponding reports, while the 
government contribution would finance the travel, subsistence and administrative costs of the 
programme. 
21 In the case of the Marshall Plan, each member of the mission transferred his experience to an average 
of between 5 and 10 plants in his country of origin. 
22 Indeed, this was done in Europe during reconstruction, through the establishment of national 
productivity committees made up of heads of firms, trade unionists, technicians and public officials. 
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with the available international information 
complements efforts to inform them of the 
experience of companies employing the 
"best practice". 
ii) Improvement of the financing 
conditions for technological efforts. In 
most countries of the region, the funds 
handled by the institutions that are trying 
to promote technological development 
are insignificant compared with the 
total requirements of production 
modernization. Nevertheless, they can 
demonstrate to private banks the potential 
profitability of financing technological 
investment, and they can serve as a 
mechanism for learning and teaching how 
to evaluate technological risk. Conditions 
of financing should be revised to reflect 
support for the external economies 
deriving from technological development. 
To that end, in spite of the difficulties 
involved, efforts should be made to 
evaluate the trade-offs between granting 
preferential interest rates and assuming all 
or part of the technological risk, as well as 
to move towards reducing the margin of 
intermediation for technological credit, 
the high level of which reduces demand 
from companies. It is likewise necessary to 
develop insurance for such credits and to 
strengthen the traditional mechanisms for 
financing prototypes and pilot plants, thus 
easing the firms' transition from 
pre-competitive research to the 
installation and start-up of production 
plants, with special attention to the needs 
and limitations of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
iii) Dissemination of regional 
experience in the operation of institutions 
for supporting companies' technological 
activities. There is considerable experience 
in this field, but although it is well known to 
experts on technological questions it has not 
yet filtered through to decision- making 
bodies, particularly in small and 
medium-sized countries. Moreover, in spite 
of the positive experience accumulated in 
connection with technological centres at the 
level of industrial branches, incubators and 
technology parks, linkages between 
universities and enterprises and alternative 
financing mechanisms, the feasibility of 
expanding them to the whole economy has 
not yet been properly evaluated, yet 
without such expansion they will have 
only a marginal impact on productivity. 
iv) Promotion of alliances among 
companies by simplifying procedures, 
providing information and granting fiscal 
incentives. The first two mechanisms are 
clearly called for if the aim is to promote a 
strategy of developing company alliances. 
Although there is no consensus on the 
third, it would undoubtedly serve to send 
a signal that this is a priority strategy for 
modernization and that, in view of its 
importance, there is a readiness to accept 
the necessary trade-offs in terms of public 
expenditure. 
v) Support for the efforts of 
enterprises to modernize their 
associations. Many of the region's 
industrial business associations were 
established at a time when their basic 
function was to guarantee their 
members high levels of protection and 
good access to policy-makers and those 
responsible for public contracts. In the 
eyes of those they represented, the 
fundamental criterion used to measure 
the success of industry representatives 
was their efficiency in lobbying. In a 
new competitive environment 
characterized by trade liberalization and 
greater competition, however, such 
functions have declined in importance, 
and in some cases this has deprived some 
organizations of their very raison d'être. For 
that reason, the region's more modern 
business associations have sought to 
transform themselves into providers of 
services for their members, especially in 
areas related to the provision of 
information, the consolidation of efforts in 
the areas of trade and transport, and 
business and economic analysis. These 
efforts entail important externalities and 
should be supported as a mechanism 
which makes for higher levels of efficiency 
in the region. In particular, a mechanism 
which has shown itself to be especially 
useful for achieving such purposes is 
the facilitation of exchanges of 
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modernization experiences among 
business leaders so that they can weigh 
alternatives and have access to the 
relevant advice. 
The third set of measures relates more 
specifically to the region's agriculture, as 
the special characteristics of this sector 
require that special attention be paid to the 
forces which can promote technological 
change in it. Thus, the small average 
size of farms, producers' difficulties in 
organizing themselves to carry out and 
internalize technological efforts, the 
need to adapt even basic techniques to 
specific soil and climate conditions, and 
the difficulty of protecting intellectual 
property rights in this field call for a 
special effort by the public sector. 
In order to achieve more dynamic 
growth in which the agricultural sector 
plays an important part, it is necessary to 
restore and promote public programmes 
of technological research and 
dissemination. With the crisis of the 
1980s and the consequent reduction in 
public expenditure, agricultural 
research and extension systems suffered 
contraction and dismantling which 
resulted in significant deterioration in 
the capacity to generate and disseminate 
agricultural technologies, precisely in a 
sector in which such linkages had been 
most successful. The full impact of these 
cutbacks has yet to be felt, given the long 
delay between theoretical research, its 
experimental development and its 
subsequent dissemination and full 
maturity. 
Resuming the unfinished research and 
restoring research teams will require a 
long and considerable effort, but this is all 
the more necessary because the region 
needs the expansion, diversification and 
development of "non-traditional" crops 
(ECLAC, 1993d). This is particularly 
important because perfecting a new 
variety requires a decade or more of 
research and adaptation: a period of time 
which increases considerably in the case of 
the genetic improvement of animals. In an 
environment of highly dynamic markets, 
in which agricultural and agroindustrial 
products appear and are replaced with 
great rapidity, research and dissemination 
in the field of agricultural technological 
innovation is a decisive factor for ensuring 
a supply capable of adapting to the quality 
and timing requirements of such markets. 
This is even more evident in the case of 
products or crops that are new to a 
country, in which case the adaptation 
process and the introduction of quality 
standards must be carried out in the 
shortest possible time. 
Some countries of the region have 
become aware of this situation and its 
requirements and have taken action in 
recent years to restructure their national 
systems of scientific and technological 
research. The importance of these measures 
should be emphasized, as recent studies on 
the social profitability of agricultural 
research and extension have shown highly 
favourable results. Indeed, one of them, 
which aggregated the findings of 114 
specific studies on the subject in developed 
and developing countries, concluded that 
the rate of social profitability of investments 
in this area was above 50% in 45% of the 
cases, between 30% and 50% in 42% of the 
cases, and below 20% in only the remaining 
13% (Evenson, 1992).24 
23 A successful example of such exchanges in the region is the modernization effort made by the 
Chamber of Industry of the State of Carabobo (CIEC) and the Venezuelan Plastic Industries Association 
(AVIPLA). For an analysis of these efforts, see León (1993). 
24 Similar results were obtained with regard to investments in agricultural extension systems. In this 
connection, it should be emphasized that, even when extension services are not very efficient, the 
externalities generated are considerable and directly benefit the rural community in areas such as 
adult education and training and improvement of communications. Moreover, the results obtained 
were not significantly different for developed and developing countries. This makes it clear that there 
are very good reasons for investing in national systems of agricultural technology generation and 
dissemination. 
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Lastly, mention must be made of the 
considerable impact that proper linkages 
between producers and agroindustries 
can have on the modernization of the 
agricultural system, especially in the 
case of small and medium-scale 
producers. The fact that agroindustrial 
enterprises need inputs of a given 
quality, at a given time and with high 
yields (to offset high transport costs) leads 
them to provide technical and financial 
assistance to agricultural producers, and 
this is an effective means of transferring 
technological advances and improve-
ments (see box VIII.2). 
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LINKAGES BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL UNITS AND AGROINDUSTRY 
Research carried oui by lhe Agricultural 
Development L'nit of F.CLAC and by country 
institutions has made clear the effect of 
agroindustrial processes on agricultural 
productivity and product quality. In certain 
circumstances, agroindustry constitutes a 
powerful means for modernizing agriculture, 
particularly in the case ot small and 
medium-scale producers. This phenomenon is 
particularly important in some agroindustrial 
chains usually, although not exclusive!), 
connected with foreign markets. The need to 
ensure good quality and an adequate supply of 
raw materials leads many agroindustrial 
enterprises to sign contracts involving the 
pro\ ision of technical and financial assistance to 
farmers, who, in tu rn, must meet pre-established 
standards and deliver their products on 
schedule. For some products such as vegetables, 
where quality depends to a large extent on 
careful handling, agroindustries prefer to 
establish relations with family farms, usually 
small-scale ones. In many ol these cases, the 
technology transferred has more general 
applications and can be used for other crops too. 
There is much evidence that an environment 
of stable, long-term contractual relations has led 
to increases in productivity and that in the 
course of time productivity levels even out 
between the various scales of producers. 
Examples of this are tobe found i n activities such 
as milk and sugar beet production and tobacco 
growing. Moreover, the share of contract 
agriculture covers a significant portion of the 
total. Research carried out by M 1 M'in Paraguay 
shows that of a total of 307,000 producers, 
nearly 200,000 have some form of contractual 
relationship with agroindustry. Of these, nearly 
130,000 are small farmers with less than 
10 hectares of land. In most cases, these contracts 
provide for advance payments in cash and in 
kind. These arrangements by agroindustries for 
financing agricultural producers arc additional 
to those provided by Paraguay's National 
Development Bank, which covers almost 30% 
of the land under cultivation. 
In Chile, of a total of 200,000 production 
units, about 80,000 producers have linked 
themselves with agroindustry. Of these, more 
than 60,000 are small farmers and, in most cases, 
arc dependent on the corresponding 
agroindustrial chain and recei\e technical and 
financial assistance. In industrial crops such as 
tobacco, sugar beet and tomatoes for paste and 
concentrates, this assistance may cover 100% of 
producers. Similar rates of coverage are also 
found in the case of new export products such 
as berries. This phenomenon is not limited to 
exports, however. In the dairy products chain, 
which is basically geared to the domestic 
market, technical and financial assistance for 
producers is also widely prevalent as a means of 
raising productivity and the quality of the raw 
material. 
Another study, carried out by the Bank of 
Guatemala in 1990, shows th<nt »ibout S0"'«> of 
agricultural producers specializing in fruit and 
vegetables for export are linked to 
agroindustrial enterprises by various 
contractual agreements under which nearly 75";. 
of them normally receive technical assistance. 
This has made it possible to increase and 
standardize productivity for a large number of 
export crops. 
Source: L:( I.AC, on tho b.isis ot ease studies lor v.inous lountnos 
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2. Training policies 
Education and training are basic 
determinants of the competitiveness of 
countries. There is no doubt that the basic 
requirement for securing a lasting, 
long-term improvement in the productive 
competitiveness of the region and the 
standard of living of its population is 
educational reform focused on quality. 
Nevertheless, in the short term, training is 
the activity most closely related to the 
competitiveness of the production sector 
and the main instrument for equipping the 
workforce to cope with labour-related 
changes in the enterprise. This is all the 
more necessary now that rapid changes in 
technology, the organization of work and 
demand make it essential for the 
workforce to be able to learn on an 
ongoing basis. 
a) The problem, the potential and the 
challenge 
The few studies available on the 
training activities of enterprises in the 
region show that they are of rather modest 
proportions, with no more than 10% of 
employees receiving any form of training. 
This contrasts with the evidence that 
training costs have a high rate of social 
profitability (25% on average, and always 
more than 10%), as indicated by 
evaluations of vocational training 
programmes which include apprenticeship, 
initiation and supplementary training 
courses (ECLAC/UNESCO,  1992). Moreover, 
the average worker in the region currently 
receives barely a month of training 
throughout his working life, which 
contrasts with the 5-10 months of training 
he would receive if 1% of the payroll were 
devoted to this purpose, in line with the 
internationally suggested minimum and 
the legislation of various countries of the 
region.25 
Not only is there little training, but the 
management of human resources in the 
region is frequently not of a professional 
nature and does not follow integrated 
programmes, being dictated instead by 
short-term considerations. In this context, 
training is seen as a mass of dispersed 
efforts, in response to specific requests or 
problems, without reference to the overall 
production process. Businessmen 
generally regard training as a cost rather 
than an investment, and therefore 
naturally tend to minimize it. They 
frequently regard it as a social benefit 
granted to employees and rarely connect 
it with the firm's modernization strategy. 
This is in line with their perception that 
external factors (especially exchange 
rate policy, foreign trade legislation and 
tax policy) are much more important for 
their competitiveness than factors 
internal to the enterprise (ECLAC, 1988a 
and 1993e; Guerguil, Macario and Peres, 
1993). 
A clear and very up-to-the-moment 
example of the secondary role which many 
enterprises assign to training is the way in 
which computerized equipment has been 
introduced: despite its importance, it has 
been accompanied by only a minimum of 
training, and this has, of course, reduced 
the possibility of improving the 
productive efficiency of firms. On the one 
hand, there is no question that 
computerized machines are more 
productive, facilitate quality control and 
25 Part of the reason for the minimal training given to workers, even where programmes with significant 
financing exist, is that generally such training is directed towards only a few workers and enterprises, 
and many of those who do receive it belong to middle or senior-level management. External training 
(outside the enterprise) in fact usually concentrates on administrative or management subjects, 
instead of those directly related to production. In Chile, for example, almost half the staff trained in 
1992 belonged to the management and administrative categories (SENCE, 1993). In contrast, the 
training of production staff is usually carried out in the enterprise; such courses are usually narrow 
in scope, covering only initial training (for a specific job) or training related to the introduction of 
new machinery; the former is usually provided by supervisors and the latter by suppliers. 
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are generally easier to use, as a result of 
which they require less initial 
training.26 On the other hand, such 
equipment requires sophisticated 
maintenance services which are usually 
contracted outside the firm, generally 
from the supplier himself. The lack of 
training of the firm's maintenance staff 
prevents them from coping adequately 
with the tasks of basic maintenance, the 
adjustment of machines or the detection of 
malfunctions. In countries where the 
external supply of maintenance services is 
not very efficient, down-time is lengthened 
and there may even be reluctance to 
introduce new machinery because 
entrepreneurs see it as involving greater 
risks of interrupting the production process. 
Moreover, many of the enterprises 
which have introduced computerized 
machines fail to take advantage of their 
versatility, because of the scant training 
they give its operators, who are then 
unable to control the efficiency of the 
process or the quality of the product, 
necessitating a greater number of final 
checks, and unable to adapt themselves 
quickly to changes in product 
specifications. By contrast, enterprises 
which have made greater training 
efforts achieve higher product quality 
and, in general, greater productive 
efficiency.27 
The contrast between the minimal 
training provided and its high social 
profitability naturally raises the 
question as to why this discrepancy 
between possibility and reality exists. 
Basically, the answer would be that 
entrepreneurs see general training as 
benefiting the worker, not the 
enterprise, because worker productivity is 
increased not only in the enterprise in 
question but overall, which means that 
the enterprise cannot fully appropriate 
this greater productivity and thus 
cannot recover the cost of such training. 
On the other hand, the main beneficiary of 
the potential training -the worker-
usually lacks the resources needed to 
finance it (both the direct and the 
opportunity costs). 
In the light of these factors, three 
complementary approaches seem 
possible: i) to recognize the primary 
interest of the worker in his own 
training and generate instruments in 
the capital market which will make it 
possible to use new forms of financing 
for people who wish to receive 
advanced training, using, for example, 
their pension fund or social security 
accounts as a guarantee; ii) to develop 
training activities with the help of State 
resources: an approach which is fully 
justified because such activities are a 
public asset and generate considerable 
externalities; and iii) to seek to change 
entrepreneurs' perceptions about training, 
promoting a broader and longer-term 
outlook. As the first point has been 
analysed in detail in ECLAC (1992a), 
proposals will be developed in this 
document which go more extensively into 
the other two. 
b) Proposed measures 
Three kinds of measures are proposed 
for reducing the gap between the potential 
and actual productivity of the workforce 
as quickly as possible. 
i) Measures to stimulate and channel the 
demand by enterprises for  training 
services through the provision of 
training for  heads of  enterprises and 
differentiated  incentives 
a. Direct or indirect incentives for 
training. In some countries of the region, 
there are financial incentives for training, 
either positive (tax exemption) or negative 
(deduction of the cost of activities carried 
out in enterprises themselves from the 
compulsory contribution to vocational 
26 This technology transfers part of the workers' skills in production programming to the machine's 
computerized memory, which can then perform very complex routines without interruption. 
27 In a survey of firms in the garment industry, a clear inverse relationship emerged between the length 
of initial training and the rate of final defects (Guerguil, Macario and Peres, 1993). 
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training institutions). These 
mechanisms do not seem to have 
attracted new resources quickly and 
massively to training, as only a few 
enterprises (especially the large ones, 
which usually train their personnel in 
any case) take advantage of them;29 
these incentives have nevertheless had 
other positive effects, such as 
promoting expansion of the private 
supply of training services, providing 
more information on these services 
and furthering greater market 
transparency. Moreover, they may have 
positive side-effects if they are 
accompanied by promotion and 
information efforts on the part of the 
on 1 
authorities. It would therefore be 
useful to introduce mechanisms of this 
kind in appropriate countries. 
The possibility of reducing, at least 
partially, the compulsory contribution by 
enterprises to vocational training 
institutes, on the basis of the training 
activities carried out by the enterprise 
itself, is a particularly efficient mechanism 
for simultaneously promoting both the 
supply of and the demand for training. 
One possible form of action would be to 
establish a training fund which would 
grant subsidies on the basis of the amount 
which firms spent on training; in this case, 
the burden of financing could be shared 
between the public and private sectors, 
with public funds acting as the 
counterpart of the private contribution or 
providing the necessary seed capital, 
which would then be replaced by private 
resources. 
It would also be advisable for public 
subsidies to be differentiated on the basis 
of the expected social effectiveness of 
training activities. For example, more 
general training (rather than the specific 
training that the enterprise would in any 
case carry out) and the training of staff 
with a lower educational level should be 
subsidized more heavily. Other 
programmes which should be given 
greater incentives are those which 
envisage training that is passed on down 
to lower levels, including the training of 
staff to act as "potential instructors" who 
will then responsible for passing on within 
the enterprise or plant the knowledge they 
have acquired. In addition, in order to 
reinforce the impact of financial incentives 
and subsidies, in special cases direct 
incentives might be considered, such as 
the creation of an ad hoc committee to 
promote training in enterprises, which 
would be responsible for identifying firms 
where there is room for improvement in 
this field and helping them to establish 
and implement internal training 
programmes. 
b. Promotional, information  and 
awareness-building measures. In order to 
speed up the dissemination among 
employers of more efficient practices in 
the fields of labour organization and 
human resources management, it is 
proposed that dissemination and 
information activities on these issues be 
28 Most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have introduced a compulsory tax, equivalent 
to l%-2% of the firm's payroll, for financing public or semi-public vocational training institutions. 
Some countries (Brazil and Venezuela, for example) authorize firms that carry out their own training 
activities to deduct all or part of the cost from that tax payment, while some other countries (Chile 
is the most obvious case in the region, but Argentina and Brazil have similar, albeit less extensive 
schemes) allow firms to deduct training costs from the taxes due on their profits (Ducci, 1990). 
29 In Chile, for example, in 1992 only 6% of the total number of firms made use of the tax exemption for 
training; although enterprises with more than 200 workers accounted for only 17% of these firms, 
they received almost 80% of the value of the subsidies granted (SENCE, 1993). Similarly, in Brazil, only 
7% of enterprises opted in 1987 to reduce their compulsory contribution on the grounds of their direct 
training activities (ECLAC/OREALC,  1992; Ducci, 1990). 
30 In Chile, for example, a growing number of enterprises have been making use of the system of tax 
exemption for training activities; the increase in the share of small enterprises in this total is 
particularly important: from 24% in 1978 to 58% in 1992 (SENCE, 1993). 
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carried out with a view to changing 
prevailing attitudes. Consideration might 
be given, for example, to the establishment 
of an "open school" for businessmen, with 
seminars in various cities, lectures by 
specialists, case illustrations, plant visits, 
etc.31 Moreover, encouragement could be 
given to the establishment of centres 
which provide information and advice on 
the availability of courses, teaching 
materials, training techniques, etc. Since 
lack of training is not usually the only 
impediment to a firm's competitiveness, 
such centres might offer complementary 
services such as technological 
information, market studies, management 
techniques, and industrial extension 
services in general, in order to increase 
their attractiveness to the business world. 
Conflictive labour relations limit both 
the desire of enterprises to train their 
employees and the desire of workers to 
take part in the corresponding 
programmes. An environment of mistrust 
and conflict leads the owner of an 
enterprise to limit training to what is 
strictly necessary to ensure the operation 
of the equipment, since he is afraid that 
better training for the workers will 
translate immediately into pressures for 
wage increases. The workers, for their part 
-since they do not feel involved in the 
fortunes of the enterprise- tend to see 
training simply as a means for the owner 
to increase productivity without giving 
them anything in return. It is common, in 
such cases, for the attitude of workers to 
training courses to be one of apathy. 
Finding ways of promoting better 
labour relations within the firm is 
therefore a necessary step for encouraging 
a favourable attitude towards training on 
the part of both the trade unions and 
businessmen. The holding of seminars on 
this subject directed jointly at 
businessmen and trade union leaders, the 
dissemination of experiences in which 
good labour relations have played an 
important part in improving the 
productive performance of specific firms, 
and increasing support for better training 
on the part of trade union leaders are 
measures which can help to promote 
relations directed towards cooperation 
rather than conflict within an enterprise. 
This would create a more propitious 
climate for increased training efforts and 
greater benefits from them. 
ii) Expanding the supply of  training 
services and improving their quality 
The regional supply of training 
services is limited and comes, for the most 
part, from public or semi-public 
institutions financed by firms' 
compulsory contributions. At present, 
much of the activity of these institutions is 
geared to the initial training of young 
people for traditional occupations or to 
social fields such as rural training, 
assistance to small businesses, and 
training of traditionally neglected groups 
such as marginal urban workers and the 
self-employed. Moreover, with some 
exceptions, these institutions have proved 
to have only limited capacity for adapting 
to the demands of the modern production 
sector and their programmes have 
gradually become obsolescent; 
consequently, the services they offer 
attract little interest from enterprises. 
Public expenditure on such institutions 
accounted for somewhat less than 0.5% of 
GDP during the 1970s, but it decreased in 
the 1980s as public resources became more 
scarce and enrolment declined: in 1987, 
enrolment was estimated at only 2% of the 
region's labour force (ECLAC/UNESCO,  1992; 
Ducci, 1990). 
The private supply of training services 
is even smaller and comes basically from 
suppliers of machinery. In addition, there 
are a number of consulting institutions 
which provide training services generally 
directed at administrators and managers, 
the supply of which has increased 
significantly in recent years. Lastly, there 
are a few training centres belonging to 
large enterprises or groups of enterprises 
31 As we saw in the section on technological policies, among the measures which might be considered 
are visits to foreign plants using the best international practice. 
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which use them for the initial training and 
later upgrading of their employees. 
The main feature of the training market in 
the region is therefore its lack of 
development and its distribution between 
relatively obsolete public institutions and 
a handful of private institutions. It is up to 
the authorities to design policies which 
will make it possible both to broaden 
the scope and improve the quality of this 
supply, to which end four lines of action 
are needed: 
a. Institutional development. The 
promotion of such development involves 
abandoning the traditional methods, 
which give priority to the supply of these 
services by the public sector, in favour of 
another approach which seeks to 
concentrate public action in the areas 
where it is most needed (especially the 
training of traditionally neglected sectors 
such as own-account workers or workers 
in the informal urban sector), while at the 
same time encouraging private supply, 
which is more flexible and more closely 
linked to the needs of enterprises. This 
change of focus requires the establishment 
of new norms for the provision of training 
services and the regulation of the market. 
Some countries, for example, establish 
public monopolies for the supply of some 
services of this kind; others restrict or even 
prohibit apprenticeship contracts. These 
restrictions should be eliminated in line 
with the new requirements of 
entrepreneurial, production and labour 
sectors. As a complementary measure, 
adequate channels for the dissemination 
of information should be created, such as 
centres or networks for exchanges 
between enterprises, so that firms can 
share information on such services and 
their evaluation. As the training market 
develops, support can be given to the 
establishment of mechanisms for 
certifying the training given. For such 
certification to make an effective 
contribution to increased competitiveness 
without hindering the flexibility needed to 
meet the changing needs of the productive 
environment, it is necessary to have the 
active participation of business and trade 
union associations. 
b. Improving the quality of  the supply of 
public training services. Although there are 
examples of public institutions in the 
region which carry out training tasks, in 
many cases it is essential to make their 
operations more flexible so as to bring 
them closer to enterprises and make them 
better able to meet the latter's needs. Some 
of these public institutions, for example, 
have already replaced long-term formal 
education by short in-plant courses; others 
have signed agreements with enterprises 
to provide training services better adapted 
to the enterprise's needs. In general, it 
would be desirable for these public 
institutions to develop two-pronged 
training procedures which would increase 
their links with enterprises and facilitate 
their graduates' subsequent access to the 
labour market. Encouragement should 
also be given to the provision of such 
services by other educational institutions, 
such as technical institutes and 
universities, which would then be able to 
improve their curriculum by gaining a 
better understanding of the problems of 
enterprises and supplementing the 
training they give with in-service 
training of their students in production 
plants. 
c. Making full  use of  training sources 
outside the enterprise, such as suppliers of 
machinery and equipment, professional 
journals, visits to plants or the services of 
expatriates from the region who are 
performing highly skilled jobs in 
developed countries and can transfer their 
expertise during brief visits to their 
countries of origin. 
d. Promoting the development of  purely 
private training facilities.  Three kinds of 
measures might be particularly useful for 
this purpose: 
32 In Chile, the country in which the private supply is relatively most developed because of the impact 
of the existing tax incentives, there are no more than 52Ô of these institutions in the entire country 
(one for every 900 enterprises). 
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i. In addition to the financial 
incentives to demand already 
referred to, incentives can be 
offered to encourage enterprises 
which have their own training 
centres to share them with other 
enterprises in the same sector, 
particularly their suppliers or 
subcontractors. This would give 
smaller enterprises access to 
training and strengthen 
coordination linkages between 
enterprises by making use of 
subcontracting networks as 
collective education mechanisms. 
ii. Public training programmes, such 
as those directed towards 
marginal or neglected sectors, 
should consider inviting 
competitive bids for the provision 
of at least some of the services they 
offer. 
iii. Consideration could be given to 
public support for the retraining of 
instructors and the modernization 
of the equipment of private 
training institutions, as there is 
often a significant gap in terms of 
modernity between their 
equipment and that of enterprises; 
this reduces the relevance of the 
training given and leads to 
concentration within the overall 
supply of training on 
administrative and sales areas, 
where the investment in 
equipment is much lower. To 
achieve this goal, tax legislation 
could be revised to encourage 
contributions from firms in the 
form of loans of equipment and 
materials and in-service training 
of instructors. An additional 
option would be to include private 
training institutes in public 
programmes of technological 
support. 
iii) The main prerequisite: improving the 
general educational level of  the 
present and future  labour force 
It must be emphasized, once again, 
that any significant and lasting 
improvement in the competitiveness and 
standard of living of the region is 
dependent on reform of the educational 
system aimed at improving its quality. A 
joint ECLAC/UNESCO  document prepared in 
1992 (see box VIII.3, which summarizes 
the document) notes that although the 
educational, training and science and 
technology systems of most countries of 
the region have expanded considerably in 
recent decades, they have obvious 
deficiencies as regards the quality of their 
results and the possibility of equal access 
to them by all levels of society. 
Successful as they maybe, educational 
reforms will only begin to have an effect 
on the labour force 15 or 20 years from now 
and will not solve the immediate problem 
of the inadequate basic education of 
almost half the present workforce of the 
region (see box VIII.4 on the educational 
level of the region's labour force). The fact 
that these workers do not have the 
minimum reading, writing and 
arithmetical skills needed in order to 
respond efficiently to the requirements of 
a modern production system that is 
increasingly integrated into the 
international economy reduces labour 
productivity and, ultimately, business 
competitiveness and increases the 
amount which firms must spend on 
initial training. 
The above assertion is corroborated 
by the real situation of enterprises, 
according to the results of a survey of 
firms in the garment industry carried 
out in 1993 in some countries of the 
region. These results show that Mexican 
firms require an average of six weeks to 
train a newly hired machinist, as 
compared with only two weeks for 
Chilean firms; in other words, in order 
to make up for the lower average 
educational level of the population (six 
years in Mexico as compared with nine 
years in Chile), Mexican firms must 
spend three times more than Chilean 
firms on initial training, quite apart 
from the impact of the other factors that 
affect the amount that must be spent on 
initial training, such as the rate of staff 
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THE JOINT ECLAOUNESCO PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING HUMAN RESOURCES 
TRAINING SYSTEMS IN Tl IE REGION 
This proposal, made in 1992, notes that a quality 
educational system requires institutional 
reforms which will transform it into a 
participatory, llexible, open «system integrated 
into its environment and helping lo encouiage 
lhe relevance and mutual enrichment of 
educational, training and research and 
development s y s t e m s l jrid of the production and 
social systems The strategy proposes the 
adoption of new standards of equity, 
emphasizing real equality of opportunity and 
giving priority to the oftectKoness and quality 
of educational practices and their results, 
allocating the best resources to the places of 
greatest need, and getting aivay irom the 
traditional emphasis on quantitative 
indicators. 
On this basis, policy measures in seven a teas 
are identified. The tirst concerns institutional 
reform of the system of production and 
dissemination ol knowledge, along (wo b.isic 
Unes, i) a decent!aliz.ed torm of organization 
designed In increase the autonomy ol 
educational establishments and theieby then-
flexibility in adapting to the changing needs ot 
the environment in which they operate, and n) a 
flexible regulatory framework that e n s u i e s the 
integration and' coherence of the system, 
equitable access and certain minimum levels ot 
efficiency by strengthening the governing 
bodies and establishing s y s t e m s of an reditation 
anil certification. 
The next two areas relate to the result- sought 
by this institutional liberalization First, 
emphasis is placed on lhe imporiam*, ol 
ensuring universal access by the population to 
the set of skills and knowledge which they need 
in order lo participate in public life and function 
productively in modern souety Such skills are 
the necessary basis for future learning m or oui 
ol school. One essential requisite for achieving 
universal acecss to them is to guarantee 
universal basic educational coverage, but it is 
just as vilal, or even more so, to improve lhe 
i)ualiiv ot education. Second, international 
experience has shown that competitiveness i«s 
positively related to policies which promote 
innovation and dissemination ot s.-ienlific and 
technological progress. In this respect, actions 
are proposed lo increase the supply of 
technology, the demand tor it Irom'the 
production system and the linkages between the 
The last four policy areas are of an 
instrumental nature. The best way to ensure the 
internal and external efficiency ol a 
decentralized system is to establish an et furtive 
system ol lnlorrnalion and evaluation, since this 
enables u-eis tu demand higher quality, helps 
schools to improve their perlormanee, and 
makes it easier foi the authorities lo concentrate 
their action where results are pooiesl and lhe 
equity ol the system most needs s|lengthening. 
Emphasis is also placed on the urgent need to 
raise the professional level ol leaching, through 
reform ot the processes ot recruitment, training 
and rémunération ol teachers. Financing 
polities aie then outlined to help bring together 
various sources of public and private lundmg, 
with selective mechanisms for allocating public 
resources in line With the objectives of 
increasing c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and equity. Lastly, 
various areas of potential international and 
regional cooperation are identified 
Sourer T \i,<.N < Hi^umal Uluwilioii Ott i ielurl j t in Aim-riu .nul tlu'L.iribbi-.iii « vi MI I, 1 ¡ii,calii>n and hnveltfa  B JML' Prit,m 
oTtJmiyng  I'míuchim  {'Mm-uitii  ' ;uilt d L.Í.  lTUi-Kev M ' l . Sjntu»;» Chite l 'ni l td Valuin* publication.. 
Sales \<> K 4 2 I I G 6 
turnover and wage levels (Guerguil, 
MacarioandPeres,1993). 
In order to ensure that this large 
number of workers with incomplete 
primary education ceases to be a 
short-term obstacle to the productive 
modernization of the region, it is 
necessary to: 
a. Increase general education 
opportunities for the adult population and 
make their access to such services more 
flexible. This calls for efforts to promote an 
awareness that such educational efforts 
are of benefit to both the enterprise and the 
worker and, where necessary, the 
amendment of labour legislation to 
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Bex VIIÍ.4 
EDUCA 11ÛNAL LKVF.I. OF THE REGION'S LABOUR FORCE 
Because ot the considerable expansion ot 
educational systems 111 the last 30 wars, I aim 
America's economically active population now 
has an average ot six véais at schooling, but the 
impact ot these quantitative advances has been 
sharply reduced by the low efficiency and high 
rales ol lepelilion prevailing in basic education. 
The decrease in the proportion ol the population 
without any education has probably been 
accompanied by an increase in the proportion 
whose primaiy education it. incomplete, with a 
much smaller increase in the propoition with 
post-primary education U ^  estimated that, at 
the beginning of lhe 19Ws, ot least 70 nullioii 
people (40'r ol the economicallv active 
population ol the region) have not completed 
their primary education and could be 
considered absolutely or tumtionally illiterate, 
while only 30'.? (slightly mon- than 30 million) 
have had some post-pfmuuy education 
The abov e data do not bear Com pa i ¡son v\ ith 
newly industriali/ing  economies iMh) such as 
the Republic of Korea, where even in I'M) only 
16% of the EAP had an educational level bt low-
that of primary schooling. Moreover, the 
present figure for Latin America is higher than 
that lor the South-Last Asian countries as a 
whole (im lulling relatively pool nations like the 
Philippines and Thailand), where the figure for: 
workers without lull primary education was 
37'/.  almost a decade and a hall .(go ( 1S>80) 
It is estimated that the working-age 
population iWAPi of the region will exceed 350: 
million by the year 20(H) Since the population 
now of school age will only represent a little 
more than a quarter ol that total, even a rapid 
and spectacular increase in the coverage and 
quality of primary education in the current, 
decade VA, ill have only a modest influence on the 
educational level ot the \\M" as a whole For 
example, an increase ol two \ t ars in lhe average 
educational level of the population leaving 
school duiing the IWk would only result in an 
increase ol 0 5 years in the average educational 
level of the U'AP. Improvement of the qinültii of 
basic education would have a more visible, 
though still modest, elfect thus, if WW ol each 
age group completed primary education (as 
compared with only UVl at present), the 
proportion of lhe WAI' without education or with: 
incomplete primary education would still be 
over one-third of the total in Iheyear 2000 
Source-HI n i - \ rv Kii;ii>n<il P l l i n toi I diKiihun tin I .llin Aimni..) aiul I lie (. .iribK.m I i.i.u'ivi n>,J kn <...'<,.vv 'Wi . 
M u ' , si l'Iuwyinv Piojiulu u l'ail,-m- with m 1 i'i.ilv il t C 17lU Ki-\ 2 H SanlURii L hile, \pr i l l " u 2 t 'mti-il \ . i l ,nn-
publication, Sales \<> 11 <î (j 
authorize the granting of unpaid leave for 
this purpose. 
b. Incorporate basic education 
subjects, such as mathematics or writing 
skills, into the training activities of firms or 
suppliers of machinery. Although some 
firms have already found it necessary to 
carry out such activities, it is very unlikely 
that the practice will become widespread, 
because of the likelihood that the trained 
worker will leave the firm. To overcome 
this reluctance, it is suggested that tax 
incentives be offered to firms which 
incorporate general educational subjects 
into their training programmes. The 
authorities should also promote the 
design of teaching materials and their 
dissemination in business circles. 
It must nevertheless be clearly 
understood that training is not a panacea 
for problems of low labour productivity. 
Even with the efforts suggested, 
investment in training cannot compensate 
completely for deficiencies in the basic 
education of the workforce. Moreover, in 
order to make training more fruitful and 
make investing in it attractive, it is 
necessary to introduce substantial changes 
in the management styles prevailing in 
many firms in the region, where 
centralized management leaving little 
room for workers to contribute actively to 
i 
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an increase in productive efficiency still 
predominates. In these circumstances, it 
is understandable that owners of firms 
may fail to see training as a fundamental 
tool for increasing productivity. 
Breaking this vicious circle, in which 
deficient management of the firm and 
mutual distrust between the workers and 
their employers act as disincentives to 
training and ultimately undermine labour 
relations, is the primary goal of the 
proposals made in this section. 
3. Infrastructure development policies 
It has been repeatedly stressed throughout 
this document that competition in foreign 
markets is not something that takes place 
simply among isolated companies. When 
companies compete, they are supported 
by an infrastructure in which the 
functioning of the energy supply, 
telecommunications, transport networks, 
ports and customs plays a prime role. The 
legal and institutional framework, the 
efficiency of the banking system and the 
prevailing business culture are also basic 
infrastructural elements. The concept of 
systemic competitiveness assumes special 
importance when it is understood how 
important it is for firms to be able to rely 
on an infrastructure that is equal to the 
challenges they have to face. 
A survey based on interviews with 
businessmen in several countries of the 
region showed that manufacturing firms 
which export from countries where such 
support systems function reasonably well 
have a substantial competitive edge 
(Guerguil, Macario and Peres, 1993). On 
the other hand, there are countries where 
the difficulties encountered by firms when 
they try to send their merchandise abroad 
and therefore have to go through customs 
are so serious that they are one of the main 
reasons why companies do not even try to 
export. Complicated customs procedures, 
corruption and the risk of theft are such 
formidable obstacles that beginners in the 
export business finally give up trying to 
overcome them. In other countries, 
deficient telecommunications and energy 
supply systems raise costs considerably 
because firms are forced to establish their 
own facilities for such services. 
These differences are serious enough 
to alter the competitive conditions of 
businesses with otherwise similar 
productivity characteristics. Thus, for 
example, in two countries of the region of 
very different sizes, a survey was made of 
two companies which were similar as regards 
their products, size and quality levels and 
which had both made significant efforts to 
improve their internal organization and 
raise their productivity. However, the 
products of the company in the larger 
country faced competition in their own 
market from the products of the company 
in the smaller one. This difference in 
competitiveness did not originate in the 
companies themselves, but in the 
environment in which they operated. 
While the company in the smaller country 
operated within an environment which 
was relatively efficient for its needs, that in 
the larger country had to contend with 
arbitrary import and export formalities and 
absorb the costs of an inefficient transport 
system, customs delays and the large number 
of permits needed in order to operate. All this 
resulted in higher production costs which 
eventually cancelled out the initial 
similarities in physical productivity. 
a) Energy supply 
In some countries of the region, a 
stable energy supply is a priority target for 
33 Firms that are successful at the global level usually have management styles which, by various means, 
stimulate active participation by workers in decisions relating to production processes. When they 
assume greater responsibilities, workers increase their commitment to the goals of the firm, and this 
is reflected in suggestions for innovations which can have positive effects on production and 
organizational procedures. In these enterprises, improving the skills of the workforce becomes a 
highly profitable investment. 
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enhancing companies' competitiveness. 
One of the prior conditions that must be 
met if a manufacturing firm is to be able to 
produce efficiently and if its products are 
to be competitive in international markets 
is that it should have an adequate, steady 
energy supply at reasonable cost. The long 
period of time needed for the installation 
and start-up of an adequate energy 
generation and distribution system clearly 
shows the systemic nature and public 
utility of such a system, as well as the 
various externalities it generates along the 
production chain. 
In countries with an inadequate 
energy supply, a common complaint from 
businessmen is that the introduction of 
relatively sophisticated equipment results 
in energy shortages for the rest of their 
company's production processes. 
Moreover, energy supply restrictions are 
also an obstacle to plant modernization 
and the use of new technologies, as well as 
presenting a challenge to regional 
integration efforts (see box VIII.5). 
b) Telecommunications 
Properly functioning telecom-
munications are important for any 
productive activity, but they are 
absolutely crucial when a company is 
trying to penetrate export markets. 
When companies have problems in 
communicating with their customers 
abroad or in receiving their orders, this 
often results in loss of markets even for 
products which are competitive at the 
international level or for companies which 
exploit rich, high-grade natural resources. 
Such problems usually force companies to 
spend large sums of money on acquiring a 
telecommunications system which 
operates properly. For example, 
Venezuelan businessmen have expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the inefficiency 
prevailing in telecommunication services 
there, despite rate increases in recent years 
which they would not mind paying if the 
services were satisfactory. 
A detailed survey conducted in 
several countries, inside and outside Latin 
America, showed a positive correlation 
between increases in telephone density 
and average investments in 
telecommunications, on the one hand, and 
indicators of competitiveness on the other 
(ECLAC, 1992a). According to the survey, 
telephone density is much lower in the 
countries of the region than in some 
countries in other areas where GDP has 
grown faster. This is especially true for the 
Republic of Korea, which at the end of the 
1980s had a much higher telephone 
density indicator than the Latin American 
countries, although it had begun the 
decade with similar indicators. The survey 
in question concludes that it is imperative 
to establish an adequate telecommuni-
cations infrastructure and to encourage 
the broadest possible dissemination of 
information technologies in order to 
stimulate productivity increases in 
individual companies. Once again, the fact 
that these services are in the nature of a 
public good providing strong externalities 
clearly stands out, and that is precisely 
why the formulation of an adequate 
regulatory framework is needed when 
such services are privatized. 
Likewise, it is essential to improve the 
telecommunications systems that support 
computer use, and especially electronic 
data exchange, at both the national and 
international levels. The strong shift in the 
region towards export-led growth makes 
it increasingly necessary to modernize 
these support systems for business 
management, which involves not only 
timely, informed decision-making bu t also 
new management techniques such as "just 
in time" delivery of materials and global 
sourcing, both of which depend on a 
continuous flow of "real time" data. 
c) Cargo transportation 
In recent years, cargo transport needs 
have grown sharply in the region, in terms 
both of frequency and of the average 
volume of shipments. At the same time, 
there have been changes in methods of 
transportation all over the world, and a 
growing proportion of cargo is being 
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MODERNIZATION AND RATIONALIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER SERVICES 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
In the Dominican Republic, the Dominican 
Electiicily Corporation <CD1 ) held a monopoly 
over clectric power generation until 1990. While 
the company had a total installed generating 
capacity ol 1,140 MW m that year, plant 
obsolescence and lack of maintenance, as well a» 
inadequate price-fixing and revenue collection 
policies, prevented it from genejalmg more than 
590 MW. Because of these problems, lhe electric 
power supply was sometimes interrupted lor 
more than 1 ¿hours a day. 
Eleclric power supply difficulties were 
à major problem tor Dominican manu-
facturing companies, which wuie often 
compelled lo install their own genetating 
plants at an extremely high Cost, both lor 
individual companies ,ind tor the economy 
as a whole In 1988, fur example, the cost o'l 
power culs in terms ol loss ol piodiiclion 
was estimated at USS- 1811 million, the 
equiv aient ol .1 3'>f of that year's CDP c m is 
currently engaged in a process ol 
administram e restructuring and is making 
new investments with the support of the 
World Bank, in order to correct these; 
problems and regularize energy supply. 
The Slate eleclric power companies of all lhe 
Central American countries and Panama are 
currently looking into ways ol linking up their 
national electric power systems. Such linkages 
would enable these countries to obtain 
electricity Irom a neighbouring country in the 
event of failure ol their own supply,'as has 
happened in the case of Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay, which share the hydroelectric power 
id based on lhe Itaipú Dam. The pioject for 
Central America would cost t)S$ 51X1 million 
and would be financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank and lhe Governments of 
Spain and China. 
Soune: M Peña, ¡>>nutmcifn  ,k la í'miuiií&i  IVIJHNUWM ,/,•  /Í<\\"W<Í..?  ,-U. S into Domingo. l 'Wl, and Woild liank. Hummcim 
Republic t&urs MilOphwr llvlntrwi S.yf,n, Rvpnrl ¡C14-DO, Wa-hington, D C , I W l 
containerized. All these changes require 
large-scale port and road infrastructures, 
which likewise assume the character of 
public goods producing important 
externalities. 
In most countries, the cargo transport 
infrastructure takes the form of links 
between major cities and the sources that 
supply domestic markets. Patterns 
developed in colonial times, when roads 
were built between ports and mining or 
agricultural areas, also persist. These 
ports, in turn, were designed chiefly for 
exporting traditional commodities and 
their installations are not always suitable 
for handling some of the new products 
which are emerging as a result of the 
diversification of the region's economies. 
In Venezuela, for example, a survey of 
40 companies which together represent 
about 43% of non-traditional exports 
revealed that low competitiveness was 
due mainly to transport problems 
(Clemente, 1993). Similar observations 
are often made about Mexico's 
inefficient road transport system, which 
accounts for 75% of cargo traffic. 
Likewise, 45% of the companies surveyed 
in a study on the competitiveness of 
Brazilian industry were of the opinion that 
it was necessary to modernize the 
transport infrastructure, including roads, 
railways and port operations 
(MCT /  FINEP /  PADCT, 1993). 
The inadequacy of the highway 
infrastructure of certain countries of the 
region results in traffic congestion 
problems, particularly in cities and near 
ports. Roads also deteriorate because they 
were designed years ago for trucks and 
buses that were smaller and lighter than 
those used today, and this deterioration is 
further accelerated by truck overloading 
made possible by inadequate or 
non-existent provisions for regulation and 
inspection. 
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As in other infrastructural areas, the 
region is still recovering from the drop in 
tax revenues earmarked for transport 
infrastructure in the 1980s. This reduction 
resulted in a lack of new investments, but 
its repercussions were even greater on the 
existing infrastructure, which suffered 
severe deterioration as a result of lack of 
maintenance. The resulting deficiencies 
continue to prevent the transport system 
from adequately meeting the demands 
made on it. In order to reverse this 
situation and ensure the rehabilitation and 
proper maintenance of the road system, 
several countries are awarding 
concessions to the private sector, where 
this is economically viable, in order to 
lighten the burden of this branch of the 
infrastructure on the public budget. 
The discrepancies existing between 
countries or groups of countries with 
respect to the standards regulating truck 
weight and size represent an additional 
problem for international transport. In rail 
transport, there are gauge (track width) 
incompatibility problems at border 
crossings where the rail systems of Brazil 
and Uruguay, Guatemala and Mexico, and 
Brazil and Argentina meet, thus limiting 
the contribution that this means of 
transport could make to efficient 
international trade. 
Some efforts can be made at the 
enterprise level, however, to use the 
existing transport infrastructure more 
efficiently. One option is to promote the 
consolidation of cargo among groups of 
companies in order to reduce 
transportation costs. In more general 
terms, it is essential to establish the legal 
and institutional frameworks needed to 
reap the considerable benefits of 
multimodal transport. These transport 
systems must not be geared only to the 
domestic market or to the export of 
traditional commodities, but must 
encourage competitiveness throughout 
the foreign trade sector. 
Lastly, in addition to increasing 
investments in infrastructure, priority 
must be given to its efficient management. 
This involves implementing adequate toll 
policies, which are a prerequisite not only 
for achieving greater efficiency but also for 
ensuring the sustainability of 
infrastructural investments over the long 
term (Winston, 1991). 
d) Ports 
Port management, port charges and 
loading and unloading facilities affect the 
final cost of exported goods and also 
compliance with delivery dates, all of 
which are clearly important for 
maintaining positions won in foreign 
markets. 
Efficient port management requires 
reforms which involve the modification of 
labour, institutional and physical 
infrastructure variables. Labour reform 
means putting an end to the monopoly of 
cargo handling by dockers' unions as well 
as union workrolls which favour their own 
members. Institutional reform requires the 
establishment of a legislative framework 
which identifies and defines the rules for 
private sector participation in loading and 
unloading ships and in financing port 
investments. It is interesting to note that 
the market is already headed in this 
direction with the vertical integration of 
big national groups which are extending 
their operations from natural resources to 
transportation and finally also to port 
infrastructure, as is clearly seen in the 
production and marketing of soybeans 
and sunflower products in Argentina. 
An example of the achievements 
which such changes can bring about is the 
case of Chile, where the 1981 port reforms 
enabled operations to increase from one 
and a half shifts approximately 300 days a 
year to three shifts 365 days of the year. 
This made possible not only the reduction 
of port operating costs, but also the 
postponement for ten years of fixed 
investment in port expansion which 
would otherwise have been necessary. In 
the case of fruit exports, it reduced the unit 
handling cost per crate from US$ 0.54 to 
US$ 0.26 and the turnaround time for 
ships from 129 to 40 hours. It has been 
estimated that these port
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permitted savings of US$ 75 million a year 
(ECLAC, 1990a). 
One case which is all too typical in the 
region is the situation in Mexican ports, 
where the problem has been so severe that 
companies located in Monterrey have 
often opted to send their exports to third 
countries via Houston because of the 
additional delays they would incur by 
sending them through the ports of 
Tampico or Altamira (Latin  American 
Regional Reports, 1993). At the same time, a 
large proportion of imports from Asia are 
unloaded in United States ports and then 
transported to Mexico City overland 
rather than entering directly via the port of 
Manzanillo, because using Manzanillo 
would almost double both the cost and the 
time needed to receive the merchandise. 
While Mexican customs administration 
has been simplified, thereby significantly 
reducing the time spent on the 
corresponding formalities, companies still 
experience difficulties in dispatching their 
exports through national ports because of 
obsolete port facilities. The decision to 
turn over the administration of several 
ports to the private sector and the outright 
privatization of some port facilities reflect 
the Mexican Government's determination 
to increase port management efficiency. It 
is also planned to make substantial 
investments for improving multimodal 
transport, so as to be able to combine 
container transport by truck, rail and ship. 
The modernization prospects for Latin 
American port systems are generally 
encouraging. While modernization has 
been relatively slow because of the vast 
number of new rules which must be 
designed and implemented, some of the 
current changes aim to improve even on 
the conditions under which some ports 
operate in developed countries, especially 
with respect to collective bargaining, 
levels of decentralization, and customs 
procedures (Sgut, 1993). 
e) Customs 
Transit of goods through customs can 
be a serious hurdle for manufacturing 
firms in some countries of the region, both 
for importing inputs and for exporting 
their products. These difficulties are 
particularly significant for small and 
medium-sized companies, and this in 
practice limits the benefits of trade 
liberalization. 
Most customs authorities in the region 
follow procedures designed for a highly 
complex system of tariff and para-tariff 
protection designed to meet trade 
protection needs, and adapting these 
practices to a context of trade liberalization 
and internationalization has not been an 
easy task. The trade liberalization 
processes initiated in several countries 
have led to the modification of some 
customs procedures, but much remains to 
be done in order to bring customs 
operations in line with the new orientation 
of the region's economies. Indeed, there 
are some countries which have 
liberalized their trade but have not 
experienced any significant increase in 
their foreign trade. One of the reasons 
advanced for this is that serious 
impediments still exist in practice, since 
customs authorities still wield a good 
deal of discretionary power and their 
officials have too much leeway in the 
interpretation of existing regulations. In 
addition, the weakening of the public 
sector has prevented the necessary 
investments in infrastructure and in the 
training of customs officials, thus 
compounding the difficulties of enforcing 
the new regulations. 
Modern customs authorities (such as 
those of the European Common Market) 
have changed their mode of operation so 
that there are now very few physical 
checks on traffic but there is more 
investigation of the tax, financial and 
accounting aspects of export and import 
operations. The most notable result of this 
trend has been the uninterrupted physical 
flow of goods, yet greater efficacy in 
curbing fraud. The almost complete 
elimination of direct contacts between 
customs officials and users has had the 
effect of inhibiting arbitrary actions and 
corruption. 
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f)  Conclusions 
It can be seen from the above that the 
disparity in the infrastructures available to 
companies in different countries of the 
region leads to differences in their levels of 
competitiveness. These differences affect 
companies' readiness to attempt to export 
their products, and sometimes they are 
even discouraged from importing inputs 
that would enable them to be competitive 
in the domestic market; these impediments 
are particularly severe for companies 
wishing to export manufactures, in which 
the region usually has less of a competitive 
edge than in products based on natural 
resources. 
Some notable features of infrastructure 
as a determinant of company competi-
tiveness may be identified: 
i) Infrastructure supply is obviously a 
public asset because it generates strong 
externalities for productive activities as a 
whole. Because of the indivisible nature of 
the big investments it entails, this supply 
is characterized by conditions of increasing 
returns and monopolistic or heavily 
oligopolistic structures of ownership and 
control. This makes it imperative to formulate 
adequate regulatory frameworks that 
establish standards for disseminating the 
systemic effects deriving from tariff policy 
and infrastructure modernization. 
ii) The need for increased investment 
in infrastructure, both to compensate for 
the sharp drop of the 1980s and to narrow 
the gap in per capita availability of services 
as compared with the developed countries 
and some newly industrialized countries, 
offers great opportunities for stimulating 
the domestic and intraregional supply of 
related engineering services. This would 
have a major spillover effect on the industries 
that produce inputs and capital goods for 
construction and heavy engineering. 
4. Industrial restructuring policies 
The growth of a country's varied economic 
activities is never a homogeneous process; 
while some sectors are innovative and 
increase their efficiency, others exhibit less 
dynamism or fall clearly behind. The term 
"restructuring" applies here only to 
situations where specific products or 
sectors have fallen behind. When the 
whole economy, or the whole industrial 
sector, has lost its competitiveness, it is 
likely that the problems are due to flaws in 
macroeconomic management (exchange-
rate lag, high interest rates) or structural 
defects (insufficiently skilled labour, lack 
of complementary infrastructure), both of 
which require the adoption of global 
measures. 
When a subsector of the economy falls 
behind or ceases to be competitive, this 
may be the result, among other factors, of 
sudden sharp reductions in the level of the 
subsector's relative effective protection; 
changes in key prices in the economy 
which erode the competitiveness of 
low-profitability subsectors; technological 
advances that render obsolete the 
production processes used or generate 
good substitutes for existing goods; the 
emergence of new competitor countries 
with comparative advantages in the sector 
(lower wages, cheaper raw materials); or 
the exhaustion of a natural resource on 
which a particular activity is based. The 
problems arising from these situations can 
be aggravated when companies react to 
them too late out of inertia or because they 
do not know what to do. 
a) Bases for  a restructuring policy 
If markets functioned perfectly and 
factors were fully mobile, nothing would 
need to be done in this respect. Declining 
competitiveness would be simply an 
indication that, in the new situation, the 
old allocation of factors in the economy 
had ceased to be efficient and must 
therefore be modified. Since factors could 
move freely and instantaneously, there 
would be no adjustment cost. 
In reality, however, there are many 
barriers to factor mobility, while the 
functioning of markets exhibits 
imperfections that justify State action in 
that field (Atiyas and others, 1992). These 
distortions include the many flaws in 
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factor markets, as well as the externalities 
already mentioned; the specific 
characteristics of the equipment and plant 
installed and the human resource capital 
acquired, which limit the free movement 
of factors; lack of coordination by 
companies in adjusting to the new 
requirements of the different sectors; the 
multiplicity of often conflicting interests 
involved in the restructuring process -of 
owners, managers, workers, consumers 
and even government- as a result of which 
the pressures of individual agents can 
seriously impede the adoption of what 
would be the most opportune measures 
from the social point of view. 
Some of these distortions thwart the 
adoption of restructuring policies by 
companies, seriously reduce their chances 
of success or increase the costs of a sharp 
contraction of the sector. Consequently, 
unless measures are taken to confront 
these distortions, they may lead to a waste 
of important productive potential and to 
high social costs.34 
b) Elements for  an industrial restructuring 
policy 
Aside from the trade and productive 
development policies examined, a 
subsectoral restructuring policy 
comprises two kinds of actions: 
i) measures to create an environment that 
would stimulate and facilitate the early 
adoption by firms of action to overcome 
their lagging competitiveness; and 
ii) targeted restructuring programmes. 
i) Creation of  an environment conducive 
to restructuring. In order to maintain and 
increase the competitiveness of 
companies, it is necessary first of all to 
instil an attitude of foresight. To this end, 
it is of paramount importance, on the one 
hand, to send out clear signals that the 
authorities will not reward delays in 
making adjustments by adopting 
protectionist measures or awarding public 
subsidies and, on the other hand, to 
facilitate the necessary readaptation 
processes by taking steps to eliminate the 
above-mentioned obstacles and 
distortions that impede companies' 
restructuring efforts. 
The first area of action is the 
dissemination of information on market 
behaviour, technological trends and, in 
general, the competitiveness of domestic 
producers. It must be reiterated that 
information is an asset which is subject to 
externalities and economies of scale, and it 
is therefore reasonable that the State 
should encourage its dissemination or 
provide this service directly. A technical 
unit could be created for this purpose to 
make periodic evaluations of the situation 
in the different branches of activity and of 
the global economic trends affecting them. 
The detection of problems or anomalies in 
an area should then be followed up 
quickly by detailed studies to identify the 
proper course of action. Such a unit would 
have to have the assistance of the private 
sector both for guiding its activities and 
helping to finance it.35 
A second area of action involves 
elements that facilitate factor mobility, 
especially that of labour, given its obvious 
impact on social equity. This involves 
strong support for training, outside as well 
34 The possibility that the lack of an appropriate restructuring policy may have high social costs is also 
a pragmatic argument in favour of government action to aid an efficient industrial restructuring 
process: when confronted with a sharp sectoral contraction, there is always the risk that the 
authorities may be subjected to such pressure that they have to resort to a "rescue" operation to keep 
a specific activity artificially afloat. This would result in a waste of resources that would postpone or 
put an end to firms' decisions to restructure, with the further drawback that it would create 
unjustified incentives for companies. 
35 Another option is for the State to support the creation of private institutions which provide these 
services or the establishment of technical units based on business organizations. However, such 
options can leave smaller companies at a disadvantage and should therefore be considered as 
complementary, rather than as alternatives to a government service. 
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as inside the company, in order to sustain 
a process of continuous adaptation of the 
labour force to the changes which 
companies must make, as well as 
measures in the direction of the 
introduction of unemployment insurance 
schemes linked to manpower retraining 
programmes and the creation of 
institutions that provide timely 
information on employment supply and 
demand. Attention should also be given to 
management training, especially in areas 
related to aspects of the production 
process, such as inventory management, 
organizational change and quality control 
systems. 
A third key element of restructuring is 
the need for flexible instruments, rapidly 
accessible to their beneficiaries, enabling 
companies to obtain qualified advisory 
services or to strengthen their own 
research and development units. 
ii) Targeted  restructuring programmes. 
In spite of the above measures, it is possible 
that the resources available through 
programmes to support competitiveness 
will be insufficient to resolve severe, 
concentrated crisis situations. The most 
dramatic cases, which for that very reason 
deserve special intervention, are those in 
which the activity is highly concentrated in 
geographical terms and directly or 
indirectly generates a large share of the jobs 
in a region. There is then a need to 
implement targeted restructuring 
programmes, but only as an exception and 
selectively, since otherwise there would be 
a danger of delaying the necessary 
adjustment and making it even more costly. 
These programmes should give firms 
a chance to regain competitiveness in their 
subsector or to specialize in other areas of 
the same sector,36 but should not be 
confused with "rescue" programmes or 
serve to disguise indiscriminate transfers 
of public resources to the private sector. 
The existence of the necessary technical 
and supervisory capacity on the part of the 
public sector is consequently an essential 
condition for the implementation of such 
programmes, in order to ensure strict 
supervision to determine whether steps 
are being taken in the right direction. 
Without this capacity, the risk of failure is 
very high and it is very likely that the 
programme will have a higher social cost 
than not intervening at all. 
The exact design of the programme 
should be based on a diagnostic study of 
the situation and of the problems of the 
sector concerned (see box VIII.6). Such a 
study must be a shared effort by the 
parties involved -the government, 
employers and workers- in order to 
avoid working at cross-purposes. The 
generation of a degree of consensus 
among workers and employers is 
essential in order to ensure the success of 
the initiatives undertaken. 
Decisions concerning the action to be 
taken should come from the firms 
themselves, but can be facilitated by the 
measures contemplated in the 
restructuring programme. In this respect, 
the heart of tike programme should be the 
concentrated application at the sectoral 
level of the development instruments 
already available (including training 
incentives, support for technological 
innovation, and the provision of market 
information), which can be adapted to 
meet more effectively the specific needs of 
the sector concerned. 
Nevertheless, there may be two 
problem areas which require special 
measures. The first arises when it is 
36 The irreversible loss of competitiveness of certain subsectors when they are the economic mainstay 
of a city or region is a separate case, of course. The management of such crises may require both the 
retraining of the workforce and its movement to other activities and regions, as well as transitory 
incentives for the installation of enterprises of other kinds in the region. The economic justification 
for such subsidies would be that they avoid the cost of creating additional infrastructure in other 
areas of the country, while taking advantage of the existing physical and human infrastructure in 
the area, the opportunity cost of which would be very low or nil. 
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SPAIN'S EXPERIENCE WITÏI INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 
In 1981, Spain adopted an Industrial 
Restructuring Act in order to provide a 
framework for dealing with problems of excess 
production capacity and lack of international 
competitiveness in a number of industrial 
sectors in Spain. 
The Act was inspired by two basic principles. 
First, the initiative and responsibility for 
restructuring rested with the private sector, and 
government intervention must be kept to the 
minimum. Second, the Government was not 
supporting individual firms but the 
restructuring programme as a whole. The Act 
also emphasized the need for a concerted effort 
by the Government, employers and trade 
N H l l ^ H H M H H B I I I ^ H H M I 
The specific purposes of the programme 
were to reduce excess installed capacity and 
overmanning, put firms' finances on a 
sounder basis, and contribute to the 
implementation of an investment programme 
which would make it possible to modernize 
the sectors involved. 
In addition, complementary measures were 
adopted to minimize the social costs of 
restructuring, especially those created b\ 
lav-offs. One of the most important initiatives 
was the establishment of emergency 
«•industrialization zones in the areas most 
affected by restructuring processes. A series of 
incentives was created (tax reductions, 
subsidies and investment credits) in order to 
encourage firms to stay in those areas or move 
to them, and the C iovernment provided tunds to 
stimulate early retirement programmes and 
compensate those who had lost their 
employment. In the lat ter case, the unemployed 
workers were offered the opportunity to 
participate in a programme of retraining and 
assistance in finding new employment. Less 
than half the workers chose that option, 
however: the majority preferred to rcceive 
substantial severance payments. 
An evaluation of the programme carried out 
in 1488 (I ópez-Claros, 1488) showed that 77% of 
the 84,000 superfluous jobs hadbeen elimina ted 
and that 66% of the planned investments had 
been made. Mergers and specialization 
agreements had also been achieved in various 
sectors, supported by subsidized ciedits from 
the Government. Although the State had 
contributed a considerable amount of resources, 
improvements in the financial position of firms 
and faster growth of productivity were also 
evident. The weakest point of the programme 
was the unwillingness of redundant workers to 
look for new jobs, because of the generous 
benefits to which they were entitled. 
Source: I Al i i . is and others, "Fundamental issuer and Fo|jc\ Appi oat lies to Industrial Restrm luring", ludustri/  Sirn',1 Paper, 
N o Sti, Washington. I ) C .World Bank,April l ' « 2 
necessary to adjust installed sectoral 
capacity. It is very difficult for an efficient 
adjustment of this nature to be made 
independently, because each firm hopes 
that it will be others that abandon the 
market or decrease their production. 
Outside intervention to encourage the 
merging of firms or the closure of less 
efficient companies would provide a 
better outcome than the market solution. 
Experience shows, however, that if some 
firms remain outside the agreement 
reached and there is no effective system of 
incentives and penalties, the desired result 
may not be achieved. 
The other problem area is access to 
financing for firms that are in the process 
of restructuring. If a given sector has 
problems of profitability, it is unlikely that 
financial institutions will be able to 
distinguish between firms with good 
prospects and those with little chance of 
success, since this would require very 
specialized technical capacity and the 
supervisory work required would be very 
costly. Instead of providing funds directly, 
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the State might help to reduce the costs 
involved for credit institutions by 
promoting the establishment of 
specialized consulting firms to provide 
evaluation services to banks or, if there 
was a general feeling that this would be 
effective, directly subsidizing the financial 
institutions dealing with these cases. This 
would facilitate access to credit without 
generating the traditional problems of 
supervision or implicit guarantees 
normally involved in the provision of 
public funds. 
5. Macroeconomic preconditions 
for a policy of productive 
development 
High inflation causes firms to take a very 
short-term view, so that restructuring 
considerations are subordinated to more 
immediate needs, which -in the case of 
high inflation- often go no further than 
how to survive the next 30 days. It is no 
accident that in such circumstances the 
strategic decisions and investments 
required to achieve international 
competitiveness are postponed, no matter 
how favourable the relative prices for 
carrying out such restructuring may be. 
Moreover, given the uncertainty and 
instability characteristic of situations of 
high inflation, the response of firms to the 
micro and meso-economic policies that are 
implemented, as well as to current relative 
prices, becomes inelastic. However, this 
problem has been solved in most of the 
countries thanks to their successful 
stabilization efforts. Consequently, other 
macroeconomic factors take on greater 
importance. 
In the external accounts, macro-
economic imbalances are also associated 
with big fluctuations in the terms of trade, 
international interest rates or capital 
inflows, which give rise to sudden and 
unstable adjustments in aggregate 
demand and rates of exchange. This 
hinders exports and the efficient 
production of import substitutes (whose 
expansion is more sensitive to long-term 
signals), while stimulating imports. 
Consequently, the greater the instability of 
trade accounts, current account balances 
or capital accounts, the lesser the 
credibility of the incentives in effect at a 
given moment and the greater, therefore, 
the incentives needed to achieve the 
desired response from economic agents, 
while there is a even bigger danger of 
falling into the trap of a costly 
"over-adjustment" such as occurred, for 
these reasons, in almost the whole of the 
region during the 1980s. 
Macroeconomic instability is also 
reflected in an imbalance between 
aggregate demand and productive 
capacity. Such instability obviously leads 
to a sub-optimum rate of average use of 
that productive capacity, and its 
consequences are an actual productivity 
level lower than the potential level, as well 
as lower rates of profitability, which 
consequently discourage capital 
formation. In addition, the instability of 
aggregate demand and relative prices 
tends to discourage firms from making 
innovations that could increase their 
productivity. 
The micro-economic consequences of 
macroeconomic imbalances are the 
reduction or postponement of 
investments designed to modernize 
equipment and processes, as well as of 
innovation efforts. Thus, for example, 
when they have a large part of their 
installed capacity idle and shorten their 
planning cycles, firms tend to give priority 
to activities with very short-term returns, 
to the serious detriment of expenditures 
on investment and development. One 
very damaging effect of reductions in 
these expenditures is the frequent 
dismantling of entire engineering 
departments or the loss of critical masses 
of work on innovation, adaptation, design 
and development, with the consequent 
loss of know-how and technological 
capacity acquired at such a high cost 
during the substitution industrialization 
stage. Moreover, this attention to the short 
term even affects efforts to find new 
methods and processes, above all if these 
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involve expensive visits abroad. Finally, as 
Brazil's recent experience shows (see box 
VIII.1), although macroeconomic 
instability does not completely delay all 
innovation efforts, the shortage of 
resources and the uncertainty which 
necessarily accompany it lead to an 
emphasis on "soft technologies", whose 
full potential can only be realized by 
complementary investments in modern 
equipment, processes and plants ("hard 
technologies"). 
The subject of macroeconomic policies, 
particularly as they relate to capital move-
ments and the stability of key prices such 
as exchange rates, is taken up in part three. 
Part Three 
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS 
Chapter IX 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS 
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 
1. Background 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have received large net 
amounts of external capital. During the 
period 1992-1993, the flow of capital 
towards the region reached an annual 
average of US$ 63 billion. Inflows were 
also substantial in 1994, until the 
extremely sharp devaluation put into 
effect in Mexico in December of that year 
(see table IX.l). 
This extremely heavy capital flow 
represents an abrupt turnaround from the 
equally noteworthy restriction in the 
matter of external finance which the region 
had to face during practically the whole of 
the 1980s as a result of the external debt 
crisis. This turnaround was of dramatic 
scale: between 1983 and 1989 the net entry 
of capital, on average, was only US$ 8 
billion a year (see table IX.l). The recovery, 
too, was of a surprising magnitude: the net 
entry of capital in 1992-1994 was 50% 
higher than the previous peak, recorded in 
1981 -the last year before the debt crisis 
exploded, with the consequent collapse of 
financial flows. As a proportion of the GDP 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
net entry of capital represented 5.2% in 
1992-1993,1 as compared with a coefficient 
of 4.5% in 1977-1981 (see table IX.2) and of 
only 1.2% in 1983-1989. 
Because of this abundant flow of 
capital, combined with lower interest 
payments on the external debt, the region 
registered a net positive transfer of 
resources for the first time since the 
beginning of the crisis. Thus, in 1991 the 
transfer became positive again, with a 
value of US$ 7 billion, while for 1992-1993 
it rose to an average of US$ 31 billion. In 
terms of regional GDP, the positive transfer 
in these last two years amounted to 2.6%, 
compared with an average negative figure 
of 3.7% of the regional product in 
1983-1989 (see table IX.3). 
Nearly all the Latin American and the 
Caribbean countries benefited in the 1990s 
from this spectacular expansion of capital 
inflows. However, in some of them the 
turnaround was especially marked. The 
most noteworthy case was that of Mexico: 
while it generated a quarter of the output 
1 The coefficient for 1992-1993 was calculated, for purposes of converting each country's GDP into 
dollars, on the basis of the real exchange rate for 1990-1991, as shown in table IX.2. The coefficient 
for 1992-1993 turns out to be 4.9% if calculations are based on the nominal exchange rate 
corresponding to the real average rate for 1990-1994. 
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Table IX.l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBEAN: NET CAPITAL MOVEMENTS a 
(Millions  of  dollars per year) 
1950- 1966- 1974- 1977- 1983- . 
1965 1973 1976 1981 ( 1 9 8 1 ) 1 9 8 2 1989 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 ^ 
Latin America and 


































Trinidad and Tobago 
814 4,042 14,956 
274 1,601 5,449 
26 23 72 
34 289 338 
11 105 165 
192 924 3,425 
61 149 1,054 
-51 110 394 
539 2,442 9,507 
438 2,025 7,828 
108 92 142 
210 1,727 7,244 
87 169 207 
7 29 106 
24 8 129 
102 417 1,322 
17 83 232 
3 19 114 
21 44 186 
8 15 106 
8 35 146 
10 57 175 
31 71 206 
4 91 157 
68 292 357 
4 36 49 
3 22 60 
25 139 174 
17 28 58 
18 66 15 
28,861 39,804 20,133 
12,297 17,632 3,835 
253 493 230 
956 1,941 2,182 
705 653 863 
8,154 17,393 2,806 
778 1,200 1,692 
1,451 ^ ,048 -3,938 
16,564 22,172 16,298 
14,664 19,757 13,974 
1,895 1,519 1,684 
9,329 12,382 11,113 
2,627 4,942 1,033 
339 420 316 
473 494 -172 
1,900 2,415 2,324 
455 360 398 
68 224 210 
184 273 361 
111 185 141 
219 250 174 
225 735 593 
235 -50 136 
402 438 311 
576 710 974 
66 134 44 
76 148 139 
79 122 302 
83 136 111 
271 171 379 
8,154 17,975 37,211 
533 7,965 25,833 
378 355 444 
879 53 -527 
503 549 741 
-662 10,716 21,882 
1,046 1,653 2,837 
•1,612 -5,361 456 
7,622 10,010 11,3 78 
5,308 7,513 7,362 
1,757 -1,173 3,301 
1,991 5,054 1,640 
1,260 3,075 1,404 
198 438 873 
103 119 144 
2,313 2,497 4,016 
437 364 515 
297 535 299 
361 205 740 
172 179 154 
303 307 400 
755 467 935 
-285 369 516 
275 72 457 
270 200 50 
1 -13 -9 
54 
323 550 192 
-30 10 
-78 -347 -133 
61,682 65,088 56,65 
33,171 37,991 25,420 
780 823 575 
167 2,213 3,075 
1,325 962 800 
26,664 29,531 19,500 
2,711 2,662 5,975 
2,717 1,800 -4,505 
28,511 27,097 31,145 
24,259 23,322 28,335 
11,213 10,047 10,500 
8,802 9,041 13,060 
3,487 2,838 3,145 
519 774 1,040 
238 622 590 
4,252 3,775 2 810 
587 518 295 
482 495 450 
738 879 510 
76 35 85 
371 335 350 
1,096 771 900 
398 250 300 
504 522 -80 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Includes long- and short-term capital, unrequited official transfers, and errors and omissions. b Preliminary figures, 
projected on data covering the period up to October, approximately. 
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Table IX.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
AS A SHARE OF GDPa 















Latin America and 
the Caribbean (19) 1.2 2.8 4.2 4.5 4.6 2.8 1.2 2.5 5.2 
Oil-exporting 
countries 1.0 2.5 3.7 4.6 4.3 1.2 0.2 4.0 7.7 
Bolivia 3.9 2.4 2.9 7.1 13.1 8.8 6.0 8.5 15.2 
Colombia 0.8 4.0 2.4 3.4 5.4 5.4 2.3 0.1 2.4 
Ecuador 1.3 6.1 3.6 7.3 4.9 6.8 4.7 6.0 4.5 
Mexico 1.7 2.6 4.2 5.1 6.5 1.7 -0.4 6.1 9.6 
Peru 2.4 2.1 7.6 4.5 4.9 6.7 4.2 5.8 6.5 
Venezuela -0.8 0.9 1.0 2.9 -6.1 -5.8 -3.0 -5.0 3.7 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 1.3 3.0 4.6 4.5 4.8 4.0 1.9 1.6 3.6 
South America 1.0 2.5 4.1 4.1 4.4 3.5 1.4 1.2 3.4 
Argentina 0.7 0.4 0.4 2.0 1.3 2.5 2.5 0.6 5.2 
Brazil 1.0 3.6 5.5 4.1 4.4 3.8 0.7 0.8 2.0 
Chile 2.0 2.0 2.3 12.7 16.2 4.3 6.5 7.2 8.2 
Paraguay 2.7 4.5 6.8 10.2 8.5 6.2 5.4 10.2 9.2 
Uruguay 2.1 0.4 3.6 6.2 4.3 -1.6 1.7 1.4 4.0 
Central America 
and Hisponiola 4.8 8.7 10.5 9.2 10.3 10.6 7.6 6.6 7.2 
Costa Rica 4.0 9.0 11.8 12.7 13.3 16.1 10.3 7.6 8.2 
El Salvador 0.5 1.8 6.4 2.1 6.5 5.8 6.2 7.3 7.1 
Guatemala 2.2 2.4 4.7 2.7 3.2 4.1 4.6 5.2 8.0 
Haiti 4.4 21.6 13.5 20.3 15.0 14.1 10.1 3.6 
Honduras 2.3 5.1 12.3 9.7 8.8 6.0 8.1 12.0 10.4 
Nicaragua 5.8 7.2 11.3 11.0 29.7 21.2 34.4 7.0 9.0 
Panama 7.7 6.9 11.4 8.0 -1.3 3.2 -6.0 8.2 5.0 
Dominican 
Republic 0.6 6.0 4.8 7.8 7.7 5.7 5.3 3.0 5.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Estimates of GDP in current dollars for the period 1950-1990 were calculated on the basis of GDP data expressed in local 
currencies and the exchange rate for exports of goods and services which is implicit in the balance-of-payment series 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); estimates for the period 1990-1993 were calculated using a 
nominal exchange rate based on the assumption of a constant real exchange rate for the 1990-1991 biennium. 
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Table IX.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS a 















Latin america and 
the Caribbean (18) -0.6 0.7 2.4 1.9 1.1 -2.5 -3.7 -0.4 2.6 
Oil-exporting 
countries -2.2 -0.1 1.8 1.9 1.1 -4.3 -4.7 0.9 4.3 
Bolivia 3.7 0.3 2.0 1.8 3.5 -7.0 0.9 3.3 11.5 
Colombia -0.2 0.8 0.0 1.6 4.0 3.0 -2.2 -5.5 -1.3 
Ecuador -0.9 3.4 0.5 3.2 -0.2 0.3 -4.1 -3.4 -2.1 
Mexico 0.2 0.9 2.0 1.6 2.4 -5.9 -5.6 3.2 6.0 
Peru 0.7 0.1 5.7 -0.0 0.7 2.6 -0.4 3.2 4.2 
Venezuela -9.5 -4.5 0.6 3.3 -5.2 -8.0 -6.7 -6.3 0.8 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 0.4 1.3 2.8 1.9 1.2 -1.2 -3.0 -1.2 1.5 
South America 0.4 1.2 2.6 1.7 1.0 -1.6 -3.5 -1.5 1.3 
Argentina 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 0.4 -1.9 -4.4 -5.1 -2.1 3.6 
Brazil 0.2 2.5 4.0 1.4 0.7 -0.8 -3.3 -1.7 -0.0 
Chile 0.3 -0.1 -0.9 8.9 11.4 -3.7 -3.3 1.5 3.8 
Paraguay 2.2 2.9 5.0 9.0 8.1 6.7 2.8 9.5 7.8 
Uruguay 1.5 -0.7 1.9 5.2 3.6 -3.4 -3.5 -1.6 2.5 
Central America 
and Hisponiola 0.8 2.6 5.0 4.0 5.2 3.8 4.3 3.5 4.3 
Costa Rica 1.9 6.8 9.0 7.9 2.0 1.1 2.8 3.9 5.3 
El Salvador -0.1 0.8 4.7 -0.0 3.5 3.1 3.7 5.1 5.4 
Guatemala 1.9 0.5 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.3 3.3 6.6 
Haiti 0.8 5.7 13.5 23.9 22.6 12.4 8.5 3.0 
Honduras 0.3 1.8 9.6 4.7 3.4 -1.0 2.4 2.7 1.0 
Nicaragua 2.8 3.7 7.6 5.8 22.5 14.6 24.2 4.1 4.5 
Dominican 
Republic -1.2 3.9 1.8 4.0 2.8 1.0 0.3 0.9 2.8 
Source: ECLAC, "Postwar Transfer of Resources Abroad by Latin America", Cuadernos de la CEPAL, series No. 67 
(LC/G.1657-P),  Santiago, Chile, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.G.9. 
a Net resource transfers are equivalent to net capital inflows (unrequited official transfers, short- and long-term capital, 
and errors and omissions) less net profits and interest, which includes both interest payments actually made and 
interest due but not paid. Negative figures indicate a transfer of resources out of the region. b Estimates of GDP in 
current dollars for the period 1950-1990 were calculated on the basis of GDP data expressed in local currencies and the 
exchange rate for exports of goods and services which is implicit in the balance-of-payment series published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); etimates for the period 1990-1993 were calculated using a nominal exchange rate 
based on the assumption of a constant real exchange rate for the 1990-1991 biennium. 
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of Latin America and the Caribbean, it 
absorbed one half of the capital 
movements directed towards the region 
in 1991-1993. As a result, the annual 
average flow of capital into Mexico rose 
from a negative balance of US$ 700 
million between 1983 and 1989 to a 
positive inflow of US$ 26 billion in 
1991-1993. The flow ebbed somewhat 
in 1994, dropping off to one third of 
the region's capital inflows for that year. 
Even so, when expressed as a percentage 
of GDP, the annual flow jumped from a 
negative balance of 0.4% to a positive level 
of over 9% between 1983-1989 and 
1992-1993. Argentina has also been a very 
important recipient of capital: between 
the two periods, its average flow as a 
proportion of GDP increased from 2.5% to 
5.2%. Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, 
Guatemala and Venezuela have also 
received exceptionally large capital 
inflows in the 1990s (see tables IX. 1 and 
IX.2).2 
2. The new capital movements in 
historical perspective 
a) The tight financial  situation of  the 
1950s 
In the first decade after the war, Latin 
America faced persistent financial 
constraints. In fact, between 1950 and 1965 
the annual average inflows of external 
resources received by the region barely 
represented 1% of its GDP: not enough to 
compensate for the outflows in the form of 
profits and interest on external capital. As 
a result the net transfer of resources to the 
region was negative in this period (see 
table IX.3).3 It is interesting to note, 
however, that in this time of moderate 
financial constraints, the countries of the 
region attained fairly acceptable rates of 
growth of GDP, of the order of 5.5% a 
year.4 
This financial situation was due 
largely to external factors. Among these 
it is noteworthy that in the 1950s the 
capital markets of the northern 
hemisphere were oriented mainly 
towards domestic financing (Hayes, 
1977), due partly to the fact that investors 
recalled the non-compliance with many 
international obligations during the 
period between the two wars, some of it 
attributable to Latin America (ECLAC, 
1964). Moreover, controls had been 
established over the movement of capital 
by the industrialized countries, which 
were still in the process of economic 
reconstruction. At that time, most of the 
external financing came from foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (equivalent to 
60% of the total net flow of capital) and 
from medium- and long-term loans 
awarded initially by suppliers or their 
Governments and, from the 1960s 
onwards, by multilateral financial 
agencies. Private financing was 
generally limited to the short term and 
to specific projects with State 
guarantees. 
b) An expansionary financial  cycle: from  the 
mid-1960s to the early 1980s 
In the mid-1960s the capital 
accounts of the Latin American and 
2 The countries of Central America and the Caribbean showed the most modest growth in average 
capital flows between 1983-1989 and 1990-1992 (table IX.l). This was partly because this subregión 
was not faced in the 1980s with such a sharp contraction in the flow as that observed in most Latin 
American countries; in its turn, this reflects the fact that the economies of Central America and the 
Caribbean have relatively greater access to official loans and donations, which usually represent a 
relatively stable source of external financing. This subregión also benefits from quasi-capital flows 
in the form of transfers by nationals working abroad, primarily in the United States. 
3 During this period Venezuela recorded large net outflows of capital and profits. Excluding 
Venezuela, the entry of capital and transfer of resources from the countries of the region were 
equivalent to 1.4% and 0.4% of GDP, respectively. 
4 For a more detailed analysis of this period, see Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and Palma (1994). 
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Caribbean economies began to be more 
dynamic owing, to a large extent, to 
new events in the international economy. 
Thus, there now began a broad, 
expansionary phase of external financing, 
within an equally expansionary 
international financial cycle, which was 
to extend up to the debt crisis of 1982. 
The increase in the external financial 
flows received by the economies of the 
region was as significant as it was 
widespread: already in the early 1970s 
the capital flows represented, on 
average, 3% of regional GDP. This 
expansion was further intensified in the 
second half of the 1970s and the early 
1980s, when flows reached 4% to 5% of 
GDP (see table IX.2). 
This large increase in capital inflows 
was due mainly to external factors. In 
fact, the very development of the 
industrialized countries' banking sector 
exerted a decisive influence. Firstly, we 
must mention the general change that 
occurred in banking circles in the 1950s: 
a period in which a "new" banker 
appeared, less marked by the financial 
crises of the 1930s. This, together with 
the excess liquidity in the financial 
markets of the industrialized countries 
and the decline in the participation of the 
banks in those markets, meant that 
banking executives were more and more 
ready to apply an expansionary strategy 
to place their available funds (Hayes, 
1977). Initially, their field of action was 
limited to domestic markets, but during 
the 1970s this expansionary strategy 
began to be extended to the international 
level. 
During the major part of the 1960s 
the banks concentrated their 
expansionary forces on the markets of 
the OECD countries which enjoyed 
greater solvency; however, the intense 
competition in those markets and the 
resulting reduction in the margins of 
intermediation, together with the 
marked recessionary trend which 
affected the OECD economies in 
1969-1970, induced the bankers to 
explore new markets in the developing 
countries.5 
While in the period 1966-1981 the 
private international banks were 
undoubtedly the main driving force 
behind the dynamic supply of external 
financing to the region, there were other 
factors which also helped to feed this huge 
flow of external capital. The oil crises of 
1973-1974 and 1979-1980 gave a strong 
impetus to this capital movement. On the 
one hand, a strong demand arose in 
connection with the current-account 
financing of the oil-importing countries; 
on the other, there was an increase in the 
apparent creditworthiness of the 
oil-exporting countries, which became a 
preferred objective in the 
internationalization strategy of the 
private banks. Similarly, the great influx 
of "petrodollar" deposits into the 
international banking system accelerated 
the expansion of their loans. The 
governmental policies of the OECD 
countries also helped to swell the flow of 
resources, given the existence of negative 
real domestic interest rates6 and the bank 
regulations in force, which became more 
lax in the early 1970s. The Latin American 
countries, for their part, displayed passive 
receptiveness in the face of an aggressive 
supply.7 
It is worth recalling that there was a 
great deal of optimism about the boom 
in bank loans. Bankers, international 
organizations and many analysts 
applauded without reservations the 
abundant flows from the banks, and 
many countries thought that they had 
5 For a more detailed analysis of the factors which contributed to the banks' expansion, see Devlin 
(1989). 
6 The negative real interest rates led many analysts, including certain international bodies, to think 
that external indebtedness was "good business" for the developing countries. 
7 The only exception was Colombia, which distinguished itself by the caution with which it managed 
the supply of loans from the international financial markets (Junguito and Perry, 1983). 
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finally been freed from the paternalism of 
official financing.8 
The expansionary phase of the credit 
cycle continued almost without 
interruption between 1966 and 1981. 
However, there was a brief crisis in 
mid-1974, which illustrated the fragility of 
the financial systems and showed how 
international financial cycles can have a 
life of their own. At this time a small 
German bank, Herrstatt, failed after 
incurring losses through speculation on 
the European exchange markets. 
Although this failure was in no way linked 
to Latin America, it had important 
consequences for the region, for as a result 
of the panic set off in banking circles, 
towards the end of 1974 the flow of loans 
to Latin America was paralysed, their cost 
went up drastically, and repayment terms 
were notably reduced, all of which made 
the servicing of the debt and the 
macroeconomic management of the 
countries of the region more difficult. The 
market settled down again in the second 
quarter of 1975, bringing with it a renewed 
flow of bank loans to the region.9 
Another result of the expansion of 
bank lending was the heavy accumulation 
of liabilities with variable interest rates. At 
the beginning of the 1980s Latin America's 
external debt already exceeded US$ 300 
billion, of which over three-quarters 
corresponded to private bank loans. At 
that date, the total value of the regional 
debt exceeded the critical level of solvency 
of 200% of export earnings, and its 
servicing absorbed one-third of exports, 
while interest payments on the external 
public debt represented between 10% and 
25% of tax revenue (Altimir and Devlin, 
1994). Furthermore, the banks' 
enthusiasm for issuing loans led them to 
take excessive risks: thus, at the beginning 
of the 1980s the nine biggest United States 
banks had accumulated loan exposure in 
Latin America equivalent to nearly 200% 
of their capital (ECLAC, 1990b). In short, the 
permissiveness then reigning in the 
unregulated international capital market 
and the adoption of frankly pro-cyclical 
public policies with respect to taking 
advantage of the great capital supply 
placed the region in a position of 
vulnerability which created favourable 
conditions for a crisis. 
c) The financial  constraints of  the 1980s 
As is well known, the debt crisis 
began in August 1982 when Mexico 
declared that it could not continue to 
service its bank debt, the second biggest 
in the developing world. In the months 
following Mexico's failure to pay, the 
negative externalities that usually occur 
in the midst of a financial crisis were 
exacerbated by the banks' panic, which 
led them to almost completely cut off 
new loans to the Latin American 
countries, including countries like 
Colombia that had been very cautious in 
the management of their capital inflows. 
As loans were not renewed, this meant 
that the countries of the region, except 
Colombia, found themselves in a 
situation of de facto  non-compliance with 
their debt service commitments to the 
banks. De jure non-compliance was 
avoided only thanks to a rescue operation 
agreed by the creditors, which enabled the 
countries to formally meet their 
obligations (ECLAC, 1984a). 
While this rescue operation avoided 
formal non-compliance, it had an 
enormous social cost for the region, 
because an integral part of the rescue 
was the requirement that the countries 
should adjust their economies, generally 
within the framework of a programme 
8 So great was the faith in market criteria that some even thought that the International Monetary Fund 
had become redundant as far as regulation of the macroeconomic policies of the developing countries 
was concerned (Morgan Guaranty Trust, 1976). 
9 Portfolio investment, for its part, continued to represent only a small fraction of the total external 
resources available, while the share of foreign direct investment shrank to less than one-fifth of total 
net financing. 
200 LATIN  AMERICA AND THE  CARIBBEAN: POLICIES TO . 
agreed with the IMF, the objective being 
to generate a trade surplus large 
enough to enable them to service the 
bulk of the interest due on the 
commercial bank debt. 
In this context, the negative transfer 
of resources from Latin America (i.e., 
from the region to the rest of the world) 
reached a level without precedent. 
Between 1982 and 1986, it was equal to 
4% of the region's GDP: an even bigger 
proportion than Germany had had to pay 
after the First World War as reparations to 
the Allies (ECLAC, 1991b). Because of the 
size of this transfer and the very short 
term over which it had to be paid, it was 
clear that it could only be achieved at the 
cost of a spectacular reduction in imports 
(40%) and a sharp economic recession in 
the region (see ECLAC, 1984a and chapter 
XI). 
The heavy capital flight by residents of 
Latin America and the Caribbean also 
fuelled the crisis and aggravated the 
problem of the transfer of resources 
abroad. This phenomenon was reflected, 
in part, in the negative balances recorded 
under the entries "Errors and omissions" 
and "Short-term capital" in the capital 
accounts of the region during the first half 
of the 1980s. Using a fairly common 
methodology, the World Bank (1993b) has 
determined that capital flight reached a 
very significant order of magnitude in 
1980-1983: about US$ 90 billion/10 
It must also be remembered that, at 
this time, there were high rates of interest 
on deposits in international markets, a fact 
which gave even more impetus to the 
flight. Before the crisis broke out, capital 
flight was concentrated in Mexico, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina and some 
Central American countries. This reflects 
the fact that in these countries national 
agents anticipated the beginning of the 
crisis.11 After 1982, however, the flight 
became widespread and was related to the 
existence of uncertainty and to the 
recessionary adjustment that the debtor 
countries had to make, under strong 
pressure from their creditors. As indicated 
below, although the capital of domestic 
agents was the first to flee, it was 
apparently also among the first to come 
back in the 1990s. 
The high cost of Latin America's debt 
crisis may have been partly the result of 
the type of capital received by the region 
from the 1970s onward, for the artificial 
rescue of the value of the loans, through 
reprogramming of payments of 
principal and the granting of new 
"involuntary" loans by the banks in the 
1980s, was not subject to any direct 
market valuation,12 so that it was easier 
for the banks to insist that the nominal 
value of the debt must be respected. 
Unlike the portfolio investors of the 
1930s, the banks could isolate themselves 
from market forces, which probably 
would have forced the bank creditors to 
accept immediate and substantial losses 
on their loans. 
Indebtedness with the banks had two 
other characteristics which heightened the 
impact of the crisis in Latin America. 
Firstly, by contrast with the atomized 
market of bondholders of the 1930s, the 
banks operated in an oligopolistic market 
which enabled private creditors to create a 
quasi-cartel in order to exert effective 
pressure on the debtor countries. 
Secondly, the capital flows were owed, to 
a disproportionate extent, to a single type 
of investor (the banks) and the resulting 
concentration of credit was so excessive 
that it became a systemic risk for the 
international financial markets. As a 
result, the governments of the OECD 
countries decided to intervene actively to 
overcome the crisis, but unfortunately 
their action was not at all even-handed, 
10 We stress "order of magnitude" because there is no consensus on what constitutes "capital flight" 
nor on how to calculate it. See Lessard and Williamson (1987) for an analysis of the problems involved 
in estimating capital flight and a presentation of the various estimates. 
11 In Central America political uncertainty also exerted an influence. 
12 See ECLAC (1984a) for a study of the rescue techniques. 
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since it helped to transfer most of the cost 
of the crisis to the debtors.13 
During the second half of the 1980s 
there were some novel changes in capital 
movements. As the debt crisis persisted, a 
secondary market for the external debt 
paper began to arise, and the heavy 
discounts at which this paper was traded 
revealed publicly what was already 
suspected: the real value of the debt was 
much lower than its nominal value. The 
development of the secondary market had 
two other important positive effects. 
Firstly, from 1985 onwards, the countries 
used the big discounts in the secondary 
market to initiate involving the swapping 
of debt for equity in programmes of 
national enterprises, thus facilitating the 
financing of privatization operations, and 
the subsidy implicit in these operations 
served to stimulate foreign investment 
flows through these channels, especially 
from 1987 onwards (Fuentes, 1992 and 
Calderón, 1994) (see table IX.4).14 
Secondly, the development of the 
secondary market and the growing 
discounts undermined the credibility of 
the official crisis-management strategy, in 
which it was not envisaged that the banks 
should register any losses. As regards 
external debt service, which was a heavy 
burden for the debtors, from 1987 onwards 
growing arrears of interest payments built 
up (see table IX.5). For Latin America, 
these arrears represented substantial 
forced inflows of capital. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, the accumulated arrears 
amounted to more than US$ 25 billion (of 
which US$ 21 billion were for bank 
credits), a sum equal to about 30% of the 
net capital inflows registered between 
1983 and 1990. Although the accumulated 
arrears served as a safety-valve to counter 
the debt pressures, however, they are in 
fact a relatively inefficient form of external 
financing. Fortunately, together with the 
decline in international interest rates seen 
up to 1993 and the increase in capital 
flows, a trend towards the regularization 
of payments was observed, inasmuch as 
the region's interest arrears had decreased 
substantially by the end of 1992. 
3. The resurgence of capital movements 
in 1990-1994 
As we have seen, over the last 20 years, the 
region has been affected by abrupt capital 
movements that have often perturbed 
macroeconomic management. Moreover, 
the fluctuations of financing were often 
determined by external factors. Thus, as 
the financial rationing of the 1980s clearly 
gave rise to costly adjustments, the return 
of capital flows in the 1990s obviously had 
initial positive effects, since it put an end 
to the external constraints which had 
affected the region since the financial crisis 
of 1982. Indeed, the economic recovery 
and the greater price stability in recent 
years were directly linked to the greater 
external leeway permitted by the entry of 
capital. This, in turn, confirmed the 
perception that external financing was an 
important ingredient missing from the 
official adjustment programmes of the 
previous decade (ECLAC, 1990a). However, 
the favourable impact of capital flows over 
the medium term will depend on their 
stability and cost over time, as well as on 
the efficiency with which economic policy 
channels those capital flows to meet the 
needs of macroeconomic stability, 
changing production patterns, 
international competitiveness and social 
equity. A summary analysis of the volume 
and nature of the different capital flows in 
the 1990s is given below. 
a) Types of  flows 
Besides the increase in the volume of 
external resources mobilized, the recovery 
of capital flows in the 1990s has been 
characterized by a significant 
13 For an analysis of the biased nature of the official handling of the debt, see ECLAC (1990b). 
14 For a detailed analysis of these programmes, see Bouzas and Ffrench-Davis (1990), Islam and Hilton 
(1993) and ECLAC (1990b). 
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Table 1X.4 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS (FDI), 
BY CATEGORY, 1988-1993 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Country /  Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993° 1988-1993 
Argentina 1,147 1,028 1,836 2,439 4,179 6,305 16,934 
Normal FDI flows 807 869 -80 1,586 2,112 587 5,881 
Debt swaps 340 159 815 - - - 1,314 
Privatizations® 0 0 1,101 853 2,067 5,718 9,739 
Brazil 2,969 1,267 901 972 1,454 802 8,365 
Normal FDI flows 882 321 618 850 1,359 752 4,782 
Debt sawps 2,087 946 283 68 95 50 3,529 
Privatizations 0 0 0 54 0 0 54 
Chile 933 1,289 590 523 699 841 4,875 
Normal FDI flows -15 67 235 563 731 891 2,472 
Debt swaps 809 1,107 355 -40 -32 -50 2,149 
Privatizations 139 115 0 0 0 0 254 
Colombia 203 576 500 457 790 850 3,376 
Normal FDI flows 203 576 500 405 790 850 3,324 
Debt swaps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Privatizations 0 0 0 52 0 0 52 
Mexico 2,594 3,037 2,632 4,762 4,393 4,901 22,319 
Normal FDI flows 1,671 2,648 2,432 3,956 4,302 4,901 19,910 
Debt swaps 868 389 85 19 0 0 1,361 
Privatizations 55 0 115 787 91 0 1,048 
Peru 26 59 41 -7 127 349 595 
Normal FDI flows 26 59 41 -7 -13 60 166 
Debp swaps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Privatizations 0 0 0 0 140 289 429 
Venezuela 89 213 451 1,916 629 372 3,670 
Normal FDI flows 39 30 148 159 545 347 1,268 
Debt swaps 50 183 303 258 70 25 889 
Privatizations 0 0 0 1,499 14 0 1,513 
Totalb 7,961 7,469 6,951 11,062 12,271 14,420 60,134 
Normal FDI flows 3,613 4,570 3,894 7,512 9,826 8,388 37,803 
Debt swaps 4,154 2,784 1,841 305 133 25 9,242 
Privatizations 194 115 1,216 3,245 2,312 6,007 13,089 
Source: Alvaro Calderón, "Transformación productiva y empresas transnacionales", Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1993, 
unpublished, and additional official information. 
a All of Argentina's inflows during 1991-1993 from external debt-equity swaps formed part of the country'sprivatization 
programme. b This total includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela only. 
Debt-equity swaps carried out as part of privatization operations are included in the figure given for the latter. 
c Preliminary estimates. 
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Table IX.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL DEBT INTEREST ARREARS a 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total 129 247 916 1,893 -489 791 4,861 327 8,167 8,978 1,779 -6,179 
Oil-exporting 
countries 12 47 114 419 536 713 1,280 668 766 887 -784 -380 
Bolivia 12 39 26 95 137 56 48 -306 -58 -44 9 -4 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 5 -5 2 -1 2 25 -5 -12 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 9 4 446 341 271 451 370 153 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 8 88 324 384 657 782 635 548 460 -1,157 -661 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 -1 3 -6 0 144 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 117 200 802 1,474 -1,025 78 3 581 -341 7,401 8,091 2,563 -5,798 
South America 28 29 919 1,270 -1,118 -212 2,912 -1,034 6,552 7,445 3,031 -5,953 
Argentina 0 0 837 1,237 -1,297 -291 -135 1,777 3,405 1,921 1,063 451 
Brazil 28 29 74 27 166 54 3,033 -2,838 3,162 5,485 1,948 -6,314 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 8 6 13 25 14 27 -15 39 20 -90 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central America 
and Hispaniola 89 171 -117 204 93 290 669 693 849 646 -468 155 
Costa Rica 84 145 -214 51 -53 67 140 60 105 -304 /  -12 -41 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 4 14 -17 0 8 
Guatemala 0 0 0 10 30 19 24 13 21 81 -7 5 
Haiti 0 0 0 9 2 -1 1 5 -1 -2 10 7 
Honduras 2 2 7 19 14 19 44 28 29 -83 -14 -21 
Nicaragua 0 18 85 55 139 158 354 229 304 348 -416 - 134 
Panamá 0 0 1 0 0 -1 16 295 302 355 181 6 
Dominican 
Republic 3 6 4 60 -41 27 89 59 75 268 -210 57 
Source: O. Altimir and R. Devlin, "An overview of debt moratoria in Latin America", Development Policy Review, vol. 11, 
No. 4, December 1993. 
a Net annual cumulative figures. 
diversification of financing sources. Thus, 
the banks have been largely displaced by 
other important flows, especially foreign 
direct investment and portfolio 
investment (see table IX.7). 
i) Financing with indebtedness 
Commercial banks. It is estimated that 
the contribution of the banks to the 
external financing of the region amounted 
to US$ 11 billion in 1992. This is about 18% 
of total flows: a small fraction of its share 
in the 1970s. Although the net financing 
provided by the banks was a good deal 
greater than that supplied in 1991, it was 
mostly short-term. This reflects their 
attitude to Latin America, which has been 
restrictive since the crisis. In 1992, 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile were very 
active borrowers in this segment of the 
market. In 1993, the level of net loans made 
204 LATIN  AMERICA AND THE  CARIBBEAN: POLICIES TO.. 
Table IX.6 
LATIN AMERICA: SOME SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993a 
A. Debt 
Bonds b 833 2,760 7,242 12,577 27,397 
Banksc -6,497 8,559 6,800 10,900 5,200 
Commercial paper 127 - 1,212 840 315 
Certificates of deposit - - 670 1,100 65 
Investment 
Directd 8,118 7,733 12,064 13,420 14,675 
ADRs/GDRs  6 - 98 4120 4,063 5,725 
External fundsf 416 575 727 293 10 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Bank for 
International Settlements. 
a Preliminary figures. b Gross value. 0 Net, short- and medium-term. d Includes profit reinvestment in some 
countries. e ADR = American Depository Receipts; GDR = Global Depository Receipts. Includes only sales of new 
stock issues. Includes only closed-end funds; starting capital. 
Table IX.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES a 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total 833 2,760 7,242 12,577 27,397 
Argentina - 21 795 1,570 6,233 
Brazil - - 1,837 3,655 6,679 
Chile - - 200 120 433 
Colombia - - - - 566 
Guatemala - - - - 60 
Mexico 570 2,477 3,782 6,100 10,783 
Panama - - 50 - -
Peru - - - - 30 
Trinidad and Tobago - - - 100 125 
Uruguay - - - 100 140 
Venezuela 263 262 578 932 2,348 
Average term (years) 4.9 4.0 3.9 4.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Private Market Financing for  Developing Countries, Washington, D.C., December 
1993 (data covering period up to 1992 and information obtained directly (1993)). 
a Gross financing. 
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to the region was more modest. Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico featured prominently in 
this, especially in the contracting of 
short-term trade credits. 
Bonds. From 1989 onwards, the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries 
obtained extensive access to the 
international bond market: a source of 
financing to which the region had had only 
limited recourse since the Great 
Depression. In fact, its entry into this 
market has been on a noteworthy scale: in 
1993 the countries of the region issued 
US$ 27 billion in bonds, -double the total 
registered during the whole previous year 
(see table IX.7). In 1992, bond issues were 
equivalent to 21% of the region's 
financing, and in 1993 they rose to 43% (see 
tables IX.1 and IX.7). 
The countries most active in the 
bond market have been Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina and Venezuela. They have 
been joined by a growing number of 
other countries, however, Chile and 
Colombia entered the market in 1991; 
Trinidadand Tobago and Uruguay began 
to issue bonds in 1992, while in 1993 a 
Central American country (Guatemala) 
participated for the first time (see table 
IX.7). 
Apart from the growth in the number 
of transactions and participants, there are 
other signs of growing receptiveness in 
this segment of the market. For example, 
the size of new bond issues is increasing; 
in March 1993 a private Mexican firm and 
in June a United States subsidiary of the 
Venezuelan State Petroleum Enterprise 
made "jumbo" bond issues of US$ 1 billion 
each. 
Furthermore, financing through bond 
issues continues to be relatively expensive. 
In relation to the LIBOR rate, the bond 
margins have often been higher, especially 
in Argentina and Brazil, as compared with 
Chile, Mexico and Colombia. The initial 
yields offered on bonds are around 8% to 
10% for terms of three to five years, and 
there has also been some lengthening of 
the terms (up to 7 years) (see table IX.8).15 
Table IX.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICATORS OF TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES a 
1990 1991 1992 1993 b 
Yieldc Termd Yield0 Termd Yield0 —, d lerm Yieldd Termd 
Argentina - 10.6 3.2 9.3 8.7 3.4 
Brazil - 12.2 2.7 10.6 2.8 9.7 3.9 
Chile - 7.4 7.5 
Colombia - - - 7.5 3.1 
Mexico 13.1 3.7 10.7 5.6 9.8 4.9 8.3 5.3 
Trinidad 
and Tobago - - - 11.8 5.0 
Uruguay - - - 8.6 3.0 
Venezuela 14.0 5.0 10.4 4.3 9.6 5.0 8.8 4.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the West Merchant Bank. 
a Weighted averages for a large sample of bond offerings. b January-October. c Initial yields in annual 
percentages. d Terms in years. 
15 It should also be noted that the initial costs of incorporation in a new financing market are typically 
high. In time, it is hoped that competition between lenders will help to reduce bond charges. 
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ii) Foreign investment16 
Foreign investments of risk capital 
have assumed considerable importance in 
the region. In 1993, identifiable flows of 
foreign capital totalled US$ 21 billion (see 
table IX.6). 
Foreign direct investment (FDI). It is 
estimated that in 1993 the flow of FDI to the 
region was close to a record level of US$ 15 
billion. Moreover, the share of total capital 
flows represented by FDI rose to 25% in the 
three-year period of 1991-1993, compared 
to 17% in 1977-1981 (see tables IX.l and 
IX.9). 
In the 1990s, FDI flows have increased 
substantially, especially in Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic. 
In Mexico, the FDI inflow was three 
times the annual average for the period 
before the crisis (see table IX.9). This boom 
in direct investment is linked to a large 
extent to the announcement and 
subsequent ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the profound economic reforms 
carried out in Mexico. 
Chile has also received a strong flow 
of direct investment. The average 
annual inflow of US$ 700 million in 
1991-1993 was notably higher than the 
US$ 300 million received during the 
crisis years (more than half of which 
was in the form of external debt paper) 
and the US$ 200 million received 
annually between 1977 and 1981. In 
1991-1993, the investment was made 
without the benefit of the big subsidies 
offered between 1985 and 1989, when 
foreign investment benefited from the 
national debt/equity conversion 
programme (see table IX.4).17 
In the case of Argentina, the average 
FDI flow of US$ 5.2 billion in 1992-1993 was 
more than double the amounts recorded in 
1991 and 1990. Three-fourths of these 
investments were attracted by the 
ambitious programme for privatizing 
public enterprises (Calderón, 1994). 
The FDI flow to Venezuela declined 
from US$ 1.9 billion in 1991 to US$ 500 
million in 1992-1993, largely because of the 
paralyzation of the privatization 
programme. As for the increased flow of 
FDI to Costa Rica, this was due in part to 
the efficiency of the official incentives 
programme (in respect of assembly 
industries, for example) for foreign 
investors (Rodriguez, 1993). 
It is difficult to specify the yield 
required by FDI, because of serious 
problems of measurement. However, a 
rough indicator may be the estimate made 
by the United States Department of 
Commerce regarding the rate of return on 
FDI from the United States in Latin 
America. This statistical base suggests that 
in recent years FDI has usually been 
gaining relatively high annual yields of the 
order of 15%-20% (see table IX.10). 
American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs).18 While these instruments came 
into being in 1927 and there are now more 
than 700 ADR and GDR programmes, only 
in the last few years has there been active 
participation by developing countries in 
this market. In 1993, a number of Latin 
American enterprises issued US$ 5.7 
billion in stock that was then converted 
into ADRs and GDRs -equal to 9% of the total 
16 The word "foreign" is not totally appropriate; as will be seen below, Latin American residents are 
repatriating capital through financial instruments which have traditionally been associated with 
foreigners. 
17 In this sense, the Chilean programme was a pioneering one. For an analysis of the subsidies offered, 
see Ffrench-Davis (1990). 
18 ADRs are negotiable certificates issued by United States banks. They represent a share package in 
foreign companies. ADRs are quoted on the United States stock exchanges and give the holder the 
same rights as any other shareholder of the State in which they are issued. There is also a variant of 
ADRs (Global Depository Receipts-GDRs), which are certificates circulating simultaneously on various 
stock exchanges of the world. The figures appearing in the text refer to initial sales of new shares 
(primary ADRS/GDRS). 
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Table IX.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS 
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT a 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1977-
1981 (1981) 1982 
1983-
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean (24) 5,317 8,177 6,536 5,881 7,733 12,064 13,430 14,675 b 
Oil-exporting 
countries 1,948 3,788 2,643 3,130 3,735 7,265 6,127 5,737 
Bolivia 34 76 31 5 27 52 93 
Colombia 144 265 366 571 500 457 790 
Ecuador 55 60 40 67 82 85 95 115 
Mexico 1,576 3,078 1,901 2,401 2,634 4,762 4,393 4,901 
Peru 60 125 48 13 41 -7 127 349 
Venezuela 78 184 257 73 451 1,916 629 372 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 3,370 4,390 3,892 2,752 3,997 4,799 7,303 8,938 
South America 2,951 3,821 3,575 2,381 3,403 4,018 6,468 8,174 
Argentina 423 837 227 587 1,836 2,439 4,179 6,305 
Brazil 2,138 2,520 2,910 1,470 901 972 1,454 802 
Chile 208 383 401 300 590 523 699 841 
Paraguay 32 32 37 5 76 84 136 150 
Uruguay 150 49 19 76 
Central America 
and the Caribbean 419 569 318 371 594 782 834 765 
Barbados 6 8 5 6 11 7 14 
Costa Rica 55 70 29 79 163 178 220 280 
El Salvador 6 -6 -1 18 2 25 15 16 
Guatemala 116 127 77 110 48 91 94 149 
Guyana 0 -2 4 2 
Haiti 10 8 7 7 8 14 
Honduras 11 -4 14 34 44 45 60 
Jamaica -9 -12 -16 11 138 127 87 139 
Nicaragua 4 0 15 39 
Panama 3 6 3 17 -18 -30 2 -41 
Dominican 
Republic 65 80 -1 73 133 145 180 183 
Suriname 2 35 -6 -50 -43 10 -30 
Trinidad and Tobago 150 258 204 66 109 169 178 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies. 
a Includes debt swaps and privatizations. b Covers only 16 countries, which accounted for 88% of total net inflows 
in 1983-1989. 
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Table IX. 10 
RATE OF RETURN ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OF UNITED STATES ORIGIN a 
(Annual  average percentages) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
All countries 18.2 14.7 9.9 9.9 10.1 12.8 12.6 13.4 15.5 15.0 14.3 11.5 10.7 
Developing 
countries 23.5 23.1 16.9 12.1 15.2 13.8 12.0 13.1 16.4 18.0 17.0 16.0 17.5 
Latin America b 14.2 12.2 3.2 -0.3 6.6 7.6 8.8 10.9 17.0 18.8 14.2 13.6 18.6 
Argentina 29.9 3.9 16.8 12.5 2.2 4.7 13.3 11.6 13.8 1.8 17.2 19.4 17.3 
Brazil 6.6 6.3 8.7 1.5 5.9 6.1 9.2 12.8 19.9 26.3 10.0 6.5 17.8 
Chile 1.7 23.3 -12.4 21.5 42.6 93.3 53.8 40.8 44.3 29.1 20.4 16.8 17.0 
Colombia 7.2 5.4 13.3 7.6 9.5 12.6 7.1 3.2 6.1 4.2 20.6 18.3 18.1 
Ecuador 0.0 17.4 14.5 11.3 19.9 25.4 21.2 6.6 1.1 7.1 9.7 10.1 15.8 
Mexico 22.1 21.0 -18.7 -6.2 7.7 13.7 4.4 14.4 23.6 20.3 19.9 20.3 19.6 
Peru 0.0 22.6 13.3 6.0 5.7 -2.0 -0.3 -4.0 -10.8 -14.6 -17.3 -3.8 1.6 
Venezuela 5.3 14.3 12.4 -30.8 8.8 3.9 13.5 7.5 13.7 7.8 15.0 22.1 30.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data published in Survey of  Current Business, United States Department of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C., various issues. 
a This rate of return was calculated as the income from foreign direct United States investment (reinvested profits plus 
distributed profits) divided by the average stock of these investments between the beginning and end of each year at 
current prices. However, the main limitation in using current prices for this purpose is that they give rates of return 
which may differ from the returns on other similar investments made at different times and at different prices. 
Including Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Caribbean island countries were not 
included, nor was Panama, since most of the foreign direct investment from the United States is concentrated in the 
financial sector. 
flow of net external financing received by 
the region. This amount compares with 
US$ 4.1 billion in 1991 and 1992 and 
US$ 100 million in 1990, the first year in 
which an enterprise from the region issued 
certificates of this type (see tables IX.6 and 
IX.ll). 
The country which has made most use 
of ADRs and GDRs is Mexico. In 1992,10 new 
programmes were launched for obtaining 
fresh capital of US$ 3.1 billion, i.e., 75% of 
the resources mobilized by regional 
enterprises through this instrument. 
While the number of Mexican issues 
continued to be high in 1993, their volume 
declined to US$ 2.5 billion (see table IX.l 1). 
In 1992 two Argentine firms mobilized 
some US$ 370 million through ADR and 
GDR issues, while in 1993, Argentine 
companies obtained US$ 2.8 billion -48% 
of the total value of ADRs and GDRs issued-
mainly through an issue made by the 
privatized firm Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales (YPF). Chile was the pioneer in the 
use of ADRs, since in 1990 its privatized 
telephone company issued the first 
certificates from the region for an amount 
close to US$ 100 million. During 1992, two 
programmes totalling US$ 130 million 
were launched, while in 1993 four new 
operations totalling US$ 270 million were 
registered (Ffrench-Davis, Agosin and 
Uthoff, 1995). In the biennium 1992-1993 
companies from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela joined the 
ADR market. 
Offshore investment funds. This 
financial mechanism was added to the 
market in the 1980s with the aim of 
facilitating foreign investment in the new 
emerging stock markets of developing 
countries. The administrators of a fund ask 
the authorities of a developing country for 
the right to buy and manage a portfolio of 
shares to be traded on the local stock 
exchange; the fund is subscribed in dollars 
and is quoted on foreign stock exchanges. 
The funds may be "open", i.e., with the 
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Table IX. 11 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL SHARE OFFERINGS a 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total 98 4,120 4,063 5,725 
Argentina - 356 372 2,793 
Bolivia - - - 10 
Brazil - - 133 -
Chile 98 - 129 271 
Colombia - - - 91 
Mexico - 3,764 3,058 2,493 
Panama - - 88 -
Peru - - - 25 
Venezuela - - 283 42 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Private Market Financing for  Developing Countries, Washington, D.C., December 
1993 (data covering period up to 1992 and information obtained directly (1993)). 
a ADRs and GDRs offered on United States exchanges for purposes of capital widening. 
right to increase the initial capital, or 
"closed", with only one capital offering 
when the fund is established. It is 
estimated that at the end of 1993 there 
were more than 40 offshore funds 
operating with regional portfolios and 
more than 20 funds specializing in 
individual countries. 
In 1992 the establishment of new 
closed offshore funds -which represent 
only a part of the investment funds' 
activity- generated capital flows on the 
order of US$ 300 million (see table 
IX.12).19 
As regards the yield offered by these 
investment funds, a sample of some of the 
funds with the best performance covering 
Chile, Brazil and Mexico suggests that 
there is a fair amount of variability, 
associated with the big fluctuations in 
stock-market quotations. Thus, in March 
1993 the best yield was that of Mexico (an 
average of 7%), while in the case of Chile 
there was a loss of 6%. In September 1993, 
the highest return was the 5% rate attained 
in Brazil, while a loss of 5% was recorded 
in Mexico (World Bank, 1993a). Even so, 
cumulative rates of return for investors 
have generally been very high. For 
example, US$ 490 million in investments 
made in Chile between 1989 and 1993 were 
worth US$ 1.73 billion by the end of 1993 
(see Ffrench-Davis, Agosin and Uthoff, 
1994). 
iii) Other flows 
While the amount of data available 
for 1993 is still quite meagre, it is known 
that other capital flows into the region 
came to about US$ 16 billion. Most of 
these were short-term credits and other 
flows. In 1992 the region also obtained 
US$ 1.1 billion through the issue of 
certificates of deposit and US$ 840 
million through the sale of commercial 
paper (see table IX.6). As regards the 
terms of indebtedness, certificates of 
deposit carry terms of two to three years, 
and in 1992 their spread over LIBOR 
varied from 2.3% for Mexico to 
2.8%-4.7% for Argentina and Brazil. In 
the case of commercial paper, their term 
of repayment is less than a year, with 
spreads over LIBOR of between 2.8% and 
3.8% for Argentina in 1992 (Goldstein and 
19 These figures may underestimate the total flow generated by the funds. 
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Table IX. 12 
LATIN AMERICA: NEW CLOSED OFFSHORE INVESTMENT FUNDS a 
(Initial  capital, in millions of  dollars) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total 608 383 771 293 10 
Argentina 56 
Brazil - - 43 112 
Chile 230 180 
Mexico 192 71 
Venezuela - - 100 
Regional 186 203 501 181 10 
Source: S. Gooptu, Portfolio  Investment Flows to Emerging Markets, Policy Research Working Papers, No. 1117, 
Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1993, and ECLAC, Economic Development Division. 
3 Including Global Depository Receipts (GDRs). 
Folkerts-Landau, 1993). It is also known 
that substantial foreign resources have 
entered Mexico through the purchase of 
treasury bills (treasury certificates or 
readjustable bonds) expressed in pesos. 
It is estimated that capital inflows by this 
mechanism amounted to US$ 9 billion in 
1992 and US$ 7 billion in 1993. 
It is difficult to break down the 
remaining resources. However, it may be 
assumed that the bulk of them were 
acquired by the region's banking 
systems as interest-bearing short-term 
deposits or took the form of increases in 
enterprises' working capital or 
investments on the stock exchange or in 
real estate. In particular, direct portfolio 
investment in the stock market may have 
been highly significant. In Mexico, for 
example, it is estimated that 19% of the 
capital increase on the Mexican stock 
exchange was coming from foreign 
investment by 1992, while in Argentina, 
the proportion was over 25% (Gooptu, 
1993). This has given rise to a close 
interconnection among the stock 
exchanges in different countries as well 
as to the transmission of changes in 
expectations, a phenomenon the poses 
the risk of fostering a high degree of 
volatility. 
b) Factors behind the resumption of  capital 
flows 
There are a varied range of factors, 
both national and international, that 
explain the inflow of capital into Latin 
America during the 1990s. 
The external and internal factors 
underlying the capital movements of the 
region are varied and it is hard to 
determine their relative importance. 
However, we know that the structural 
reforms of the Latin American economies 
and the high domestic interest rates are not 
completely new: they have been present to 
a greater or lesser extent since the 
mid-1980s. In contrast, the abrupt changes 
in two determinants of financial 
profitability in the countries of the 
northern hemisphere (low interest rates 
and slower economic growth) are recent 
events which more or less coincide with 
the renewed external capital flows. 
Indeed, this is the conclusion of Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart (1993). In their 
econometric study of 10 Latin American 
countries during the period 1988-1991, 
they conclude that external factors, 
particularly the fall in United States 
interest rates, have exerted considerable 
influence on the development of the Latin 
American capital account, and in at least 
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five countries have been the most 
influential factor. Clearly, both factors 
-low interest rates and slow economic 
growth rates- are impermanent in nature 
and could undergo an abrupt turnaround. 
i) The fall in international dollar 
yields. The recession in the United States 
and the sharp fall in international dollar 
interest rates, especially short-term ones, 
seem to have acted as strong external 
stimuli from 1990 onwards. The LIBOR 
short-term dollar rate registered an annual 
average of 11% in 1979-1988 and 9% in 
1989, but from 1992 onwards it fell to less 
than 4%, the lowest level in 30 years. In real 
terms, its fall was even more marked: from 
annual averages of 4.4% in 1979-1988 and 
4.6% in 1989, it declined to less than 1% in 
1992-1993 (see table IX.13). Long-term 
dollar interest rates also declined, 
although to a lesser extent. For example, 
the yield on long-term United States 
Government bonds fell from an annual 
average of almost 11% in 1979-1988 and 
8.5% in 1989 to 7% in 1992 and to less than 
6% during 1993. 
The reduction in international interest 
rates was originally a phenomenon that 
occurred primarily in the "dollar zone"; in 
fact, the rates in Europe and Japan went up 
at the beginning of the 1990s, but they too 
showed a downward trend as from 1992 
and 1993, respectively (see table IX.13). 
After a decade of high yields on dollar 
loans, the sharp fall in the international 
interest rate in dollars obviously led 
investors to reassign part of their dollar 
portfolio. This movement, together with 
the drop in real estate yields and in the 
profits of United States enterprises (Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993) made it 
even more attractive to invest in Latin 
America, a region which continued to offer 
very high yields on short- and 
medium-term capital. Moreover, the risk 
premium applied by investors to these 
yields was probably lowered to the extent 
that the creditworthiness of countries 
indebted in dollars improved as a result of 
the drop in international interest rates and 
the bigger supply of funds, which reduced 
the risk of exchange-rate devaluation. 
ii) The persistence of high yields on 
capital in Latin America. As already noted 
a large volume of short-term external 
capital has entered the Latin America 
banking systems. During the 1990s, the 
ex post difference between international 
interest rates in dollars and those 
prevailing on the capital markets of Latin 
America (in dollar equivalents) was often 
extraordinarily high in favour of the latter 
region.20 The differences in yield have 
varied sharply from one year to another. 
In 1991, the biggest differences were 
recorded in Brazil, Peru arid Guatemala, 
while in 1993, the most striking 
differentials were seen in Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, 
and Venezuela (see table IX. 14). 
Although it is difficult to make a 
precise calculation, it is known that a large 
part the external capital has seized the 
spectacular opportunities for profits 
offered by the region's stock markets. 
Figure IX.l shows that the behaviour of 
these profits as a whole between 1990 and 
1993 was extremely dynamic, for in the 
1990s the share price index in dollars 
increased more on the Latin American 
stock exchanges than on those of Asia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and 
Japan, with the stock exchanges of Chile, 
Argentina, Mexico and Colombia being 
particularly active. 
Privatization operations were another 
incentive that helped channel capital 
towards the region. Between 1990 and 
1992, Latin American public enterprises 
worth some US$ 40 billion were 
privatized, the process being particularly 
intense in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, 
Venezuela and Peru (see table IX.15). 
Investments in most of the big privatized 
undertakings, especially those in the 
public service sectors, have been attractive 
20 The reasons for the high interest rates in the region differ according to the situation. In some countries 
they reflected restrictive monetary policies, motivated by efforts to control aggregate demand and 
domestic prices. In other cases, they were linked to the shortage of capital and exchange instability. 
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Table IX. 13 
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
1972- 1979-
1978 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Dollars 
A . LIBOR ( 1 8 0 d a y s ) 
Nominal 7.9 10.9 9.3 8.3 6.1 3.9 3.4 
Real -0.8 4.4 4.6 3.2 1.7 0.9 0.7 
B. United States 
Government bonds 
Nominal 7.4 10.7 8.5 8.6 7.9 7.0 5.8 
Real -1.2 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.0 
Marks 
A . LIBOR ( 1 8 0 d a y s ) 
Nominal . . . 6.6 7.2 8.8 9.4 9.4 7.0 
Real . . . 0.4 2.6 3.6 4.9 6.2 4.2 
B. Long-term German 
Government bonds 
Nominal 8.0 7.6 7.1 8.9 8.6 8.0 6.3 
Real -0.7 1.4 2.5 3.7 4.2 4.8 3.5 
Yen 
A . LIBOR ( 1 8 0 d a y s ) 
Nominal . . . 6.6 5.5 7.9 7.2 4.4 3.0 
Real . . . 0.4 1.0 2.7 2.7 1.3 0.3 
B. Long-term Japanese 
Government bonds 
Nominal 7.8 6.8 5.1 7.4 6.5 4.9 3.7 
Real -0.8 0.6 0.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 0.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
because of the potentially high yields 
offered by captive markets and, in a 
number of cases, the modest prices 
asked.21 This was reflected in active 
participation by foreign companies in the 
direct purchase of public enterprises, 
which also led to new investments 
designed to expand and improve the 
goods and services produced by the newly 
privatized companies; this phenomenon 
was particularly marked in Argentina and 
Venezuela (see table IX.4). 
Furthermore, governments also sold 
shares in privatized enterprises to the 
general public on local stock exchanges, 
thus influencing the behaviour of the 
latter, as well as to investors with 
foreign capital, either directly, through 
ADR and GDR programmes and offshore 
investment funds, or indirectly, through 
deposits made in Latin American banking 
systems from the exterior. Where the 
share package on sale was big compared 
with the size of the domestic market, 
21 There are quite a few indications of a notable under-valuation of the sale prices of public enterprises. 
For an analysis of this phenomenon and other aspects of the privatization programmes in the region, 
see Devlin and Cominetti (1994). 
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Table IX.14 
LATIN AMERICA: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES a b 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Argentina 
Short-term 26.4 127.7 -12.6 9.2 5.8 
Long-term 27.2 127.5 -14.4 6.1 3.4 
Bolivia 
Short-term -6.4 0.0 6.2 8.5 8.7 
Long-term -5.7 -0.2 4.4 5.4 6.3 
Brazil 
Short-term 98.8 -2.0 24.1 38.7 32.1 
Long-term 99.6 -2.2 22.3 35.6 29.7 
Chile 
Short-term -3.3 15.7 4.1 11.2 2.1 
Long-term -2.5 15.5 2.3 8.1 -0.3 
Colombia 
Short-term -9.3 -8.4 3.7 -8.3 17.3 
Long-term -8.5 -8.6 1.9 -11.4 14.1 
Costa Rica 
Short-term -0.1 -8.8 -8.8 9.9 3.0 
Long-term 0.7 -9.0 -10.6 6.8 0.6 
Ecuador 
Short-term -13.8 -3.7 -7.9 -2.6 21.1 
Long-term -13.1 -3.9 -9.7 -5.7 18.7 
El Salvador 
Short-term 7.0 -19.7 9.4 -5.2 18.5 
Long-term 7.8 -19.9 7.6 -8.3 16.1 
Guatemala 
Short-term -14.7 -10.0 16.6 2.0 -1.9 
Long-term -13.9 -10.2 14.8 -1.1 -4.3 
Honduras 
Short-term -0.7 -58.5 2.5 0.1 -13.8 
Long-term 0.1 -58.7 0.7 -3.0 -16.2 
Mexico 
Short-term 9.0 8.9 6.1 10.1 12.4 
Long-term 9.7 8.7 4.3 7.0 10.0 
Peru 
Short-term 75.8 -42.2 76.9 -6.0 5.3 
Long-term 76.5 -42.4 75.1 -9.1 2.9 
Uruguay 
Short-term -4.6 -7.9 4.8 5.6 6.7 
Long-term -3.8 -8.1 3.0 2.5 4.3 
Venezuela 
Short-term -29.6 3.2 2.8 0.8 27.2 
Long-term -28.8 3.0 1.0 -2.3 24.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
aNational deposit rates, equivalent in dollars, less international dollar interest rates. b Short-term rates 
correspond to national rates, less LIBOR, while long-term rates correspond to national rates, less the yields of United 
States Government bonds. 
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Figure IX.l 
REGIONAL INDEXES OF SHARE PRICES 
ON STOCK EXCHANGES 
(Dollars, indexes 1984=100) 
600 
S Latin America B Asia a United States United Kingdom • Japan 
Source: International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
a Average January-September. 
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Table IX.15 
LATIN AMERICA: INCOME FROM PRIVATIZATIONS 
Number 
of sales 
Gross public income a 
(millions of dollars) Total 
1989-1992 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1989-1993 
Argentina 43 - 2,105 2,592 6,094 4,565 15,356 
Brazil 17 - - 1,658 2,340 2,697 6,695 
Colombia 16 52 72 670 82 5 881 
Mexico 130 730 3,205 10,831 7,007 1,403 23,176 
Peru 14 - - 3 264 318 585 
Venezuela 13 - 9 2,290 20 33 2,352 
Total 233 782 5,391 18,044 15,807 9,021 49,045 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures, and Latin Finance, March 1994. 
a In cases where the privatization was financed with external debt paper, this was valued at secondary market prices. 
selling stock abroad sometimes 
constituted a good way of reducing the 
possibility of saturating the local market 
with shares and thus causing a fall in 
prices. For example, when 160 million 
shares of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
(YPF) of Argentina were placed on sale, 
with a value of more than US$ 3 billion, 
75% of them were bought by investors 
living in the United States and Europe. 
The difference between capital yields 
in Latin America and the industrialized 
countries also partly explains the region's 
capacity to sell bonds abroad. The yield of 
the Latin American bonds, with fairly 
short terms, was higher than that of United 
States Government bonds with terms that 
were four to six times longer (see tables 
IX.8 and IX.13). 
As the capital supply was stimulated 
by the relatively high yields promised by 
investments in the region, the demand for 
their financing tended to be directed at 
external markets, attracted by the lower 
costs of new capital. Interest rates on loans 
obtained in Latin American capital 
markets have generally been very high 
because of a combination of high real 
interest rates in local currency and 
exchange revaluations which make the 
cost of domestic credit even dearer, 
compared with external credit. For 
example, in 1993 the dollar equivalent cost 
of such loans was almost 50% in Peru, 41 % 
in Bolivia, 18% in Costa Rica, 11% in Chile, 
18% in Argentina, -2% in Honduras, 12% 
in Guatemala and 40% in Ecuador (see 
table IX.16). Indeed, the rates on loans in 
Latin American markets became so high 
that, in many cases, the available capital 
was confined to very short terms or was 
rationed by some lenders. In this context, 
it is only logical that many enterprises in 
the region decided to seek working capital 
and medium-term financing abroad. 
iii) The economic policies of the Latin 
American countries. The economic 
policies of the countries of the region have 
undoubtedly also influenced the boom in 
capital flows. Many countries, to varying 
degrees have carried out profound 
structural reforms whose effects have 
included the following: they have 
stabilized the expectations of private 
agents and increased the productivity and 
profitability of private investments; they 
have offered foreign investors equal or 
better conditions than local investors; and 
through the policy of liberalization, 
especially of the capital account, they have 
reduced the transaction costs and the risks 
involved in the movement of capital 
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Table IX.16 
LATIN AMERICA: DOLLAR EQUIVALENT RATES FOR LOANS TAKEN OUT 
ON DOMESTIC CAPITAL MARKETS a 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Argentina 40.6 1,087.5 138.0 -8.8 18.4 21.5 
Bolivia 14.2 24.1 28.0 32.7 41.1 
Chile 16.9 12.8 31.6 15.8 20.6 10.9 
Colombia 1.1 11.0 10.7 18.3 20.5 30.6 
Costa Rica 11.4 22.0 9.0 6.2 26.2 18.3 
Ecuador -25.3 -11.6 0.2 1.8 7.9 36.9 
El Salvador 17.0 18.5 -8.9 19.0 2.6 26.3 
Guatemala 7.1 -2.9 2.4 32.2 14.6 12.5 
Honduras 15.4 15.4 -46.3 18.8 12.7 -2.0 
Peru 131.6 29.5 504.9 49.9 48.9 
Uruguay 31.0 28.8 39.5 60.0 54.3 27.1 b 
Venezuela 8.5 -25.3 11.9 7.8 3.5 37.6 c 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and IMF data. 
a Average quarterly values. From 1993 on, figures refer to the prime lending rate. c From 1993 on, figures refer 
to effective rates. 
between the national and international 
markets. The reforms have been 
recognized by the market as is clear from 
the investment risk ratings assigned by 
Moody's Investors Service and Standard 
and Poor (S&P) of the United States. 
Capital flows have also been 
stimulated by the "neutral" economic 
policies of a large number of governments. 
In cases where the sterilization of capital 
inflows was not very marked, they were 
reflected in exchange rate appreciation, an 
increase in the trade deficit, and greater 
demand for financing. The relative 
permissiveness shown by many 
governments in their systems of 
regulation of external liabilities has also 
contributed to the increase in these flows. 
iv) Institutional changes in 
international markets. Apart from their 
interest in taking advantage of the 
relatively high yields offered in Latin 
America, it has been observed that many 
portfolio investors abroad are gradually 
modifying their investment strategy. The 
"emerging markets" of the developing 
countries are not very highly integrated 
with international capital markets, and 
some experts have therefore concluded 
that this lower interdependence between 
the two, together with the higher growth 
prospects of the developing countries, 
offer additional benefits to investors who 
diversify their portfolio in order to 
participate in the new markets. Moreover, 
since their investments in emerging 
markets represent only a very small 
fraction of their total portfolio, their 
exposure to exchange risks does not 
necessarily outweigh the favourable 
effects of such diversification. Moreover, 
emerging markets typically offer only 
limited information to the public, so that 
investors ready to spend money on the 
generation of information have a better 
chance of identifying undervalued shares 
with appreciation potential. Finally, the 
emerging markets are now being 
discovered by investors who traditionally 
concentrated their attention on the 
industrialized countries. 
External investors also apparently see 
Latin American bonds as a relatively 
secure instrument. Firstly, during the 
crisis of the 1980s, the countries of the 
region continued to service the bonds they 
had previously issued in a normal manner, 
and some experts have concluded from 
this that the bonds have de facto  priority 
with regard to the availability of foreign 
exchange. Secondly, it is often maintained 
that bonds are less subject to non-payment 
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than commercial loans, as it is a good deal 
easier for bondholders to initiate legal 
action (Gooptu, 1993).22 
There were also regulatory factors at 
the international level which facilitated the 
entry of capital. One of the most important 
of these was probably rule 144A adopted 
in April 1990 by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the United 
States. This rule allowed institutional 
investors registered in the United States to 
buy and sell securities not registered with 
the Commission. This strengthened the 
"private market" for securities not 
registered in the United States, thus 
making it possible for Latin American 
enterprises to organize sales of ADRS 
without having to adhere to the conditions 
imposed on the "public market" of 
registered securities (for example, the 
adoption of the United States system of 
book keeping). 
Financial "engineering" has become 
the fashion in international markets and 
has given Latin America greater access to 
those markets. Enterprises with a low 
market profile have been able to obtain 
financing thanks to the imaginative 
mechanism of offering special guarantees 
in cash; for example, some Mexican 
enterprises were able to issue bonds by 
using the backing of blocked funds, 
financed against future earnings of foreign 
exchange. Another technique used has 
been to offer bonds with option certificates 
or warrants; the Mexican firm Nacional 
Financiera S.N.C. recently made a US$ 100 
million bond issue which gave investors 
the option, after the third year, to convert 
their bonds into shares in a State 
enterprise. 
The popularity acquired by financial 
instruments such as ADRs also facilitated 
the flow of capital into the region, because 
they created a more favourable 
environment for external investors. On the 
one hand, dividends are received directly 
in dollars; on the other, the ADRs may be 
purchased with the cheaper credit 
available in the United States. A sizeable 
sub-group of ADRs (known as secondary 
ADRs) have done more to boost stock prices 
than to increase business firms' capital, 
however, and have heightened stock 
quotations' sensitivity to cyclical 
fluctuations. From a macroeconomic 
standpoint, in a number of countries 
investments in the stock market have 
entailed inflows of foreign exchange that 
have put strong upward pressure on the 
currency. Thus, they have come to 
represent a source of future instability. 
c) Sources and uses of  the neio external 
capital flows 
As already noted, one of the main 
features of the recent boom in capital flows 
has been the relative marginalization of 
the commercial banks and the emergence 
of more diversified sources of financing 
than those of the 1970s. In particular, a 
more important role has been played by 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
portfolio investments (shares, bonds and 
other securities). 
Naturally, the flows of FDI originate in 
decisions taken by transnational 
corporations, most of which are located in 
the industrialized countries, especially the 
United States, which has traditionally 
been the primary source of FDI (Calderón, 
1994). Although the industrialized 
countries are the main generators of these 
flows, however, intra-Latin American 
investments are showing increasing 
dynamism (Calderón, 1993b). During the 
two or three last years, for example, 
Chilean enterprises have become 
important foreign direct investors in 
Argentina. 
Unfortunately, investments in 
securities, which are now one of the most 
important sources of financing, represent 
22 This confidence appears to contradict historical experience, for in the 1930s prolonged cases of 
non-payment of the external debt occurred mainly in the case of bonds, which were then the main 
debt instruments (ECLAC, 1964). In the 1980s, in contrast, bonds represented only a minimal 
proportion of the total debt. 
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to a large extent anonymous transactions 
in which it is not easy to identify the 
investors.23 Nevertheless, there is 
relatively general agreement that, in the 
beginning, the predominant source of 
portfolio finance was the repatriation of 
assets held by Latin American residents 
abroad (Gooptu, 1993). An estimate based 
on a methodology contained in a recent 
report of the World Bank (1993b), as cited 
earlier, suggests that between 1988 and 
1992 the return of flight capital was a very 
significant source of external financing, 
even taking into account substantial errors 
of overestimation. 
As already noted, there are various 
reasons which explain such repatriation. 
Firstly, residents are perhaps the best 
informed about developments in their 
own country, so that when problems arise 
they may be the first to "escape", and 
when the situation improves, the first to 
return. Clearly, the structural reforms and 
liberalization which have been carried out 
have increased the opportunities for 
obtaining profits and reduced the 
transaction costs of moving domestic 
financial resources into and out of the 
region. Another motive for repatriation 
has been the relatively high cost of 
domestic credit, together with the low 
profitability of external assets. The 
purchase of Latin American bonds (which 
are seen as having government support), 
of shares in specific country investment 
funds and of American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) have also given local 
residents a feeling of security against 
political risks and risks involved in the 
transfer of resources. 
Although part of this repatriation is 
permanent, perhaps the prime motivation 
is speculative -to obtain high profitability 
over the short term (Gooptu, 1993). To the 
extent that this is true, this means that a 
large part of the region's external 
financing is highly volatile. 
Other sources of financing are foreign 
individuals and enterprises who seek 
high-risk high-return investments. The 
main channels for this type of investment 
have been the managed funds specializing 
in the securities of emerging markets 
(bonds and shares) and in the retail 
purchase of international bonds and ADRs. 
The most stable sources of portfolio 
financing are the big institutional 
investors, like insurance companies and 
pension funds. The institutional investors 
with the largest foreign portfolios are to be 
found in the United Kingdom, followed by 
Japan and the United States. However, 
their investments in emerging markets 
constitute a relatively marginal part of 
their portfolios, amounting to less than 5% 
of their total investments abroad. Even so, 
institutional investors seem to have been 
much more active in Latin America in 
1992-1993, and certain information 
provided by market operators suggests 
that those organizations might continue to 
considerably increase their participation 
in the years to come (Gooptu, 1993). Finally, 
as regards the geographical origin of the 
portfolio flows towards Latin America, they 
appear to come largely from the United 
States, followed by Europe (especially the 
United Kingdom) (Howell, 1993). 
As regards the use made of the new 
external financing, relatively little 
information is available. It is clear, 
however, that the Latin American private 
sector mobilizes the bulk of the portfolio 
investment. Naturally, most of the 
investment in capital stock is mobilized by 
private enterprises. But the private sector 
has also predominated in bond issues: in 
1992 and 1993 private bodies accounted 
for 70% and 55%, respectively, of the total 
value of new bonds (World Bank, 1993a). 
4. The quality and future prospects of 
the new financing flows 
One of the problems in evaluating the 
current increase in the flow of capital is the 
relatively limited nature of the 
23 For example, bonds are usually payable "to bearer", while, investments in equity are also hard to 
trace unless there is an official requirement to register them. 
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information available. There is no single 
complete source of data on the different 
components of capital flows. The large 
quantity of local deposits in United States 
dollars (see table IX.17) and local-currency 
government securities acquired with 
dollars (such as the Treasury Certificates 
(CETES) issued in Mexico) represent 
potential foreign-currency obligations 
which do not appear in the external debt 
figures. Meanwhile the most general 
estimates of flows and obligations are full 
of chronological anomalies, while the 
various public and private efforts to collect 
information do not necessarily generate 
compatible estimates. A similar situation 
prevailed in the 1970s with regard to bank 
loans to the developing countries, and this 
lack of information on the part of creditors 
may have contributed to the excessive 
granting of loans, the overindebtedness 
and crisis (Ffrench-Davis and Devlin, 
1994).24 
In spite of these limitations, a brief 
assessment of the new capital flows is 
given below. 
a) Terms and costs 
A relatively large proportion of the 
new flows of external financing seem to be 
on relatively burdensome terms, with a 
significant proportion of short-term 
maturities. Aside from short-term loans 
and bank deposits, portfolio investment 
has quite short maturities or can be 
liquidated (albeit perhaps at a loss) quite 
rapidly. 
Bonds -considered as one of the most 
rapidly growing of the new financial 
flows- have formally had a medium-term 
maturities, but in the 1990s this means 
three to five years. This limited horizon 
compels borrowers to have frequent 
recourse to difficult and uncertain 
refinancing exercises. The present 
situation contrasts with the past century 
when developing countries could attract 
capital by issuing bonds with terms of up 
to 99 years (Hughes, 1979). Even the 
commercial banks offered average terms 
of seven to 10 years in the 1970s. If Latin 
America can maintain access to these bond 
markets, and if more institutional 
investors participate, the terms might be 
extended. Stock exchange investment, for 
its part, carries no commitments as 
regards terms and can be withdrawn 
without prior notice.25 FDI, however, 
which made up less than a fourth of net 
flows in 1992 and 1993, is a long-term 
commitment. 
All the new sources of finance are 
relatively burdensome. Such is the case of 
bonds and FDI; but it is also true in general 
of financing based on stock issues 
(Williamson, 1993a). This is one of the 
reasons why stock exchange investment in 
new shares is not usually an important 
source of new capital.26 Naturally, the 
high cost is not in itself a problem if the 
resources are used in activities with even 
higher profitability and if the global 
economy can generate enough foreign 
exchange to service the external capital. 
Unfortunately, there is little 
microeconomic information on the 
manner in which external financing is 
used; however, at the macroeconomic 
level it is possible to examine the 
association between changes in external 
financing and domestic use of the 
resources for consumption or investment. 
This question is addressed in chapter XI. 
b) Volatility 
As already stated, an important source 
of capital has been the repatriation of 
funds by residents and the entry of foreign 
capital for short-term speculation in Latin 
America. The profits from such 
24 Indeed, creditors only became aware of the growing debt problem at quite a late stage. 
25 Naturally, there must be a domestic buyer. This question will be examined later. 
26 In the United States, stock exchange investment is only 7% of new gross investment, and in the 
developing countries it is much lower (Welch, 1993). Traditionally, the main role of stock markets 
has not been to encourage new investments, but rather to offer liquidity to investors. 
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Table IX.l7 
LATIN AMERICA: FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
1990 1993 
Share of external 
flows a 
(In percentages) 
Argentina 3,442 17,126 55.7 
Mexico 10,765 17,027 8.0 
Paraguay 242 632 18.0 
Peru 1,031 4,120 37.6 
Uruguay 4,427 5,584 115.2 
Total (5) 19,907 44,489 21.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Increase in the sum of foreign-currency  deposits between 1990 and 1993, expressed as a percentage of the increase in 
the stock of external liabilities (measured by approximation as the sum of net capital f lows dur ing the three-year period 
1991-1993 as given in table IX.l). 
speculation are currently quite high, 
partly because of the international 
recession and the low international real 
interest rates in the North. Naturally, any 
substantial variation in short-term 
profitability in Latin America compared 
with the rest of the world may reverse the 
direction of the capital flow, with negative 
consequences for the balance of payments 
and external adjustment. The speculative 
nature of these flows makes them 
potentially unstable. 
Another perspective from which to 
judge volatility is to examine the standard 
deviation of the flows in the capital 
account broken down by types of 
transactions. This is the procedure used in 
table IX.18 for Latin America as a whole 
and six relatively large countries of the 
region. From this table we can see that the 
short-term financial flows (i.e., those with 
terms of less than one year) have 
traditionally been highly volatile in the last 
40 years.27 
In contrast with short-term capital, in 
general long-term flows have shown 
much less volatility over the last 40 years. 
This category includes some portfolio 
flows, such as bonds. Up to the 1990s, 
however, the magnitude of this type of 
financing was so small that evaluations of 
its historical volatility are of no great 
significance. Also, with the exception of 
the early 1980s, the "loans" category has 
shown a relatively low degree of volatility 
over the period since the war. However, in 
the 1990s this type of flow has not been 
very dynamic, partly because of the 
variability of the international strategies of 
the commercial banks. 
Another long-term flow is foreign 
direct investment (FDI). This balance of 
payments category also has relatively low 
volatility. FDI is usually touted as a very 
attractive source of external financing, 
which is claimed not only to be relatively 
permanent but also to incorporate 
technology and know-how. Supposedly, it 
also follows an anticyclical trend in the 
sense that profits are sensitive to the ups 
and downs of domestic economic activity. 
However, an examination of FDI trends 
in Latin America suggests that a few 
warnings are in order regarding the 
27 This is clear from the very high standard deviations for the category "short-term" flows of the balance 
of payments for the period 1950-1992. These standard deviations are comparable, since they were 
standardized by the average for each sub-period. 
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Table IX.18 
LATIN AMERICA: VOLATILITY OF EXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
(Coefficient  of  volatility) a 
Net capital 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990- 1980 
movements 1959 1969 1979 1989 1992 1992 
Latin America 
Long term 0.63 0.45 0.62 0.88 1.92 0.87 
-Loans 0.69 0.42 0.63 1.25 3.12 1.90 
-Foreign direct investment 0.77 0.58 0.61 0.34 0.36 0.40 
Short term 3.40 2.20 1.76 3.63 2.61 16.20 
Grants and donations 0.70 0.16 0.44 0.43 1.73 0.72 
Errors and omissions 1.39 1.80 4.10 1.45 5.98 1.80 
Argentina 
Long term 1.50 3.10 1.60 0.80 0.69 0.78 
-Loans 2.60 22.10 1.60 1.10 1.80 1.70 
-Foreign direct investment 1.50 1.60 1.50 0.68 0.95 0.98 
Short term 3.70 2.90 39.70 2.10 2.30 2.70 
Grants and donations 2.50 2.60 2.90 . . 
Errors and omissions 19.60 3.60 270 2.20 3.10 2.70 
Brazil 
Long term 0.67 0.48 0.50 1.10 2.20 1.28 
-Loans 1.39 0.80 0.60 1.50 3.70 1.70 
-Foreign direct investment 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.52 1.40 0.60 
Short term 6.70 2.30 1.30 4.80 2.10 3.30 
Grants and donations 0.50 0.40 1.50 5.20 - 3.70 
Errors and omissions 3.30 1.60 3.00 1.00 0.70 0.80 
Chile 
Long term 1.00 0.52 1.80 0.80 0.38 0.72 
-Loans 1.60 0.39 1.40 1.40 0.47 1.30 
-Foreign direct investment 1.30 2.40 9.20 0.65 0.41 0.70 
Short term 15.40 1.60 1.16 4.20 1.00 2.40 
Grants and donations 1.20 1.20 0.62 0.56 0.43 0.92 
Errors and omissions 3.80 3.00 2.00 5.00 43.60 7.90 
Colombia 
Long term 1.20 0.76 0.69 0.53 0.38 0.73 
-Loans 1.30 0.80 0.75 0.68 0.18 1.00 
-Foreign direct investment 2.50 0.76 0.63 0.64 0.07 0.58 
Short term 13.20 3.20 27.60 3.70 1.10 2.57 
Grants and donations 0.93 0.82 0.54 11.20 0.20 2.97 
Errors and omissions 2.00 7.80 0.86 2.20 0.75 5.16 
Mexico 
Long term 0.40 0.57 0.62 1.12 0.56 0.98 
-Loans 1.02 0.74 0.67 2.28 1.20 1.53 
-Foreign direct investment 0.29 0.58 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.72 
Short term 2.20 4.49 7.49 2.53 0.43 10.80 
Grants and donations 1.35 1.39 0.42 1.13 1.14 1.36 
Errors and omissions 320 8.70 2.60 2.29 3.70 2.40 
Venezuela 
Long term 1.58 5.58 1.59 25.70 0.81 4.60 
-Loans 2.45 7.00 1.41 2.56 1.80 2.90 
-Foreign direct investment 1.55 6.00 3.60 1.08 0.76 1.24 
Short term 12.40 2.88 19.30 1.46 2.30 1.55 
Grants and donations 0.46 1.25 0.84 0.16 0.26 0.25 
Errors and omissions 1.20 2.00 1.56 3.30 0.62 2.10 
Source: ECLAC, o n the basis of official  information. 
a Standard deviat ion, weighted by the average for the relevant sub-period. 
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anticyclical nature of this type of flow. 
According to preliminary statistical 
analyses, the correlation coefficients tend 
to suggest that net transfers of FDI have 
been positively associated with the 
direction of the global external transfer of 
resources and with the behaviour of the 
export sector and the levels of reserves. 
Hence, it could be worth going more 
deeply into the hypothesis that the 
financial behaviour of FDI is procyclical in 
the face of balance-of-payments trends. If 
this is so, then its financial effects on the 
external sector may not be all that favourable. 
As regards external capital on the 
Latin American stock exchanges, it should 
be noted that it cannot be withdrawn 
unilaterally: in order to sell part of it, there 
must be a buyer to act as a counterpart. 
Hence, massive withdrawal from these 
markets can only be achieved at the cost of 
a steep price drop. For this reason, some 
maintain that it is improbable that external 
capital trends on the stock exchanges 
could be suddenly reversed. However, the 
financial influence of investors and 
externalities on the stock exchanges is so 
great that it could prove to be a serious 
mistake to underestimate the risks of 
possible stampedes by foreign investors 
and systemic crises, for events on the stock 
or foreign exchange markets may induce a 
massive liquidation movement in an 
attempt to cut losses sustained as a result 
of additional price declines.28 
c) Future access 
In speculating as to whether Latin 
America will further extend and develop 
its present advantageous position on 
international capital markets, there are 
reasons to be optimistic: for example, there 
are certain indications that in the 1990s 
portfolio investors "discovered" emerging 
markets in the developing countries 
(Howell, 1993). If the only thing 
motivating them are high profitability, 
this might simply be a passing interest, but 
apparently there has been a growing 
interest in gaining the supposed benefits 
derived from the diversification of 
portfolios towards financial markets 
whose behaviour is not closely correlated 
with that of markets in the industrialized 
countries. This latter motive is more 
structural and permanent. Moreover, the 
external portfolio of the investors is 
enormous. For example, at the end of 1992 
international investors held US$ 900 
billion in foreign securities (Howell, 1993), 
and only a tiny fraction of this sum is 
currently assigned to the emerging 
markets. Consequently, even a small 
diversification towards those markets 
could bring a huge flood of resources to 
the developing areas, and to Latin 
America in particular.29 
Another factor that must be borne in 
mind on the supply side is that the capital 
holdings maintained abroad by Latin 
American residents are apparently very 
considerable. Kuczynski (1992), for 
example, estimates that Latin Americans 
have some US$ 300 billion deposited 
abroad.30 Nor can we discount the 
possibility that the favourable 
demonstration effects generated by the 
profits obtained by foreign investors may 
renew the interest of banks in extending 
medium-term loans to developing areas. 
At the same time, economic growth, added 
28 Hence the importance of internal regulation, which is dealt with in chapter XII. 
29 The pension funds of the United Kingdom have increased their investments in foreign securities, 
which represented 18% of their assets as of 1990; this is by far the highest coefficient among developed 
countries. If 5% of these investments were placed in emerging markets, this would still represent 
only 1% of these funds' total assets. The percentage of foreign securities held by German pension 
funds was 1%, while for United States pension funds the figure was 4% (Griffith-Jones, 1994, table 
12). In contrast, at the beginning of the century, portfolio investors held up to 50% of their investments 
in emerging markets (Howell, 1993). 
30 Naturally, not all these funds would be available for repatriation, for they may include significant 
amounts of semi-permanent investments abroad. 
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to transparent and attractive investment 
rules, should continue to attract foreign 
direct investment. 
But as pointed out by Williamson 
(1993a), in the Latin American economy 
we should not equate access to external 
financing with success, for on quite a few 
occasions the region has had access to 
abundant external financing -the last 
episode was in the 1970s- only to end up 
in crisis. Clearly, continued presence in 
these markets will depend not only on 
good incentives for investors but also, in 
more general terms, on prudent economic 
management, including the extent to 
which the volume, type and use of external 
financing are compatible with 
macroeconomic stability, international 
competitiveness and a strong domestic 
process of saving and investment. The 
external capital markets are usually less 
disciplined than the textbooks and market 
operators like to make out, and they are 
clearly prone to adopt prevailing cyclical 
trends and to make adjustments which 
create unsustainable financial booms. 
Moreover, the volume of resources 
available at a given moment may be 
enormous, compared with any 
developing country's capacity for efficient 
absorption and production. 
Consequently, in times of abundance 
borrowers need to maintain far-sighted 
policies and special discipline rather than 
trusting exclusively in the "judgement of 
the market" or of the creditors. 
Chapter X 
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT: 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
From both the theoretical and the practical 
standpoint, external financial inflows can be 
a valuable complement to domestic efforts to 
initiate and sustain development processes. 
This chapter examines the relationship 
between inflows of external capital and 
macroeconomic stability and development. 
Section 1 discusses a number of 
theoretical arguments, both traditional 
and relatively new, which analyse the role 
played by external capital mobility in 
developmentprocesses. Section 2 presents 
a brief description of the ongoing debate 
on the dynamics of capital account 
liberalization. What is attempted here is 
not to make a detailed study of the 
literature on these topics,31 but rather to 
review the development of some of the 
main ideas and policies on capital 
mobility. This will provide useful 
background information which, together 
with the discussion of the composition and 
volume of capital flows in the previous 
chapter, will make it easier to analyse the 
relevant public policies in the region. 
1. The role of external capital mobility 
in development 
External capital flows have long been 
assigned an important role in 
31 For a good recent study, see Hanson (1992). 
development. Moreover, in recent years 
increasing attention has been given to the 
issue of capital mobility and its impact on 
development. Here, six central roles 
for capital mobility are identified: 
a) improved macroeconomic resource 
allocation; b) mobilization of foreign 
savings; c) smoothing out of expenditure 
over time; d) risk diversification; 
e) micro-productive efficiency and 
f) enhanced credibility of the monetary 
authorities. Each of these roles is backed 
up by powerful theoretical arguments. 
However, it also will be shown that the 
real second-best world in which we live 
can run counter to many of the textbook 
appreciations of capital flows. This has 
given rise to certain caveats about the role 
of capital mobility in the development 
processes, the most important of which are 
also outlined in this section. 
a) Efficient  resource allocation 
At the aggregate level, capital 
movements are supposed to improve the 
efficiency of world resource allocation 
(Mathieson and Rojas-Suárez, 1993), for 
real returns on marginal investment in 
capital-rich countries are typically lower 
than those in capital-scarce countries. 
With capital mobility, savers in the 
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capital-rich country may be expected to 
give up their lower-yielding investments 
at home for higher-yielding investments 
in the poorer country. Thus, savers in the 
rich country earn a higher rate of return on 
their capital, while domestic investment 
and national income of the capital-poor 
country increase. The improved world 
resource allocation is also gradually 
reflected in smaller differentials in yields 
on investment between the two countries. 
Like many theoretical arguments, the 
predicted outcomes depend on 
compliance with some strict conditions. 
Among these is the condition that financial 
markets, which intermediate most 
international movements of capital, must 
have what Tobin (1984) terms 
fundamental valuation efficiency: i.e., 
market valuations must accurately reflect 
the updated value of the dividends that 
the assets in question can reasonably be 
expected to generate over time. Accurate 
pricing is extremely important because 
prices are the main signal for the market's 
reallocation of capital. Unfortunately, 
price movements in financial markets 
often do not reflect fundamentals (Tobin, 
1984; Stiglitz, 1993; Kenen, 1993). Thus, 
those investments which attract 
cross-border capital flows owing to their 
higher expected private returns may not 
necessarily be the investments with the 
highest social rate of return. 
Thus, empirical studies (summarized 
in Tobin, 1984; Akyüz, 1993; Lessard, 1991) 
as well as historical analyses 
(Kindleberger, 1978) suggest that serious 
inefficiencies can arise from the allocative 
mechanisms of capital markets. Indeed, 
under conditions of capital market 
imperfections, together with 
non-economic factors, almost anything 
can happen regarding the conjunctural 
flow of capital. 
In the long run, the process of trial and 
error allows market agents to get a better 
idea of the prevailing distortions and 
imperfections, so that, over time, 
unencumbered international financial 
markets can systematically allocate capital 
more efficiently.32 However, in the short 
term the imperfections in question can 
cause financial markets to allocate too 
much or too little capital (vis-à-vis the 
underlying returns) to some recipients at 
a given moment. The risk of such 
misallocation rises in proportion as flows 
are directed to purely financial operations 
rather than to productive investment and 
trade. When the short-term misallocation 
is very large or systemic, it can induce a 
crisis and have devastating consequences 
for firms, economic sectors and nations. 
Moreover, these short-term disturbances 
in finance, which seriously disrupt output 
and distort returns to capital, can 
obviously impart arbitrary advantages 
and disadvantages to different economic 
agents, which in themselves can become 
determinants of returns and thus of 
international resource allocation trends. 
b) Mobilization of  external savings 
This has been perhaps the most 
traditional, and certainly the strongest, 
argument in favour of international capital 
mobility and flows to developing 
countries, for in developing countries 
capital is usually the scarcest factor of 
production, while relatively low incomes 
and domestic savings hinder rapid capital 
accumulation and growth. Therefore, 
external savings in the form of net capital 
inflows can supplement domestic savings, 
raise investment levels and boost growth. 
In turn, expansion of aggregate income 
can further raise domestic savings and 
investment, thereby creating the basis for 
sustained economic expansion. 
The "virtuous cycle" is usually seen in 
terms of the favourable long-term external 
resource cycle shown in figure X.l. During 
period I, foreign capital (for the sake of 
simplicity represented exclusively in the 
form of debt) finances the shortfall in 
savings. External saving has its 
32 Indeed, Bloomfield (1968) concluded that free international mobility of capital in the 19th century 
resulted in capital migrating to the places with the highest rates of return. 
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Figure X.l 
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counterpart in a deficit on the country's 
trade account. In this initial period foreign 
debt grows faster than GDP because new 
loans must not only cover the savings gap 
but must also refinance the debt service 
falling due. However, economic growth 
progressively raises the proportion of 
targeted investment that can be financed 
from domestic savings, until a point is 
reached at the end of period I, where the 
country's savings level is high enough to 
finance all its investment and trade 
balance is reached. Interest payments are 
still, however, covered with new debt. 
In period II, continued economic 
growth generates a surplus of domestic 
savings with respect to targeted 
investment levels and this manifests itself 
in the emergence of a trade surplus, which 
permits the country to voluntarily begin to 
reduce the flow of resources from abroad 
by paying progressively greater 
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proportions of the interest on its foreign 
debt. Consequently, the rate of growth of 
the debt gradually declines until it ceases 
growing altogether at the end of period II, 
when the savings (and trade) surplus rises 
to a level large enough to cover all interest 
on foreign liabilities. In period III, 
economic growth and the continued 
expansion of the domestic savings surplus 
permit the country not only to cover all its 
interest commitments, but also to begin 
paying off the foreign debt until it falls to 
zero. After this, the country's virtuous 
credit cycle culminates in its graduation to 
the club of net capital exporters. 
While obviously highly stylized, this 
traditional parable has some powerful 
messages. First, external capital flows 
should consistently go to augment 
aggregate investment, and not be diverted 
to consumption. Second, an aggressive 
domestic savings effort is called for: from 
the outset of the cycle, the marginal 
savings rate must be kept at a level which 
is much higher than the country's average 
savings rate and also considerably greater 
than the investment rate, thus eventually 
permitting a savings surplus to emerge. 
Third, the investment must be efficient. 
Fourth, the country must invest heavily in 
tradables, exports and import substitutes, 
in order to be able to create a trade surplus 
large enough to transform domestic 
savings into convertible currency, so as to 
service the debt in stage II and pay it off 
completely in stage III. 3 Fifth, it requires 
well-informed, and patient, creditors who 
are willing to provide stable and 
predictable flows of finance on reasonable 
terms, especially in the delicate stage of 
period I, when creditors must roll over the 
total sum of debt service as well as 
financing a positive transfer of resources 
over a considerable number of years. 
These strict stylized conditions may 
not all be complied with in practice, of 
course: countries may experience an 
ongoing substitution of domestic savings 
by foreign savings; investments may not 
always be efficient or channeled 
sufficiently into tradable goods, and 
creditor behaviour may be perverse. 
Indeed, convincing though the traditional 
argument for the transfer of international 
savings to relatively poorer countries may 
be, the above problems have often caused 
this valuable developmental mechanism 
to operate only feebly. It may be recalled, 
for example, that between the Great 
Depression and 1965, relatively little 
capital flowed to developing regions. 
Moreover, when flows were renewed in 
the 1970s, many countries experienced a 
glut of finance which was one of the causes 
of the crisis. Notwithstanding these 
serious difficulties, however, foreign 
savings have historically played a 
significant role in the development of 
many countries, with some, like the 
United States, emerging as industrialized 
nations and subsequently evolving into 
major capital exporters. 
Latin American countries have long 
used foreign savings to promote 
development and growth. Latin America's 
history as regards external financial flows 
has been chequered, however, as countries 
have repeatedly entered into defaults and 
crisis either due to imprudent deployment 
of foreign resources, destabilizing creditor 
behaviour or adverse external shocks 
(ECLAC, 1964; Stallings, 1987). The most 
recent crisis was of course the devastating 
debt problem of the 1980s. 
Table X.l shows the importance of 
external savings in aggregate investment 
flows in the region since 1970. As may be 
seen, even if the crisis years are excluded, 
for the region as a whole external savings 
have financed only about 15% of aggregate 
investment. It should be noted that this 
average masks the much greater 
significance for foreign savings for Central 
America and the Caribbean, where their 
contribution to investment is a third or 
more. This relatively high participation of 
33 If the government is the main debtor, a fiscal surplus must also be generated, implying some 
combination of increased taxes and lower expenditure. For an analytical framework, see Eyzaguirre 
(1989). 
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Table X.l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL SAVINGS AS A 












Latin America and 
the Caribbean 13.5 17.3 6.1 7.0 20.0 
Petroleum exporters 9.7 14.3 1.5 8.2 31.2 
Non-petroleum 
exporters 16.2 19.9 9.6 5.9 10.0 
South America 
Central America and 
the Caribbean 30.9 35.0 38.9 41.5 47.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a External saving is equal to capital income less the variation in reserves as shown on the balance of payments. 
Investment is equal to gross capital formation. Data are expressed in 1980 dollars. 
foreign savings, which confirms the 
special situation of that subregión, is due 
in part to the importance of official 
donations, which unlike most foreign 
savings do not involve a direct servicing 
burden. 
At all events, it is clear that domestic 
savings is by far the principal source of 
financing for the bulk of investment, even 
in Central America and the Caribbean. 
Clearly, without a sustained effort on this 
front, the level of investment will fall short 
of what is needed for sustained growth. 
Thus, foreign savings only complement 
this domestic effort. This conclusion is all 
the more evident in the case of the "success 
stories" of East Asia (see table 1.2). 
c) Smoothing-out of  expenditure over time 
There are some possible scenarios 
where external capital inflows can reduce 
the costs of intertemporal differences 
between production (or income) and 
expenditure. Whereas the previous 
arguments focused on long-standing 
movements of capital, this one is more 
oriented towards conjunctural trends. 
The simplest example of this role of 
external capital is shown in figure X.2, 
where a country experiences in the first 
half of every year a sharp and predictable 
seasonal drop in the output of its principal 
export commodity. Even if it had no 
reserves to draw upon, it could sustain a 
constant capacity to import by 
compensating the period of low export 
earnings through external borrowing and 
then repaying the loans in the period when 
earnings rise to their seasonal peak, thus 
leaving the country with no net debt. In 
this way, at the cost of the interest 
payments on the debt, the country avoids 
the social disruption of adjusting its 
domestic expenditure to the fluctuations 
in the output of its principal export. 
Developing countries may also 
confront very protracted shocks and loss 
of income. In this case external financing 
can smooth the inevitable adjustment 
process and even allow the country to 
keep up its domestic expenditure (and 
import capacity) while resources are 
reallocated to new productive activities. 
For instance, a world-wide 
technological change may suddenly 
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Figure X.2 
COMPENSATORY INDEBTEDNESS 
X = Exports 
M = Imports 
D = External debt 
Y = GDP 
E = Aggregate expenditure 
t = Time 
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adversely affect external demand and 
production in a major exporting sector, 
causing exports, output and income to fall. 
Obviously, the country must adjust and 
reallocate its now idle domestic resources 
to new productive export activities if it is 
to regain its pre-crisis level of output and 
restore balance in the external accounts. 
The start-up of production and exports by 
new activities is inevitably a lengthy 
process. 
Thanks to capital flows the growth of 
domestic expenditure can be maintained 
at or near the old levels during the 
adjustment period with a concomitant 
external deficit and rise in foreign debt. 
While this policy does not eliminate all the 
costs of adjustment, it does minimize the 
under-utilization of productive resources 
and the social disruption caused, by 
allowing the inevitable costs to be spread 
out over time, although when the fruits of 
adjustment produce new exports and 
there is a recovery in the growth of output, 
the rate of expansion of aggregate 
expenditure must be restrained so that a 
domestic surplus (i.e., negative foreign 
savings) emerges to repay the foreign 
debt. 
If the shock were basically transitory 
(for example, a temporary rise in 
international interest rates or a 
conjunctural worsening of the terms of 
trade), the country could borrow foreign 
resources to sustain expenditure. In this 
case, no structural adjustment would be 
necessary, but here too there is a cost 
similar to the above: in order to service the 
debt and repay it in the future, aggregate 
expenditure must be kept below aggregate 
output for a certain period of time. 
While capital mobility can 
theoretically help to spread out over time 
the costs of intertemporal differences 
between output and expenditure, the 
process may not always evolve smoothly 
in practice. If the transitory swings in 
external variables -like the volume of 
exports, the terms of trade, or interest 
rates- are entirely predictable, free capital 
markets could conceivably provide the 
desired finance without much difficulty. 
But in developing countries it is not 
always easy to ascertain whether a 
downturn in the external sector is 
transitory or not, and this uncertainty, 
coupled with imperfections in 
international capital markets (especially 
their shortsightedness or relatively 
narrow time horizons), the relatively large 
impact that even small external shocks can 
have on poor developing economies, and 
the less than perfect policy responses that 
can emerge, all represent obstacles to the 
arrival of adequate amounts of external 
finance. Moreover, in the face of a 
protracted shock, where creditworthiness 
depends on the ability and uncertain 
willingness of the country to adjust, the 
mobilization of adequate non-
compensatory finance may be very 
problematical indeed. In these 
circumstances official compensatory finance 
-e.g., from the IMF- could fill the financing 
gaps that might emerge. However, here 
the record shows that in this respect there 
are serious imperfections owing to the 
mechanical limits on the availability of 
multilateral funds to each borrower and 
the only modest overall financial capacity 
of official lenders (O'Connell, 1993). 
When this valuable role of 
international capital mobility is played 
only imperfectly, the costs of adjustment 
for developing countries can be enormous. 
That is because in the face of a negative 
external shock (and limited domestic 
international reserves), any shortfalls in 
capital inflows will require immediate 
cutbacks in domestic expenditure to 
restore the external balance. Moreover, 
while in theory output need not 
necessarily fall during this adjustment of 
expenditure, it almost certainly will in 
practice because of the natural rigidities 
standing in the way of resource 
reallocation, while there also tends to be a 
disproportionate cutback in investment. 
Latin America's external adjustment in the 
1980s illustrates this point very well: much 
higher interest costs on the foreign debt 
and deterioration in the terms of trade, 
coupled with a severe shortage of 
financing, forced a massive adjustment of 
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domestic expenditure. At the same time, 
resource rigidities and serious 
contractions in the supply of imported 
inputs and investment contributed to 
unprecedented losses of output (ECLAC, 
1984a; Ramos, 1985; Ground, 1986; 
Feinberg and Ffrench-Davis, 1988). 
d) Diversification  of  risks 
If finance is treated analogously to 
goods, social benefits could be perceived 
in a two-way international trade in 
financial assets, since capital mobility 
would allow individuals to satisfy their 
risk preferences more fully through 
greater diversification of their asset 
holdings. As Hanson (1992) emphasizes, 
this social benefit arises even if capital 
mobility has no effect whatsoever on the 
savings and investment process. 
Following the analogy of trade in 
goods, this relatively recent idea 
concerning the benefits of capital mobility 
leads logically to the recommendation of 
free trade in financial assets (Mathieson 
and Rojas-Suárez, 1993). Indeed, this is one 
of the most widely-used arguments for 
justifying international across-the-board 
capital mobility. The conclusions are 
based on the notion of an integrated world 
economy where total well-being is the sum 
of the well-being of individual investors. 
The strength of the general argument 
is weakened, however, when one breaks 
with the analytical tradition of the 
representative agent and the unit of 
analysis used is the country, some of them 
net debtors and others net creditors. In the 
first place, it is an individual's desire for 
diversification through capital outflows 
that initiates the trade in financial assets, 
and in the final analysis the main benefits 
from free trade in financial assets will go 
to those countries which are net capital 
exporters rather than those which are net 
importers of capital, as is usually the case 
in developing regions (Williamson, 1983). 
In the second place, during the process of 
equalization of interest rates, an 
unregulated situation could degenerate 
into big imbalances owing to the excessive 
proliferation of investors with speculative 
instincts, who, it is well known, can lead to 
a weakening of the savings-investment 
process, which is of course of central 
importance to a developing country. 
High-risk transactions are known to be 
inherently more unstable, and when their 
volume is substantial they can cause the 
economy to adjust to prices which will not 
prevail in the medium term. These 
phenomena could weaken the solvency of 
financial systems, raise the interest cost to 
borrowers, deter investment in tradables, 
and develop into speculative bubbles 
which end in a crisis. 
In fact, the analogy between trade in 
goods and trade in financial assets may be 
mistaken. Trading in international 
financial assets is not identical to, for 
example, cross-border trades of wheat for 
textiles (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Devlin, 
1989). The latter transaction is complete 
and instantaneous, whereas trade in 
financial instruments is inherently 
incomplete and of uncertain value, since it 
is based on a promise to pay in the future. 
In a world of uncertainty, incomplete 
insurance markets, informational costs 
and other distortions, ex ante and ex post 
valuations of financial assets may be 
radically different. Moreover, the 
separation in time between a financial 
transaction and payment for it, coupled 
with informational barriers, generates 
externalities in market transactions that 
can magnify and multiply errors in 
34 Indeed, significant speculative bubbles arose in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Domestic interest rates and the value of domestic financial assets grew considerably faster 
than output and income, and remained above the levels observed in international financial markets. 
Financial bubbles were basically the result of four factors: i) relatively fast, radical liberalization of 
domestic financial markets; ii) a permissive or non-existent domestic regulatory system; iii) heavy 
capital inflows, mainly resulting from the liberalization of the capital account and the big interest 
rate spread; and iv) the corresponding exchange rate lag caused by these flows. 
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subjective valuations to the point where 
finally the market corrections are very 
abrupt and destabilizing. It is precisely 
because of this that well-being may decline 
with deregulation of trade in financial 
assets and rise with a certain amount of 
increased public intervention (Stiglitz, 
1993). Thus, public control of trade in 
certain financial assets might reduce some 
individuals' well-being, but at the same 
time it would increase national or 
aggregate well-being through the 
enhancement of macroeconomic stability 
and better investment performance. 
Finally, the separation in time between 
a financial transaction and the payment for 
it, with the consequent risk of default, also 
leads to efficiency criteria which are 
different from those found in the markets 
for goods and services, which clear 
themselves naturally through prices. In 
contrast, many financial markets do not 
clear exclusively through prices, as 
informational, monitoring and 
enforcement problems related to the 
borrower's behaviour cause efficient 
creditors to ration the volume of finance in 
practice. 
e) Microefficiency  of  production 
International capital mobility is also 
supposed to improve productive 
efficiency at the micro-economic level. For 
the financial system this would imply 
lower intermediation spreads between 
lender and borrower (Akyüz, 1993). 
Generally, productive efficiency also 
entails lower interest costs; this increases 
the average quality, or creditworthiness, 
of applicants for funds in the capital 
market (Stiglitz, 1993). Lower interest 
rates also raise the capital value of 
non-financial firms and stimulate their 
investment processes. 
Since inflows of external funds 
compete with domestic capital, it may be 
expected that capital mobility will lower 
domestic interest rates. In addition, it can 
raise the number of effective 
intermediaries working in the market 
-including foreigners- which encourages 
financial innovations and puts downward 
pressure on intermediation spreads. The 
lower financial costs and the more 
intensive monitoring of borrowers 
(assuming that international investors are 
initially more sophisticated than their 
counterparts in a developing country) 
could also be conducive to greater 
efficiency in non-financial enterprises. 
If the increased external capital is not 
allocated properly, or promotes greater 
volatility of asset prices, however, the 
mean result could be persistently high real 
domestic interest rates and spreads even 
in the face of massive capital inflows. High 
interest costs deteriorate loan portfolios 
and erode the capital value of firms as well 
as their savings/investment processes 
(Akyüz, 1993). Indeed, all these problems 
were present during the upward credit 
cycle in Latin America in the 1970s, 
particularly in those countries that 
indiscriminately encouraged unrestricted 
flows of external loans (Ramos, 1986). 
Some regulation of competition may 
therefore be desirable, especially if 
financial market stability and predictable, 
stable access to finance help to reduce the 
perceived risks of long-term investment. 
This is one reason why many 
industrialized countries have been willing 
to sacrifice some degree of competition for 
the sake of tight regulation and stability in 
financial markets. 
35 This rationing occurs due to fears of "adverse selection", i.e., at some point a higher interest rate will 
attract only the market's riskiest borrowers, causing an overall deterioration in the expected value 
of the creditors' loan portfolio. Thus an efficient creditor will not necessarily offer loans to the highest 
bidder, as would occur in fragmented goods markets. For more on this see Jaffee and Russell (1976) 
and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
36 European countries (except the United Kingdom) tend to follow this pattern (The Economist, 1993a). 
In contrast, the United States has probably one of the most competitive financial markets, but it also 
has one of the highest rates of failure of financial institutions (Stiglitz, 1993). 
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f)  Credibility of  the monetary authorities 
Some authors view capital mobility as 
a key ingredient in policies designed to 
give credibility to the monetary 
authorities, especially when that 
credibility has been lost owing to serious 
outbreaks of inflation. In its most 
conventional form, this analytical 
framework (often termed the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments) 
assumes open and internationally 
integrated trade and capital accounts, in 
conjunction with a fixed nominal 
exchange rate. The important thing, 
however, is that in the context of this 
overall scheme the economic agents 
should perceive that the existence of full 
convertibility and capital mobility takes 
away the ability of the country's 
authorities to manage the money supply: 
in other words, the money supply 
becomes just another endogenous variable 
of the economy. Consequently, the 
economic agents will anticipate that 
inflation will converge to international 
levels. On the one hand, the 
announcement of a fixed exchange rate 
favourably affects inflationary 
expectations, because it signals a 
commitment to an anti-inflationary policy, 
while on the other hand, arbitrage of 
goods and financial assets may be 
expected to push domestic orices down 
towards international levels. 
In this approach, the monetary 
authorities' credibility supposedly rises 
not because of what they can do but rather 
of what they cannot do. In effect, they 
attempt to overcome a reputation for 
monetary indiscipline (and inflation) by 
renouncing monetary policy altogether: 
owing to the existence of capital mobility, 
their actions cannot affect the level of the 
money supply, which will adjust 
"automatically" to the real demand for 
money through changes in balance-
of-payments transactions which alter the 
amount of the international reserves.38 
This theoretical approach has been 
controversial and has generated much 
debate (Ardito Barletta, Blejer and 
Landau, 1983). On the one hand, its 
theoretical conclusions are weakened 
when international arbitrage suffers from 
serious imperfections, as is usually the 
case in developing countries. Even with 
radical trade liberalization, goods 
arbitrage can be hindered by market 
segmentation and product differentiation, 
monopolistic distribution systems, and 
high transport and distribution costs. 
Moreover, the opening up of trade will not 
stabilize all prices, as non-tradable goods 
can (at least for some time) find their price 
level with some degree of independence, 
and wages can also rise. Meanwhile, an 
open capital account in and of itself will 
not convert risk-adverse investors into 
risk-neutral investors, so that domestic 
and foreign assets will not necessarily be 
perfect substitutes for each other (Kenen, 
1993; Dornbusch, 1983). The result is that 
the monetary authorities will still have 
some impact on the money supply, and the 
"single price law" will be imposed only 
slowly. As a consequence, there can be real 
exchange rate appreciation and financial 
crisis. Indeed, all these problems emerged 
in the Latin American countries which 
tried to use the monetary approach to 
stabilize prices in the late 1970s (Ramos, 
1986). 
Whatever its theoretical merits, the 
monetary approach has important 
detractors; as Peter Kenen (1993) has 
remarked, it is clearly a "high-risk 
strategy" because "no sensible sailor 
throws out an anchor before the boat stops 
moving". Indeed, instead of trying to 
attack inflation indirectly through the 
complex channels of an exchange rate 
commitment, many experts are of the 
37 For a more detailed overview of the monetary approach, see Blejer (1983). 
38 This approach focuses basically on the changes in reserves rather than on the internal components 
of the current account of the balance of payments. This is because if the fiscal accounts are in balance, 
movements in the reserves are assumed to reflect private agents' demand for money. 
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opinion that it is more efficient to use 
direct fiscal, monetary and institutional 
reforms for that task. 
2. Liberalization of the capital account: 
policy evolution since the war 
a) Recent trends in developed countries 
For the most part, liberalization 
processes have been cautious and very 
gradual in the developed economies of the 
world. A global trend towards open 
capital accounts started in the 
industrialized countries and was 
formalized in the 1961 OECD Codes of 
Liberalization. The Codes emerged as a 
collective plan for liberalizing restrictions 
on foreign exchange transactions and 
avoiding the costs caused to member 
countries by unilateral actions. Their 
objective was to make a transaction 
between non-residents as easy as one 
between residents of a country. The 
original Codes focused mainly on 
medium-term capital movements, but in 
1989 they were modified to include 
short-term capital flows. The Codes are 
meant to guide the liberalization process 
in the industrialized countries; indeed, 
they subject member countries to regular 
reviews, in which they must justify their 
reservations regarding implementation of 
any aspect of the Code as well as any 
temporary backsliding they may have 
experienced with respect to previous 
liberalization measures (Ley, 1989). 
In the 1950s all the OECD countries had 
some type of major restriction, in line with 
the prevailing orientation of public policy 
at that time and the notion of national 
autonomy. In particular, controls helped 
to give more autonomy to monetary policy 
in the context of fixed exchange rates of the 
Bretton Woods system. 
The countries that first began to 
liberalize restrictions were Canada, the 
United States, Switzerland and Germany, 
which had eliminated practically all their 
controls by the end of the 1950s. However, 
the last three countries periodically 
reintroduced controls in the 1960s and 
1970s to deal with conjunctural problems 
involving exchange rates and/or the 
balance of payments. Indeed, controls 
continued to play an important role in 
most OECD economies during this period 
(OECD, 1993). 
A more marked liberalization trend 
began in the 1980s. This pattern can be 
seen in table X.2, which describes the 
situation for a representative group of 
OECD countries.40 As may be seen, a few 
countries like Germany, Canada, and the 
United States started out the decade with 
no restrictions on the movement of foreign 
exchange, while some countries radically 
eliminated all their restrictions at once: 
this is clearly seen from the table in the case 
of the United Kingdom, but it is also true 
of New Zealand and Australia (not shown 
39 It has also been argued that capital mobility can increase the credibility of the fiscal authorities. In 
effect, when an economy is closed, it is easier for governments to arbitrarily tax its citizens, either 
directly or via inflation. Potential taxes also cause foreign investors to raise their risk premiums. Since 
many taxes, but especially the inflation tax, are considered distortionary, it has been argued that 
well-being could be increased by permitting greater capital mobility; in this way, citizens could 
escape the taxes at low cost and society would benefit (Hanson 1992). Moreover, the authorities would 
be bound in the future to keep the tax burden at internationally acceptable levels. Capital mobility 
can certainly erode governments' ability to tax, especially today when there are few countries with 
bilateral tax treaties, and it is common practice to exempt non-residents' deposits from tax liabilities. 
However, it would be taking things to an extreme to conclude a priori that capital flight is 
welfare-enhancing; it would first be necessary to determine how tax revenue is spent and how much 
weight upper-income groups have in society's welfare function. 
40 The table uses a homogeneous source of data: IMF information on foreign exchange restrictions on 
the trade and capital accounts. The data only indicate whether the restrictions exist or not, not their 
intensity or scope. 
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in table X.2).41 Most countries, however, 
took a gradual approach, with the poorer 
Southern European countries being the 
most gradual of all. At the beginning of the 
1990s, France and several other OECD 
countries still maintained some 
substantial restrictions on capital 
movements. 
It is clear, then, that most 
industrialized countries have generally 
been cautious in managing foreign 
exchange movements and the opening of 
their capital account.42 It is also clear that 
the Codes of Liberalization have 
undoubtedly served to drastically reduce 
foreign exchange restrictions in the OECD 
area. Even so, it seems that the consensus 
on the need for an inflexible commitment 
to an open capital account has been 
weakened by recent speculative attacks on 
OECD currencies and the doubts that many 
have about the degree to which 
movements of funds are motivated by 
long-term considerations (fundamentals). 
Thus, the use of temporary controls on 
short-term capital has recently been 
mooted, and indeed Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland reintroduced certain restrictions in 
the autumn of 1992 in order to deal with 
serious currency instability44 However, 
by the end of the year the situation had 
calmed down enough to allow the 
countries to relax the restrictions once 
more (OECD, 1993). 
b) Recent trends in developing countries 
There is a broad consensus that 
international capital mobility is a 
necessary component of the development 
process. Moreover, it may be recalled that 
external capital has many and diverse 
potential roles. However, most of these 
arguments analyse capital-as-a-whole and 
take no account of important real world 
conditions such as informational 
shortcomings, the institutional 
peculiarities of investors, the structure of 
the market within which investors 
operate, the volume and timing of 
financing, its costs and volatility, public 
regulation and incentive structures, and 
the recipient country's political and 
economic matrices. These and other 
factors do not always mix in ways which 
permit countries to tap the full potential 
benefits of external capital movements. 
Indeed, systemic market failure can and 
does occur. Frequent reminders of this 
problem are the major financial crises, 
accompanied by macroeconomic collapse, 
that have appeared in economic history, 
including the recent crisis in Latin 
America. 
Since the real world can condition the 
merits of even the most attractive 
theoretical arguments, it is not surprising 
that lively debates have arisen over the 
functioning of international financial 
markets, capital mobility and open capital 
accounts. The debate has been further 
fuelled by the fact that many of the most 
important benefits attributed to capital 
mobility -e.g., the use of external savings 
to supplement domestic saving for 
financing development- do not 
necessarily require an open capital 
account per se (Williamson, 1983), for while 
liberalization allows more individuals to 
interact with foreign capital markets, 
41 The countries which carried out such radical liberalization tended to experience some serious 
economic problems, at least to begin with. For a good case study of New Zealand, see Chappie (1991). 
42 For instance, Japan and Denmark took 16 and 15 years, respectively, to carry out this process (OECD, 
1993). 
43 As The Economist (1993b) pointed out, "The market...could not care less about these fundamentals. 
Once investors believe that governments are unable to defend their currencies with high interest 
rates, the game is up. With some US$ 1 trillion a day traded on foreign-exchange markets, no amount 
of intervention is likely to defeat the speculators". 
44 Economists Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) have argued that speculative attacks can and should 
be discouraged. Their preferred response is temporary margin requirements, with zero interest, on 
short-term capital inflows. 
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Table X.2 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS a 
A. Exchange rate 
1. More than one exchange rate 
for capital transactions 
2. More than one exchange rate 
for imports and/or  exports 
B. Quantitative restrictions on foreign 
exchange payments 
1. On current account transactions 
2. On capital account transactions 
C. Surcharges 
1. Advance import deposits 
2. Requirements for surrender 
of export proceeds 
A. Exchange rate 
1. More than one exchange rate 
for capital transactions 
2. More than one exchange rate 
for imports and/or  exports 
B. Quantitative restrictions on foreign 
exchange payments 
1. On current account transactions 
2. On capital account transactions 
C. Surcharges 
1. Advance import deposits 
2. Requirements for surrender 
of export proceeds 
A. Exchange rate 
1. More than one exchange rate 
for capital transactions 
2. More than one exchange rate 
for imports and/or  exports 
B. Quantitative restrictions on foreign 
exchange payments 
1. On current account transactions 
2. On capital account transactions 
C. Surcharges 
1. Advance import deposits 
2. Requirements for surrender 
of export proceeds 
A. Exchange rate 
1. More than one exchange rate 
for capital transactions 
2. More than one exchange rate 
for imports and/or  exports 
B. Quantitative restrictions on foreign 
exchange payments 
1. On current account transactions 
2. On capital account transactions 
C. Surcharges 
1. Advance import deposits 
2. Requirements for surrender 
of export proceeds 
Germany 
1970 1975 1980 1984 1991 
France 













X X X X X 
Finland 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Washington, D.C., various 
issues. 
a X indicates the existence of one or more restrictions. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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similar volumes of capital flows could in 
principle be realized through a relatively 
limited number of capital-account 
channels. 
The evolution of positions on the 
question of open capital accounts has been 
very interesting. On the one hand, the 
number of proponents of open capital 
accounts in developing countries has 
steadily grown over the years, to the point 
where many consider that an open capital 
account should be a major objective of 
economic policy. Indeed, during the 1980s 
developing countries were under heavy 
pressure to open their capital accounts. 
However, there is a growing trend 
towards more pragmatic thinking 
regarding capital account opening; this 
view counsels caution and gradualism, to 
the point of severely questioning the 
urgency of a perfectly open capital 
account, at least over a time horizon 
relevant to economic policy 
determination. More recently, there has 
been some sympathy for the idea of 
permanent monitoring of short-term 
capital flows, with controls being used for 
its regulation if necessary. A brief review 
of these trends is given below. 
i) From closed to open economies. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, development 
thinking predominantly focused on real 
economic activity rather than questions of 
money and financial markets, at the same 
time, government investment planning 
and major State intervention in the 
savings/investment processes were 
generally considered an acceptable, if not 
necessary, practice for successful 
development. 5 Moreover, the analysis of 
foreign savings flows concentrated on a 
very limited number of channels of capital 
inflow, basically government-to-
government bilateral foreign aid, 
multilateral lending and foreign direct 
investment. 
The above situation had its roots in 
concrete historical circumstances. Thus, 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
the activity of private markets, and 
international finance in particular, had 
been partially in recess, with a slow revival 
beginning only after the Korean War. As a 
consequence of market failures, 
government economic intervention in 
developed and developing country 
markets had become routine. Most 
countries had comprehensive controls on 
capital movements. Therefore, given the 
restrictions on private markets, 
governments of developing countries 
were often the only borrowers able to 
mobilize large amounts of medium- and 
long-term foreign credit. 
State intervention in the economies 
enjoyed a degree of legitimization thanks 
to relatively successful, albeit not always 
efficient, economic growth performances. 
This policy orientation did not have a 
monopoly of ideas, however: indeed it was 
confronted by energetic competing 
paradigms, particularly variants of 
classical laissez faire  economics (see Killick, 
1989). These latter arguments focused on 
the gross inefficiencies and rent-seeking 
typical of government intervention and 
the need to improve resource allocation 
through deregulation of markets and the 
consequent emergence of "correct" 
market-based prices. Moreover, these 
ideas enjoyed a growing international 
following towards the end of the 1960s, 
due partly to the increasing difficulties 
that governments were encountering in 
bringing their regulation in line with the 
realities of the recovery of domestic and 
international market activity in the period 
since the war. Highly symbolic of the new 
trend was the decision in 1971 to abandon 
the Bretton Woods agreement, which had 
been the cornerstone of government 
regulation of the international monetary 
system. 
The new trends also contributed to a 
decisive change in the direction of 
development policy. Major studies 
emerged which focused on the need to 
reduce government intervention and to 
45 This was symbolized in popular development theories such as the "big push", "balanced 
development" and "linkages". 
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liberalize markets, with special emphasis 
on domestic financial markets.46 The main 
argument was that financial markets are 
the nerve center of the savings/ 
investment process and their performance 
was typically being "repressed" by 
government intervention, with negative 
consequences for growth. Such so called 
financial repression has many dimensions, 
but the existence of low or negative real 
interest rates is at the heart of the 
argument. The principal prescription of 
these studies was therefore domestic 
financial deregulation and the freeing of 
interest rates. This was expected to raise 
domestic savings, stimulate more and 
better-quality investment, improve social 
equity, reduce dependence on foreign aid, 
and raise growth rates.47 
It was also held that an open capital 
account was needed as a way to raise 
domestic saving, deepen domestic 
financial markets, reduce the costs of 
financial intermediation through 
enhanced competition, satisfy 
individuals' demand for risk 
diversification and optimize country and 
world resource allocation: in short, most of 
the benefits of capital mobility outlined 
above were invoked. This prescription, 
while mainly stressing the importance of 
relaxing the repression of financial 
activity, also led logically to the need for 
reforms and liberalization in other areas. 
ii) Opening up and sequencing. While 
those attracted to this approach were in 
broad agreement on the diagnosis and 
general policy prescription, there were big 
differences of opinion regarding 
implementation. On the one hand, there 
was the position that basic reforms were 
part of a "seamless web" and should 
ideally be undertaken simultaneously in a 
type of "big bang" (Shaw, 1973). On the 
other, there were those who favoured the 
sequencing of reforms, with the capital 
account being opened up only after 
consolidation of the other liberalization 
measures, with domestic financial reform 
and trade liberalization being given the 
highest priority (McKinnon, 1973). The 
capital account was deemed an especially 
sensitive area because, if it were opened 
up in conjunction with other reforms, that 
could induce a surge of capital inflows 
which could bring premature exchange 
rate appreciation, with negative 
consequences for the trade liberalization 
and resource allocation programme. 
According to this view, a competitive 
exchange rate was crucial to trade reform; 
hence, maintenance of capital controls 
could be justified as a way to temporarily 
reduce pressures for exchange rate 
appreciation. 
The different policy focuses began to 
have real implications for Latin America in 
the mid-1970s when three Southern Cone 
countries -Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay- underwent radical economic 
liberalization processes, inspired partly by 
the financial repression hypothesis. All 
three countries removed price controls, 
freed interest rates, sought to make fiscal 
reforms and opened up their trade and 
capital accounts.48 
There was an additional incentive 
for encouraging capital account 
opening. Many analysts viewed the 
1970s world-wide boom in international 
bank lending as an inherently benign 
event for development. On the supply 
side, private financial markets -and 
especially the unregulated Eurocurrency 
market- were considered to be highly 
efficient and capable of imposing 
"market discipline" on borrowers, in 
contrast to the allegedly inefficient and 
permissive lending of official agencies 
(Friedman, 1977). Furthermore, it was 
46 The pioneering studies were by Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973). 
47 An underlying assumption was that personal savings are very interest-sensitive. In contrast, Stiglitz 
(1993) argues that savings and investment can actually be enhanced with a reasonable amount of 
financial repression. At all events, studies in Latin America have shown that there is no strong relation 
between high real interest rates and national saving (Held and Szalachman, 1990). 
48 For a detailed analysis see Foxley (1983), Frenkel (1983), Ramos (1986) and Corbo and de Melo (1987). 
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felt that portfolio and direct investment 
decisions werebased on the long-term key 
variables -"fundamentals"- of the 
countries concerned, and were 
therefore inherently favourable to 
greater order and discipline. On the 
demand side, there was also a popular 
notion that if, moreover, the borrowers 
were from the private sector -in contrast 
to public agencies- the resources would 
be deployed efficiently (Robichek, 1981). 
This latter consideration was especially 
relevant in the Southern Cone, where the 
private sector was a very active 
borrower, especially in Chile. 
As already noted, the Southern Cone 
experiment ended in failure as the 
economies collapsed because of the impact 
of price disequilibria and speculative 
bubbles on asset prices, low domestic 
savings and investment, the huge external 
debt accumulated by the countries and 
rampant insolvency. Some attributed the 
failure to unexpected external shocks; 
others to a flawed basic concept; and still 
others to poor macroeconomic 
management. But most of the debate has 
focused on the failure of international 
financial markets and/or flawed 
sequencing of the liberalization reforms. 
As far as market failure is concerned, 
it was concluded that the so-called 
discipline of the private financial market 
had simply not materialized, for instead of 
facing an upward supply curve for funds, 
with credit rationing, as would be 
assumed for a market with efficient 
lenders, many developing countries in the 
1970s apparently faced a horizontal 
supply curve, which gave inherently 
perverse price signals for the 
savings/investment process.49 
As for the reasons for the horizontal 
supply curve and market failure, some 
have laid stress on the presence of direct 
or indirect public guarantees for lenders 
and borrowers (McKinnon, 1984 and 
1991), while others have stressed flaws in 
the structure of international banking 
markets and lending practices, as well as 
permissiveness in national and 
international regulatory frameworks 
(Devlin, 1989). The optimism about the 
inherent prudence of private borrowers 
also proved to be excessive, to judge by the 
overly-leveraged firms and banks in the 
Southern Cone. 
As far as sequencing is concerned, 
there is now some consensus that the 
capital account opening was premature in 
the Southern Cone and should have been 
postponed until other major reforms had 
been consolidated and equilibrium prices 
established. The lesson is that during 
adjustment, open capital accounts 
(especially in periods of elastic supply of 
international finance) can induce surges of 
capital inflows with destabilizing 
macroeconomic and sectoral effects. In the 
first place, if domestic financial markets 
are still shallow and uncompetitive, they 
will not be able to efficiently intermediate 
a surge in capital flows, thereby 
threatening the sustainability of the flows. 
Secondly, without a solid tax base and 
flexible fiscal instruments, authorities 
must rely on monetary policy to regulate 
the domestic economy, and it should be 
remembered that unless countries are 
willing to abandon exchange rate 
management, even partial opening up of 
the capital account can erode the 
effectiveness of monetary policy (Reisen, 
1993a). 
Lastly, since part of the capital flows 
are inevitably spent on non-tradables, the 
relative price of the latter tends to rise, 
with consequent real exchange rate 
49 n properly functioning private credit markets, borrowers face an upward supply curve for finance; 
this is because the more that is borrowed, the riskier the loan is at the margin, thus resulting in 
appropriate price signals to borrowers. With a horizontal curve, however, the marginal price of credit 
does not rise; this gives incentives for external indebtedness to substitute domestic savings effort 
(Harberger, 1981; McKinnon, 1991). In the 1970s the situation was further complicated by the fact 
that the supply curve was actually slanting down, meaning that increased loan volumes were 
accompanied by falling interest rates and shrinking commissions. 
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appreciation. This in turn is reflected in 
widening of the current account deficit 
due to the fall in the production of 
tradables, coupled with a rise in domestic 
demand for them. The real appreciation of 
the exchange rate can obviously distort the 
resource allocation and investment, 
seriously debilitating a country's 
medium-term structural objective of 
penetrating external markets with new 
exports.50 Real appreciation also tends to 
bring unnecessary social costs, as 
domestic resources most probably will 
have to be switched back to production of 
more tradable goods, through later real 
depreciation of the exchange rate 
(Edwards, 1984; Park and Park, 1993; 
Jiménez, 1995). This is because the 
counterpart of the current account deficit 
is an accumulation of external liabilities, 
which must eventually be serviced in 
foreign exchange. 
A considerable body of expert opinion 
has thus emerged which urges that capital 
account opening should only take place 
after the consolidation of other major 
liberalization programmes, especially in 
the areas of trade and domestic finance; 
indeed, according to McKinnon (1991, p. 
117), "during liberalization, stringent 
controls on suddenly increased inflows (or 
outflows) of short-term capital are 
warranted". 
Where there has been perhaps most 
divergence of opinion is with respect to the 
speed of capital account opening once the 
decision is taken: some have advocated 
rapid and ambitious opening-up, while 
others counsel a gradual approach. The 
first-named position is favoured by those 
who distrust government intervention in 
foreign exchange and capital markets 
and/or fear that vested interests will 
paralyse liberalization programmes. The 
second approach stems from the belief that 
macroeconomic stability also requires a 
certain sequence in capital account 
opening. At a more general level, a clear 
distinction is drawn between inflows and 
outflows, and it is suggested that countries 
should liberalize the former before the 
latter, partly because the benefits that can 
be derived from outflows are more evident 
for a country that has accumulated 
substantial net foreign assets (Williamson, 
1991 and 1993b). There could also be 
sequencing within the components of 
inflows and outflows: for instance, 
long-term inflows could be liberalized 
before short-term transactions, while in 
the case of outflows, priority might be 
given to direct export-oriented 
investments and trade credit. 
While there is no consensus on radical 
versus gradual opening, the gradualist 
approach seems to be gaining ground; 
moreover, it is more consistent with the 
helpful insights gained from the 
international discussion on the 
sequencing of reforms. Thus, even though 
developing countries may have made 
radical reforms, it may take a long time 
before conditions emerge -i.e., a deep and 
institutionally diversified domestic 
financial market, a broad, consolidated tax 
base, a diversified, internationally 
competitive export sector, and a wide 
range of available macroeconomic policy 
instruments- which will allow their 
economies to absorb unregulated 
movements of external capital in ways that 
are consistent with sustained growth and 
social equity.51 
The proponents of sequencing only 
question the order and timing of 
liberalization, not the ultimate objective of 
an open capital account. However, the 
overriding importance of macroeconomic 
stability, coupled with the overwhelming 
size of international capital markets 
compared with the much smaller Latin 
American economies and the serious 
50 As noted in the first chapters of this document, the countries which have successfully devoted 
themselves to export activities have typically needed a prolonged period of balanced and stable 
exchange rates. 
51 Of course, as long as there are serious imperfections in capital markets, unrestricted capital flows 
will never be fully compatible with macroeconomic stability. This point will be discussed later. 
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imperfections existing in such markets, 
makes an inflexible commitment to an 
open capital account undesirable. Indeed, 
the increasing volatility of international 
capital flows, and the enormous amounts 
of foreign exchange traded every day, 
which are out of all proportions to real 
economic activity, have already given rise 
to renewed discussion in the 
industrialized countries on the potentially 
destabilizing behaviour of capital markets 
and the possible need for the temporary 
use of capital controls.52 If the 
industrialized countries, which have the 
most mature markets and the most 
powerful battery of indirect 
macroeconomic policy instruments, are 
debating the need for more direct 
management of some types of flows of 
external capital, it would certainly be 
reasonable for developing countries to be 
doing the same. 
There are a number of ways to manage 
capital flows. The more pressing the need 
for regulation, and the more 
underdeveloped fiscal and monetary 
policy is, the more likely it is that the use 
of direct controls on certain types of 
external capital will be warranted, even if 
only temporarily. Of course, any sort of 
control is often branded as inefficient and 
always capable of being circumvented by 
ever more sophisticated capital market 
operations. But as Williamson (1991, p. 
139) points out, "assertions about the 
ineffectiveness of capital controls are 
vastly exaggerated." As mentioned 
earlier, there are obviously costs involved 
in the use of these instruments. However, 
these must be measured against the global 
social benefits in terms of macroeconomic 
stability, investment and growth as well as 
against the feasibility and reliability of 
possible alternative ways to achieve the 
same goal.53 As Zahler (1992) argues, the 
possible micro-economic costs of 
regulating capital movements may be 
more than offset by the benefits resulting 
from greater macroeconomic stability. 
Naturally, the net result will depend on 
the economic climate and the quality of the 
regulatory policies applied. 
52 For example, in September 1992 the United States Government called for the Group of Ten countries 
to study new forms of international cooperation to deal with the size and complexity of the world's 
money markets (Graham, 1992). Meanwhile, in September 1993 Jacques Delors, President of the 
Council of the European Community, discussed the possible use of capital controls to manage 
short-term speculative flows (Financial Times,  1993a). 
53 Korea's recent financial liberalization and capital account opening has been very gradual and Korea 
frequently resorts to direct controls for management of domestic liquidity. This is because the 
authorities find sterilization to be too expensive and they view the direct controls as powerful 
instruments that give predictable results (Kang, 1993). 
Chapter XI 
CAPITAL INFLOWS: THEIR DOMESTIC 
EFFECTS AND MACROECONOMIC 
POLICY APPROACHES 
1. Macroeconomic impact of 
capital flows 
Chapters IX and X examined in detail the 
resumption of private capital flows to 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
1990s, after their virtual absence 
throughout the 1980s. This chapter 
examines the issue from the standpoint of 
the impact of these resources on the 
region's economies. 
Both a shortage and an abundance of 
external funds pose challenges to 
economic policy. Specifically, this chapter 
analyses how to increase an economy's 
capacity to absorb external savings so that 
those savings can help strengthen 
productive development, generate 
sustainable growth trends in the trade 
balance and She balance of payments, and 
foster macroeconomic policies which 
encourage investment and increased 
productivity. Policies adopted by different 
countries of the region are examined, 
bearing in mind the effect that the 
interrelationship between the financial 
and macroeconomic dimensions has on 
two of the basic pillars of changing 
production patterns with social equity: the 
generation of savings and the intermediation 
of these funds in a way that will enhance 
the region's systemic competitiveness. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
one of the main arguments -from the 
perspective of a developing country- for 
promoting a linkage with external capital 
is that it opens up an opportunity for 
mobilizing external savings to strengthen 
national savings and investment. It is 
important for external capital to 
supplement -rather than replace- a 
country's domestic savings effort, since 
domestic saving plays a decisive role in 
generating the investment required in 
order to change production patterns with 
social equity (ECLAC, 1990a; 1992a). 
Large-scale capital inflows into a 
country's economy may have two possible 
effects. The first is Keynesian in nature and 
is reflected in greater effective demand 
within a context marked by an 
underutilization of production capacity. It 
also results in a reduction of the external 
constraints under which the country is 
operating, with a consequent upturn in the 
growth rate of output. If the capital inflow 
is only temporary, then the Keynesian 
effect will be transitory as well. If demand 
is financed from external sources (external 
savings), it is important to note that the 
increase in aggregate expenditure will 
outpace the growth of output. The danger 
inherent in this situation is that, since the 
increase in spending has been financed by 
external borrowing, a reversal of these 
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flows can cause output and investment to 
drop. If, in addition, the terms of trade are 
unfavourable -as in the case of Latin 
America during the preceding decade- the 
adverse effects on the level and growth of 
national income could be even greater. 
In the first phase of a sharp upward 
trend in capital inflows, there is generally 
a tendency for the real exchange rate to 
appreciate, since the entry of capital 
exerts pressure for a revaluation of the 
currency in the foreign exchange market. 
This in turn intensifies the entry of 
capital and heightens the trend towards 
an appreciation of the currency. The 
major appreciations in the real exchange 
rate observed in 1976-1981 and in 
1990-1994 were also associated with the 
use of the exchange rate as a tool for 
combating inflation in several countries of 
the region. 
The second effect of capital inflows, as 
distinct from the first, is that they influence 
a country's production capacity. In this 
case, it is important to determine what 
proportion of these external flows is being 
channeled into investment in the recipient 
country, how productive this investment 
is, and what percentage of it is being used 
-directly or indirectly- to produce 
tradables. If a large proportion of this 
investment is being used in a way that 
increases production efficiently (and is, to 
a great extent, being converted into 
tradable goods and services), then it is 
more likely that the economy will be able 
to cope with future changes in the terms 
and conditions applying to external debt 
servicing or in the volume of external 
flows. 
As was discussed in chapter IX and is 
shown in table XI.l and figure XI.l,54 the 
region's experience during the 1976-1981 
boom in capital inflows demonstrates that, 
as macroeconomic disequilibria 
intensified, it failed to create the necessary 
conditions to ensure the sustainability of 
those capital flows. Instead, the 
subsequent adjustment led to a deep 
recession as the countries strove to 
contend with deteriorating conditions in 
international financial and commercial 
markets (Ffrench-Davis and Devlin, 1993). 
The excess expenditure -amounting to 
about 4 percentage points of GDP-
observed during 1976-1981 was 
accompanied by large speculative 
"bubbles" in the financial markets of some 
countries of the region, particularly 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.55 The 
value of domestic financial and real estate 
assets grew at significantly higher rates 
than output and income, and domestic 
interest rates remained above the levels 
observed in international financial 
markets. These financial bubbles were 
attributable chiefly to two factors: i) large 
inflows of capital (stimulated by large 
interest-rate spreads); and ii) the widening 
exchange-rate lag sustained by these 
flows. The severe problems faced by 
domestic financial systems during the 
debt crisis demonstrate that these factors 
were not sustainable over time (Ramos, 
1986; Corbo, de Melo and Tybout, 1985). 
As indicated earlier, in the 1990s many 
countries of the region have re-entered 
international financial markets, which has 
enabled them to reactivate their 
production systems. However, prevailing 
circumstances in international markets for 
goods and services have not generated 
conditions conducive to a full recovery on 
the part of the region's economies. The 
terms of trade have continued to have 
seriously adverse effects (see table XI. 1), 
with the resulting loss of resources 
swelling by 80% between 1983-1989 and 
1991-1993. At the same time, the relative 
burden of external debt servicing has 
diminished thanks to the decline in 
international interest rates witnessed up to 
1993, although its relative level remains 
high. 
54 Except where otherwise indicated, the figures in the text and the tables are expressed in 1980 dollars. 
55 These countries were pioneers in the liberalization of domestic financial markets in the region. 
Chapter XII analyses the various experiences of the countries of the region in supervising and 
regulating the commercial banking system. 
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Table XI.l 
LATIN AMERICA: MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 















1. Net capital inflow 32.7 7.9 38.6 15.8 32.3 51.8 54.7 4.9 1.0 2.8 5.9 
2. Variation in reserves 6.6 -0.3 16.7 12.1 16.0 21.9 16.8 1.0 -0.0 1.7 2.2 
3. External saving (1-2) 26.1 8.1 22.0 3.7 16.2 29.9 37.9 3.8 1.0 1.2 3.8 
4. Deficit on current 
account (5+6+7-8) 26.1 8.1 22.0 3.7 16.2 29.9 37.9 3.8 1.0 1.2 3.8 
5. Trade deficit 4.3 -53.8 -51.6 -62.9 -54.7 -43.8 -45.0 0.6 -6.9 -7.0 -4.9 
6. Effect of deterioration 
in terms of trade a 5.5 28.7 51.1 41.9 48.6 53.9 60.2 0.8 3.7 5.4 6.3 
7. Factor service 16.9 35.1 28.7 29.6 28.8 27.3 28.9 2.5 4.5 3.5 3.1 
8. Unrequited transfers b 0.6 1.9 6.2 4.9 6.5 7.4 6.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 
9. GDP 671.3 778.6 781.2 829.2 858.5 884.3 912.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
10. National income 
(Y=9-6-7+8) 648.4 712.9 785.2 752.9 774.6 795.7 817.6 96.8 92.1 91.8 91.3 
11. Consumption 513.5 594.4 672.3 637.1 664.1 893.9 704.0 76.5 76.3 77.1 77.2 
12. Gross domestic 
investment 162.2 130.5 147.3 129.2 139.6 156.6 163.9 24.2 16.8 15.9 17.8 
13. Expenditure in excess 
of GDP (ll+12-9)=5 4.3 -53.8 -51.6 -62.9 -54.7 -43.8 -45.0 0.6 -6.9 -7.0 -4.9 
14. Expenditure in excess of 
income (11+12-10)=4 26.1 8.1 22.0 3.7 16.2 29.9 37.9 3.8 1.0 1.2 3.8 
15. Per capita GDP 
(US$ 1,980) 2,044 2,017 2,023 1,982 2,013 2,034 2,061 
16. Per capita Y (US$ 1,980) 1,978 1,857 1,852 1,823 1,847 1,864 1,873 
17. Growth rate of GDP 4.6 1.8 2.5 0.2 3.5 3.0 3.2 
18. Growth rate of exports 
(goods) 6.5 5.5 6.5 6.4 4.9 8.1 6.4 
19. Growth rate of imports 
(goods) 5.4 1.4 13.6 10.2 16.1 19.8 8.7 
20. Exports of goods 81.8 120.6 162.7 148.2 155.5 168.1 178.9 12.2 15.5 18.0 19.3 
21. Imports of goods 79.5 70.3 113.6 89.8 104.2 124.8 135.8 11.8 9.0 11.5 14.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the balance of payments and national accounts of the countries concerned. 
a Resources necessary to cover the loss resulting from the increased price of imported goods as compared with 
goods exported by the region, measured at 1980 prices. b Corresponds to net private flows in the form of grants 
and donations and other non-official operations. 
In 1992-1993, net capital inflows 
reached an annual average of US$ 53 
billion (in 1980 dollars). About one third of 
this amount went to build up the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries' 
inadequate international reserves, with 
the rest being used to cover the current 
account deficit (4% of GDP). This figure was 
four times as much as the external savings 
received during the 1980s and exceeded 
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Figure XI. 1 
LATIN AMERICA: DOMESTIC SAVINGS AND NATIONAL SAVINGS 
(Percentages  of  GDP) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Domestic savings less the negative terms-of-trade effect. 
factor payments for the first time since 
1981. Due to the adverse effect of the terms 
of trade, however, domestic expenditure 
remained below GDP. The investment rate, 
for its part, was only one point above the 
average for 1983-1989. Thus, the rate of 
capital formation remains very low. 
The experience of the region in the past 
decade and a half provides us with 
valuable lessons about the way in which 
-at a point in time when countries are in 
the process of re-entering international 
financial markets- the short-term 
macroeconomic situation influences the 
design of economic policy. A relative 
abundance of capital flows leads to 
currency appreciations which may be 
incompatible with medium- and 
long-term objectives. The authorities must 
base their decisions on four major 
objectives: i) to maintain stable capital 
inflows; ii) to sustain a competitive 
exchange rate; iii) to ensure the stability of 
aggregate demand and prices; and iv) to 
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Figure XI.2 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Billions of1980  dollars) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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promote capital formation and savings for 
the production of tradables while 
channelling these funds primarily 
towards investment in sectors that will 
increase the economy's productivity. 
2. Use of external capital and questions 
of economic policy 
The countries' return to international 
financial markets and the lessons of the 
past two decades point to the need to 
design an economic policy that fulfils three 
conditions: i) the impact of external funds 
must not adversely affect the efficiency of 
the economy's allocation of resources, 
which should be oriented towards a 
sustained form of growth for which 
international competitiveness is the 
driving force; ii) the absorption of external 
savings must not act as a disincentive for 
national saving if the economy is to 
achieve the level of investment required 
for long-term growth; and iii) measures 
for managing the balance of payments 
(exchange rate policy and regulation of 
short-term movements) must not 
needlessly discourage the entry of 
long-term capital (Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart, 1993; Reisen, 1993b). 
An initial level of  intervention is in the 
foreign exchange market. In this instance, 
the purpose of intervention is to moderate 
any tendency towards an excessive 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
since this rate is one of the main 
instruments of export promotion.56 This 
function has become more important as 
the countries have pursued trade 
liberalization programmes and regained 
access to the international capital market. 
Variations in reserves reflect official 
sales and purchases of foreign exchange 
and indicate the extent to which the central 
bank has intervened in the foreign 
exchange market. This form of 
intervention is meant to lend stability and 
credibility to a type of ex change policy that 
will send out signals conducive to 
on-going, sustainable growth. This point 
was stressed by the President of the 
Central Bank of Chile (Zahler, 1992, p. 161) 
when he said: "From a macroeconomic 
standpoint, the impact of an 'excessive' 
inflow of [external] capital on the level of 
the real exchange rate may be even greater 
than that of increased exchange-rate 
volatility. If the exchange rate remains 
below equilibrium for too long, it will have 
at least two kinds of undesirable effects. 
First, the tradables sector of the economy 
may be hurt. It is a well-known fact that 
many of the economies that have been 
successful in recent years (especially the 
small ones) have based their development 
on the growth of the export sector ... 
Second, ... sooner or later the value of the 
currency will have to return to its 
long-term equilibrium level (or even rise 
above it for a time), and this will put 
pressure on prices, thereby jeopardizing 
the goal of curbing inflation." 
At the first level of intervention, two 
very different situations may arise, 
depending on how central banks respond 
to increases in capital inflows. One 
response is not to intervene at this first 
level (not to accumulate reserves). In this 
case, capital flows would not bring about 
any changes in the international assets 
held by the central bank, and the full 
weight of the increase in these flows 
would be brought to bear on the exchange 
market, where it would exert pressure for 
a revaluation. This sets the scene for a net 
increase in imports of goods and services. 
The other situation occurs when the 
monetary authority intervenes at this first 
level by building up reserves. In this 
approach, the effects of that increase on the 
foreign exchange market can be sterilized, 
but it also has implications for the money 
market. Under these circumstances, the 
authorities must decide whether or not to 
sterilize the monetary effects of the 
build-up in reserves -which, in fact, 
influences the degree of liquidity of the 
56 This has not always been the approach taken. As wili be seen later, the exchange rate, in a context of 
increasing capital inflows, has served anti-inflationary purposes in a number of cases. 
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economy- by increasing the money supply. 
At this second level, intervention involves 
choosing between an active or passive 
approach to monetary policy (in terms of 
managing aggregate demand) and its 
relationship with stabilization. In the most 
extreme case, if monetary authorities were 
to intervene actively and buy up all the 
foreign exchange brought in by capital 
inflows, then the increase in the capital 
account balance would be equal to the 
increase in official reserves. In this case, 
sterilization of these resources means that, 
at least in the short term, the central bank 
is preventing them from being used to 
finance the current account deficit and, 
hence, is stopping them from being 
channelled towards the domestic market 
through the use of external savings. 
Moreover, there is no change in the 
differential between national savings and 
investment, or in the net external wealth of 
the economy. It may, however, require a 
great effort on the part of the central bank 
to sterilize the monetary effects of exchange 
operations in order to maintain the level of 
the real exchange rate (Calvo, Leidermann 
and Reinhart, 1993; Reisen, 1993b). 
Finally, countries can always modify 
the way in which they choose to open up 
their capital account in order to regulate 
the composition of inflows and bring them 
more closely into line with national 
development objectives. Thus, there is a 
third level at which intervention can occur. 
Most countries have chosen to open up 
their economies to capital inflows. À 
number of countries have also, however, 
set up intervention mechanisms designed 
to block the entry of short-term, 
speculative capital which does not 
contribute to the investment process 
(Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 1995; 
World Bank, 1993d). 
To sum up, policy options are 
available at three levels: i) intervention in 
the currency market through a build-up of 
reserves compatible with the various 
aspects of exchange policy; ii) sterilization 
by the central bank of the monetary effect 
of the increase in reserves with a view to 
influencing the level and composition of 
aggregate demand; and iii) regulation of 
capital movements for the purpose of 
controlling their level and shifting their 
composition in favour of long-term flows. 
Since economic authorities have 
reacted in different ways to capital 
inflows, depending on the status of their 
countries' economies at the relevant point 
in time, a wide variety of policy measures 
have been adopted in the region. These 
measures will be discussed below. 
a) Capital inflows  and their macroeconomic 
effect 
Capital inflows have brought to light 
an important policy issue. On the one 
hand, they have provided the financing 
needed to carry out, in a more socially 
efficient way, the structural adjustment 
programmes initiated by a number of 
countries in the 1980s. On the other, they 
have posed challenges for policy makers 
to design safeguards that will prevent 
those inflows from setting off financial 
crises, while at the same time ensuring the 
stability and sustainability of macro-
economic equilibria and promoting 
investment. Concern about these 
challenges has re-emerged as a key 
policy-making element as the countries 
re-enter international financial markets.57 
For the region as a whole, the inflow of 
capital has had a positive effect, since it has 
made it possible to achieve a higher use 
rate for existing production capacity and, 
57 ECLAC documents have drawn attention to two aspects related to the availability of external financing: 
i) the need for countries, once structural adjustment processes have been initiated, to have access to 
external financing to facilitate each of the different stages (ECLAC, 1990a, pp. 49-59); and ii) as shown 
by the events of the 1970s -when financial "bubbles" and crises were observed in a number of 
countries of the Southern Cone- liberalization and the opening of financial markets must take place 
in an appropriate macroeconomic and regulatory framework (Corbo, de Melo and Tybout, 1985; 
Ffrench-Davis, 1983; and chapter XII of this document). 
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as a result, to bring about a reactivation of 
production, income levels and 
employment.58 As can be seen from 
table XI.2, along with the processes of 
external liberalization initiated as part of 
adjustment programmes, the region's 
success in overcoming existing external 
constraints in the early 1990s has enabled 
it to resume its economic growth, whose 
average annual rate increased from 1.8% 
for 1983-1989 to 3.4% in 1991-1994 without 
any significant increase in investment. This 
upturn is largely attributable to the fact 
that the greater availability of external 
financing has made it possible to finance 
more imports of inputs, thus boosting the 
use rate of existing production capacity, 
and this, via its effect on output and income, 
is spurring forward aggregate demand. 
One special concern of the countries' 
economic authorities should be to ensure 
that the aggregate expenditure of the 
economy is not channelled solely towards 
consumption but that a large portion of 
that expenditure goes towards investment 
in sectors that produce competitive tradables. 
This largely depends on the incentives 
offered by the economy, including the 
strategic variable of the exchange rate. 
Together with this reactivation, the 
speed with which capital inflows have 
closed the external gap and generated a 
surplus of external funds has been 
reflected in a tendency for the currency to 
appreciate,59 a rapid reduction in trade 
surpluses and a widening of the 
current-account deficit (i.e., an increase in 
the use of external savings). Initially, these 
trends may have reflected a return to 
"normal" levels of aggregate demand, 
imports and the real exchange rate, all of 
which had been dampened by the external 
constraints present during the period 
1983-1989. The continuing abundance of 
capital is sustaining these trends over time 
and, in doing so, is causing an 
overadjustment of these variables. This 
brings economic authorities face to face 
with an issue of crucial importance in 
determining future stability, since, if the 
inflow of capital were to be reversed, the 
levels of aggregate spending, imports and 
the exchange rate would not be 
sustainable in the medium and long terms. 
When at their equilibrium values, these 
variables ought to serve as a reflection of 
the internal status of the merchandise and 
money markets, as well as the sustainable 
supply of external savings, which depends 
on whether capital flows are permanent or 
temporary, on their volume and on how 
they are used. 
Table XI.2 shows that in the four-year 
period of 1990-1993: i) a larger proportion 
of capital inflows was used to build up 
reserves than in the past, thereby 
moderating the impact of these flows on 
the region's economies (the increase 
amounted to 7.7% of the region's GDP 
during those four years); ii) even so, the 
share of imports in terms of GDP climbed 
to levels above those registered prior to the 
debt crisis (14.5% in 1992-1993 and 12.3% 
in 1980-1981); iii) domestic expenditure 
rose faster than output and income, while 
the surplus on the total and non-financial 
current accounts shrank -which is 
tantamount to an increase in the use of 
external savings; and iv) national savings 
were displaced by external savings, as 
evidenced by the fact that the increase in 
total investment was less than the increase 
58 The externa] constraints under which the region's economies were operating did not allow them to 
make use of their production capacity. Once -thanks to a reactivation- the short-term production 
frontier has been reached, the prospects forcontinued growth will then be determined by the intensity 
of savings and investment efforts and by gains in productivity (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1994; Devlin, 
Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 1995). 
59 In recent years, the countries of the region have tended to modify their exchange policies, without 
necessarily avoiding an appreciation of their exchange rates. Table XI. 3 shows that most of the 
countries have an active exchange policy involving first-level interventions. Figure XI.3 illustrates 
the changes observed in the real exchange rate in 18 countries of the region, 13 of which have seen 
their currencies appreciate since 1990. These 13 countries account for over 97% of the region's GDP. 
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Table XI.2 
LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED INDICATORS 
(Percentages  of  GDP based on figures  expressed in 1980 dollars) 
Î979" 1981 1 9 8 2 1989~ 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 
Net capital inflows 5.0 4.7 2.6 1.0 1.9 3.8 5.9 6.0 
Variation in reserves 1.6 -0.1 -2.7 -0.0 1.5 1.9 2.5 1.8 
External saving 3.3 4.8 5.3 1.0 0.4 1.9 3.4 4.2 
Effect on reactivation 
GDP growth rate (%) 5.4 3.1 -1.1 1.8 0.2 3.5 3.0 3.2 
Imports (goods) 11.6 12.3 10.2 9.0 10.8 12.1 14.1 14.9 
Gross domestic investment 24.1 24.3 20.5 16.8 15.6 16.3 17.7 18.0 
Per capita GDP (1980 dollars) 1,994 2,144 2,057 1,726 1,982 2,013 2,034 2,061 
Medium-term effect 
Domestic saving 23.9 22.9 22.6 23.6 23.2 22.6 22.7 22.9 
National saving 20.8 19.5 15.2 15.7 15.1 14.4 14.3 13.8 
Exports (goods) 12.0 12.5 13.2 15.5 17.9 18.1 19.0 19.6 
Non-financial current account 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
plus term-of-trade effect -1.3 -1.7 -0.2 3.3 2.5 0.7 -1.1 -1.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
in external savings. It is noteworthy that 
the coefficient of capital formation has 
remained very low thus far in the 1990s.60 
The effects of these new inflows of 
capital have differed from country to 
country, as have their access to such 
resources and the use which the region's 
economies have made of international 
financial markets. The capacity to absorb 
these flows, as well as the policies pursued 
by the various countries, has been affected 
by each country' timing (in terms of initial 
conditions) of the economic adjustment 
process. Thus, the region's return to 
international financial markets has caught 
the various countries at different stages in 
their adjustment programmes.61 
b) Policy approaches 
The countries of the region have used 
a variety of policy instruments to tackle 
the conflicts described above. In general, 
60 Something similar occurred during the period when the debt crisis was brewing. In that case, 
however, the reduction in national savings was due to a marked expansion of consumption, whereas 
now the drop in income brought about by the deterioration of the terms of trade is a more significant 
factor. In 1991-1993, the loss of income represented 5% of GDP (in 1980 dollars) as compared to the 
period 1976-1981. 
61 Some countries found themselves in a situation where they needed to establish or reinforce 
macroeconomic stability;  others, which were further along in the process of stabilizing their economies 
but had idle production capacity, were at a point where they needed to stimulate the reactivation  of 
the production  apparatus;  lastly, a few (which had inflation under control and were seeing signs of a 
reactivation of their production apparatus) were seeking to strengthen their savings and investment 
capacity so that they could attract the financial resources they needed in order to expand their 
production capacity and achieve sustainable economic growth.  While this description serves to illustrate 
the components of an adjustment programme, these stages do not necessarily occur in the above order. 
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Table XI.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS 
IN OPERATION AS OF MID-1993 





1. Chile D 
2. Colombia ' 
3. Mexico d 
4. Uruguay e 
1. Bolivia 
2. Brazil 
3. Costa Rica 








12. Trinidad and 
Tobago 
13. Venezuela 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of reports from the countries concerned. 
a A system invo lv ing small daily devaluations since 1992. b A dirty float w i th in a band which fluctuates around a 
benchmark exchange rate, which is determined on the basis of a basket of the currencies of the country's main trading 
partners. c A benchmark exchange rate determined by the resale value of an exchange certificate.  d No 
intervention is involved, but fixed nominal floor and ceiling rates are used based on a sl iding parity that changes at 
the rate of 0.40 thousands of a new peso per day. e The floor of the band is set daily, w i th the quotation for the 
dollar being corrected on the basis of the annual monetary programme. The w id th of the band is 7%  above the 
min imum. Floating exchange-rate regimes involv ing intervention by the central bank. Among the countries using 
this system, the central banks of Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala use auction mechanisms on a daily or weekly 
basis. In Honduras (for official  transactions) and the Dominican Republic, the monetary authority adopts a benchmark 
quotation wh ich follows trends on the free market. In Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Honduras (for 
private transactions) and Venezuela, foreign-currency  quotations are determined by the foreign exchange market, 
usually of the banking system. 
within a context of financial liberalization, 
the instruments adopted have been 
applied primarily at the first and second 
levels of intervention. Depending on the 
importance attached to the need to 
mitigate trends towards currency 
appreciation, the authorities have 
engaged in different forms of intervention 
in the foreign exchange market; in 
addition, depending on whether they have 
chosen to pursue an active or passive 
monetary policy, they have undertaken 
different degrees of intervention for the 
purpose of regulating aggregate demand. 
Some countries have also regulated capital 
inflows in order to influence their level 
and composition and to align them more 
closely with their development objectives. 
The possible combinations of first- and 
second-level forms of intervention yield 
different mixes of exchange rate policy 
and monetary policy which can be 
identified with one of two major 
intervention options. The first, favoured 
by countries which have chosen to 
maintain a passive monetary policy, is 
known as non-sterilized intervention. This 
option involves building up substantial 
international reserves, since the central 
bank buys up the foreign currency 
entering the country in the form of capital 
flows and exchanges it for local currency, 
without sterilizing the monetary effect of 
these operations, under a controlled 
exchange rate system.62 This averts an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
62 The usual forms range from fixed nominal exchange rates and crawling pegs to dirty floats within 
pre-established bands. See, for example, Helpman, Leiderman and Bufman (1993). 
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but, if an adjustment via an increase in 
imports does not occur quickly enough, 
this alternative can expand the monetary 
base beyond desirable limits. This usually 
generates inflationary pressures which 
push up the real exchange rate and set the 
scene for excesses and changes in the 
composition of expenditure. 
The second option, which is used by 
countries that, in addition to defending 
their exchange rate, have chosen to pursue 
active monetary policies, is known as 
sterilized intervention. As in the case of 
non-sterilized intervention, it involves 
accumulating reserves, but it also 
systematically approaches the second 
level of intervention in that it also involves 
sterilizing the monetary effects of these 
operations. The purpose here is to isolate 
the money stock from fluctuations 
stemming from the mobility of foreign 
capital. This type of sterilization, if 
effective, prevents real domestic interest 
rates from falling. In economies that are 
making full use of their production 
capacity, this approach has the advantage 
of helping to control aggregate spending 
and forestalling any further appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. However, with 
this option, if interest rate differentials 
persist, capital inflows will continue to be 
stimulated, thereby creating a need for 
further sterilization operations. This may 
be a source of quasi-fiscal deficits, since the 
central bank is called upon to place 
commercial paper on the domestic market 
at higher interest rates than those it obtains 
on its international reserves. 
The sterilized-intervention option is 
not problem-free. Conflicts arise mainly 
when the tax system is not flexible enough 
for national economic authorities to use 
this policy to offset domestic or external 
shocks. What happens in these cases is that 
the executive branch is deprived of yet 
another policy tool and hence cannot use 
fiscal instruments when it wants to curb 
aggregate spending or stimulate the 
economy, but must instead rely solely on 
monetary and exchange instruments. A 
more flexible tax system permits a better 
policy mix and more stable interest and 
exchange rates. 
In the absence of a flexible fiscal policy, 
the problems associated with sterilized 
intervention arise out of the dilemma 
confronting economic authorities when 
they try to control, simultaneously, the 
real interest rate (as an instrument of 
monetary policy for implementing 
stabilization policies) and the real 
exchange rate (as an instrument of trade 
policy for boosting the production of 
tradables). If the interest rate needed to 
pursue the objective of stemming 
inflation (through the sterilization of the 
monetary effects of a build-up in 
reserves) is higher than the international 
rate once the latter has been adjusted for 
expectations of devaluation, then the 
tendency will be for capital inflows to 
continue to exert upward pressure on the 
real exchange rate, thereby jeopardizing 
the objective of protecting the tradables 
sector of the economy. If, on the other 
hand, the domestic interest rate is allowed 
to fall, then both objectives may be 
thwarted, since the higher level of 
expenditure prompted by lower interest 
rates will put pressure on prices as well as 
pushing up the real exchange rate (Zahler, 
1992). 
It is for this reason that, in practice, 
the sterilized-intervention option has 
been used in combination with other 
policy measures in an effort to take 
action at: i) the first level of 
intervention, to influence the exchange 
market; ii) the second level of 
intervention, to regulate aggregate 
demand; and iii) the third level of 
intervention, to modify the level and 
composition of capital flows -either 
directly, through restrictions and levies 
aimed particularly at short-term capital, 
or indirectly, by generating exchange-
rate uncertainty. Some of the possible 
measures are the following:63 
63 Table XI.4 presents examples of these measures as applied in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile 
and Mexico in 1991 and 1992. 
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At the first level of intervention, 
measures designed to influence the foreign 
exchange market include: i) increasing the 
demand for foreign currency by creating 
incentives for the outflow of capital during 
periods when there is a surplus of funds; 
this can be done by relaxing the rules 
governinginvestment by nationals abroad 
and the repatriation of foreign direct 
investment, by authorizing institutional 
investors to invest overseas and by 
permitting various categories of debtors to 
make overseas payments in advance; 
ii) applying foreign trade measures 
designed to gear the level of imports, the 
current account deficit and the build-up of 
reserves to the country's exchange-rate 
target; and iii) promoting the introduction 
of mechanisms which encourage 
productivity growth in keeping with the 
level of exchange rate appreciation.64 
At the second level of intervention, 
whose purpose is to control the impact on 
aggregate demand, possible measures 
include: i) introducing mechanisms for 
regulating the financial system in order to 
avoid distortions in the sector and remedy 
shortcomings in the prudential and 
financial regulation of the banking system 
(see chapter XII); ii) imposing fiscal 
discipline in an effort to ease the additional 
pressures on demand; and iii) supplementing 
exchange policy with social contracts 
regarding prices and wages. 
At the third level of intervention, 
measures designed to alter the 
composition of capital inflows may 
include: i) applying indirect types of 
exchange measures aimed at reducing the 
inflow of short-term financial capital by 
introducing an element of uncertainty as 
to the trend of the exchange rate; this could 
be accomplished by having the central 
bank play a part in determining that rate 
over the short term; ii) adopting direct 
measures to regulate capital inflows; such 
measures may take the form of 
adjustments in the reserve requirements 
(often without interest) applying to bank 
deposits or other external credits and 
various kinds of quantitative controls 
(along with requirements as to minimum 
maturity periods, minimum volumes for 
bond issues, caps on interest rates on 
foreign capital and regulations regarding 
the participation of foreign capital in the 
stock market). 
3. National experiences with 
intervention 
a) Non-sterilized intervention 
This option has often been adopted by 
countries which focus on price stability as 
a priority objective of economic policy. It 
is a strategy which acts directly on 
inflation and indirectly on the real 
exchange rate. In setting up this 
mechanism, the expectation is that 
national interest and inflation rates will 
rapidly converge with international rates. 
Much of the success of this strategy ultimately 
depends on the confidence of economic 
agents in the monetary authority's ability 
to maintain the nominal exchange rate. 
This situation, in the final analysis, 
requires the central bank to maintain a 
large stock of international reserves, which 
affects its mix of assets and liabilities. 
The success of this strategy also 
depends on the relationship between the 
nominal exchange rate and inflation. If 
there are substantial lags6 5 in the 
inflationary dynamic, using the nominal 
64 If the production sector registers strong gains in productivity on a par with the currency appreciation 
being led by the financial sector, then it can be expected that the macroeconomic equilibrium will be 
maintained. It has usually been the case, however, that during periods marked by a great abundance 
of external finance, financial appreciation far outweighs productivity growth. This generates an 
imbalance that often proves to be unsustainable in the long run. 
65 This refers to the inertial component which tends to impede the reduction of the inflation rate. This 
element is a function of the economy's degree of formal and informal indexation and should be 
considered when designing an exchange policy for purposes of stabilization. 
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exchange rate as an anchor to stabilize 
prices can cause marked currency 
appreciations, along with the consequent 
effects on other relative prices, resource 
allocation and macroeconomic equilibria 
(Fanelli and Frenkel, 1993). Ultimately, if 
this trend persists and domestic inflation 
consistently exceeds the external rate, the 
authorities must be prepared to make 
adjustments in the level and composition 
of economic activity in cases where the real 
exchange rate deviates sharply from its 
long-term value. 
While, in practice, countries can be 
seen to have used different policy mixes, 
Argentina is one of the countries that, 
starting from high levels of inflation, have 
come closest to using a pure form of this 
option. 
In recent years, Argentina has adopted 
a series of measures whose general 
purpose has been to deregulate the 
various markets, including those related 
to capital movements. With regard to the 
operation of the foreign exchange market, 
the Convertibility Act promulgated in 
March 1991 (which set the nominal 
exchange rate for the peso at one-to-one 
with the dollar and established the legality 
of contracts denominated in different hard 
currencies) has permitted an extensive 
deregulation of this market's operations. 
The explicit aim of this Act was to curb 
inflation and ensure the stability of the 
nominal exchange rate (Argentina, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Public 
Works and Services, 1993; Fanelli and 
Machinea, 1995). 
These changes in exchange parities 
have been coupled with monetary and 
fiscal reforms. In September 1992, the 
Central Bank's charter was amended. 
Some of the main amendments provided 
for the independence of the Central 
Bank, the prohibition of monetary 
financing of the public deficit and the 
elimination of State guarantees on 
deposits. These changes are intended to 
increase the credibility of the programme 
for maintaining monetary stability over 
time and of the convertibility of the 
currency (Fanelli and Machinea, 1995; 
Argentina, Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Public Works and Services, 1993). At 
the same time, policies designed to 
deregulate and open up the capital 
account have been applied in order to step 
up the trade liberalization process. This 
move towards deregulation, under a 
system of fixed exchange rates, has helped 
to control the prices of internationally 
traded goods and thus to back up efforts 
to curb inflation. 
The increase in international 
ftY 
reserves, in the absence of mechanisms 
for sterilizing the effects of exchange 
operations, has brought about a 
considerable monetization of the economy 
(starting from the low levels observed 
after the country's bout of hyperinflation 
of 1989); this situation, combined with the 
increased use of external savings and the 
expansion of domestic credit, has sharply 
boosted aggregate demand and economic 
activity during the four years from 1991 to 
1994. 
The policies instituted in the 1990s 
have drastically reduced the inflation rate. 
Measured in terms of the consumer price 
index (CPI), this rate was 1,344% in 1990,7% 
in 1993 and 4% in 1994. The slackening of 
inflation was accompanied by a strong 
appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(following a steep devaluation in 1990 
66 Other measures adopted in order to stimulate capital movements have been the Economic Emergency 
Act (August 1989), which established equal treatment for foreign and national capital invested in 
production sectors; the Tax Amnesty Act (April 1992); the deregulation of the financial and securities 
markets; and, lastly, public-sector reforms. The latter have had a major effect on capital movements 
and have included, in particular, the State Reform Act, which paved the way for the privatization of 
public enterprises and debt-equity swaps. 
67 Measured in months' worth of imports, reserves amounted to about 4.5 months in 1989, but in 1990 
they jumped to the equivalent of 15 months' worth. In 1993, reserves were equivalent to 10 months 
of imports. 
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which enabled the country to mark up a 
large trade surplus); this process slowed, 
however, as the domestic inflation rate 
drew closer to the international rate. At the 
same time, the authorities have promoted 
the creation of incentives for productivity 
growth. 
According to ECLAC figures expressed 
in 1980 dollars, GDP growth rates in 
Argentina have been high -averaging 
7.4% between 1991 and 1993- and have 
been coupled with a widening deficit on 
the current account, which went from 0.9 
points of GDP in 1991 to 4.4 in 1993.68 
Domestic and national savings exhibited a 
downturn, with this trend being more 
pronounced in the case of domestic 
savings, which fell from 27 points of GDP 
in 1990 to 23 points in 1993. Investment 
recovered, reaching 19.8% of GDP in 1993, 
although this figure was still far below the 
average for 1976-1981. The trade surplus 
(measured in constant 1980 dollars) was 
reduced from 13 points of GDP in 1990 to 7 
points in 1993, reflecting the fact that the 
growth of imports outpaced that of 
exports as a result of the reactivation of the 
economy, the appreciation of the currency 
and the liberalization of trade. In nominal 
terms, the merchandise trade balance 
flip-flopped from a surplus of US$ 8.6 
billion in 1990 to a deficit of US$2.5 billion 
in 1993 and of US$4.2 billion in 1994, while 
the current account balance plunged from 
a surplus of US$ 1.9 billion to a deficit of 
US$10.5 billion in 1994. 
To sum up, the Argentine option -based 
on a fixed nominal exchange rate, the 
adoption of a monetary regime which does 
not provide for the sterilization of the effects 
of capital flows on the money supply, and 
the implementation of a structural reform 
package-has made considerable headway 
in terms of stabilization and the 
reactivation of production; these advances 
have been accompanied by a strong 
appreciation of the real exchange rate 
which has influenced the composition of 
demand and the allocation of investment 
resources, along with a growing deficit on 
current account. 
b) Sterilized intervention 
This alternative has been preferred by 
countries that have pursued an active 
monetary policy while at the same time 
maintaining a more cautious position with 
regard to the make-up of capital flows. It 
is an approach that arises out of a concern 
for the continued development of the 
tradables sector, the generation of national 
income and the channelling of that income 
towards savings and investment in that 
sector. 
Among the countries which have 
opted for active intervention, Chile has 
done so most consistently, but others 
-such as Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Mexico- have also taken this approach. 
Some of the instruments used by these 
countries at the three levels of 
intervention are reviewed below (see 
table XI.4). 
The case of  Chile. In 1991, the authorities 
began to take steps to regulate capital 
inflows and sterilize the monetary effects 
of the build-up of reserves by intervening 
in the foreign exchange and money 
markets. Chile has primarily used three 
instruments for these purposes: an 
exchange policy based on a "dirty" float of 
the exchange rate using a benchmark 
value determined on the basis of a basket 
of currencies; sterilization of the monetary 
effects of the accumulation of reserves 
through open market operations; and the 
application of levies and reserve 
requirements to regulate the entry of 
capital and discourage excessive inflows, 
mainly of short-term capital (Ffrench-Davis, 
Agosin and Uthoff, 1995). 
The Chilean authorities opted for 
intervention with a view to influencing the 
real exchange rate in the short term; this 
approach was based on two assumptions: 
i) the monetary authority has a clearer 
picture of probable future trends in the 
68 The available figures in 1980 dollars generally cover the period up to 1993 only. Figures expressed 
in current dollars for 1994 are preliminary in nature and have been taken from ECLAC (1994a). 
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Table XI.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND CENTRAL AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): SUMMARY OF 
CAPITAL-INFLOW INTERVENTION MEASURES 
Argent ina Colombia Costa Rica Chi le Mexico 
First Leve l 
( M o d e r -
at ion of the 
i m p a c t o f 
capital 
i n f l ows on 
c u r r e n c y 
a p p r e c i -
a t i o n / 
bu i l d -up of 
reserves) 
M a r c h 1991: 
Convert ib i l i ty 
A c t fixes the 
n o m i n a l ex -
c h a n g e ra te 
a n d d e r e g u -
la tes t h e 
f o r e i g n 
e x c h a n g e 
market. 
Liberal ization 
a n d o p e n i n g 
u p of trade. 
June 1991: in t roduc t ion 
o f f l o a t i n g b a n d 
(certicambios). 
January 1992: exporters 
a l l o w e d to h o l d a 
po r t i on of their earnings 
ab road , and res idents 
a l l owed to h o l d u p to 
US$ 500,000 i n assets 
a b r o a d w i t h o u t p r i o r 
p e r m i s s i o n . F e b r u a r y 
1992: reduc t i on of the 
m i n i m u m m a t u r i t y 
p e r i o d fo r e x t e r n a l 
l o a n s t o be u s e d fo r 
w o r k i n g capi tal or fixed 
investment. 
L iberal izat ion of trade. 
E a r l y 1992: 
i n t r o d u c -
t i o n o f f l oa t 
coupled w i t h 
i n t e r v e n t i o n 
measures 
1991: s m a l l r e v a l u -
a t i o n s f o l l o w e d b y 
g radua l devaluat ions 
t h a t h e i g h t e n t h e 
i n f l o w o f sho r t - te rm 
capital. 
M a r c h 1992: " d i r t y " 
f loat in i t ia ted w i t h i n 
the currency band. 
J u l y 1992: c r i t e r i o n 
u s e d fo r s e t t i n g 
e x c h a n g e r a t e is 
changed; rate pegged 
t o a b a s k e t o f 
c u r r e n c i e s 1991: 
increase i n percentage 
o f f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y 
deposits w h i c h banks 
c a n use for f o r e i g n 
t r a d e . Ru les f o r 
overseas i n v e s t m e n t 
b y n a t i o n a l s m a d e 
m o r e o p e r a t i o n s 
flexible. 
In t roduc t ion of 
f l o a t i n g b a n d 
w i t h f i x e d 
f loor. 
N o v e m b e r 
1991: b a n d 
c e i l i n g d e -
v a l u e d b y 20 
c e n t a v o s pe r 
day. 
O c t o b e r 1992: 
d a i l y d e v a l u -
at ion increased 
to 40 centavos. 
Second 
leve l 
( S t e r i l i -
z a t i o n o f 
the m o n e -
ta ry effect 
of exchange 
operations) 
S t r e n g t h -
en ing of pub -
l i c f i n a n c e s 
and in t roduc-
t i o n o f a 
pass i ve m o -
netary pol icy . 
Strengthening of pub l ic 
finances. 
January-October 1991: 
active monetary pol icy . 
October 1991: interest-
rate controls l i f ted and 
s t e r i l i z a t i o n p o l i c y 
abandoned. 
S t r e n g t h -
e n i n g of 
p u b l i c 
f i n a n c e s . 
O p e n market 
o p e r a t i o n s 
a n d r e s e r v e 
requi rements 
o n deposits i n 
f o r e i g n a n d 
local currency. 
S t r e n g t h e n i n g o f 
p u b l i c f inances. 
A c t i v e m o n e t a r y 
p o l i c y based o n o p e n 
m a r k e t opera t ions . 
S t r e n g t h e n i n g 
o f p u b l i c f i -
nances. 
M o d e r a t e 
steri l izat ion. 
T h i r d 
leve l 
( M o d e r -
a t i o n o f 
capital 
in f lows) 
June 1991: 3% tax o n 
f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e 
t r a n s a c t i o n s 
genera ted by pe rsona l 
s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d 
abroad. 
F e b r u a r y 1992 : i n -
crease i n c o m m i s s i o n 
o n p u r c h a s e s o f 
f o re ign exchange f r o m 
C e n t r a l B a n k f r o m 
1.5% to 5%. 
June 1992: r e g u l a t i o n 
o f the e n t r y o f f o re i gn 
exchange as p a y m e n t 
for services. 
J u n e 1991: r e s e r v e 
r e q u i r e m e n t o f 20% 
( w i t h o u t interest) on 
external credits. 
January 1992: reserve 
requ i rement ra ised to 
30% and extended to 
a p p l y t o f o r e i g n -
currency deposits. 
The amoun t of 
l iabi l i t ies w h i c h 
t h e b a n k i n g 
s y s t e m m a y 
h o l d i n foreign 
c u r r e n c y is 
l i m i t e d to 10% 
o f i t s t o t a l 
l iabi l i t ies. 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of var ious authors c i ted i n the text. 
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balance of payments and how they may 
affect the economy; and ii) it has a longer 
planning horizon than do agents operating 
in short-term markets (Zahler, 1992). 
Chile's exchange policy has 
undergone important changes in recent 
years. In 1983, once the freeze placed on 
the nominal exchange rate in 1979 had 
been lifted, the country returned to a 
crawling peg system which involved 
setting a benchmark price for the dollar. 
This was devalued daily by the Central 
Bank on the basis of domestic and external 
inflation differentials. In order to give the 
market some role to play in this respect, 
the price for the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange was allowed to float within a 
certain range on either side of the benchmark 
value for the dollar. As of mid-1989, this 
band was fixed at 5% of that value. 
Due to the intensification of capital 
inflows from 1990 on, the official exchange 
rate repeatedly settled near the floor of the 
band, forcing the Central Bank to step in. 
As a result, the Central Bank had to buy up 
US$ 1.5 billion in 1990 and US$ 3 billion in 
1991, as well as engaging in a large volume 
of open market operations in order to 
sterilize the monetary effect of exchange 
operations. As will be seen later on, these 
measures were supplemented with reserve 
requirements on external credits, taxes 
which mainly affected short-term 
operations, and the gradual liberalization 
of capital outflows, although this last 
measure failed to have the desired effect. 
In addition to this large inflow of 
capital, Chile also witnessed an 
improvement in its non-financial services 
account thanks to a strong expansion of 
exports of services and of non-traditional 
goods and to reductions in the external 
debt service. The authorities felt that some 
of the factors that were contributing to the 
positive trends in the current and capital 
accounts were of a fairly permanent nature 
and therefore proceeded to adapt the 
economic environment to these trends by 
means of two additional measures: i) a 
2% revaluation in June 1991 coupled with 
a reduction in customs tariffs from 15% to 
11%; ii) a further revaluation, of 5%, in 
January 1992. Nevertheless, the foreign 
exchange market persisted in bringing 
pressure to bear for a significantly larger 
appreciation. In response to this situation, 
the Chilean monetary authorities, who 
were convinced that they were dealing 
largely with transitory factors, took a 
series of steps that enabled them to blunt 
these upward pressures. 
Some of the main such measures were: 
i) in 1991, a 20% reserve requirement and 
a 1.2% tax on short-term external credits 
were established; ii) in 1992, the currency 
band was widened from 5% to 10% of the 
dollar's benchmark value in order to 
introduce more uncertainty into the 
formation of short-term expectations; 
iii) this measure was supplemented in 
March 1992 by the Central Bank's decision 
to intervene on a discretionary basis within 
the limits of the band (a "dirty" float); iv) in 
May 1992, the reserve requirement was 
raised to 30% and its application was 
extended to include foreign-currency 
deposits; and v) in July 1992, exchange 
regulations were amended with a view to 
reducing the linkage of Chile's monetary 
policy with that of the United States and 
tying it more closely to the policies of 
Chile's other main trading partners. To 
this end, the benchmark exchange rate was 
pegged to a currency basket made up of 
the United States dollar (50%), the German 
mark (30%) and the Japanese yen (20%), 
with these weightings reflecting the 
importance of the different currency areas 
in terms of Chile's foreign trade 
(Ffrench-Davis, Agosin and Uthoff, 1995). 
To sum up, in order to discourage 
inflows of short-term capital -stimulated, 
in particular, by differences between 
domestic and international interest rates-
the Chilean authorities have looked for 
ways of raising the cost of foreign-
currency borrowing from overseas 
sources through the use of reserve 
requirements (and taxes) designed to 
equalize it with the cost of domestic credit 
(adjusted for the exchange risk assumed 
by agents wishing to operate in Chile). In 
addition, by instituting a dirty float and 
pegging the exchange rate to a currency 
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Figure XI.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDEXES OF THE REAL EFFECTIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE a 
(Percentage  variations in relation to the 1985-1989 average) 
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basket, the authorities have increased the 
uncertainty and costs of agents dealing in 
short-term speculative capital.69 These 
measures discourage capital inflows, 
thereby easing upward pressure on the 
currency and helping to restore control 
over the domestic interest rate and 
aggregate demand. 
Another important characteristic of 
the Chilean experience has been the 
Central Bank's ability to gain access to the 
domestic financial market in order to 
counter the liquidity created by the 
build-up of reserves, which trebled 
between 1989 and 1993.70 The national 
financial market received a strong boost, 
inter alia, from the reform of the country's 
pension system. In fact, the rate at which 
pension funds have been accumulating 
resources has outstripped the increase in 
the supply of authorized financial assets, 
and they now hold a majority share in the 
market for some instruments. This 
development of the capital market has 
allowed the Central Bank to place a very 
large volume of notes on that market, 
mainly for the purpose of sterilizing the 
increased liquidity resulting from its 
purchases of foreign exchange. 
In terms of combating inflation, the 
policies implemented in Chile 
demonstrate that if a country places 
priority on curbing the trend towards an 
appreciation of its currency, it may find it 
necessary to set less stringent inflation 
targets in the short run, but these targets 
may not necessarily be unsatisfactory by 
Latin American standards or compared 
with the country's (in this case, Chile's) 
historical averages. Chile's annual rate of 
inflation, as measured by the CPI, dropped 
from over 30% at the start of 1990 to 13% 
in 1992 and 9% in 1994. The measure of 
inertia displayed by the inflation rate in 
recent years is a consequence of the fact 
that the anti-inflation effort is being made 
in the context of a heavily indexed 
economy.71 
The case of  Mexico. Mexico's return to 
international financial markets began in 
the second half of 1989 and has resulted in 
large surpluses on the capital account of its 
balance of payments. This has enabled the 
country to cope with growing deficits on 
its current account while at the same time 
building up its international reserves. 
Since 1983, Mexico's economic 
strategy has been based on two courses of 
action: i) macroeconomic adjustment and 
stabilization of price levels; and 
ii) structural reforms/2In this context, and 
given the possibility that, by expanding 
aggregate demand, new capital inflows 
might prevent the economic authority 
69 Chile has also adopted a number of important measures to encourage selective, gradual capital 
outflows. In 1991, the authorities raised the percentage of foreign-currency deposits which 
commercial banks could use for financing external trade, loosened regulations applying to overseas 
investment by national enterprises, shortened the time period allowed for the remittance of capital 
brought into the country through debt conversions, and authorized pension-fund management 
boards (AFPs) to invest part of their portfolios in low-risk instruments on overseas markets. In general, 
the effects of these measures have been very limited because returns on investment have continued 
to be higher in Chile. The only significant developments have been overseas investments involving 
the purchase of business firms as part of privatization operations and the purchase of shares in bullish 
stock markets, since in both cases investors look forward to large capital gains. 
70 As early as 1991, these reserves were equivalent to one year's worth of imports. 
71 Other issues, such as the policy governing international reserves, the 6% average growth rate of GDP 
in the 1990s coupled with a record level of investment in 1993, and the quasi-fiscal cost of sterilizing 
the increase in reserves (in that the interest rates which the Central Bank must pay on its notes are 
much higher than those it obtains from its foreign-currency holdings), are examined in Ffrench-Davis, 
Agosin and Uthoff (1995). 
72 Structural changes have been based, inter alia, on: i) trade liberalization; ii) modifications in the 
regulatory framework for foreign investment; iii) privatization of public enterprises; iv) deregulation 
on the domestic front (commercial, industrial, financial sectors); and v) strengthening of public finances. 
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from attaining its inflation targets, a 
number of measures aimed at reducing the 
impact of such flows on the economy have 
been adopted: i) the sterilization of the 
effect of foreign exchange operations; ii) a 
relaxation of exchange policy; and iii) the 
imposition of limits on external borrowing 
by commercial banks (Banco de Mexico, 
1993; Gurrfa, 1995). 
The primary objective of monetary 
policy has been to combat inflation and 
exchange policy has been used to help 
achieve that goal (Banco de Mexico, 1993). 
Mexico's exchange policy allows the 
exchange rate to fluctuate within a band 
whose maximum point of intervention is 
lowered daily by a pre-announced 
amount, while the lower level of the band 
73 
remains constant. 
For purposes of monetary policy, this 
exchange system (i.e., controlled 
movement of the nominal exchange rate) 
entails an endogenous money supply 
determined by variations in domestic 
credit and by the balance of payments. 
Thus, the main instrument of monetary 
policy available to the authorities is to 
control domestic credit, giving the interest 
rate full freedom to adjust to the target 
exchange rate (Banco de México, 1993). 
The authorities have been cautious in 
their use of open market operations to 
sterilize the impact of capital flows. It is 
estimated that the cost of sterilization 
amounted to 0.25 points of GDP during 
1990-1992 (Gurria, 1995). 
Together with these sterilization 
operations and a relaxation of exchange 
policy, in 1992 Mexico placed a limit on the 
amount of liabilities which commercial 
banks could hold in foreign currency: the 
current limit is 10% of total liabilities. The 
coefficient of liquidity was maintained at 
15%, which must be placed in low-risk 
instruments. 
With regard to the objectives of 
stabilization, the results have been 
positive. The annual rate of inflation 
(measured by the CPI) declined from 30% 
in 1990 to 8% in 1993 and 7% in 1994. The 
exchange rate has shown a persistent 
trend towards real appreciation, however, 
and in 1993 reached levels similar to those 
of 1980 (see figure XI.4). In 1980 dollars, 
the current account deficit rose from 4.4% 
of GDP in 1990 to 9.5% in 1993; total 
investment increased from 19% of GDP in 
1991 to 21% in 1993.74 Domestic and 
national savings have been declining, with 
the former slipping from 24% of GDP in 
1990 to 22% in 1993 (see table XI.5), and the 
growth rate of output has been edging 
upward quite hesitantly in some years, 
averaging 3% since 1990. 
The case of  Colombia. During the 
period 1990-1992, the Banco de la 
República of Colombia built up its stock of 
international reserves to the point where it 
practically doubled its original balance.75 
There is now some degree of consensus 
among analysts that the bulk of the 
build-up in reserves was the result of 
capital movements and not, as on previous 
occasions, of export-related movements 
(Carrasquilla, 1993). 
During the first three quarters of 1991, 
capital inflows were accompanied by an 
active policy effort to sterilize the 
monetary effects of the build-up in 
reserves through open market operations 
73 In November 1991, together with the elimination of exchange controls, Mexico widened its currency 
band, allowing a devaluation of the band's ceiling of 20 centavos per day. In October 1992, it increased 
the devaluation to 0.40 thousandths of a new peso per day (equivalent to an annual rate of 
devaluation of 4.5%). By the end of 1993 the difference between the minimum and maximum levels 
amounted to 9%. The purpose of this measure was to give the exchange rate greater flexibility in 
adapting to the increased supply of capital and, by widening the band, to increase the level of 
exchange risk in order to deter short-term capital inflows. 
74 In nominal terms, the current account deficit rose from US$ 8 billion in 1990 to US$ 25 billion in 1992 
and US$ 29 billion in 1994. Exports of goods amounted to around 19% of GDP in 1993. 
75 In 1990, reserves were equivalent to 10 months' worth of imports; in 1991 they jumped to 16 months' 
worth, but fell back to the equivalent of 10 months in 1993. 
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Figure XI.4 
INDEXES OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE FOR 
EXPORTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
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Source: ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of  lhe Economy of  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994 (LC/G.1846), Santiago, 
December 1994, table A-8. 
a Values for 1994 correspond to the average for the period from January to September. 
and by a change in exchange policy, in As a result of this change, the Central 
June of that year, designed to backstop Bank would no longer pay cash for foreign 
those sterilization efforts.76 exchange but would instead pay with 
76 Other measures aimed at reducing capital inflows included the application, in June 1991, of a 3% tax 
on transactions in foreign currency generated by personal services rendered abroad and on other 
types of transfers. In February 1992, the Banco de la República raised the commission on foreign 
exchange purchases from 1.5% to 5% (IMF, 1993). 
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Table XI.5 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INDICATORS OF 
RESERVES AND PRICES 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Argentina 
Reserves (months' worth of imports) 
Real exchange rate (1985=100) 
Interest rate spread 
Short term 
Long term 
Inflation according to CPI 
Chile 
Reserves (months' worth of imports) 
Real exchange rate (1985=100) 
Interest rate spread 
Short term 
Long term 
Inflation according to CPI 
Colombia 
Reserves (months' worth of imports) 
Real exchange rate (1985=100) 
Interest rate spread 
Short term 
Long term 
Inflation according to CP1 
Costa Rica 
Reserves (months' worth of imports) 
Real exchange rate (1985=100) 
Interest rate spread 
Short term 
Long term 
Inflation according to CPI 
Mexico 
Reserves (months' worth of imports) 
Real exchange rate (1985=100) 
Interest rate spread 
Short term 
Long term 
Inflation according to CP1 
4.5 14.8 10.7 9.9 9.9 
151.1 105.6 88.0 81.8 78.6 
26.4 127.7 -12.6 9.2 5.8 
27.2 127.5 -14.4 6.1 3.4 
4 923 1 344 84.0 17.6 7.7 
6.7 10.3 11.5 12.5 11.3 
135.4 140.4 138.9 133.1 135.0 
-3.3 15.7 4.1 11.2 2.1 
-2.5 15.5 2.3 8.1 -0.3 
21.4 27.3 18.7 12.7 12.2 
9.5 9.9 15.9 14.2 10.1 
149.0 167.8 169.5 150.2 139.8 
-9.3 -8.4 3.7 -8.3 17.3 
-8.5 -8.6 1.9 -11.4 14.9 
26.1 32.4 26.8 25.2 22.6 
5.7 3.5 6.6 5.8 4.6 
109.0 111.2 120.5 114.7 111.9 
-0.1 -8.8 -8.8 9.9 3.0 
0.7 -9.0 -10.6 6.8 0.6 
10.0 27.3 25.3 17.0 9.0 
3.2 3.8 5.6 4.9 6.1 
108.4 105.0 95.7 88.0 82.8 
9.0 8.9 6.1 10.1 12.4 
9.7 8.7 4.3 7.0 10.0 
19.7 29.9 18.9 11.9 8.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official  figures provided by the countries and the International Monetary Fund; ECLAC, 
Preliminary Overview of  the Economy of  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994 (LC/G.1846), Santiago, Chile, 
December, 1994. 
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exchange certificates called "certicambios", 
which were dollar-denominated 
non-interest-bearing bonds having a 
maturity period of one year. These bonds' 
redemption price in pesos (referred to as 
the official exchange rate) was fixed daily 
by the Central Bank. At the time of their 
issue, certicambios could be sold on the 
secondary market at a discount that 
fluctuated within a band of from 5.5% to 
12.5%. The price of these certificates on the 
secondary market was equivalent to the 
price of the dollar. 
If the discount moved above 12.5%, 
the authorities would intervene by buying 
certicambios-, thus, whenever the demand 
for these certificates expanded, their 
discount shrank (Cárdenas, 1993). This 
system was discontinued in 1994, and in 
April of that year a reserve requirement on 
external credits was instituted. 
Although this exchange strategy 
permitted the monetary effects of the 
build-up in reserves to be spread out over 
a period of time, the monetary sterilization 
operations carried out during this period 
were intense, and it is estimated that in 
1991, its impact on the quasi-fiscal deficit 
was equivalent to between 0.5% and 1% of 
GDP (Cárdenas, 1993; IMF, 1993). 
In October 1991, an effort began to be 
made to bring down interest rates in the 
domestic financial system. Colombia thus 
abandoned the active sterilization policy it 
had pursued during the first nine months 
of 1991, and the emphasis of monetary 
policy began to shift more and more 
towards a gradual elimination of the spread 
between domestic and external interest rates 
in order to discourage inflows of speculative 
capital, even at the cost of allowing a sharper 
expansion than before in the means of 
payment. Despite this increase, the inflation 
rate slowed in 1992and 1993 (Carrasquilla, 
1993; Garay, 1993). At the same time, 
however, the balance on current account 
took a notable turn for the worse. 
In order to backstop the 
implementation of a monetary policy that 
did not provide for sterilization, the tax 
reform approved in June 1992 included a 
measure for regulating inflows of 
foreign-exchange earnings from services 
as a means of influencing capital inflows; 
at the same time, the rules governing 
capital outflows were relaxed.77 
The rate of inflation, as measured by 
the CPI, fell from 32% in 1990 to 23% in 1993 
and 1994, and the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate has tended to pick up speed 
since 1992 (see figure XI.4). In 1980 dollars, 
the current account yielded a surplus 
amounting to 1.2% of GDP in 1991, but 
showed a deficit of 5.4% in 1993. The 
domestic savings rate and the investment 
rate climbed swiftly between 1990 and 
1993, but the growth rate of the economy 
has been moderate, averaging 4% for 
1990-1994. 
Historically, the pattern of capital 
movements in the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean has differed 
from that of the other countries in the 
region. As mentioned in earlier sections, in 
those countries the trend in net capital 
movements has been relatively less 
unstable during the past three decades.78 
One particularly notable feature of the 
composition of these flows is the importance 
of official and private unrequited transfers 
(with remittances from emigrants making 
up the bulk of the latter). On average, each 
of these two headings accounted for 
one-third of the capital movements 
recorded in 1990-1992, representing a 
sharp increase over the period 1980-1989. 
77 In January 1992, all exporters were authorized to hold a portion of their foreign-exchange earnings 
abroad; formerly, only State-run exporters of oil and minerals and coffee exporters had been 
permitted to do this. In addition, residents were allowed to hold up to US$ 500,000 in assets abroad 
without having to seek prior permission. In February 1992, Colombia reduced the minimum maturity 
period for external loans to one year (it had been five years with a two-year grace period). These 
loans are permitted only if they are to be used for working capital or to finance fixed investment (IMF, 
1993). 
78 On average, net capital inflows totalled 9% of GDP in 1977-1981,8% in 1983-1989 and 7% in 1990-1993. 
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Costa Rica's involvement in 
international financial markets has also 
exhibited the above-mentioned features, 
although the proportion of unrequited 
transfers in total capital flows has been 
below the average for the subregión. 
Official unrequited transfers accounted 
for an average of 21% of capital 
movements in 1990-1992, while private 
transfers hovered around 13%. Compared 
with the other countries in the subregión, 
Costa Rica has used more macroeconomic 
instruments for the management of capital 
flows, the build-up of reserves has been 
significant and the composition and 
volume of new flows has been different. 
In 1982, Costa Rica embarked upon a 
gradual process of economic reform 
whose main thrust was to liberalize the 
country's foreign trade, financial system 
and exchange policy.79 
Since the mid-1980s, Costa Rica has 
sought to encourage private participation 
in the financial market, most of which 
had previously been in the hands of the 
State. In March 1992, the Government 
authorized commercial banks to accept 
deposits in foreign currencies (prior to 
that time they had done so only on behalf 
of the Central Bank), to engage in 
securities trading and to make 
foreign-currency loans. In late 1989, banks 
began setting interest rates on their own 
(traditionally, interest rates had been 
regulated by the economic authorities), 
and in 1991 restrictions on the banks' 
credit-allocation functions were lifted 
(Rodriguez and Rodríguez, 1993). 
Within this context, the main tools 
used by the Central Bank to implement the 
country's monetary policy have been open 
market operations and the establishment 
of minimum reserve requirements on 
checking accounts and time deposits in 
local and foreign currencies. 
As regards exchange policy, after 
using a crawling peg system for a time, 
in early 1992 Costa Rica allowed its 
currency to float;80 banks and other 
institutions were allowed to buy and sell 
foreign exchange freely, and exchange 
restrictions on capital movements were 
eliminated. 
The country's currency exhibited a 
tendency to rise in value, appreciating by 
7.5% between the time of the float's 
introduction at the start of 1992 and June 
of the same year. After that, the Central 
Bank began to intervene actively in an 
effort, first, to reverse this trend and, 
second, to maintain a fairly stable real 
exchange rate in 1993 and 1994 (see figure 
XI.4). 
Output expanded at a relatively rapid 
pace between 1991 and 1994, with its 
annual growth rate averaging 5% (see 
table XI.6). Inflation (as measured by 
the CPI) fell from 25% in 1991 to 9% in 1993, 
but rebounded to 17% in 1994 (ECLAC, 
1994d). 
Measured in constant 1980 dollars, 
after dropping to 5 points of GDP in 1991, 
the current account deficit swelled to 12% 
in 1993. National savings rose by 4 points 
of GDP between 1990 and 1993, while total 
investment was up by 2 points (see 
table XI.6). 
4. Reflections on the countries' 
experiences 
From the various experiences outlined 
above it can be seen that, in general, the 
renewal of capital inflows to the region in 
the 1990s has led to a reactivation of the 
countries' economic growth. In addition, 
this has taken place within relatively more 
stable macroeconomic environments than 
in earlier decades, and this fact has been 
79 Costa Rica has also applied other reforms, such as price decontrol, the elimination of subsidies, fiscal 
adjustments and special regimes for promoting foreign investment. 
80 The Central Bank of Costa Rica has continued to engage in some degree of intervention through the 
direct sale and purchase of foreign exchange, and this has been reflected in a gradual accumulation 
of international reserves. In terms of months' worth of imports, reserves totalled 3.5 months in 1990 
and 5.8 in 1992. It should be noted that Costa Rica has an import coefficient of around 50% of GDP. 
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reflected in a considerable downturn in the 
inflation rate. 
Both in the countries discussed here 
and in the region as a whole, a significant 
trend towards currency appreciation is to 
be observed, as well as towards widening 
current-account and trade deficits. 
Countries which have opted for a 
moderate degree of sterilization or which 
have chosen not to engage in sterilization 
tend to exhibit a marked appreciation of 
their exchange rates, larger increases in 
their current-account and trade deficits, 
reductions or moderate increases in 
national saving and success in combating 
inflation. 
Countries which have adopted active 
intervention policies display increases in 
their national saving rates, less of a trend 
towards currency appreciation, and 
smaller current-account deficits. The 
reductions registered in their rates of 
inflation have also been less notable than 
in the above cases. 
The region's experiences, particularly 
during the last decade and a half, teach us 
that one of the main factors in ensuring 
that external capital inflows will 
contribute to medium- and long-term 
growth is the countries' ability to maintain 
a stable macroeconomic environment 
which will bolster their efforts to change 
their production patterns and increase 
their international competitiveness. 
Accordingly, these experiences suggest 
that an economic policy's success should 
be measured in terms of a country's ability 
to -simultaneously- ensure the continuity 
of capital inflows over time, maintain a 
degree of control over its exchange and 
monetary policies, and increase national 
savings and investment -elements which 
should serve to support the production 
base -for tradables and non-tradables- so 
that the country will be able to compete in 
the international marketplace. 
A carefully-conducted form of 
sterilization and regulation of short-term 
capital inflows is usually needed in order 
to accomplish this. Generally speaking, 
intervention schemes have been applied 
at three levels: i) intervention in the 
foreign exchange market by floating the 
currency within predetermined bands; 
ii) sterilization of the monetary effects of 
the increased supply of foreign exchange; 
and iii) regulation of short-term 
speculative capital movements through 
reserve requirements, quotas and 
commissions. 
The experiences analysed here 
illustrate the importance of having 
instruments that can be adapted rapidly 
and flexibly to the economic situation. The 
object is for such instruments to permit the 
establishment of regulations to: i) isolate 
the money and foreign-exchange markets 
from short-term speculative international 
capital movements; ii) permit the 
management of monetary policy when 
capital inflows bring about changes in the 
monetary base which generate excess 
demand; iii) discourage capital outflows 
during periods when the economy is 
subject to external constraints by 
neutralizing the effect of cyclical factors 
that are not in keeping with medium- and 
long-term trends; and iv) bring the cost of 
gaining access to external capital into line 
with the cost of domestic credit in order to 
forestall overborrowing by the private 
and/or public sectors as well as the 
emergence of destabilizing bubbles. 
Intervention also has its risks, 
however. Excessive restrictions must be 
avoided because: i) an overabundance of 
regulations creates uncertainty, which 
generally discourages productive 
innovation; ii) regulations which 
consistently run counter to medium-term 
market forces end up being violated or 
reversed; iii) overly restrictive regulations 
also limit the range of risk, liquidity and 
maturities available to creditors and 
borrowers; and iv) they could limit 
economic growth by cutting the country 
off from other opportunities for obtaining 
funds to finance such growth and for 
cushioning the economy from short-term, 
transitory shocks. Hence regulations, 
although essential, need to be designed 
very carefully. A comparative analysis of 
different experiences in this regard sheds 
a great deal of light on the subject. 
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Table XI.6 
LATIN AMERICA: INDICATORS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Percentages  of  GDP based on figures  in 1980 dollars) 
Argentina 
Net inflow of capital 
Variation in reserves 
External saving 
Effect on reactivation 
GDP growth rate 
Imports of goods 
Investment 
Per capita GDP (1980 dollars) 
Medium-term effect 
Domestic saving (GDP-C) 
National saving (Y-C) 
Exports of goods 
Non-financial current account3 
Chile 
Net inflow of capital 
Variation in reserves 
External saving 
Effect on reactivation 
GDP growth rate 
Imports of goods 
Investment 
Per capita GDP (1980 dollars) 
Medium-term effect 
Domestic saving (GDP-C) 
National saving (Y-C) 
Exports of goods 
Non-financial current account3 
Colombia 
Net inflow of capital 
Variation in reserves 
External saving 
Effect on reactivation 
GDP growth rate 
Imports of goods 
Investment 
Per capita GDP (1980 dollars) 
Medium-term effect 
Domestic saving (GDP-C) 
National saving (Y-C) 
Exports of goods 





1990 1991 1992 1993 
41.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 -0.1 2.5 6.7 5.8 
2.8 -2.5 -0.6 -0.1 2.4 1.6 2.5 1.4 
-1.1 4.2 2.2 -1.3 -2.5 0.9 4.2 4.4 
3.9 -1.4 -3.1 0.0 -0.1 8.9 8.7 6.0 
5.2 7.9 4.8 3.8 3.0 5.0 8.2 9.1 
25.2 23.7 19.2 16.5 13.3 15.3 18.5 19.8 
3,932 3,978 3,655 3,553 3,255 3,500 3,757 3,936 
28.6 22.3 24.3 24.4 26.7 24.0 22.4 22.7 
26.3 19.5 17.0 15.3 16.5 14.9 14.7 15.7 
8.3 7.8 8.0 10.3 15.0 13.2 12.2 12.1 
3.4 -1.7 2.5 3.2 5.9 2.0 -2.0 -2.6 
6.1 15.6 4.5 5.4 7.8 3.5 7.7 6.0 
2.0 2.8 -5.6 0.9 5.8 3.0 5.5 0.9 
4.2 12.8 10.1 4.5 2.0 0.5 2.2 5.2 
8.2 6.6 -12.6 4.5 2.8 5.7 9.8 5.6 
17.6 22.6 16.1 16.3 19.2 19.3 21.7 23.2 
14.1 19.8 12.6 15.6 18.8 17.4 19.5 20.8 
1,998 2,362 2,070 2,247 2,570 2,673 2,890 3004 
14.2 12.8 15.2 22.9 28.3 29.3 32.0 31.1 
9.9 7.2 2.7 11.3 16.9 17.0 17.5 15.7 
18.9 17.2 19.9 22.8 26.4 26.6 29.5 28.8 
0.1 -7.9 -1.6 2.5 2.6 3.9 1.9 -1.9 
2.5 5.1 6.5 3.6 2.0 2.1 3.3 5.4 
3.9 1.4 -2.4 0.1 1.1 3.3 1.9 -0.0 
-1.4 3.7 8.9 3.5 0.9 -1.2 -1.4 5.4 
5.7 3.3 1.0 4.2 4.0 1.8 3.6 4.9 
11.0 13.4 15.1 10.9 10.2 8.7 11.0 16.0 
18.3 20.1 22.0 17.3 14.9 13.3 17.9 21.7 
1,138 1,225 1,213 1,326 1,444 1,445 1,472 1,518 
19.4 18.2 17.0 19.1 21.6 22.2 25.5 25.1 
19.7 17.0 13.6 15.3 15.9 17.5 19.4 18.1 
11.9 11.5 10.1 12.6 15.9 17.2 17.9 18.3 
1.1 -2.7 -6.3 0.7 3.3 4.9 2.0 -2.7 
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Table XI.6 (concluded) 
Costa Rica 
Net inflow of capital 
Variation in reserves 
External saving 
Effect on reactivation 
GDP growth rate 
Imports of goods 
Investment 
Per capita GDP (1980 dollars) 
Medium-term effect 
Domestic saving (GDP-C) 
National saving (Y-C) 
Exports of goods 
Non-financial current accounta 
Mexico 
Net inflow of capital 
Variation in reserves 
External saving 
Effect on reactivation 
GDP growth rate 
Imports of goods 
Investment 
Per capita GDP (1980 dollars) 
Medium-term effect 
Domestic saving (GDP-C) 
National saving (Y-C) 
Exports of goods 







1990 1991 1992 1993 
14.8 16.2 12.7 12.5 9.5 12.5 13.8 11.7 
1.1 0.6 3.7 1.3 -4.5 7.7 2.9 -0.4 
13.7 15.6 9.0 11.2 14.0 4.8 10.9 12.1 
6.5 -0.9 -7.3 4.1 3.4 2.1 7.3 6.1 
41.5 34.5 24.7 36.5 46.1 42.6 51.9 58.0 
24.3 21.8 13.6 21.2 22.4 19.2 23.6 24.1 
1,526 1,512 1,325 1,399 1,462 1,455 1,523 1,577 
11.9 16.7 23.8 22.0 20.6 24.7 23.4 22.0 
10.7 6.9 5.5 11.1 9.7 15.5 14.4 13.7 
31.5 29.1 29.3 31.4 34.2 41.5 46.4 49.0 
-12.4 -8.3 2.2 -2.5 -8.3 -0.5 -6.6 -8.1 
3.2 7.7 1.5 0.6 5.3 9.9 11.0 11.7 
0.1 0.5 -1.8 0.2 1.0 3.1 0.7 2.2 
3.1 7.1 3.3 0.4 4.4 6.8 10.4 9.5 
7.3 9.0 -0.6 1.1 4.4 3.6 2.8 0.6 
6.9 11.3 7.4 8.8 14.2 15.9 19.3 18.7 
23.0 27.9 21.8 17.2 18.9 19.6 21.8 21.0 
2,275 2,705 2,704 2,463 2,455 2,490 2,506 2,470 
24.6 25.0 27.4 26.6 23.6 22.9 21.3 21.8 
19.9 20.9 18.7 17.2 15.4 13.8 12.5 12.4 
6.8 9.3 12.5 16.4 17.4 18.1 18.1 18.5 
1.6 -2.7 2.9 3.8 -1.2 -3.5 -6.8 -5.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Balance for goods and services plus the terms-of-trade effect. 
r 
Chapter XII 
REGULATION, SUPERVISION AND STABILITY 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
The liberalization of the capital account of 
the balance of payments, as described in 
previous chapters, is generally carried out 
as part of a broader process of financial 
-and indeed economic- deregulation 
designed to give priority to market forces 
in the determination of key prices within 
the economy. Whatever the pace and 
content of a financial liberalization effort, 
however, a regulatory and supervisory 
apparatus must be in place in order for it 
to be successful, given the importance of 
upholding the credibility and solvency of 
financial institutions and capital markets. 
Because of the dominant position 
which banks occupy in domestic financial 
systems, the deregulation of credit, of 
interest rates and of the instruments used 
by banks to attract funds plays a 
prominent role in these policies. Since the 
mid-1980s, a number of Latin American 
countries have extended the scope of 
financial reforms to cover securities 
markets as well. In some cases, 
institutional investors have played an 
important part in the development of 
securities markets and in capital 
formation. Since the start of the 1990s, the 
inflow of international funds to these 
countries in the form of portfolio 
investments has also given a boost to 
emerging securities markets.81 
This chapter will analyse the 
significance and role of one of the main 
determinants of the performance 
of financial institutions and capital 
markets: the regulations and standards 
which establish the "ground rules", or 
institutional framework for the relevant 
agents, governing the attraction, 
intermediation and allocation of funds, 
together with the enforcement of those 
regulations.82 The analysis focuses on 
regulatory and supervisory systems 
designed to ensure financial solvency. 
These types of regulations play a 
particularly important role in 
programmes aimed at bringing about the 
financial liberalization of the domestic 
market and opening up the capital 
account. The deregulation of interest rates, 
credit, access to external funds and other 
81 A more detailed analysis of policy proposals concerning the regulation, supervision and stability of 
financial institutions and capital markets in Latin America and the Caribbean may be found in a 
number of ECLAC reports, particularly Held (1994). 
82 The solvency and efficiency of banks and financial institutions also hinge upon the following factors: 
macroeconomic conditions and policies, incentives for saving and capital formation, and the manner 
in which those institutions manage their portfolios. , -
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financial variables gives banks and 
financial institutions greater decision-
making latitude as regards the allocation 
and attraction of funds, as well as exposing 
them to various forms of risk. 
1. Regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions and 
capital markets 
a) Financial regulation 
At the macroeconomic level, the main 
objective of financial regulations is the 
control of monetary aggregates, or of 
aggregate expenditure, with a view to 
stabilizing price levels and achieving a 
high rate of economic activity. 
Macroeconomic policies having these 
same aims were one the central themes of 
chapter XI. These types of regulations can 
influence the two key financial prices: 
interest rates and the exchange rate. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, such 
regulations may be used to establish price 
bands for these variables or rules that 
govern their behaviour, or simply to fix 
one or both of these key prices. These 
prices may also be influenced indirectly 
through the use of rules that affect the 
availability or cost of funds by imposing 
restrictions on access, establishing reserve 
requirements or levying taxes. Rules 
governing the inflow and outflow of 
foreign or domestic capital are another 
type of financial regulation. 
Financial deregulation seeks to extend 
the scope of the market's role in 
determining interest rates, the exchange 
rate, and the attraction and allocation of 
funds at the microeconomic level. In this 
context, financial liberalization constitutes 
a broad-ranging deregulation policy 
which customarily forms part of 
market-oriented reforms. 
b) Prudential regulation 
Prudential regulation is aimed mainly 
at ensuring the solvency of banks, 
financial funds, insurance companies and 
other agents which manage funds or 
assume risk for third parties on a large 
scale. The performance of these functions 
strongly influences public confidence, and 
the solvency or stability of financial 
institutions therefore generates important 
macroeconomic externalities. 
Prudential regulations have two 
distinct aims. The first is to give 
transparency to the financial standing of 
institutions and other agents that float 
bonds and issue securities that can be 
traded on the stock exchange. The 
fulfilment of this objective requires the 
provision of a sufficient amount of 
accurate, up-to-date information about 
such institutions' assets and performance 
as well as other evidence of their ability 
and intention to comply, under the agreed 
conditions, with the payment obligations 
stipulated in the securities and share 
certificates they issue. The second aim is to 
control the amount of risk which financial 
institutions can assume. The attainment of 
this objective calls for a precise definition 
of the financial services such institutions 
may provide, the restrictions and 
prohibitions applying to their activities, 
and the pertinent capital requirements. A 
clear identification of the levels of risk, 
assets and yields associated with the 
provision of different financial services is 
essential in order to maintain 
transparency and avoid conflicts of 
interest whenever the range of activities in 
which financial institutions may engage is 
broadened. 
Prudential deregulation involves the 
relaxation of controls designed to 
safeguard financial institutions' solvency. 
If this process is carried too far, it results in 
"decontrol", i.e., a conspicuous lack of 
rules governing risk and information 
management. Prudential regulation, in 
contrast, strengthens controls aimed at 
maintaining financial institutions' 
solvency and encourages agents that 
supply funds to such institutions to play 
an active part in controlling the level of 
risk which they can assume. Prudential 
regulation has been growing in 
importance at the international level, 
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especially as the world's economies have 
become more liberalized. 
c) Supervision 
Effective supervision is crucial in 
ensuring that banks, financial institutions 
and other agents operating in credit and 
capital markets observe the financial and 
prudential rules governing transactions 
and the provision of services. Depending 
upon the level of sophistication and 
development policies of these markets, 
such supervision will involve one or more 
specialized authorities of the public sector. 
One of the central components of the 
prudential supervision of financial 
institutions is regular monitoring of these 
institutions to ensure that their portfolios 
of financial assets (loans or financial 
investments, as the case may be) have been 
correctly appraised in accordance with 
their varying degrees of exposure and, on 
that basis, the publication of simple 
solvency indicators that are readily 
understandable to depositors, savers and 
financial investors. 
The rather limited development of 
credit and capital markets in many Latin 
American and Caribbean countries 
indicates that the role of regulatory 
agencies in the financial system must not 
be confined to the enforcement of existing 
rules. One of the main tasks of these 
regulatory authorities is to introduce or 
modernize solvency standards for new 
institutions and financial instruments in 
order to meet the demand created by the 
attraction, intermediation and allocation 
of a growing volume of funds. 
2. Prudential regulation and supervision 
of the banking system 
In view of the financial fragility of the 
banking system, the prudential regulation 
and supervision of that system are highly 
important. The system's fragility is 
attributable to two of its distinctive 
characteristics. The first is the highly 
leveraged nature of banks' financial 
structures, in that their ratio of financial 
liabilities (deposits and other obligations) 
or financial assets (loans and investments) 
to equity is very often 10 or more to one. 
The second is that, since banks take in 
funds from third parties by issuing 
certificates of deposit and other 
obligations and then use these funds to 
extend loans and make financial 
investments in their own name, they are 
putting up their own equity and other 
assets against various types of risk. 
Consequently, the loss or devaluation of 
even a fraction of their loan and 
investment portfolios can severely 
jeopardize their solvency. 
a) Solvency-oriented regulations and 
supervision 
Table XII. 1 shows how important it is 
for banks to maintain types and levels of 
exposure compatible with their highly 
leveraged structures. Since corporate and 
personal loans are a bank's main types of 
lending activity, credit risk or default risk 
(i.e., of failure to make payment in 
accordance with the conditions stipulated 
when the loan was granted) is a distinctive 
type of risk assumed by banks. The table 
also refers to the following types of risk: 
exchange risk, which becomes a factor 
when loans or investments are made in a 
currency other than that in which the 
underlying deposits are expressed; 
interest-rate and liquidity risk, which arise 
when a bank makes loans or investments 
that have longer repayment or maturity 
periods than those of the deposits used to 
finance them; and the risk associated with 
the concentration of loans or financial 
investments in certain agents, sectors of 
activity or geographical areas due to an 
insufficient diversification of bank portfolios. 
If the condition of transparency with 
regard to bank solvency is not fulfilled, 
depositors will not be able to exert market 
control. A lack of transparency may also 
give depositors and other bank creditors 
the impression that deposits and other 
obligations are covered by some sort of 
"implicit" government guarantee, i.e., that 
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Table XII.l 
PRUDENTIAL BANKING REGULATIONS 
Objective of regulation Content of regulation 
Stringent entry requirements - High minimum level of capital required for entry 
- Eligibility requirements for principal shareholders, directors and 
CEO 
Risk associated with excessive 
leverage 
Full loss provisioning 
Maintenance of bank capital 
on a solid footing 
Transparency in respect of 
banks' financial status 
Orderly withdrawal from the 
banking system 
- Broad diversification of loan and financial investment portfolios (to 
avoid concentrating risk in certain agents, economic sectors or finan-
cial instruments) 
- Written rules governing the extension of loans and the constitution 
of guarantees (to control the credit risk of personal loans, especially 
"related-party" loans granted to shareholders, directors and bank 
agents) 
- Limits on maturity-period differentials between assets and liabilities 
(to control interest-rate risk) 
- Limits on asset/liability currency differences (to control exchange 
risk) 
- Limits on investment in fixed assets or immovables and require-
ments regarding holdings of liquid financial instruments (to control 
liquidity risk) 
- Control of other types of bank exposure.3 
- Careful measurement of all portfolio risk 
- Setting aside of reserves to fully cover bank exposure 
- Suspension of interest on high-risk loans 
- Prompt replenishment of capital following expected losses 
- Minimum capital requirements commensurate with the risk associa-
ted with different types of assets 
- Provision, on a regular basis, of information -presented in the form 
of simple indicators of exposure, reserves, and equity or net worth-
to depositors and the general plublic regarding banks' financial 
standing 
- Orderly liquidation of insolvent banks 
- Rules governing the order in which payments on certain types of 
deposits and other obligations (such as checking accounts, savings 
deposits, Central Bank credits, etc.) are to be made 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of case studies of the Joint ECLAC/UNDP  Regional Project on Financial Policies for 
Development. 
a Refers mainly to risk that is "off the balance sheet", or risk that is not located in the loan and investment portfolio. 
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the public sector will cover their losses in 
the event of a bank failure, even if no 
written guarantee to that effect exists. 
b) Banking systems without solvency controls 
Solvency-oriented regulations (see 
table XII. 1) and loan guarantees or 
insurance on deposits and other 
obligations constitute the two main 
components of any regulatory and 
supervisory system whose purpose is to 
ensure the financial soundness of the 
banking system. 
Hence, when the presence of some 
system (whether explicit or implicit) of 
government guarantees coincides with 
serious shortcomings in the prudential 
regulatory framework, neither depositors 
nor any public-sector agency will be 
concerned with the banks' financial stability. 
A banking system whose financial 
status is not subject to controls has 
incentives to make high-risk loans, often at 
high real interest rates. The presence of an 
explicit or implicit State guarantee on 
deposits and other obligations facilitates 
this process. At the same time, the 
perception of security and the existence of 
attractive interest rates on deposits 
generates an excessive stimulus for 
investors of domestic and foreign funds. 
Consequently, when financial liber-
alization is pursued within the context of a 
decontrolled banking system, it may give 
rise to overborrowing by production 
firms, a high proportion of loans which are 
difficult to collect, and losses that severely 
undermine the banks' equity position. 
3. Regulation, supervision and financial 
instability in countries of the region 
a) Shortcomings in prudential regulation 
and supervision as a factor  of  financial 
instability 
Table XII.2 presents a sample group of 
countries in the region in which various 
types of policies have led to financial 
problems in the banking system during 
the past two decades. These problems 
have been due, in particular, to two 
factors. The first has to do with serious 
flaws in the prudential regulatory and 
supervisory system arising from 
weaknesses in terms of risk management, 
inadequate regulations concerning banks' 
capital and reserves, insufficient 
supervision or supervision narrowly 
focused on accounting and financial 
aspects, and the existence of explicit or 
implicit State guarantees on deposits and 
other obligations. Almost all of these 
problems arose in systems having the type 
of institutional structure most likely to 
generate problems of insolvency, i.e., 
decontrolled banking systems or systems 
lacking solvency safeguards. Second, these 
problems arose out of macroeconomic 
environments that were unstable or 
subject to severe misadjustments that 
entailed major changes in the levels of 
economic activity, relative prices, and 
corporate and personal income which, by 
affecting the "first" source of loan 
payments or the value of guarantees (the 
"second" source of payment), reduced the 
quality of the banks' loan portfolios. 
In the mid-1970s Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay began to liberalize interest rates, 
credit and other financial variables; these 
policies also provided for a broader 
definition of the activities in which banks 
could engage, and they did so under 
highly adverse conditions in terms of the 
banks' solvency and stability. The 
simultaneous application of ambitious 
stabilization measures -particularly the 
adoption of the nominal exchange rate as 
an anchor to stabilize the currency in these 
three countries from 1978 onward- and of 
structural reforms focusing on foreign 
trade and the liberalization of the capital 
account generated inconsistencies in 
economic policy and macroeconomic 
instability. Overly low exchange rates, 
high real interest rates and major shifts in 
the profitability of various economic 
activities undermined the quality of the 
banks' loan portfolios (ECLAC, 1984b; 
Corbo, de Melo and Tybout, 1985; Ramos, 
1986). 
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Table XII.2 
PROBLEMS RELATING TO BANK SOLVENCY IN LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN 
COUNTRIES OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES 
















1974- Liberalization of Fiscal deficit and Serious flaws. 
1981 interest rates and high inflation. Sta-
credit. Opening of bilization based on 
capital account. exchange rate 
(1978-1981). 
1974- Liberalization of Structural re- Serious flaws. 
1982 interest rates and forms and finan-
credit. cial adjustment of 
public sector. Sta-
bilization based 
on exchange rate 
( 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 2 ) . 
Heavy external 
indebtedness. 
1974- Liberalization of Misadjustment of Serious flaws 
1982 interest rates and trade balance. Sta-
credit. Opening of bilization based on 
capital account. exchange rate 
(1979-1982). 
1979- Sectoral credit Relatively stable Serious flaws. 
1982 limits. Cautious macroeconomic 
management of conditions, 
external borrow-
ing. 
1980- Sectoral credit Substantial fiscal Serious flaws. 
1989 allocation. Fixed deficit. Inflation-
interest rates. ary pressures. 
Financial crisis in High real interest 
banking system, rates. Exchange-
rate lag. 
W i d e s p r e a d High real interest 
banking crisis. rates. Exchange-
rate lag. 
Financial crisis in High real interest 
banking system, rates. Exchange-
rate lag. 
Financial crisis in Fragmented in-
banking system, terest-rate struc-
ture. 
Financial crisis in Financial repres-







1982- Sectoral credit Fiscal imbalance. Serious flaws. 
1990 limits and fixed Rising inflation, 
interest rates. 
Fianancial crisis Financial repres-
in unregulated sion in regulated 
financial sector, banks. High in-
terest rates in un-
regulated sector. 
1983- Gradual liberali- Stabilization and Substantial im- Financial crisis High real interest 
1987 zation of interest adjustment of provements in in unregulated fi- rates in unregu-
rates and credit, balance of pay- prudential regu- nance companies, lated financial 
ments. lation and super- sector, 
vision. 
1985- Liberalization of Stabilization and Serious flaws. 
1990 interest rates and structural adjust-




Isolated bank Decline in very 
failures. high real interest 
rates. 
1990- Liberalization of Stabilization and Defects in regu- Problems relating Slow decline in 
1992 interest rates and structural adjust- lations governing to solvency with- very high real in-
credit. ment following capital and re- in the banking terestrates. 
large fiscal deficits serves. system, 
ana hyperinfla-
tion. 
Source: ECLAC, Regulación, supervisión y estabilidad de las instituciones financieras y los mercados de capital en 
América Latina y el Caribe (LC/R.1358),  Santiago, Chile, December 1993. 
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Furthermore, these liberalization 
processes were pursued within banking 
systems that lacked proper solvency 
controls. In all three countries there was an 
explicit or implicit State guarantee on 
deposits and other obligations and serious 
shortcomings in the rules controlling 
exposure and reserve requirements. In 
Uruguay there were no minimum 
requirements (Banda, 1990); in Chile, loan 
portfolios did not begin to be rated on the 
basis of their level of risk until shortly 
before many banks' financial problems 
emerged in the early 1980s (Held and 
Szalachman, 1989); in Argentina, the 
banking system operated with virtually no 
supervision, and the rating of bank 
portfolios was not initiated until after the 
Government stepped in during the early 
1980s (Salama, 1991). 
In the Southern Cone countries, the 
banking systems' loan portfolios swelled 
at an abnormally rapid pace in relation to 
the increase in GDP and other aggregate 
indicators of economic activity. Five years 
after these countries had launched their 
financial liberalization programmes, 
credit continued to expand at rates from 
five to six times higher than the growth 
rate of GDP. This process was associated 
with a rapid rate of high-risk lending 
activity, i.e., loans to non-tradable 
activities (including real estate and 
speculative operations) financed largely 
with foreign debt, widespread rollovers of 
loans for which interest was compounded 
at high real rates (accruing interest that 
was never actually paid), and 
related-party loans for which very little 
real collateral was put up. 
Although it is difficult to evaluate the 
relative importance of macroeconomic 
instability versus shortcomings in 
solvency-oriented regulation and 
supervision, in the widespread financial 
crises that hit the Southern Cone countries 
in the early 1980s, there is no doubt that the 
latter factor played a major role. 
Significantly, in both Argentina and Chile, 
and, in part, in Uruguay as well, the 
banking systems' severe financial 
problems surfaced before the external debt 
crisis had brought about sharp downturns 
in these three countries' levels of economic 
activity.83 
The banking crisis that erupted in 
Colombia in the early 1980s illustrates 
how a banking system which is not subject 
to solvency controls can assume a high 
level of credit risk and suffer 
unsustainable capital losses even in a fairly 
stable macroeconomic environment and 
despite a conservative policy on external 
borrowing by banks. Bank loans exhibited 
a "bubble" in 1980-1981, when they shot 
up by over 40% in real terms. The 
widespread intervention in the banking 
system that began in 1982 demonstrated 
the undesirability of granting high-risk, 
related-party loans to conglomerates -for, 
among other purposes, buying stock in 
non-financial enterprises- and the part it 
played in this abnormal expansion. Credit 
limits and standards had been greatly 
exceeded, and the supervisory authority 
had lagged far behind in monitoring the 
quality of loan portfolios (Zuleta, 1990). 
The nationalization of the banks in El 
Salvador in 1980 and the Government's 
hefty deficit led to financial repression of 
the banking system during the 1980s. The 
allocation of credit was subject to sectoral 
directives and politically-influenced 
guidelines. Regulation and supervision 
focused on compliance with financial 
norms regarding interest rates, reserve 
requirements and mandatory bank 
investments. Since there was an implicit 
government guarantee covering bank 
deposits, the absence of concern about 
portfolio risk and insufficient levels of 
loan-loss provisioning and capital 
reserves placed this experience within the 
context of a banking system lacking in 
solvency safeguards. When the poor 
quality of bank portfolios was brought to 
light in 1989, it was found that losses 
equivalent to more than three times the 
83 The severe contraction in economic activity and the substantial devaluations brought on by the crisis 
also eroded the quality of the banks' loan portfolios. 
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banks' capital had been sustained (Belloso, 
1992). 
Financial repression became a 
significant factor in the Dominican 
Republic during the 1980s at a time when 
lax regulation and supervision had 
sparked the emergence of a flourishing 
unregulated financial sector. In fact, by 
1987 approximately 650 unregulated 
financial agents (investment houses and 
financial groups, building societies, 
leasing firms, credit card companies, etc.) 
were handling one-fourth as much credit 
and one-third as many deposits as the 
regulated banking system. The eruption of 
a financial crisis in 1989 pushed dozens of 
unregulated financial agents into 
bankruptcy and led to the failure of some 
regulated banks. Flaws in the system of 
prudential regulation and supervision 
were identified as being the main obstacle 
to the modernization of the Dominican 
Republic's financial system at the close of 
the 1980s (Guilliani and Aristy, 1991). 
Costa Rica adopted stabilization 
policies and economic reforms in 1983 in 
response to a severe balance-of-payments 
crisis and the declaration of a moratorium 
on the country's external debt payments in 
1981. The financial reform programme 
expanded the scope of the banks' 
involvement in credit allocation and 
deregulated interest rates in a three-step 
process designed to achieve positive yet 
moderate real interest rates within the 
supervised banking system. Progress was 
made in strengthening the prudential 
regulatory and supervisory system 
through the introduction of a rating 
system for bank loan portfolios, stricter 
rules on provisioning, and a set of 
performance indicators for banks which 
had to be disclosed to depositors and the 
general public. As part of these financial 
reforms, the establishment of "free", or 
unregulated, financial associations was 
also authorized. These associations soon 
grew in number and began to operate in 
higher-risk segments of tibe market at high 
real interest rates. The adoption of a tight 
monetary policy in late 1987 led to 
problems of illiquidity in the financial 
system that triggered the failure of all the 
unregulated financial associations. Not a 
single supervised bank failed as a result of 
this financial debacle, however (De Paula, 
1990; Diaz, 1991). 
Bolivia (1985) and Peru (1990) 
liberalized interest rates and credit in a 
context of considerable macroeconomic 
turbulence and severe stabilization and 
structural adjustment policies involving 
rapid price decontrol, an opening of the 
economy to external trade, and drastic 
fiscal adjustments. Uncertainty regarding 
the behaviour of prices sparked a sharp 
increase in interest rates. In Bolivia, real 
annual interest rates on bank loans 
amounted to about 100% in 1985, 40% in 
1987 and 20% in 1989-1990 (Afcha de la 
Parra, 1990), while in Peru the initial 
increase in interest rates was greater and 
their decline slower; in the first halves of 
1991, 1992 and 1993, real annual interest 
rates on bank loans were around 170%, 
50% and 35% respectively (Central 
Reserve Bank of Peru, 1993a). 
Interest rate trends and fluctuations in 
relative prices and in the profitability of 
economic activities caused by stabilization 
and macroeconomic adjustment policies 
appear to have been the main factors 
behind solvency-related problems in the 
banking systems of Bolivia and Peru. 
Flaws in solvency-oriented regulatory and 
supervisory systems have also 
contributed to such problems, however. 
The closure of four banks in Bolivia in 
1987 revealed the system's lack of proper 
solvency safeguards; specific shortcomings 
included insufficient limitations on 
exposure, excessive related-party lending, 
weak supervision and the existence of an 
implicit State guarantee on deposits. 
In Peru, prudential regulation has 
been considerably improved by the 
institution of a rating system for bank 
credit and the explicit limitation of State 
guarantees on deposits (1991) through the 
introduction of an insurance scheme 
affording limited coverage that is financed 
with premiums paid by the banks, along 
with the provision of information to the 
public regarding the quality of bank 
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portfolios (González Arrieta, 1992). The 
failure of a number of banks and mutual 
funds starting in 1991 depleted the 
insurance fund, and the State therefore 
had to cover the deficit. In March 1993, 
unpaid commercial bank loans 
represented 22% of such banks' credit 
portfolios, but their reserves amounted to 
only 12% (Central Reserve Bank of Peru, 
1993b). This situation clearly indicates an 
insufficient level of reserves. Another 
factor in the emerging problems with 
regard to solvency may have been a 
decline in the qualifications of the 
supervisory authority's technical staff due 
to deep cuts in public expenditure. 
b) Recent reforms  in bank regulation and 
supervision 
The above-mentioned cases of 
financial instability and the financial 
reform and liberalization policies being 
applied in many countries of the region 
have helped to strengthen their bank 
regulation and supervision systems, 
especially since the mid-1980s. 
Reforms in the area of prudential 
regulation and supervision have 
emphasized both the application of 
solvency controls by the supervisory 
authority and the importance of explicitly 
defining and limiting State guarantees and 
deposit insurance. The first course of 
action has led to the limitation of portfolio 
risk, especially the exposure associated 
with related-party credits; the rating of 
loan portfolios; the adoption of stricter 
rules on reserves in combination, in some 
cases, with the establishment of minimum 
capital requirements based on the level of 
risk associated with different categories of 
assets (such as those provided for in the 
Basel Accord); and the strengthening of 
the executive and technical capabilities of 
the supervisory agency.84 As for the 
second course of action, six of the nine 
countries included in the sample group 
covered in table XII.2 have opted for 
limited deposit guarantees, while another 
two have decided not to maintain any 
system of protection whatsoever (Comisión 
Nacional Bancaria de Mexico, 1993). 
These advances notwithstanding, in 
only a few countries have the reforms 
included the provision of public 
information on the banks' exposure and 
actual financial standing to depositors and 
other bank creditors. This raises some 
question as to the continued existence of 
an implicit State guarantee on deposits 
and other obligations. 
4. Prudential regulation and supervision 
of  pension funds  in Chile 
Towards the end of 1980, the Chilean 
authorities opted to replace the country's 
existing pay-as-you-go pension plans with 
an individual funded pension system. By 
the end of 1992, the pension funds' 
resources were equivalent to 34% of GDP 
and their portfolios included nearly 60% of 
the bonds issued by large companies and 
of mortgage bonds then in circulation and 
more than 20% of the total number of 
corporate shares which they were eligible 
to purchase. 
The rapid growth of these funds poses 
a formidable challenge; that challenge 
consists of finding a way to establish a 
sturdy institutional structure for the 
country's capital market so that those 
resources can be channelled to socially 
profitable uses via an array of financial 
institutions and instruments subject to 
strict prudential regulation and supervision. 
84 The Basel Accord is based on the assumption that a bank's sturdiness and safety depends mainly on 
the size of its capital base. The Accord assigns a weighted risk to each category of asset, as well as to 
items that do not figure in a bank's balance sheet; this risk weighting ranges from zero to 100%, 
depending on the relative level of credit risk, and is used for the purpose of setting capital standards. 
With a view to arriving at common minimum capital standards for a number of different countries, 
the Accord provided that the ratio between capital and off-balance-sheet items (converted into credit 
equivalents), weighted by their relative level of risk, was to be 8% by the end of 1992 (Cornford, 1993). 
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These regulations reflect the fact that 
the system calls for forced worker savings 
which will become those workers' chief 
source of income during their retirement 
years. The statutes governing the funds' 
portfolios stipulate that all bonds and 
securities must meet rigorous 
risk-evaluation standards and must carry 
high ratings; these portfolios must also be 
widely diversified in terms of both 
financial instruments and issuers, and the 
bonds and other securities they contain are 
subject to an ongoing appraisal at market 
prices and must be held in safe-keeping by 
the Central Bank. The equity capital of the 
pension-fund management boards (AFPs) is 
completely separate from that of the 
pension funds; an AFP may administer 
only one fund at a time and must 
guarantee a minimum return on the assets 
it manages. 
A bill is currently under 
consideration which would make major 
changes in the regulations applying to 
the capital market in response to the 
concentration of pension-fund 
investments in the stock of public utilities 
and the present shortage of financial 
instruments. Yet new types of institutional 
demands are already in the offing in such 
areas as the prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial conglomerates 
and overseas pension-fund investments 
(Arrau, 1994). 
The Chilean experiment with an 
individual funded pension system has 
awakened interest in other countries of the 
region. Peru introduced a similar system 
in 1992, and Argentina, Bolivia and 
Colombia are quite far along in the 
formulation of proposed reforms which 
also envisage funded systems as an option. 
In Brazil, El Salvador, Paraguay, 
Venezuela and other countries, studies are 
being carried out with a view to reforming 
the existing pension schemes. As in Chile, 
the results achieved by these new pension 
systems will hinge upon the institutional 
development of the relevant national 
capital markets, including effective 
measures of prudential regulation and 
supervision. 
5. Regulation of international 
portfolio investments 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number 
of countries in the region have gained a 
significant degree of access to foreign 
capital through international portfolio 
investment (see chapter IX). This has 
made more foreign exchange and external 
savings available to the recipient 
countries, thus paving the way for higher 
levels of economic activity, investment 
and growth. International portfolio 
investment also entails various forms of 
risk for the recipient country, however, 
with the nature of that risk being 
determined by the exposure of the foreign 
investors concerned. 
a) International portfolio  investment risk 
When investors purchase securities on 
international capital markets that have 
been issued by entities in other countries, 
they are exposed to the country risk of 
those issuers. 
Country risk involves a complex 
evaluation that takes the following factors 
into consideration: foreign-exchange risk, 
or the chance that foreign investors will 
not have access to foreign exchange for the 
remittance abroad of commitments in 
respect of capital, interest and profits; 
exchange risk, or the chance that the 
necessary hard currency will only be 
available at a substantially less favourable 
real rate of exchange than the going rate at 
the time the funds entered the country; 
price risk, or the chance that there will be 
an appreciable fall in the market value of 
the securities in which funds have been 
invested; and liquidity risk, or the chance 
of having to trade securities from local 
issuers at a very early date, thus incurring 
a sizeable loss of capital. 
These types of risk are assessed chiefly 
in terms of the relevant country's political 
and economic stability, the soundness of 
its economic and social policies, its growth 
prospects and the solvency of its financial 
system. 
REGULATION,  SUPERVISION  AND STABILITY  OF.. 281 
International rating agencies have 
recognized the progress made by the 
countries of the region in recent years in 
the areas of stabilization, trade 
liberalization and the development of 
national capital markets. Chile was given 
an investment-grade rating in 1992, while 
Mexico and Venezuela were assigned 
speculative-grade ratings, just one rung 
below an investment-grade classification 
(Harper, 1992). 
b) International portfolio  investment risk for 
the recipient country 
The benefits of an inflow of financial 
capital for the recipient country will 
depend mainly upon the volume and term 
of those flows and the extent to which they 
support the country's levels of economic 
activity and capital formation. Medium-
and long-term financial capital inflows 
will contribute to these objectives so long 
as they are in keeping with the capability 
of the recipient country's financial system 
to channel funds to socially profitable uses. 
Heavy inflows of primarily short-term 
and/or speculative capital, on the other 
hand, can jeopardize a country's macro-
economic stability and prospects for growth. 
The macroeconomic hazards 
associated with heavy inflows of financial 
capital can translate into the following 
principal impacts: i) currency appreciation 
which weakens a country's export effort 
(see chapter XI); ii) a wealth effect 
stemming from steeply rising prices for 
financial paper which boosts consumption 
and diminishes national saving; iii) 
external borrowing through the purchase 
of securities, which increases the level of 
country risk (and/or the credit risk of 
national issuers of securities), thus making 
it necessary to raise interest rates in order 
to keep external financial capital in the 
country and/or attract fresh flows of 
portfolio investment. 
In economies that have emerging 
securities markets and are making 
headway in improving their country-risk 
ratings, a number of factors can generate 
high profit expectations for international 
portfolio investment and may even 
overstimulate financial capital flows. One 
such factor is the existence of government 
guarantees on public debt paper, since 
they reduce and/or eliminate the issuer's 
credit risk. A second is the significant cost 
advantages of borrowing via the purchase 
of international securities, given existing 
differentials between national and 
international interest rates, such as those 
shown in table IX. 14 for the countries of 
the region for the period 1989-1993. In 
these cases, as indicated in table IX. 13, 
extraordinarily low short-term 
international interest rates (the 180-day 
LIBOR for dollar loans was only 3.9% in 
1992 and 3.4% in 1993) acted as an 
additional, if temporary, incentive for 
international portfolio investment. A third 
factor is the substantial undervaluation of 
share capital in the countries of the region 
and the consequently strong potential for 
realizing capital gains, as evidenced by the 
regional index of stock quotations in 
1990-1993 (see figure IX.l). 
As of late 1993, international capital 
markets had not perceived any risk of 
excessive holdings of securities issued by 
the countries of the region. Table IX.8 
shows that the yield on bonds floated by 
these countries declined in 1990-1993. 
However, the short terms of these 
securities and the volatility of short-term 
capital flows (see table IX. 18) indicate that 
events which lead to a deterioration in the 
country risk of the region's economies can 
lead to a turnaround in these yields (or 
interest rates). 
The equity capital of the countries in 
the region with emerging securities 
markets (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 
and Venezuela) soared by 320% in 
85 Low country-risk ratings are usually given to developed nations and securities markets, since such 
ratings reflect the simultaneous achievement of favourable conditions with regard to all the 
above-mentioned risk factors and the likelihood that no adverse changes will occur that would hurt 
foreign investors. 
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1986-1992 and by 170% in 1991 alone 
(measured in current dollars). In fact, the 
jump in these markets' capitalization in 
Mexico, Argentina and Chile bordered on 
the spectacular, with increases of 2,245% 
and 209%, 1,131% and 460%, and 660% 
and 104% during these two periods, 
respectively. And it was precisely in 1991 
-a year in which net inflows of foreign 
capital quadrupled in relation to the 
1983-1990 average- that stock indexes 
skyrocketed, as shown in figure XI. 1. 
The wealth effect associated with these 
price rises appears to be one of the reasons 
for the trends seen in consumption and 
saving in the region.86 As shown in table 
XI.l, consumption climbed by 0.8 points of 
GDP between 1983-1990 and 1991-1993 
(from an average of 76.1% to 76.9%) while 
national saving fell by 1.3 points of GDP 
between those same periods (from 15.8% 
to 14.5%). 
c) Prudential regulations oriented towards 
international portfolio  investment 
The arguments presented above 
underscore the importance of guarding 
against the following hazards when 
countries with emerging stock markets 
open their capital account up for 
international portfolio investment: 
i) An appreciation of the currency 
which would push the real exchange rate 
out of alignment with medium- and 
long-term conditions; 
ii) A stock-market bubble and wealth 
effect which could lead to a decrease in 
national saving; the subsequent drop in 
stock indexes could, in its turn, spur an 
outflow of financial capital as well as 
exerting downward pressure on the 
exchange rate (Akyiiz, 1993); and 
iii) An external debt overhang in 
stocks which might in some ways be 
similar to the external debt overhang in 
bank loans witnessed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s in various countries of the region. 
The prudential regulation of 
international portfolio investment can 
contribute to the policy approaches 
described in chapter XI by promoting an 
orderly, stable inflow of medium- and 
long-term external financial capital. The 
contents of a policy package having this 
objective are outlined in table XII.3. 
6. Conclusions and policy 
recommendations 
a) The experiences which the 
countries of the region have had over the 
past two decades with various types of 
financial policies demonstrate just how 
strongly prudential regulation and 
supervision influence the performance of 
financial institutions and capital markets. 
The regulation and supervision of 
banks, pension funds and other financial 
institutions and of access to external funds 
(including international portfolio 
investment) are important regardless of 
what type of financial policy is being 
implemented. The role of regulation and 
supervision is distinct and especially 
critical, however, in the context of financial 
liberalization policies (extensive 
deregulation of interest rates, the 
exchange rate and conditions for access to 
funds in the national and international 
markets). 
b) The severe financial troubles 
experienced by banks and credit 
institutions in a representative sample of 
countries in the region since the end of the 
1970s have in all cases stemmed from 
flaws in the system of prudential 
regulation and supervision. Simply 
deregulating financial variables within 
such a framework constitutes a policy of 
financial "decontrol" rather than one of 
financial liberalization. It is significant that 
cases can be identified in which banking 
systems not subject to solvency safeguards 
have generated or contributed to the 
86 The increased availability and lower prices of consumer goods resulting from trade liberalization 
measures are also a factor, as is the expansion of credit which typically occurs when financial 
liberalization programmes are implemented within the banking system. 
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Table XII.3 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS 
Objective of regulations Content of regulations 
To counteract any incentive to 
incur an external debt over-
hang through the issue of secu-
rities 
• Explicit elimination of State guarantees on bond sales conducted on 
international securities markets by private companies 
• Explicit definition and delimitation of State guarantees on bond sales 
on international securities markets conducted by firms in which the 
public sector has an interest 
To orient external equity debt 
towards medium- and long-
term securities 
- Requirement of express authorization by financial authorities for the 
sale of bonds and other debt paper by public institutions and firms 
to international portfolio investors 
- Facilitation of the sale of medium- and long-term bonds on interna-
tional markets by local companies, subject to the aforementioned 
conditions regarding guarantees. 
To avert the formation of stock 
market "bubbles" 
• Restrictions on short-term capital inflows being channelled towards 
stock and other securities markets and on speculative capital inflows 
(reserve requirements, taxes or bans) 
• Authorization of the sale of shares on international stock markets (via 
ADRs or the registration of issuers) only to local companies which 
meet exacting requirements of transparency and solvency 
- Granting of access to the domestic stock market to foreign investment 
funds or country funds only on a gradual basis 
Source: ECLAC, Regulación, supervisión y estabilidad de las instituciones financieras y los mercados de capital en 
América Latina y el Caribe (LC/R.1358),  Santiago, Chile, December 1993. 
outbreak of financial crises in economies 
pursuing a financial liberalization 
programme as well as in situations 
marked by financial repression and 
freely-operating financial institutions. Be 
that as it may, it has also frequently been 
the case that unstable macroeconomic 
environments and high real interest rates 
have themselves been the cause of 
solvency-related problems. 
c) The strengthening of the prudential 
regulation and supervision of the banking 
system in some countries of the region, 
primarily from the mid-1980s onwards, 
appears to be one of the main contributing 
factors to the financial stability exhibited 
by those banks and credit institutions 
since that time. 
Rating systems, reserve requirements 
and capital standards are the areas in 
which the greatest inroads have been 
made. Thus far, however, little 
information has been provided to 
depositors and the general public 
regarding the exposure and financial 
standing of banks and credit institutions. 
This has helped to perpetuate the idea that 
deposits and other obligations are covered 
by an implicit government guarantee in 
spite of the withdrawal or limitation of 
explicit guarantees. This highlights the 
importance of continuing to refine 
regulations that limit and control the 
exposure of financial institutions. 
d) The mobilization of contractual 
savings, mainly through individual 
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funded pension systems and insurance 
schemes covering specific types of risk 
(unemployment, disability, survivorship, 
etc.), constitutes an effective option for 
furthering the development of national 
securities markets. The speed with which 
pension schemes and other institutional 
investors are able to accumulate funds 
poses formidable challenges for the 
system of prudential regulation and 
supervision in terms of the introduction of 
an array of securities that will bolster real 
capital formation. 
e) Inflows of international portfolio 
investment capital presuppose the 
existence of a fairly well developed 
domestic securities market and of clear 
rules regarding access to the foreign 
exchange market. These capital inflows 
can contribute to the development of local 
securities markets and real capital 
formation provided they are motivated 
primarily by medium- and long-term 
factors. However, government guarantees 
on public debt paper, an interest rate spread 
that tilts the balance in favour of external 
borrowing and an undervaluation of 
equity capital in countries issuing 
securities that can be traded on international 
capital markets may overstimulate 
inflows of external financial capital and 
thus have adverse macroeconomic 
impacts (a sharp appreciation of the 
currency, a wealth effect and the 
substitution of national saving, and the risk 
of incurring an external debt overhang in 
securities). This constitutes grounds for the 
implementation of prudential regulations 
governing international portfolio 
investment as part of a broader policy 
designed to achieve stable inflows of 
medium- and long-term capital. 
f) Generally speaking, the more 
intensive a financial deregulation 
programme is, the greater the need to 
strengthen the prudential regulation and 
supervision of the system. This 
reinforcement is a part of the 
institution-building process in credit and 
capital markets and as such calls for a 
determined effort on the part of public 
authorities in the financial sector. 
Chapter XIII 
CAPITAL INFLOWS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS: RECAPITULATION 
S 
The region's return to international 
financial markets provides it with an 
opportunity to supplement domestic 
saving in order to meet the demands 
involved in changing production patterns 
with social equity. It is especially 
important for the region to promote 
investments that will enhance the 
competitiveness of its economies and the 
well-being of its population. 
International capital markets have 
grown dramatically since the mid-1960s. 
This expansion is, in part, reflected in the 
fact that the movement of funds in 
international foreign exchange markets 
currently averages nearly US$ 1 trillion 
per day. Thus, in a single day, total 
transactions exceed the annual GDP of 
many industrialized countries and 
amount to the equivalent of over one 
quarter of the annual value of world 
A Q7 
trade.87 
International capital movements are 
partly a reflection of growing economies, 
expanding world trade and the 
globalization of production; however, to a 
very large and increasing degree, they also 
are a manifestation of purely financial 
factors. In the 1960s, the growing presence 
of lightly-regulated offshore financial 
centres stimulated capital movements by 
enabling creditors and debtors alike to 
evade national financial regulations, 
capital controls and taxes. Then, in the 
1970s and 1980s, many countries began to 
deregulate their domestic financial sectors 
and to relax or eliminate regulations 
applying to foreign exchange transactions. 
This, combined with revolutionary 
technological advances in information 
management and telecommunications 
and the emergence of increasingly 
sophisticated techniques of financial 
engineering, has contributed to a 
spectacular increase in both national and 
international financial flows. 
It may be premature to speak of 
integrated financial markets, since 
international capital mobility is clearly far 
from perfect. Yet there is no doubt that the 
international circulation of capital and 
global financial integration are steadily on 
the rise. These developments have 
sparked controversy. At one extreme, 
there are those who see increasing 
integration as a sign of greater efficiency; 
according to their interpretation of events, 
markets are in the process of overcoming 
the financial repression characteristic of 
inefficient governments. At the other 
extreme, there are those who see the boom 
in capital flows as no more than a high-risk 
form of speculation that threatens national 
sovereignty. Of course, between these two 
87 Global exports totalled US$ 3.7 trillion in 1993 (IMF, 1994). 
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extremes there are various intermediate 
positions which recognize the significant 
potential advantages of greater 
international capital mobility, but are also 
concerned about issues such as the 
composition and terms of capital flows 
and the need to ensure that they are 
compatible with macroeconomic stability, 
investment, growth, social equity and 
national autonomy. Whether the 
achievement of all of these objectives will 
be facilitated or hindered by financial 
liberalization depends on how it is carried 
out. This, then, is an area in which the 
design of active economic policies has a 
central role to play. 
Recently, this controversy has 
assumed greater importance for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. It is true that, 
in the 1980s, the region's links with 
international capital markets were largely 
severed as a consequence of the massive 
debt crisis brought about by international 
commercial banks' permissive lending 
policies during the preceding decade. 
However, the region has witnessed a 
strong resurgence of capital inflows 
during the early 1990s. In fact, in 1992 and 
1993, average net capital inflows reached 
a record level of over US$ 63 billion a year 
(ECLAC, 1994d). One of the main benefits of 
these inflows has been a reduction of the 
severe external constraints that not only 
contributed to inflation and low 
investment levels but also brought on a 
severe economic recession in the region. 
Increased external saving -so long as it 
supplements national saving rather than 
taking its place- makes it possible to 
achieve a higher rate of investment and 
growth. Nevertheless, these inflows have 
also had an unwelcome effect on exchange 
rates, the degree of control over the money 
supply and aggregate demand, the price 
stability of financial assets, external 
liabilities and the region's vulnerability to 
further external shocks in the future. 
Financial markets play a number of 
important roles in development. For the 
countries of the region, active 
participation in international financial 
markets affords them the advantage of 
providing their economies with a means of 
attracting capital to activities that offer 
high rates of return in international terms. 
For investors, it offers a means of 
diversifying risk. Unfortunately, 
international financial markets are also the 
most imperfect markets in the economy. 
They have a long history of phases of 
burgeoning growth followed by 
contractions of varying severity 
(Kindleberger, 1978), and there are no 
compelling reasons to believe that these 
markets will not continue to exhibit this 
volatility in the future. 
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of 
the serious flaws affecting the operation of 
these markets is the virtual stagnation of 
international capital flows between the 
time of the Great Depression and the early 
1960s. Even when foreign capital inflows 
are maintained, an excessive percentage of 
that capital may be channeled towards 
short-term transactions. Moreover, 
adjustments in the volume and prices of 
flows can be sudden and unpredictable. 
From a public policy perspective, the 
ideal solution would be to separate the 
permanent components of capital inflows 
from the temporary ones. If the inflow of 
capital is of a permanent nature, then such 
related phenomena as an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, a widening of the 
deficit on current account and increased 
consumption could be interpreted as 
stabilizing adjustments and, hence, as 
economically sound developments. If, on 
the other hand, capital flows were 
temporary, the aforesaid movements in 
key variables would be distortionary, 
since they would create economic 
imbalances that would greatly increase the 
likelihood of disruptive adjustments in the 
future involving high social costs. This 
distinction is, of course, very difficult to 
make in practice. There are, however, 
certain types of economic policy measures 
which can have a differentiated impact on 
short- and long-term flows or on flows of 
productive as opposed to purely financial 
investment. 
The externalities and other serious 
imperfections of international capital 
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markets give rise, among other things, to 
frequent  cycles of  alternating abundance 
and shortages of  resources and to systemic 
crises; consequently, even potentially 
permanent flows  can evaporate overnight 
(Guttentag and Herring, 1984). 
Accordingly, it is always advisable for 
Governments to exercise caution where 
capital inflows  are concerned if  they are to 
succeed in fostering  a situation where the 
aggregate amount and main components 
of  such flows  are in keeping with 
macroeconomic stability, investment, and 
growth based on international 
competitiveness. If  the size and 
composition of  capital flows  are 
incompatible with these parameters, 
sooner or later their sustainability could be 
threatened, making it necessary to resort 
to compulsory, potentially destabilizing 
and socially costly national adjustments. 
In addition to this problem of  domestic 
absorptive capacity, consideration must 
also be given to the inherent risks of  any 
short-term external shock in international 
financial  markets. 
Since capital flows  can affect,  and are 
affected  by, national economic variables, 
Governments should exercise caution on 
two fronts.  First, they need to forestall  any 
situation in which capital inflows  would 
create atypical values or major distortions 
in key national economic indicators, such 
as real exchange rates, domestic interest 
rates, sectoral and national indebtedness, 
inflation  (including asset prices), 
consumption, investment and the 
production of  tradables. 
Second, Governments should guard 
against using external capital flows  as the 
mainstay for  efforts  to achieve a rigid or 
extreme target for  a single domestic 
economic variable (e.g., inflation), 
especially over a prolonged period of  time. 
By doing so, they would run the risk of 
achieving their objective at the cost of 
throwing other important variables out of 
balance, thereby impairing the very 
instrument they tried to use in the first 
place, namely, external capital inflows. 
Capital flows  are not always 
compatible with the objectives of 
macroeconomic stability in a broad sense, 
sustained economic growth or social 
equity. A degree of  direct or indirect 
public "management" aimed at 
influencing  the volume and composition 
of  these flows  is therefore  justified.  There 
have been numerous cases in which such 
an approach has been taken -successfully 
and unsuccessfully-  in the past. The extent 
to which the capital account should be 
opened may vary over time, depending on 
short-term domestic and international 
conditions and the stage and demands of 
the development process. 
In order to maintain a stable real 
exchange rate, the speed at which the 
capital account is opened should be 
tailored to fit  the economy's capacity to 
absorb and efficiently  allocate external 
resources. For instance, a distinction might 
be drawn between capital inflows  and 
outflows  (Williamson, 1992). It may be 
desirable to liberalize long-term capital 
inflows  first,  before  facilitating  short-term 
financial  transactions. In the case of  capital 
outflows,  it may be advisable to give 
priority to credits for  export promotion 
and to direct overseas investments by 
national firms,  which would also be 
another way of  improving such firms' 
export platform. 
The liberalization of  the capital 
account in industrialized countries has 
been a fairly  slow and gradual process 
whose pace has accelerated only in the 
past 10 years as the globalization of  capital 
markets has proceeded. However, it is 
interesting to note that Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland introduced certain restrictions 
on capital movements in 1992 in an effort 
to combat exchange rate instability. Once 
their objectives in this regard were 
achieved, the restrictions were lifted.  This 
highlights the importance of  having 
flexible  instruments which, when 
circumstances so warrant, allow 
temporary constraints to be imposed on 
capital movements in order to support 
efforts  to promote macroeconomic 
stability. 
In times of  scarcity, there may be 
sound reasons for  seeking out both 
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specific  and more general ways of 
attracting capital inflows  and for  using 
some means of  screening capital outflows. 
Just the opposite would be true in cases 
where there is clearly an abundance of 
capital in a country's markets; it would 
then be a question of  restricting certain 
types of  inflows  while promoting channels 
for  capital outflows. 
Using special instruments to regulate 
capital flows  obviously entails some costs. 
However, experience has shown that 
always allowing the market to determine 
the volume and composition of  such flows 
may also have major costs.88 No single 
instrument, or set of  instruments, works 
perfectly  or with complete efficiency;  in an 
imperfect  world, instruments must be 
judged by their overall results. Thus, 
pragmatic use must be made of  the policy 
instruments that offer  the greatest net 
benefits  in terms of  macroeconomic 
stability and growth, while minimizing 
their costs. 
The inflow  of  capital has done away 
with the external constraints on growth 
and offers  an opportunity to obtain 
financing  both for  reactivating the region's 
economies and for  making the 
investments necessary for  sustained and 
sustainable growth. In order to seize this 
opportunity, action must be taken in 
regard to two aspects of  financial  policy: 
i) its interaction with macroeconomic 
policy, with a view to engendering a stable 
economic environment that offers  suitable 
incentives for  economic agents: and ii) its 
interaction with domestic capital markets, 
with a view to supplementing national 
saving efforts  and matching them up with 
investment needs. 
Promoting a strategy of  changing 
production patterns with social equity 
necessarily entails, at a strictly 
macroeconomic level, an effort  to manage 
aggregate demand and its composition. 
The instruments available for  this purpose 
are fiscal,  income, monetary and exchange 
policies. In the absence of  active fiscal  and 
income policies, the only means of 
achieving this objective is through the 
simultaneous control of  the real interest 
rate (as a monetary policy tool for 
purposes of  stabilization and the control of 
aggregate domestic expenditure) and the 
real exchange rate (as a trade policy tool 
for  purposes of  promoting the growth of 
tradables production and influencing  the 
composition of  aggregate expenditure). 
A conflict  arises, however, when the 
level of  the domestic interest rate that is in 
keeping with the objective of  curbing 
inflation  and stabilizing economic activity 
(by sterilizing the monetary effects  of  the 
build-up in reserves) is higher than the 
international rate (once the latter has been 
adjusted for  expectations of  devaluation), 
since this spurs the inflow  of  capital and 
heightens the appreciation of  the currency, 
thereby jeopardizing the objective of 
protecting the tradables sector of  the 
economy. If,  on the other hand, real 
domestic interest rates are allowed to fall, 
then both objectives may be thwarted, 
since the higher expenditure prompted by 
lower interest rates will put pressure on 
prices and rapidly widen the current 
account deficit,  thus posing the danger of 
an unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalance. The way to resolve this conflict 
is to take direct or indirect action on capital 
flows,  as some Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have been doing in 
the 1990s. 
When the authorities are faced  with an 
unexpected abundance of  external finance 
which they consider to be partly of  a 
temporary nature or which is flowing  too 
fast  for  the economy to absorb, they can 
intervene at three decision-making levels. 
At the first  level, they can act to moderate 
the inflow's  impact on the exchange rate 
by having the Central Bank buy up foreign 
exchange (which will push up the level of 
reserves). At the second level, they can 
adopt sterilization policies to mitigate the 
monetary impact of  the increase in 
reserves caused by intervention at the first 
88 During the 1970s, most Latin American countries let the market determine the volume and terms of 
external credit; the adverse consequences of this course of action are well known by all. 
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level. At the third level, they can use 
incentives, surcharges or quantitative 
controls to influence  the composition and 
volume of  capital inflows;  the aim here 
would be to encourage a volume of  flow 
that is compatible with the economy's 
domestic absorptive capacity and to 
channel those funds  into productive 
investment projects while discouraging 
the entry of  short-term speculative capital. 
Some Governments have chosen an 
approach referred  to as non-sterilized 
intervention, meaning that they intervene 
at the first  level by having the Central Bank 
buy up foreign  exchange, but refrain  from 
sterilizing the resulting monetary effect.  If 
this option is combined with the 
liberalization of  capital movements in a 
situation where the Government is 
committed to holding the nominal 
exchange rate to a predetermined rate of 
variation, then the authorities may lose 
control over monetary aggregates. 
Another option, known as sterilized 
intervention, broadens the scope of  action 
of  the first  alternative by offsetting  the 
monetary impact of  the accumulation of 
reserves by means of  active measures to 
regulate the money supply. This is 
intended to keep the real exchange rate 
within a desirable range in terms of 
medium- and long-term objectives. 
Most countries in the region have at 
some point opted for  sterilized 
intervention and have had to deal with 
serious conflicts  between their exchange 
and monetary policies. In order to ease 
those conflicts,  they have used 
supplementary measures, such as 
providing for  a degree of  flexibility  in 
fiscal  policy in order to regulate aggregate 
demand; establishing stabilization funds 
for  their main export products to cushion 
shocks in their price cycles (as in the case 
of  Chilean copper and Colombian coffee); 
and using income policies to adjust 
relative factor  prices to changes in 
productivity. 
As mentioned earlier, when fiscal 
policy makers do not have sufficiently 
flexible  instruments at their command, 
then monetary policy (interest rates) and 
exchange policy (exchange rates) are the 
only means of  controlling aggregate 
demand. To resolve the conflicts  that may 
arise in terms of  the simultaneous 
management of  these two variables, the 
authorities have the option of  intervening 
at the third level by adopting measures 
intended to change the volume and 
composition of  capital flows;  the aim here 
would be to give priority to long-term 
flows  through the use of  incentives 
(reserve requirements or taxes, and 
exchange rate measures that generate 
greater uncertainty for  short-term capital 
flows)  or quantitative controls. 
Direct quantitative controls include 
such measures as compulsory minimum 
maturity periods; minimum volumes for 
bond issues; and regulations regarding the 
involvement of  foreign  capital in the stock 
market. 
In the area of  exchange management, 
the aim is not only to dampen the tendency 
towards a real appreciation of  the currency 
but also to discourage international 
interest-rate arbitrage, particularly by 
raising the level of  uncertainty 
surrounding short-term price trends for 
hard currencies through the use of 
mechanisms which permit a greater 
degree of  intervention. For example, one 
option is to implement a "dirty" float 
within a pre-established band using a 
benchmark value for  the dollar based on 
market conditions in the relevant 
country's trading partners. 
Under the current circumstances of  an 
abundant supply of  external funds  and 
what are still comparatively low 
international interest rates, third-level 
intervention policies -as well as sterilized 
intervention- act on monetary aggregates 
to prevent overspending on the part of  the 
private or public sector by forestalling 
artificial,  temporary increases in domestic 
expenditure which could cause steep 
decreases in national saving and excessive 
increases in external liabilities unmatched 
by a corresponding increase in the 
production capacity for  tradables. 
The extent to which foreign  capital 
flows  can further  the aims of  a strategy for 
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changing production patterns with social 
equity largely depends on the 
characteristics of  the relevant domestic 
financial  markets. This observation is 
based on the experience of  the external 
debt crisis, which was caused by heavy 
inflows  of  foreign  bank credit. 
The reorganization of  a country's 
financial  system (including the 
liberalization of  capital movements) 
should give priority to channelling 
resources into savings and investment, 
and should do so in close coordination 
with the development of  production 
capacity. Closer attention needs to be paid 
to the relationship between the financial 
system and national saving and 
investment processes, and between the 
financial  system and external financial 
markets. The present situation is clearly 
unsatisfactory,  since too small a 
percentage of  the increase in capital 
inflows  has been used to bolster the 
region's productive investment levels in 
recent years. 
Where the relationship between 
financial  markets and capital formation 
for  development is concerned, an 
institutional framework  is needed that 
will complete or refine  those markets on 
the basis of  three criteria. The first  is that a 
segment of  the dynamic, long-term 
financial  market must be included in order 
to provide financing  for  production 
projects. This means that speculative 
segments must be discouraged and that 
attention should be concentrated on 
long-term international capital, together 
with access to technology and export 
markets. Capital inflows  that take the form 
of  foreign  direct investment in the region 
are an important factor  in this regard when 
the nature of  that investment makes a 
genuine contribution to the creation of 
additional production capacity. 
The second criterion is that the 
institutional framework  must promote 
access to financing  for  small and 
medium-sized firms  that are suffering 
from  the effects  of  the capital market's 
segmentation. To that end, this market 
must operate on the basis of  a number of 
selective criteria that reflect  the needs of 
small production firms  in the areas of 
training, development promotion and 
modernization. Credit institutions and 
guarantee mechanisms are needed to 
accomplish what the region's capital 
markets have failed  to do spontaneously. 
The aim is not to subsidize the cost of 
credit, but to promote access to financing 
at normal interest rates, as well as access 
to technology, inputs and services, 
marketing channels, long-term financing 
and infrastructure  that will enhance the 
production capacity of  these sectors of  the 
population. 
The third criterion is based on a 
recognition of  the fact  that when a country 
with an emerging market pursues a 
financial  liberalization programme that 
opens up the capital account to 
international portfolio  investment, it runs 
the risk of  overborrowing from  external 
sources and excessive fluctuations  in the 
stock market and the exchange rate. 
Large-scale inflows  of  foreign  capital to 
domestic markets can trigger 
stock-market bubbles and a decrease in the 
exchange rate at one and the same time. 
The subsequent decline in stock market 
quotations can, in turn, prompt capital 
outflows  and push up the exchange rate. 
Hence the need to regulate and supervise 
financial  institutions operating in such 
capital markets in order to ensure their 
stability. 
Concern about such financial-market 
risks as the generation of  speculative 
bubbles, perverse selection and moral 
hazard has underscored the need to 
introduce regulatory and supervisory 
mechanisms to ensure the stability of  the 
financial  institutions operating in capital 
markets. Such mechanisms are particularly 
necessary in open, free-market  economies. 
By contrast with what took place during 
the debt crisis, when the prudential and 
financial  regulatory apparatus was 
weakened, the reinforcement  of  that 
apparatus can counter the above risks and 
help make the attraction of  overseas 
portfolio  investments a more orderly and 
stable process. 
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In short, the region's economies can 
take better advantage of  the opportunity 
afforded  by access to international 
financial  markets if  their domestic 
economic policies manage to achieve the 
following  three objectives: 
i) To ensure stable access to foreign 
capital flows  while making sure that such 
flows  do not contribute to distortions in 
key economic variables such as the 
exchange rate and interest rates. The 
exchange rate should be maintained at a 
level that will stimulate the international 
competitiveness of  the production 
apparatus, while real interest rates should 
be kept relatively low -but not so low as to 
generate an excessive level of  aggregate 
demand- in order to encourage private 
national investment, reduce the risk of 
insolvency in the financial  system and 
forestall  macroeconomic distortions. A 
number of  countries in the region have 
opted for  simultaneous intervention in the 
foreign  exchange and money markets in 
conjunction with such measures as the 
establishment of  reserve requirements and 
taxes and other disincentives for 
short-term capital movements. 
ii) To seek to ensure that a large 
proportion of  funds  are channelled into 
efficient  investments which will enhance 
the international competitiveness of  the 
region's economies. In order to make this 
possible, the absorption of  those resources 
should take place within the framework  of 
an export promotion policy which is based 
on a realistic, stable exchange rate in keeping 
with medium-term economic conditions and 
which is bolstered by a sufficient  pace of 
technological and human resources 
development. This will enable the economy 
to generate sufficient  external resources to 
stave off  any future  debt crises. To this 
end, the region would be well advised to 
strengthen its financial  markets by further 
developing their long-term segment and 
reducing their segmentation so that these 
markets' allocation of  resources will truly 
be based on a cost-benefit  analysis of  such 
investment projects. 
iii) To step up the supervision and 
regulation of  financial  institutions 
(particularly of  a prudential nature) to 
ensure that the increase in assets and 
liabilities generated by external flows  does 
not endanger their future  solvency. 
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